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PREFACE.
The Negotiable Instruments Law was enacted by the
Legislature of Michigan at its 1905 session and on this
16th day of September, 1905, becomes a law of the State.
Soon after the approval of the Act—June 16, 1905,—I
undertook the work of annotating the statute and of ex
plaining its origin, scope and purpose in such particu
lars as seemed to invite explanation.
It has been my purpose to point out what changes the
Statute has made in existing law, to what extent and
how it and the Bills of Exchange Act upon which it is
modeled have been construed by the courts, and wherein
it has settled the law and removed conflict in the authori
ties. To these ends, I have cited under the several
propositions of the statute the Michigan cases pertaining
to the particular proposition and such English, Federal
and other state cases as seemed to me good illustrations
or clear explanations of the proposition involved and
every case which has arisen under this statute and under
the Bills of Exchange Act tending in any way to explain,
illustrate or construe the statutory provision or to eluci
date the general proposition covered thereby.
I submit the result of my work—undertaken in the
hope that it might help the profession and the bankers
and business men in dealing with this statute—to all who
*
iii
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may find occasion to make use of it
,
with regret, however,
that the time available for its completion was neces
sarily so limited and with the assurance that I could not
have done it at all within the stipulated time but for the
energetic, efficient and intelligent aid o
f
Mr. Oscar E
.
Waer o
f
the Law Department o
f
the University o
f Michi
gan, whose assistance in this behalf I most gratefully
acknowledge.
I crave the courteous indulgence of all who may have
occasion to consult these pages in attributing something
o
f
whatever o
f
fault may be found in the plan and exe
cution o
f
this work to the enforced hurry o
f
its prepa
ration.
ROB'T E. BUNKER.
Ann Arbor, Michigan,
September 16, 1905.
THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
TITLE I. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN GENERAL.
Article.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
W.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
Form and interpretation.
Consideration.
Negotiation.
Rights of holder.
Liabilities of parties.
Presentment for payment.
Notice of dishonor.
Discharge of negotiable instruments.
TITLE II. BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
Article.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
W.
VI.
VII.
TITLE III.
Form and interpretation.
Acceptance.
Presentment for acceptance.
Protest.
Acceptance for honor.
Payment for honor.
Bills in a set.
PROMISSORY NOTES AND CHECKS.
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THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.
INTRODUCTION.
The negotiable instruments law.—The Negotiable In
struments Law is the name applied to a statute now en
acted, in terms and in language almost identical, in twen
ty-nine States and the District of Columbia, the primary
purpose of which is to make the law relating to nego
tiable instruments uniform throughout the United
States. Uniformity could not be secured without codifi
cation; therefore the negotiable instruments law is a
codification of existing law.
1—States having adopted the Kansas: enacted 1905.
negotiable instruments law: Kentucky; Laws of 1904, chap.
Arizona; Revised Statutes 1901, 102, approved March 24, 1904.
title xlix, 3304, 3491. In effect Louisiana; enacted 1905.
September 1, 1901. Maryland; Laws of 1898, chap,
Colorado; Laws of 1897, chap. 119, approved March 29, 1898.
64, approved April 20, 1897. Massachusetts; Laws of 1898,
Connecticut; Laws of 1897, chap. 533, in effect January 1,
chap. 74, approved April 5, 1897. 1899. Laws of 1899, chap. 130,
District of Columbia; U. S. in effect March 6, 1899.
Stats., 1899, chap. 47, approved Michigan; approved June 16,
January 12, 1899. 1905.
Florida; Laws of 1897, chap. Missouri; enacted 1905.
4524, approved June 1, 1897. Montana; Laws of 1903, chap.
Idaho; Laws of 1903, Sen. Bill 121, approved March 7, 1903.
86. Nebraska; Laws of 1905, chap.
Iowa; Laws of 1902, chap. 130, 83, in effect August 1, 1905.
approved April 12, 1901.
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The Statute of Michigan, printed in the following
pages, is
,
in all respects, save in designation o
f
divisions
o
f
the subject, in omission o
f
heads to sections, and
o
f
an immaterial clause in section 72, an exact copy o
f
the New York statute, the first negotiable instruments
law enacted.
The negotiable instruments law emanated directly
from the American Bar Association, but its enactment
was indirectly induced by the English Bills of Ex
change Act, o
f 1882, upon which it is modeled in sub
stance and in form.
The desirability, if not the absolute necessity, of uni
form laws relating to commercial paper had long been
apparent to lawyers and laymen. The situation in
duced by conflicting decisions and statutes embarrassed
business and interrupted that free circulation o
f
com
mercial paper which is its distinguishing characteristic.
New Jersey: Laws of 1902, Tennessee; Laws o
f
1899, chap.
chap. 184, approved April 4, 1902.
New York; Laws of 1897, chap.
612, in effect May 19, 1897; 1898,
chap. 336, in effect April 26,
1898.
North Carolina; Laws of 1899,
chap. 733, in effect March 28,
1899.
North Dakota; Laws of 1899,
approved March 7
,
1899.
Ohio; Laws o
f
1902, Sen. Bill
10, in effect January 1
,
1903.
Oregon; Laws o
f 1899, Sen. Bill
27, approved Feb. 16, 1899.
Pennsylvania; Laws of 1901,
chap. 162, approved May 16, 1901.
Rhode Island; Laws o
f 1899,
chap. 674, in effect July 1
,
1899.
94, in effect May 15, 1899.
Utah; Laws of 1899, chap. 83,
in effect July 1, 1899.
Virginia; Laws o
f
1897-8, chap.
866, approved March 29, 1898.
Washington; Laws of 1899,
chap. 149, in effect March 22,
1899.
Wisconsin; Laws of 1899, chap.
356, in effect May 15, 1899.
Wyoming; Laws of 1905, chap.
43.
The bill was introduced but
failed to pass in the following
States: Arkansas, Indiana, New
Hampshire, South Carolina, South
Dakota and Vermont. The bill
has been introduced and is pend
ing in Georgia.
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What was a promissory note in one State was a simple
contract in another. What was a contract of an in
dorser in New York was a contract of a maker in
Michigan, or of a guarantor or indorser or maker in
Vermont, as oral proof of the circumstances attending
the making of the contract might determine. What was
an indorsement in one jurisdiction was only an assign
ment in another. The maturity of the obligation, in the
absence of special stipulation in the instrument, fell
upon one day in one State, and upon a different day in
another State, if one State had abolished the grace of
the law merchant and the other had not. Time of
presentment and demand, protest and notice of dis
honor was rendered confusing, if not uncertain. Paper
payable on demand or at sight created the same obliga
tion in one State and a different obligation in another,
according to whether grace had been abolished or pre
served.
At the suggestion of the American Bar Association,
and through its coöperation, commissioners for the pro
motion of uniformity of legislation in the United States
were from time to time appointed by the several States.
In 1895 twenty-seven States had appointed such com
missioners, and in August of that year the commis
sioners met in conference at Detroit, Michigan, nine
teen States being represented in the conference. At
that conference a resolution was adopted requesting the
committee on commercial law to procure, as soon as
practicable, a draft of a bill relating to commercial
paper, based on the English statute on that subject and
on such other sources of information as the committee
might deem proper to consult. The matter was re
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ferred to a sub-committee consisting of Lyman D. Brew
ster, of Connecticut, Henry C. Willcox, of New York,
and Frank Bergen, of New Jersey. The sub-committee
employed Mr. John J. Crawford of New York, who had
made a special study of the law relating to commercial
paper, to make a draft of the proposed law. The draft
was prepared by Mr. Crawford and submitted to the
conference of commissioners which met at Saratoga in
August, 1896. The commissioners in attendance, being
twenty-seven in all and representing fourteen different
States, went over the draft, section by section, making
amendments therein, most of which were changes in the
existing law which Mr. Crawford had not felt at liberty
to incorporate into the original draft. The bill as thus
amended was subsequently enacted as the statute of
New York, and has since been enacted and is now the
law in two-thirds of the States of the Union. The bill
has been introduced in other states but has failed of
passage for reasons which do not appear.” This statute
presents within narrow compass the law of negotiable
bills of exchange, promissory notes and checks. It is
the result of two purposes; the first and controlling pur
pose was to make the law uniform, and whatever
changes were necessary to be made to accomplish that
purpose were accordingly made. The second purpose
was to preserve the law as nearly as possible as it then
existed. The work was committed to competent and
experienced persons, well versed in the law relating to
2—See note 1. Preface to Crawford's Anno
Report of commissioners on uni- tated Negotiable Instruments
formity of laws to the Senate of Law, New York, 1st ed.
New Jersey, session of 1896.
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the subject. They were aided by the able work of those
to whom had been entrusted the preparation of the
Bills of Exchange Act. These facts are a guaranty
that we have in the negotiable instruments law the
legislative expression of the law theretofore determined
by the courts, through a long series of years and in a
multitude of decisions, barring, of course, those con
flicting decisions and diverse statutes which had led to
embarrassment and confusion in the administration of
the law of commercial paper. It may be said probably
without serious question that in the enactment of this
statute no essential feature of the law of negotiable in
struments as theretofore determined has been eliminated.
What business needs is fixed and uniform rules to
govern commercial paper. Such rules are now to be
found in the negotiable instruments law.
The bills of exchange act.—In 1882 the British Par
liament passed an act entitled “An Act to codify the
law relating to Bills of Exchange, Cheques, and Prom
issory Notes;” better known by its authorized short
title as the “Bills of Exchange Act, 1882.” This act
is with certain exceptions declaratory of the common
law of England, or rather of the Law Merchant, as ex
pounded by the authority of English law. The bill
was drawn by Judge Chalmers, author of the excellent
Digest of the law of bills, notes and checks, an ac
knowledged expert on the subject, and submitted to rec
ognized authorities on English commercial law and
practice and finally settled by strong committees in
3–See Bills of Exchange Act, of Bills of Exchange, Prom
page 235. issory Notes, and Cheques.
4—Chalmers' Digest of the Law
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Parliament. And so the act may be regarded for the
main part and so far as the propositions contained in
it are directly applicable as an authoritative declara
tion, under the sanction of the Legislature, of the Eng
lish law.” The act was not intended to be merely a code
of existing law.
the law in some respects."
5–See English Ruling Cases,
vol. 4, p. 132.
6–Bank of England V. Vag
liano (1891), App. Cas. 144. See
Introduction to 3rd ed. ChalmerS'
Bills of Exchange, from which
the following extract is taken in
explanation of the purpose, mode
of preparation, and enactment of
the Statute.
“For the most part the propo
Sitions of the act Were taken
word for word, from the propo
sitions of the Digest. The Bills
of Exchange Act, 1882, was the
first enactment codifying any
branch of the common law which
found its way into the statute
book. * * ***
The success of the Bills of
Exchange bill depended on the
wise lines laid down by Lord
Herschell. He insisted that the
bill should be introduced in a
form which did nothing more
than codify the existing law, and
that all amendments should be
left to Parliament. A bill which
merely improves the form with
out altering the Substance of the
law creates no opposition, and
gives very little room for contro
Versy. Of course codification pure
and simple is an impossibility.
It was designed to alter and did alter
The act has been adopted
The draftsman comes across doubt
ful points of law which he must
decide one way or the other.
Again, voluminous though our
case law is, there are occasional
gaps which a codifying bill must
bridge over if it aims at any
thing like completeness. Still in
drafting the Bill of Exchange
bill my aim Was to reproduce as
exactly as possible the existing
law, whether it seemed good, bad
Or indifferent in its effects. The
idea of codifying the law of ne
gotiable instruments was first
suggested to me by Sir Fitz
James Stephen’s Digest of the
Law of Evidence, and Sir F. Pol
lock's Digest of the Law of Part
nership. Bills, notes and cheques
Seemed to form a Well isolated
Subject, and I therefore set to
Work to prepare a digest of the
law relating to them. I found
that the law was contained in
Some twenty-five hundred cases,
and seventeen statutory enact
ments. I read through the whole
of the decisions, beginning with
the first reported case, 1603. But
the cases on the subject were
comparatively few and unimport
ant until the time of Lord Mans
field. The general principles of
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by two-thirds of the total number of the various colo
nies and dependencies of the British Empire and by
all the most important of them, but not without changes
the law were then settled, and
Subsequent decisions, though Very
numerous, have been for the most
part illustrations of, or deduc
tions from, the general proposi
tions then laid down. On some
points there was a curious dearth
of authority. As regards such
points I had recourse to Ameri
can decisions and to inquiry as
to the usages among bankers and
merchantS. As the result, a
good many propositions in the
Digest, even on points of fre
quent occurrence, had to be stated
with a (“probably”) or a (“per
haps”). Some two years after the
publication of my digest I read
a paper on the question of codify
ing the law of negotiable instru
ments before the Institute of
Bankers. Mr. John Hollams, the
well known commercial lawyer,
who was present, pointed out the
advantages of a code to the mer
cantile community, and mainly, I
think, on his advice, I received
instructions from the Institute
of Bankers and the Associated
Chambers of Commerce to pre
pare a bill on the subject. The
draft of the bill was first Sub
mitted to a sub-committee of the
Council of the Institute of Bank
ers, who carefully tested such
portions of it as dealt with mat
ters of usage uncovered by au
thority. The bill was then intro
duced by Sir John Lubbock, the
president of the Institute. After
it had been read a second time
in the Commons it was referred
to a Strong Select committee of
merchants, bankers and lawyers,
With Sir Farrer Herschell as
chairman. As the Scotch law
of negotiable instruments differed
in certain particulars from Eng
lish law, the bill was originally
drafted to apply to England and
Ireland only. The first work of
the select committee was to take
the evidence of Sheriff Dove-Wil
Son, Of Aberdeen, a Well known
authority on Scotch commercial
law. He pointed out the partic
ulars in which the bill, if ap
plied to Scotland, would alter the
law there. With three exceptions
the points of difference were in
Significant. The committee there
upon resolved to apply the bill
to Scotland, and Sheriff Dove-Wil
Son undertook the drafting of the
necessary amendments. Eventu
ally the Scotch rules were in
three cases preserved as to Scot
land, while on the other points
the Scotch rule was either adopt
ed for England or the English
rule applied to Scotland. A few
amendments in the law were
made when the Committee was
unanimous in their favor, but
Very wisely no amendments were
pressed on which there was a dif
ference of opinion. Sir Farrer
Herschell reported the bill to the
House and it was read a third
time and sent up to the Lords
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which, though trifling in themselves, are destructive of
complete uniformity."
Continental codes.—The law of bills, notes and
checks has been codified in most of the continental
countries. The French code (code de commerce 1807,
1818) was enacted nearly a century ago, and no sub
stantial alteration has been made in it by subsequent
legislation. The German General Exchange Law was
adopted in 1849, and slightly modified in 1869. It is
an international and not merely a national code. All
the German states including Austria have adopted it
and the terms of its adoption are that each State is at
liberty to supplement it by additional laws of its own,
but such laws are not in any way to override it
.
Other
continental codes have been modeled upon either the
French Code de Commerce or the German General Ex
change Law, the later tendency being to follow the
German code in preference to the French.”
In the first half of the eighteenth century the law or
practice o
f England and France was uniform on the
subject o
f
bills o
f exchange. The French law was then
embodied in the code “Ordonnance de 1673,” which
was amplified but substantially adopted by the “Code
de Commerce,” o
f
1818. Its development was thus ar
rested and it remains in substance what it was two
without alteration. In the House were there inserted, mainly at
of Lords it was again referred Lord Bramwell's suggestion. These
to a select committee, with Lord were agreed to by the Commons,
Bramwell for chairman. (The and the bill passed without oppo
committee included the Lord Chan- Sition.
cellor (Selborne), Lord Bram- 7-Jurid. Rev., vol. 8
,
329. Ar
well, Lord Fitzgerald, Lord Bal- ticle by J. Dove Wilson.
four of Burleigh, and Lord Wol- 8-Introduction to Chalmers'
verton.) A few amendments Bills of Exchange, 3rd ed., supra.
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hundred years ago. English law has been developed
piecemeal by judicial decisions founded on custom. The
result has been to work out a theory of bills widely dif
ferent from the original. The English theory may be
called the Banking or Currency theory as opposed to
the French or Mercantile theory. A bill of exchange in
its origin was an instrument by which a trade debt
due in one place was transferred in another. The
French law keeps this theory steadily in view. The
English law has developed bills into a perfectly flexible
paper currency. In France a bill represents a trade
transaction; in England it is merely an instrument of
credit. English law gives full play to the system of
accommodation paper. French law endeavors to stamp
it out. In England it is not necessary to express on
the bill that value has been given. The law raises a
presumption to that effect. In France the nature and
value must be expressed and a false statement of value
avoids the bill in the hands of all parties with notice.
In England a bill may be drawn and payable in the
same place; in France the place where the bill is drawn
must be so far distant from the place where it is pay
able that there may be a possible rate of exchange be
tween the two. In England a bill may now be drawn
payable to bearer, though formerly it was otherwise;"
in France it must be payable to order. In England a
bill originally payable to order becomes payable to
bearer when indorsed in blank; in France an indorse
ment in blank merely operates as a procuration. In
England, if a bill be refused acceptance, a right of
9–Hodges v. Steward, 12 Mod. 36 (1692.)
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action at once accrues to the holder; in France no cause
of action arises unless the bill is again dishonored at
maturity. The holder in the meantime is only entitled
to demand security from the drawer and indorsers. In
England a sharp distinction is made between current
and overdue bills; in France no such distinction is
made. In England no protest is required in the case of
inland bills; in France every dishonored bill must be
protested."
Law merchant.—The Law Merchant or Lex Merca
toria is a term employed to designate the usages of
merchants and traders in the different departments of
trade ratified by the decisions of the courts of law.
which, upon such usages being proved, have adopted
them as settled law with a view to the interests of
trade and the public convenience, the court proceeding
on the well known principle of law that with reference
to transactions in the different departments of trade,
courts of law, in giving effect to the contracts and
dealings of the parties will assume that the latter have
dealt with one another on the footing of any custom
or usage prevailing generally in the particular depart
ment. By this process what before was usage only,
unsanctioned by legal decision, has become engrafted
upon or incorporated into the common law, and may
thus be said to be a part of it." When a general usage
has been judicially ascertained and established it be
comes a part of the law merchant which courts of justice
are bound to know and recognize.” The law merchant
10–See introduction 3rd ed. 10 Ex. 337.
Chalmers’ Bills of Exchange. 12—Brandoa V. Barnett, 12 Cl.
11–Goodwin V. Robarts, L. R. & Fin. 805.
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is the source of the codifying statutes,—the Bills of
Exchange Act and the Negotiable Instruments Law.
Before their enactment it appeared scattered through
thousands of decisions and hundreds of statutory en
actments.”
It is not a fixed and stereotyped body of law, but is
capable of expansion and enlargement to meet the
wants and requirements of trade in the varying cir
cumstances of commerce.” As a matter of legal his
tory, it cannot be definitely stated when or where those
usages arose which form the basis of the law govern
ing negotiable instruments. Some writers assign them
to one place and one time and others to others. But
notwithstanding the number and the diligence of the
laborers in this interesting field of inquiry, it cannot
now be stated with certainty by whom bills and notes
were invented or when they were first used.” The mat
ter is of no practical importance at this time. Every
one is now fully assured that those usages, whatever
their origin or whenever they were employed in the
affairs of trade, have long since been engrafted upon or
become a part of the common law. The general body
of the law merchant embraced many branches other
than that pertaining to bills and notes, for example
partnership, joint stock companies, agency, insurance,
bankruptcy, bottomry and respondentia, stoppage in
transitu, lien, contracts with carriers, and the contract
13—See note 4, supra. Vol. 7 One of the criticisms urged
American Digest, Century ed., against the Negotiable Instru
which is almost exclusively de- ments Law is that codification ar
voted to a digest of decisions on rests expansion and enlargement.
the law of Bills and Notes. 15—Daniel, Neg. Inst., 5th ed.,
14–Goodwin v. Robarts, supra. Sec. 3.
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of affreightment," but such branches of the law mer
chant became so far incorporated into the common law
as wholly to lose their identity as separate and distinct
from it
.
The branch o
f
the law merchant relating to
bills and notes has likewise become a part o
f
the com
mon law, despite the fact that it is quite usual to refer
to it as if it were a separate and distinct body of law.”
The law merchant has been spoken o
f
a
s
a branch of
the law o
f nations,—as a form o
f private international
law,” by which no more was meant than that it was
free from certain technical rules of the common law.
The law merchant was not a native o
f England, it was
adopted in England when its use was there demanded
by trade, it became a part of the law of England be
cause it was the law of other nations and because the
merchants of other nations traded with the merchants
o
f England. Nor was it less the law of England be
cause the usages on which it was based were in their
origin foreign to English usages, but, all speculation
aside, it was incorporated into and became a part of
the common law.”
is all but forgotten that they are
not Of the common law Stock. The
16—Introduction to Smith's
Mercantile Law, 10th ed., Mac
donnell.
17—“This branch Of the law
merchant (the branch which
deals With the law of bills, notes
and checks) has retained through
out its life, to the present day,
its essential characteristics,
clearly marking it off from the
common law, while other branches
have differed so little from the
common law or have become so
far assimilated to it, that the fact
result is that the term law mer
chant at the present time usu
ally suggests the law of bills,
notes and cheques.” Bigelow,
Bills, Notes and Cheques, 2d ed., 1.
18–Blackstone's Com., Cooley's
4th ed., 273.
19—Blackstone's Com., Cooley's
4th ed., 75; Christian's note, same
page. “The laws relating to bills of
exchange, insurance and all mer
cantile contracts are as much the
INTRODUCTION. 13
The law merchant as here used embraces, and the
Negotiable Instruments Law deals with negotiable bills,
of exchange, promissory notes and checks, and the con
tracts of the several parties thereto. “Bills of Ex
change,” says Cockburn, C. J.,” “are known to be of
comparatively modern origin, having first been brought
into use, so far as is at present known, by the Floren
tines in the twelfth, and by the Venetians about the
thirteenth century. The use of them gradually found
its way into France, and, still later and but slowly, into
England.” The bill of exchange was the earliest form
of negotiable instrument. Originally it was used ex
clusively for the purpose of foreign trade. It was not
in use in England earlier than 1600, certainly not as an
instrument of trade and commerce. A statute of 3 Rich.
II, c. 3 (1379) makes indefinite reference to the bill of
exchange as a means of conveying money out of the
realm and forbids such practice. The first case to be
found in the English books on the subject of bills of
exchange is Martin v. Boure” decided in 1603. “Up to
this time the practice of making these bills negotiable
by indorsement had been unknown, and the earlier bills
general laws of the land, as the
laws relating to marriage or mur
der.”
Dunlop v. Silver, 1 Cranch, ap
pendix, 367. This is an instruct
ive case because of its exhaustive
review of the authorities. From
those authorities the conclusion is
reached that the law merchant is
part of the common law and par
ticularly that a promissory note
was negotiable, according to the
custom, prior to the enactment of
the statute of Anne (see infra.)
The value of the case lies in its
comprehensive historical account
Of the introduction of the law
merchant into England, and its
development in the courts of the
Common law. See Mandeville V.
Riddle, 1 Cranch 290, wherein a
conclusion is reached contrary to
the conclusion in Dunlop v. Sil
Wer.
20-Goodwin v. Robarts, supra.
21-2 Croke's Rep. 6.
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are found to be made payable to a man and his assigns,
though in some instances to bearer. But about this
period, that is to say, at the close of the sixteenth or
the commencement of the seventeenth century the prac
tice of making bills payable to order and transferring
them by indorsement took its rise.” But because
cases involving the subject of commercial paper do not
appear in the English reports prior to the opening of
the seventeenth century, it is not to be concluded that
there were no cases involving commercial transactions.
The law merchant, at one time distinct from the com
mon law, underwent three stages of development in
England. The first stage embraced the period from its
earliest introduction in England down to the time
when Coke became Chief Justice in 1606. The second
stage embraced the period from 1606 to 1756 when Lord
Mansfield became Chief Justice, the third stage em
braced the period from 1756 to the present.” During
the first stage of development, the law merchant was
administered in special informal courts called pie
powder, pied poudre, pepoudrous, or dusty foot courts,
so named either because litigants came to the trial of
their causes with feet dusty from participating in the
fairs in connection with which and as an incident of
which these courts were held, or because the courts
were so prompt in their judgments that justice was
administered “while the dust fell from the feet.”
22—Goodwin V. Robarts, supra. 24—The greater part of the
23–Preface to Smith's Mercan- foreign trade of England, and in
tile Law, Macdonell, p. 82. Ele- deed of the whole of Europe at
ments of Mercantile Law, chap. 1. that time, was conducted in the
Thomas Edward Scrutton. great fairs, held at fixed places
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Promptness of decision and a strict adherence to and
enforcement of the customs of merchants were the
characteristic features of the dusty foot courts. As
long as submission was yielded to their judgments they
were adequate to the times and to the discharge of the
duties imposed upon them by custom. But there came
a time when submission to their judgments was not
yielded and they were without power to compel obe
dience to their mandates. A power stronger than per
suasion or pressure was needed to compel of the re
fractory loser of a cause compliance with the judgment
of the court. And because that power was lacking the
dusty foot courts died out. Controversies involving
the customs of merchants were transferred to the com
mon law courts.” The second stage of development
and fixed times in each year, to
which merchants of all countries
came; fairs very similar to those
which meet every year at the
present time in Novgorod in Rus
sia and at other places in the
East. In England also, there
were then the great fairs of Win
chester and Stourbridge and the
fairs of Besançon and Lyons in
France, and in each of those fairs
a court sat to administer Speedy
justice by the law merchant to
the merchants who congregated
in the fairs and in case of doubt
and difficulty to have that law de
clared on the basis of mercantile
customs by the merchants who
were present. The Elements of
Mercantile Law, supra, q. V. for
pleadings and forms of actions in
these courts.
25—“But the custom applied for
admission at the hands of com
mon lawyers, to common law
judges at the common law courts;
and the applicant could not hope
for success except by putting on
the common law garb. Fictions
were accordingly resorted to in
the pleadings by which it was
made to seem that the custom
Was after all nothing but a sis
ter of the common law. Suit
Was brought in assumpsit upon a
foreign bill of exchange, alleg
ing in effect, by a fiction of fac
torage or agency, that the defend
ant, acceptor of the bill, had, at
the hands of his foreign factor,
received money from the plain
tiff, in consideration whereof he
now, in accepting the bill drawn
by his factor for the purpose,
promised to repay the same. Here
were both consideration and priv
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of the law merchant dates from the time when the com
mon law courts began to deal with controversies involv
ing the customs of merchants. They determined these
controversies according to the common law procedure
and thus the customs of merchants became engrafted
upon or incorporated into the common law. The law
merchant was administered at first by the courts of
common law as a custom and not as law” and the
custom applied only to cases wherein one of the parties
was a merchant. In every action on a bill of exchange
it was necessary to count upon the promise according to
the use and custom of merchants and so the old pleas
ran “secundum usum et consuetudinem mercatorum.”
The stages by which the bill of exchange was developed
is well explained by Treby C. J.
,
in Bromwich v
.
Loyd,” decided in 1698, wherein he says: “Bills of
Exchange a
t
first extended only to merchant strangers
trafficking with English merchants, and afterwards to
inland bills between merchants trafficking the one with
the other in England; and afterwards to all traders,
and then to all persons whether traders o
r not; and
there was then no need to allege any custom o
f mer
chants.” In 1613 a plea that an acceptor of a bill of
exchange was not a merchant was held a good answer.”
In 1692 a plea that the acceptor of a bill of exchange
was a gentleman and not a merchant was held not a
ity of contract o
f
the common 2d ed., 3. See also Dunlop v
.
law. The courts winked at the
allegations, accepted the fictions
as not to be traversed and called
for proof only of what was left.”
Bigelow Bills, Notes and Cheques,
Silver, supra.
26-The Elements of Mercantile
Law, Scrutton, supra.
27-2 Lutwyche's Reports 1585.
28–Oaste v. Taylor, 1 Cro. Jac.
306.
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good defence,” the court holding that if gentlemen took
it upon themselves to accept bills they ought to pay
them.
In the second stage of development the negotiability
of instruments was declared and established in this
order: first, the foreign bill; second, the inland bill;
third, the promissory note. The law in respect to these
instruments became well settled within the second stage
of development of the law merchant. Foreign bills and
inland bills were put upon the same footing except in
the matter of protest. “All the difference between for
eign and inland bills,” said Lord Holt, “is that foreign
bills must be protested before a public notary before the
drawer can be charged; but inland bills need no pro
test,” and in this distinction there survived the only
trace of the former history of bills of exchange.
Promissory notes were declared to be negotiable in
struments in 1680. The first case which recognized
their negotiability was Shelden v. Hentley” wherein
the court said that “it was the custom of merchants
that made these good.” This case was followed for
more than twenty years” but was overruled by Clarke
v. Martin” in 1702, in which it was held that a promis
sory note payable to J. S. or order is not a negotiable
instrument within the custom of merchants. “Holt C.
J. was totis viribus against the action and said that this
note could not be a bill of exchange. That the main
29-Sarsfield v. Witherly, Carth. 3 Lev. 299; Hill et al. v. Lewis,
82. 1 Salk 132; Williams v. Williams,
30–Buller v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29. Carth. 269; Bromwich v. Loyd,
31–2 Showers 160. 2 Lut. 1582.
32–Duke of Norfolk v. Howard, 33–2 L'd Raym. 758.
2 Showers 235; Horton V. Coggs,
2
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taining of these actions upon such notes, were innova
tions upon the rules of the common law, and that it
amounted to setting up a new sort of specialty, un
known to the common law and invented in Lombard
street, which attempted in these matters of bills of ex
change to give laws to Westminster Hall. That the
continuing to declare upon these notes upon the custom
of merchants proceeded from obstinacy and opinion
ativeness.’”
The same question was before the court two years
later in Buller v. Crips, supra, note 33. Again Lord Holt
declared against the negotiability of promissory notes
and denied that they were in the nature of bills of ex
change and affirmed that they were “an invention of
the goldsmiths of Lombard street.” He learned from
the merchants of London that it was very frequent
with them to make such notes and that they looked
upon them as bills of exchange and had used them for
a matter of thirty years, and had transferred them and
indorsed them as bills of exchange. The court did not
decide the case but in the language of the reporter
“took the vacation to consider of it.” But the law
had been thrown into confusion and conflict. Parlia
ment intervened and passed the statute of Anne,” de
34–Clarke V. Martin Was fol
lowed in Potter V. Pearson, 2 Ld.
Raym. 759; Burton v. Souter, Id.
774; Williams v. Cutting, Id. 825;
Buller v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29.
35—Statute of Anne, 3 & 4,
chap. IX, 1704. An act for giv
ing like remedy upon promissory
notes as is now used upon bills
of exchange.
Whereas it hath been held, that
notes in writing, signed by the
party who makes the same,
whereby such party promises to
pay unto any other person, or
his order, any sum of money
therein mentioned, are not as
signable or indorsable over, with
in the custom of merchants, to
any other person; and that such
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claring promissory notes assignable or indorsable over
in the same manner as inland bills of exchange accord
ing to the custom of merchants.
person to whom the sum of
money mentioned in such note is
payable, cannot maintain an ac
tion, by the custom of merchants,
against the person who first made
and signed the same; and that
any person to whom such note
shall be assigned, indorsed, or
made payable, could not, within
the said custom of merchants,
maintain any action upon Such
note against the person who first
drew and signed the same; there
fore to the intent to encourage
trade and commerce, which will
be much advanced, if Such notes
shall have the same effect as in
land bills of exchange, and shall
be negotiated in like manner; be
it enacted by the Queen's most ex
cellent majesty, by and with the
advice and consent of the lords
spiritual and temporal, and com
mons, in this present parliament
assembled, and by authority of
the same that all notes in Writ
ing, that after the first day of
May in the year of Our Lord, One
Thousand seven hundred and five
shall be made and signed by any
person or persons, body politick
or corporate, or by the servant
or agent of any corporation,
banker, goldsmith, merchant, or
trader, who is usually intrusted
by him, her or them, to sign such
promissory notes for him, her, or
them, whereby such person or
persons, body politick and cor
porate, his, her, or their servant
Whether promissory
or agent, as aforesaid, doth or
shall promise to pay to any other
person or persons, body politick
and corporate, his, her, or their
order, or unto bearer, any sum
of money mentioned in such note,
shall be taken and construed to
be, by virtue thereof, due and
payable to any such person or
persons, body politick and cor
porate, to whom the same is made
payable; and also every such
note payable to any person or
persons, body politick and cor
porate, his, her, or their order,
shall be assignable, or indorsable
over, in the same manner as in
land bills of exchange are or may
be, according to the custom of
merchants; and that the person
or persons, body politick and cor
porate to whom Such sum of
money is or shall be by such
note made payable, shall and may
maintain an action for the same,
in Such manner as he, she, or
they might do, upon any inland
bill of exchange, made or drawn
according to the custom of mer
chants against the person or per
sons, body politick and corporate,
who, or whose servant or agent,
as aforesaid, signed the same;
and that any person or persons,
body politick and corporate, to
whom such note that is payable
to any person or persons, body
politick and corporate, his, her,
or their order, is indorsed or as
signed, or the money therein men
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notes were negotiable by the custom of merchants after
the manner of bills of exchange or were made so by the
statute of Anne became a question of little importance.
But it has long been the custom to refer to the
Statute of Anne as authority for the negotiability of
promissory notes.
The third stage of development of the law merchant
began when Lord Mansfield became Chief Justice of
the King’s Bench in 1756. Before his time there had
been no established system in England of Mercantile
law, no successful effort to find some certain general
principle which should serve as a guide for future cases
as well as for a determination of the particular case
under consideration. Lord Mansfield found the gen
eral principle and created a system and his administra
tion of the law for thirty years earned for him the title,
Founder of the Commercial Law of England.”
People were wont to deposit their money, their coin
and their valuables with the goldsmiths and bankers
who gave their promissory notes therefor payable on
demand. Such notes came to be called bank notes. To
these the custom of merchants speedily attached and
the negotiability of bank notes was declared in the lead
ing case of Miller v. Race.” In 1764 checks—then
tioned ordered to be paid by in
dorsement thereon, shall and
may maintain his, her, or their
action for such sum of money,
either against the person or per
sons, body politick and corporate,
who, or whose servant or agent,
as aforesaid, signed such note,
or against any of the persons
that indorsed the same, in like
manner as in cases of inland bills
of exchange. * * *
36—Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T.
R. 73.
37–1 Burr, 452, 1 Smith's
Leading Cases, 9th ed., 490.
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called cash notes—were declared to be negotiable in
struments.” At the close of Lord Mansfield’s career
as Judge, the principles of the law of negotiable in
struments were firmly established and settled. Since
that time those principles have not been materially
changed or enlarged but their application has been ex
tended to fresh usages, provided they are the usages of
English merchants,” and to instruments other than
bills, notes and checks, namely exchequer bills, coupon
bonds, bills of lading, certain foreign bonds, on proof
that bonds of that description were sold in the English
market and passed from hand to hand daily like ex
chequer bills, foreign scrip though not payable in
money but exchangeable for other securities.” The law
merchant, offspring of that body of customs and usages
which prevailed wherever trade became active among
men, has expanded and enlarged “so as to meet the
wants and requirements of trade in the varying circum
stances of commerce.”
38–Grant V. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 40–Goodwin v. Robarts, supra;
1516; Goodwin v. Robarts, supra. Gorgier v. Mieville, 3 B. & C. 45;
39—Picker v. The London and Daniels Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec.
County Bank, 18 Q. B. D. 515. 1488.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.
(Act 265, P. A. 1905.)
AN ACT relating to negotiable instruments.
The People of the State of Michigan enact:
Section 1. Short title.—This act shall be known as
the “Negotiable instruments law.”"
1—See Introduction.
The statute deals solely with
negotiable instruments. An in
strument which is not negotiable
by the terms of the statute is ex
cluded from its operation. In de
termining whether a given instru
ment is within the statute it is
first necessary to aScertain
whether the instrument is nego
tiable according to the terms of
the Statute. If Such instrument be
not negotiable according to the
terms of the statute it is governed
by the rules of the common law.
This manifest distinction must be
carefully observed.
The statute makes this radical
change: Heretofore one would
have consulted the cases to deter
mine the law of negotiable instru
ments, now he must consult the
Statute. Cases decided before the
act are law only in So far as they
are in harmony with its provi
Sions or are correct and logical
deductions from its propositions.
The proper course now to be pur
Sued by one who seeks to find out
what the law of negotiable instru
ments is, is to examine the lan
guage of the statute and to ask
what is its natural meaning un
influenced by any considerations
derived from the previous state of
the law. If a provision of the
Statute be found of doubtful im
port, a resort to the cases to de
termine the previous state of the
law will be proper for the pur
pose of aiding in the construc
tion of the statutory provisions,
but the first step to be taken is to
interpret the language of the stat
ute. Bank of England v. Vagli
ano, L. R. [1891], App. Cas. 144
(a case under Bills of Exchange
Act).
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
Sec. 2. Definitions and meaning of terms.–Person
primarily liable on instrument.—Reasonable time, what
constitutes.—Time, how computed; when last day falls
23
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on holiday.—Application of the act.—Law merchant,
when governs.—In this act, unless the context otherwise
requires: “Acceptance” means an acceptance completed
by delivery or notification. “Action” includes counter
claim and set-off. “Bank” includes any person or as
sociation of persons carrying on the business of banking,
whether incorporated or not. “Bearer” means the per
son in possession of a bill or note which is payable to
bearer. “Bill” means bill of exchange and “note”
means negotiable promissory note. “Delivery” means
transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one
person to another. “Holder” means the payee or en
dorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it
,
o
r
the
bearer thereof.” “Indorsement” means an indorsement
completed by delivery.” “Instrument” means negotiable
instrument. “Issue” means the first delivery of the
instrument, complete in form, to a person who takes it
a
s
a holder.” “Person” includes a body of persons,
whether incorporated o
r
not. “Value” means valuable
consideration. “Written” includes printed, and “writ
ing” includes print. The person “primarily” liable on
a
n instrument is the person who by the terms o
f
the
instrument is absolutely required to pay the same." All
other parties are “secondarily” liable. In determining
what is a “reasonable time” o
r
an “unreasonable time,”
regard is to be had to the nature o
f
the instrument, the
usage o
f
trade o
r business, if any, with respect to such
instruments, and the facts o
f
the particular case." Where
the day, o
r
the last day, for doing any act herein re
quired o
r permitted to be done, falls on Sunday, or on a
holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding
secular o
r
business day." The provisions o
f
this act do
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not apply to negotiable instruments made and delivered
prior to the passage hereof.” In any case not provided
for in this act the rules of the law merchant shall gov
ern.”
1—Referred to in: Mass. Nat.
Bank v. Snow (Mass.) 72 N. E.
959.
2—Referred to in: New Haven
Mfg. Co. v. N. H. Pulp and Board
Co. 76 Conn. 126.
3—Referred to in: Louisville
Coal Mining Co. v. International
Trust Co. (Col.) 71 Pac. 898.
4—Referred to in: Clutton V. At
tenborough [1897] A. C. 90. (A
case under the corresponding pro
visions of the Bills of Exchange
Act.)
5—This provision is to be con
strued in connection with sections
20, 129 and 191. No person is
liable on the instrument whose
signature does not appear thereon
(Sec. 20); the drawee is not liable
on the bill unless and until he
accepts the same (sec. 129); the
bank is not liable to the holder
unless and until it accepts or cer
tifies the check (sec. 191). These
are not, by the terms of the in
strument absolutely required to
pay the same, unless they shall
have signed, accepted, or certified.
Referred to in: Nat. Citizens
Bank v. Toplitz, 81 N. Y. Supp.
422, 81 App. Div. 593.
6-Referred to in:
Jackson, 181 Mass. 69.
7—According to the law mer
chant when the last day of grace
fell upon a non-secular day the
paper matured on the next preced
ing secular day. Capital etc. Bank
Merritt V.
v. American etc. Bank, 51 Neb.
707; Bartlett v. Leathers, 84 Me.
241.
This provision changes the rule
of the law merchant, but affirms
the previous statutory rule in
Michigan. C. L. '97, Sec. 4880, as
amended, Laws 1903, p. 420.
8–The words “prior to the pas
sage hereof” are legally equivalent
to the words “prior to the taking
effect hereof”. The words “pas
Sage of the act” and similar ex
pressions in statutes have legal
reference to the time of their tak
ing effect. Rogers V. Vass, 6 Iowa
405. Followed in: Schneider V.
Hussey, 2 Idaho 12, 1 Pac. 343.
The term “passage of the act”
as used in a statute which provides
that the State Board of Medical
Commissioners within ninety days
after the passage of the act shall
receive, through its president, ap
plications for certificates and ex
aminations, taken in connection
with Const. Art. 5 sec. 19, which
provides that no act shall take
effect until ninety days after its
passage, unless in case of an emer
gency, is to be construed, in the
absence of an emergency clause,
as meaning, after the act goes
into effect. Words and Phrases,
Vol. 6, p. 5218, citing Harding v.
People, 10 Col. 387, 15 Pac. 729.
To same effect is: State V. Be
mis, 45 Neb. 724, 64 N. W. 348.
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An act must be understood as
beginning to Speak at the moment
when it takes effect and not be
fore. Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich.
369; Rice v. Ruddiman, 10 Mich.
125; Carleton v. People, Id., 250;
Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318;
Fosdick V. Van Husan, 21 Mich..
567; Mich. Mut. Ben. ASS'n. V.
Rolfe, 76 Mich. 146.
Mr. Crawford in his note to this
provision of the statute seems to
construe “passage” as having ref
erence to the enactment of the
statute and its approval. The New
York statute was approved May
19, 1897. By its terms it was to
take effect October 1, 1897. He
says: “But while the law did not
go into effect until then, its appli
cation is not limited to instru
ments made after that date. An
instrument made and delivered
after the passage of the act was
equally within its operations after
October 1st. For example, if a
note payable four months after
date was dated and delivered on
July 15, 1897, it must, at maturity,
have been presented for payment
in the manner prescribed by the
statute; and if dishonored, the
statutory rules as to giving notice
of dishonor must have been com
plied with. But in the case of a
note dated and delivered April 15,
1897, and payable six months af
ter date, none of the provi
sions of the statute apply.” The
note in the first example was
made and delivered after the en
actment and approval of the stat
ute but before it went into effect;
it matured November 15, 1897, af
ter the statute was in effect. Pre
Sentment must be made and notice
given, says Mr. Crawford, in ac
cordance with the statute. The
note in the second example was
made and delivered before the
enactment and approval of the
statute, it matured October 15,
1897, after the statute was in ef
fect. None of the provisions ap
ply, says Mr. Crawford. The
distinction is not apparent, ex
cept upon the mistaken notion
that “passage of the act” has, as
employed in this connection, a
different meaning from “taking
effect of the act.”
One who, before the
goes into effect becomes
regular indorser (see sec. 66), of
paper maturing after the Statute
is in effect will be liable as maker,
and neither presentment and de
mand nor notice will be necessary
to fix his liability. Grace will
attach to a bill or note made and
delivered before the statute goes
into effect, but maturing after the
statute is in effect, unless the in
strument be drawn without grace.
After the statute is in effect, it
Will govern every step then neces
sary to be taken in respect to a
negotiable instrument.
9-The language of this provi
sion seems to admit of no other
construction than that cases not
provided for in the act are to be
governed by the rules of the Law
Merchant and that in the deter
mining of such cases no resort is
to be had to any former statute
even though it stands unrepealed
by the provisions of sec. 192, as
not being inconsistent with this
act.
Statute
an ir
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
TITLE I.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN GENERAL.
Article 1. Form and Interpretation.
Form of negotiable instru
ment.
Certainty as to Sum;
constitutes.
When promise is
tional.
Determinable future
what constitutes.
Additional provisions not af
fecting negotiability.
Omissions; seal; particular
money.
When payable on demand.
When payable to order.
When payable to bearer.
Terms; when sufficient.
Date; presumption as to.
Ante-dated and post-dated.
Date; when may be inserted.
what
uncondi
time;
Sec.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
Blanks; when may be filled.
Incomplete instrument not de
livered.
Delivery; When
when presumed.
Construction where
ment is ambiguous.
Liability of person signing in
trade or assumed name.
Signature by agent; author
ity, how shown.
Liability of person signing as
agent, etc.
Signature by procuration; op
eration of.
Indorsement by infant or cor
poration; effect of.
Forged signature; effect of.
effectual;
instru
Sec. 3. Form of negotiable instrument.—An instru
ment, to be negotiable, must conform to the following
requirements:"
First, It must be in writing” and signed" by the
maker or drawer;
Second, It must contain an unconditional promise or
order * to pay a certain" sum in money;"
determinable future time; *
Third, It must be payable on demand" or at a fixed or
Fourth, It must be payable to order or to bearer;" and
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Fifth, Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee,
he must be named or otherwise indicated therein with
reasonable certainty.”
1—These are the essential re
quirements of the Law Merchant.
Daniel Neg. Inst. 5th ed., Sec. 27,
28, 1566.
2—The writing may be in pen
cil. Geary v. Physic, 5 B. & C. 234
(1826); Brown v. Butchers Bank,
6 Hill (N. Y.) 443.
3—An instrument in the form
of a bill of exchange Without date
and without drawer's name but
with acceptance by the drawee is
neither a bill of exchange nor a
promissory note. It is only an in
choate instrument. The bill or
note must be signed. M’Call v.
Taylor, 34 L. J. R. C. P. 365;
Reg. v. Harper, L. R. 7 Q. B. DiV.
78 and cases cited.
Signing by rubber stamp is Val
id. Cadillac State Bank V. Cadil
lac Stave & Heading Co., 129
Mich. 15.
A person may become bound by
any mark or designation he thinks
proper to adopt, provided it be
used as a Substitute for his name
and he intend to bind himself. If
the name is not signed the holder
is required to show that what was
Written was intended to answer
the purpose of a signature.
Brown v. Butchers Bank, supra.
In this case the indorsement WaS
made with lead pencil and in fig
ures thus: “1, 2, 8;” no name be
ing written. In such a case evi
dence that the party could write
is immaterial. See Rogers v. Coit,
6 Hill 322; Brown v. McHugh, 35
Mich. 50.
A person though able to Write
his name may nevertheless sign
by his mark. The legal effect is
the same as if the party had writ
ten his name. Bliss v. Johnson,
162 Mass. 323.
4—The statute is but the ex
pression of the uniform rule of
the law merchant that, to consti
tute a negotiable instrument, the
promise or order must be absolute
and Without any contingency that
would embarrass the circulation
of the instrument. White V. Cush
ing, 88 Me. 339. In this case suit
was brought by the indorsee of an
order in the following form:
$120. Piscataquis Savings Bank.
Pay James Lawler, or order,
one hundred and twenty dollars
and charge to my account On book
No. J. N. Cushing.
Witness.
The bank book of the depositor
must accompany this order.
Held: That without the Words
italicized the order is payable ab
solutely and there is no apparent
uncertainty affecting its negotia
bility; with them, the order is
payable only upon contingency, or
condition, and that is upon pro
duction of the drawer's bank book.
* * * The drawer has it in his
power to defeat its payment by
withholding the bank book. It
was the necessity of certainty and
precision in mercantile affairs and
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the inconveniences which would
result if commercial paper was
incumbered With conditions and
contingencies, that led to the es
tablishment of an inflexible rule,
that to be negotiable, paper must
be payable absolutely and without
2ny conditions or contingencies
to embarraSS its circulation.
To same effect, Iron City Bank
v. McCord, 139 Penn. St. 52.
The order or promise must be to
pay out of the general account
of the drawer or maker.
An order or promise to pay out
of a particular fund is not uncon
ditional. This is the well Settled
rule of the law merchant. Wor
den V. Dodge, 4 Denio 159.
An instrument in form of a
promissory note but made ex
pressly subject to the conditions .
of a mortgage not payable abso
lutely but only on certain contin
gencies is not negotiable. Good
enow v. Curtis, 33 Mich. 505;
Humphrey v. Beckwith, 48 Mich.
151; Brooke v. Struthers, 110
Mich. 569; Dilley v. VanWie, 6
Wis. 206. See also Lamb V.
Story, 45 Mich. 488; Chandler v.
Carey, 64 Mich. 237; Wright v.
Traver, 73 Mich. 493. See sec. 5.
A bill reading: Pay Julius C.
Cable or order three hundred dol
lars, or what may be due on my
deposit book number E.
(Signed) John Edwards
is not negotiable, because payable
out of a particular fund and the
amount to be paid being made
to depend upon the adequacy of a
specified fund. Nat. Savings
Bank v. Cable, 73 Conn. 568; 48
Atl.
ute).
An instrument in the following
form is negotiable:
“Mr. William Tebo will please
pay to R. J. Torpey or order
two hundred and fifty dollars and
charge to my account. Due Oct. 1.
“John Ryan.”
428 (a case under the Stat
Torpey v. Tebo, 184 Mass. 307
(a case under the statute).
5–It is the rule of the law
merchant that the Sum Ordered Or
promised to be paid must be cer
tain, else the instrument will not
be negotiable. Daniel’s Neg. Inst.,
5th ed., Sec. 53.
The maxim “id certum est quod
Certum reddi potest” applies; SO
if the amount can be ascertained
from the instrument itself, the
rule as to certainty is Satisfied.
Smith V. Clopton, 4 Tex. 109;
Parsons v. Jackson, 99 U. S. 440.
In the former case the promise
was to pay $1.50 per acre for
each and every acre of land lying
within certain described bound
aries. Subsequently there Was
added to the instrument the fol
lowing, which was signed by the
maker: “Since the Within Was
Written, the land has been Sur
veyed and found to be sixty five
acres, which will make the with
in, call for $97.50.” The note was
made April 15, 1848; the addi
tion November 10, 1848. It was
held that the note was a nego
tiable instrument from the date
of the addition, to-wit: Nov. 10,
1848. In the latter case the action
was on bonds reciting that the
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Vicksburg, Shreveport and Texas
Railway Company is indebted to
John Ray or bearer, for value
received, in the sum of 225 l
sterling, or $1,000, lawful money
of the United States of America,
to-wit: 225 l sterling, if the prin
cipal and interest are payable in
London, and $1,000 lawful money
Of the United States of America,
if the principal and interest are
payable in New York or New
Orleans, etc. Each bond further
on its face declares that “the pres
ident of Said Company is author
ized to fix, by his indorsement,
the place of payment, of the prin
cipal and interest in conformity
with the terms of this obligation.
On the back of the bonds is en
dorsed a printed blank in the
following words, to-wit: “I here
by agree that the within bond
and the interest coupons thereto
attached shall be payable in
.” The uncertainty of the
amount payable, in the absence of
the required indorsement is of
itself a defect which deprives
these instruments of the charac
ter of negotiability. As they
stand they amount to a promise
to pay so many pounds, or So
many dollars, without Saying
which. And so it was held that
Without Such indorsement the
bonds were not negotiable by rea
son of the uncertainty of the
sum. It is quite obvious that had
the indorsement of place of pay
ment been completed, in the man
ner contemplated, the sum to be
paid would thereby have been
made certain. See Knight V.
Jones, 21 Mich. 161; Parker v.
Plymell, 23 Kan. 402; Smith v.
Crane, 33 Minn. 144.
A promise to pay a named sum
“with such additional premium
as may arise or become due on
policy No. 50” renders the note
non-negotiable. Dodge V. Emer
son, 34 Me, 96; Marrett V. Equi
table Ins. Co. 54 Me. 537; Pal
mer V. Ward, 6 Gray (Mass.)
340.
A promise to pay a named sum
“or what might be due after de
ducting all advances and ex
penses,” renders the note non-ne
gotiable. Cushman V. Haynes, 20
Pick. 132. See Sec. 4.
6–The rule of the law mer
chant is thus stated by Mr. Dan
iel: “It is essential to the nego
tiability of a bill or note that it
purport to be only for the pay
ment of money.” Daniel's Neg.
Ins., 5th ed., sec. 59.
Money is a generic and compre
hensive term. It is not a syno
nym of coin. It includes coin
but is not confined to it. It in
cludes whatever is lawfully and
actually current in buying and
selling, of the value and as the
equivalent of coin. By universal
consent under the Sanction of all
courts everywhere, or almost
everywhere, bank notes lawfully
issued, actually current at par in
lieu of coin, are money. The
common term, paper money, is in
a legal sense quite as accurate
as the term coined money. Klau
ber v. Biggerstaff, 47 Wis., 557.
An instrument wherein the
maker promises to pay to A or
order $1,000 in cotton is not a
promissory note according to the
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law merchant. Auerbach V. Pritch
ett, 58 Ala. 451. NOr is One
wherein the promise is to pay a
Inamed Sum in carpenter’s work.
Quincy v. Merritt, 11 Hump. 439
(30 Tenn.). Nor is an instrument a
bill of exchange which orders the
payment of 1,000 l in good East
India bonds. Buller N. P. 272.
A promise to pay by or in New
York or Chicago exchange is not
a promise to pay in money. An
instrument containing such a
promise is not a promissory note
Within the law merchant. First
Nat. Bank v. Slette, 67 Minn. 425.
The promise is not to pay a
given number of dollars “with,”
that is, plus the current rate of
exchange, but is to pay the sum
named in the note by New York
or Chicago exchange. The holder
of Such an instrument cannot de
mand in payment thereof the
Sum named, in money plus the
cost of exchange; for the maker
is not bound to discharge his ob
ligation except by means of in
land bills on New York or Chi
cago, nor can the maker tender
in payment the sum named in
money; for his promise is to
make payment by inland bills,
which he must purchase in the
market. To same effect: Chand
ler v. Calvert, 87 Mo. App. 368.
But see Bradley V. Lill, 4 Biss.
473, Fed. Cas. No. 1783; wherein
it is held that “in exchange” is
equivalent to “with exchange.”
An instrument in the form of
an ordinary certificate of de
posit, but reciting that T. W.
“has deposited in this bank $2180
in cl:S., payable,” etc., is not ne
gotiable, because it does not ap
pear that the bank promises to
pay any money. First Nat. Bank
v. Greenville Nat. Bank, 84 Tex.
40.
An order to pay quarterly rents
as they may become due is not a
bill of exchange, because (a) it
is payable out of a particular
fund, (b) it is not on its face
payable in money. Rents may be
due in wheat, fowls or services as
well as in money. Morton V.
Naylor, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 583.
In Some states, as for example,
IOWa. and Georgia, certain instru
ments are declared by statute to
be negotiable, though they pro
vide that payment is to be made
in goods or merchandise. In New
York, warehouse receipts issued
by certain corporations are de
clared to be negotiable. See Han
Over Nat. Bank V. American Dock
& Trust Co., 148 N. Y. 612; Corn
Exchange Bank v. Same, 149 N.
Y. 174; Crawford's Annotated Ne
gotiable Instrument Law, 2d ed., 9.
Certain scrip issued by the au
thority of the Russian govern
ment and certain other scrip
issued by the authority of the
Hungarian government, the essen
tial part of which was as fol
lows: “Received the Sum of
twenty pounds, being the first in
stallment of 20 per cent upon
One hundred pounds stock, and
On payment of the remaining in
stalment at the period specified
the bearer will be entitled to re
ceive a definitive bond or bonds
for one hundred pounds, after re
ceipt thereof from the imperial
government,” was held to be a
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negotiable security for money so
that the transfer of it by a per
Son not being the true owner, to
a bona fide holder for value, con
ferred a good title on the latter,
despite the fact that the scrip
did not correspond to any of the
forms of Securities for money
which had been theretofore held
to be negotiable by the law mer
chant and did not contain a di
rect promise to pay money but
only a promise to give security
for money. Goodwin V. Robarts,
L. R. 10 Ex. 337.
Equivalents of money.—The word
“money” has been used for SOme
purposes in a very wide sense,
and for others in a restricted
sense. When questions have come
up in considering negotiable pa
per it has never been extended
beyond coin and paper at par
Value. Black V. Ward, 27 Mich.
191. A note made and indorsed in
Michigan and payable in Canada
in “Canadian currency” is pay
able in money and is negotiable.
Id.; Oliver v. Shoemaker, 35
Mich. 464.
The following have been judi
cially determined to be equivalent
to money:
“The bank notes current in the
city of New York.” Judah v. Har
ris, 19 Johns. 144.
“Current bank notes.” Pardee
v. Fish, 60 N. Y. 265; Fleming v.
Nall, 1 Tex. 246.
“Current bank notes of Cincin
mati.” Morris V. Edwards, 1 Ohio
189; Swetland v. Creigh, 15 Ohio
118.
“Current funds.” Phoenix Ins.
Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501; Phoe
nix Ins. Co. v. Gray, 13 Mich.
191; Bull v. Bank, 123 U. S. 105;
Lacy v. Holbrook, 4 Ala. 88; Tel
ford v. Patton, 144 Ill. 611; White
v. Richmond, 16 Ohio 6; Citizens'
Nat. Bank v. Brown, 45 Ohio St.
39; contra, National State Bank
v. Ringel, 51 Ind. 393; Johnson
v. Henderson, 76 N. C. 227; Wright
v. Hart's Administrator, 44 Pa.
St. 454; Texas Land & Cattle Co.
Bank V. Carroll, 63 Tex. 48;
Platt V. Bank 17 Wis. 230; ex
plained and criticized in Klauber
V. Biggerstaff, 47 Wis. 551.
Currency. — Currency means
money, coined money, and paper
money equally. But it means
money Only; and the Only prac
tical distinction between paper
money and coined money, as cur
rency, is that coined money must
generally be received, paper
money may generally be specially
refused, in payment of debt; but
a payment in either is equally
made in money, -equally good.
The confusion in the cases ap
pears to have arisen for want of
proper distinction between money
which is current and money
which is legal tender. The prop
erty of being legal tender is not
necessarily inherent in money; it
generally belongs no more to in
ferior coin than to paper money.
Klauber v. Biggerstaff, 47 Wis.
561.
Currency the equivalent of mon
ey: Phelps v. Town, 14 Mich.
374; Swift v. Whitney, 20 Ill.
144; Butler v. Pine, 8 Minn. 284;
Mitchell v. Hewett, 13 Miss. 361;
Frank v. Wessels, 64 N. Y. 155;
Dugan v. Campbell, 1 Ohio 115;
Howe v. Hartness, 11 Ohio St.
449; Wright v. Morgan, (Texas)
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37 S. W. 627. Contra: Bank of
Mobile V. Brown, 42 Ala. 108;
Dillard V. Evans, 4 Ark. 175;
Rindskoff v. Barrett, 11 Iowa 172;
Huse V. Hamblin, 29 Iowa 501;
Chambers V. George, 5 Litt. (Ky.)
335. But otherwise as to “Ken
tucky currency.” Hicklin v. Tuck
er, 2 Yerg. 448.
Gold dollars. Chrysler V. Ren
Ois, 43 N. Y. 209.
Mexican silver dollars. Hogue
v. Williamson, 85 Tex. 553. See
note 5, sec. 8.
7–See Sec. 9.
8-Brooks V.
Mich. 254.
A clause attached to a promis
sory note and providing that the
payee or his assigns may indefi
nitely extend the time of payment
destroys its negotiability. Smith
V. Van Blarcom, 45 Mich. 371.
The provision in a promissory
note “that the payee or holder of
this note may renew or extend
the time of payment of the same
from time to time as often as
required without notice, and with
out prejudice to the rights of
such payee or holder to enforce
payment against the makers, Sure
ties and indorsers and each of
them, parties hereto, at any time
when the same may be due and
payable,” destroys the negotiabil
ity of the note. Second Nat. Bank
v. Wheeler, 75 Mich. 546. To same
effect Glidden V. Henry, 104 Ind.
278, 54 Am. Rep. 316.
But an option indorsed upon
the back of a negotiable note for
its extension for a definite time
by giving a new note at the op
tion of the makers and indorsers
Hargreaves, 21
similar to the original does not
destroy its negotiability. Annis
ton Loan and Trust Co. V. Stick
ney, 108 Ala. 146; 31 L. R. A. 234.
9—A note made payable to the
order of M's estate is negotiable.
Peltier v. Babillon, 45 Mich. 384.
An instrument in the form of a
certificate of deposit acknowledg
ing receipt of five hundred dol
lars from Z., and reciting “and
on five days’ notice will pay in
current funds the like amount
with interest to the said Z or her
assigns,” is not a negotiable in
strument in that it is not payable
to order or bearer. Zander V. N.
Y. Security & Trust Co., 81 N.
Y. Supp. 1151 (a case under the
statute); Westberg V. Chicago L.
& C. Co., 117 Wis. 589 (a case
under the Statute).
The North Carolina and Wy
oming acts read: “Must be
payable to the order of a speci
fied person or bearer.” The
words, “specified person” are real
ly unnecessary inasmuch as sec
tion 10 provides that an instru
ment is payable to Order where
it is drawn payable to the Order
of a specified person.
10-It is essential to the Valid
ity of a bill of exchange that
there be a clear designation of
the person upon whom it is
drawn. There cannot be a bill
without a drawee. Peto V. Rey
nolds, 9 Exch. 410; Watrous V.
Halbrook, 39 Tex. 572.
It is not necessary that the
drawee be named. He may be
identified by some other designa
tion than his name. For example,
a bill addressed to Steamer C. W.
3
34 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.
Dawrence and owners was held
a sufficient designation of the
drawee. Alabama Coal Mining
Co. v. Brainard, 35 Ala. 476.
The same concerning a bill
which contained no address, but
Specified that it was to be “pay
able at number one West Street,
etc.” Gray V. Milner, 8 Taunt.
739, 4 E. C. L. 361.
The fact that the bill does not
designate a drawee will not vitiate
it after it has been accepted.
Acceptance is an admission that
the party accepting it was the
party intended. Wheeler v. Web
ster, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 1.
This case is in conflict with Peto
V. Reynolds, supra.
In Funk V. Babbitt, 156
Ill. 408 it Was held that
instruments in the form fol
lowing “Thirty days after date
pay to the order of E. D. Babbitt
$350 for value received.” (Signed)
Funk and Lackey, but not ad
dressed to any person as drawee,
were to be regarded, in legal ef
fect, as addressed to the drawers
themselves as drawees, and that
the signatures of such drawers to
such instrument bound them as
drawers and acceptors; that the
firm sustained to the bills the
triple relation of drawers, draw
ees, and acceptors; that the
drawers and drawees being the
same, the bills were in legal ef
fect promissory notes and might
be treated as such, or as bills,
at the holder's option. In For
ward v. Thompson, 12 U. C. Q. B.
103, a similar instrument was
held not to be a promissory note
inasmuch as it lacked the very
essence of a promissory note,—a
promise in terms by the maker
which makes him primarily liable
to pay the money.
The Wisconsin act adds the
following: “But no order drawn
upon or accepted by the treasurer
of any county, town, city, Village,
or school district, whether drawn
by any officer thereof, or any oth
er person, and no obligation or
instrument made by any such
corporation or any officer thereof,
unless expressly authorized by
laW to be made negotiable Shall
be, or shall be deemed to be nego
tiable according to the custom
of merchants in whatever form
they may be drawn Or made.
Warehouse receipts, bills of lad
ing, and railroad receipts, upon
the face of which the Words “not
negotiable’ shall be plainly writ
ten, printed, or stamped, shall be
negotiable, as provided in section
1676 of the Wisconsin statutes,
1878, and in section 4194 and 4425
of these statutes, as the same
have been construed by the Su
preme Court.”
In Michigan village Orders are
not negotiable. Miner V. Vedder,
66 Mich. 101.
Sec. 4. Certainty as to sum; what constitutes.—The
Sum payable is a sum certain within the meaning of
this act, although it is to be paid:
First, With interest; or
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Second, By stated installments;” or
Third, By stated installments, with a provision that
upon default in payment of any installment or of in
terest the whole shall become due;” or
Fourth, With exchange, whether at a fixed rate or at
the current rate; or
Fifth, With costs of collection or an attorney’s fee,
in case payment shall not be made at maturity.”
1—A note providing for interest
at 7 per cent and containing this
additional stipulation: “if not
paid when due I agree to pay
10 per cent interest from date
until paid” is negotiable. Crump
v. Berdan, 97 Mich. 293; See
Flanders V. Chamberlain, 24
Mich. 305; Hope v. Barker, 112
Mo. 338; Dinsmore v. Duncan, 57
N. Y. 573; Parker v. Plymell, 23
Kan. 402; Smith v. Crane, 33
Minn. 144.
An instrument containing a
promise to pay a certain sum to
gether with any interest that may
accrue thereon (the rate of inter
est not being specified) is not ne
gotiable in that it lacks certainty
as to sum. Lamberton V. Aiken,
2 F 189, [1899] Ct. of Sessions
(a case under the corresponding
provision of the bills of exchange
act).
An instrument does not fall
short of being a bill or note
merely because it contains a stip
ulation for the payment of inter
est, but the interest must be as
certained from the face of the docu
ment or it must be capable of
being ascertained by numerical
calculation from materials con
tained in the document. This
would be the case where the docu
ment in question specifies the
rate of interest, and date of pay
ment, for then one could by sim
ple calculation ascertain the
amount of interest due.
2-A note for $1500 to be paid
20 per cent a month from July 1,
1871 is negotiable. Wright v. Ir
win, 33 Mich. 32.
A note providing for payment
of the principal sum, with the
reserved right on the part of the
maker expressed in the body of
the note to pay the same before
maturity in installments of not
less than 5 per cent of the prin
cipal, is negotiable. Riker V.
Sprague Mfg. Co., 14 R. I. 402.
An instrument wherein the de
fendant promises in writing to
pay the plaintiff 1701 with in
terest at 5 per cent as follows:
the first payment, to-wit: 401
Or more to be made on the 1st
of February, 1873, and 51 on the
first day of each month following
until the note shall be fully sat
isfied, is a valid promissory note.
Cooke v. Horn, 29 L. T. (n. s.)
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369. The objection to the note was
that if the first payment Were
more than 401, which the note
provided it might be, the subse
quent instalments and the final
time for payment would be indefi
nite. Blackburn, J., said: “The
amount of the note, however, is
certain and any variation in the
time will depend only upon the
defendant. * * * I do not see
why a stipulation which enables
a maker of a note to reduce his
liability for interest should pre
vent the instrument containing it
from being a promissory note.”
3—Markey v. Corey, 108 Mich.
184; Brooke v. Struthers, 110
Mich. 562; Wilson v. Campbell, id.
580; Brooks v. Hargreaves, 21
Mich. 25.4; Rice V. Rankans, 101
Mich. 378; Cox V. Cayan, 117
Mich. 599; Clark v. Skeen, 61
Kan. 526, 49 L. R. A. 190; Carlon
V. Kenealy, 12 M. & W. 139;
Thorpe v. Mindeman (Wis.) 101
N. W. 417 (a case under the
statute). See also First Nat. Bank
v. Carson, 60 Mich. 432; Choate
v. Stevens, 116 Mich. 28.
An instrument in the form of
a joint and several promissory
note and providing for payment
in instalments and that upon de
fault in the payment of any One
of the instalments the whole
amount remaining unpaid should
become due and payable is a ne
gotiable promissory note within
the meaning of the bills of ex
change act. Kirkwood v. Car
roll, 51 W. R. 374; 88 L. T. R.
(1903) 52, approving Yates v.
Evans, 61 L. J. Q. B. 446, (1892),
overruling Kirkwood v. Smith, 65
L. J. Q. B. 408 (1896).
4-Smith V. Kendall, 9 Mich.
241; Johnson v. Frisbie, 15 Mich.
286; Bullock v. Taylor, 39 Mich.
137; Second Nat. Bank v. Basu
ier, 6.5 Fed. 58; Whitle v. Fond du
Lac Nat. Bank (Tex.) 26 S. W.
1106; Hastings V. Thompson, 54
Minn. 184, 55 N. W. 968; Contra:
Culbertson v. Nelson, 93 Iowa
187. See note 6, Sec. 3.
5—This provision changes the
rule in Michigan as established
by the following cases: Bul
lock v. Taylor, 39 Mich. 137; Myer
V. Hart, 40 Mich. 517; Cayuga Co.
Bank V. Purdy, 56 Mich. 6; Alt
man v. Rittershofer, 68 Mich. 287;
Altman v. Fowler, 70 Mich. 57;
Wright v. Traver, 73 Mich. 493;
Second Nat. Bank V. Wheeler, 75
Mich. 546; Rice v. Rankans, 101
Mich. 378; Conrad Seipp Brewing
Co. v. McKittrick, 86 Mich. 191;
Strawberry Point Bank V. Lee,
117 Mich. 122; People v. Bennett,
122 Mich. 281; but affirms the rule
sustained by the weight of author
ity. The reason of the rule in
Michigan is based upon the prop
osition that the requisite of cer
tainty must continue until the
discharge of the instrument. In
Altman v. Fowler, supra, the
court said: “The certainty requi
site to the negotiability of the in
Strument must continue until the
obligation is discharged, and any
provision which before that time
removes such certainty prevents
the instrument from being nego
tiable at all.”
The rule in Michigan is the
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rule of the following courts: John
ston V. Speer, 92 Pa. St. 227;
First Nat. Bank V. Bynum, 84
N. C. 24; First Nat. Bank v. Gay,
71 Mo. 627; Jones V. Radatz, 27
Minn. 240; Morgan V. Edwards,
53 Wis. 599; Maryland Fertiliz
ing Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 584;
Carroll County Savings Bank V.
Strother, 28 S. C. 504; Findlay v.
Pott, 131 Cal. 385. The rule
adopted by the act is sustained
by: Oppenheimer v. Bank, 97
Tenn. 19; 36 S. W. 705; Chicago
R’y Equipment Co. v. Merchants
Bank, 136 U. S. 268; Farmers'
Nat. Bank V. Sutton Mfg Co. 6
U. S. App. 312; 52 Fed. 191;
Dorsey v. Wolff, 142 Ill. 589;
Tyler v. Walker, 101 Tenn. 306,
47 S. W. 424; Benn V. KutzSchan,
24 Ore. 28, 32 Pac. 763; Shenan
doah Nat. Bank V. Marsh, 89 Iowa
273, 56 N. W. 458; First Nat.
Bank v. Slaughter, 98 Ala. 602,
14 So. 545; Chandler V. Kennedy,
8 S. Dak. 56, 65 N. W. 439; Stark
v. Olsen, 44 Neb. 646, 63 N. W.
437; Clifton v. Bank of Aberdeen,
75 Miss. 929, 23 So. 394; Trader
v. Chidester, 41 Ark. 242. The
reason of the rule of these
cases is based upon the proposi
tion that the requisite of cer
tainty need not continue beyond
the maturity of the instrument.
It is expressed in Oppenheimer V.
Bank, supra, wherein it is said
“Upon a careful review of the
authorities we can perceive no
reason why a note otherwise en
dowed with all the attributes of
negotiability is rendered non-nego
tiable by a stipulation which is
entirely inoperative until after
the maturity of the note and its
dishonor by the maker. The
amount to be paid is certain dur
ing the currency of the note as
a negotiable instrument and it
only becomes uncertain after it
ceases to be negotiable by the
fault of the maker in its pay
ment. It is eminently just that
the creditor Who has incurred an
expense in the collection of the
debt should be reimbursed by the
debtor by whom the action was
rendered necessary and the ex
pense entailed.” In Morrison V.
Ornbaun, 30 Mont. 111, 75 Pac.
953 (a case under the statute)
the note contained this provision:
“With interest from date at the
rate of 12 per cent per annum
until paid, and reasonable attor
neys fees.” The note was not
paid at maturity. It was placed
in the hands of an attorney for
collection but Suit had not been
brought upon it. It was held
that the holder could collect Such
reasonable attorney's fees.
The conflict of authority on the
matter covered by this provision
of the act has resulted in four
distinct holdings. First, the stip
ulation is Valid and enforceable
and does not affect the negotia
bility of the instrument. Dorsey
v. Wolff, supra. Second, the stip
ulation is valid and enforceable
but it destroys the negotiability
of the instrument. Jones v. Rad
atz, 27 Minn. 240; Johnston Har
vester Co. v. Clark, 30 Minn. 30.8;
First Nat. Bank v. Larson, 60
Wis. 206. Third, the stipulation
is void and as it may therefore
be disregarded it does not affect
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the negotiability of the instru
ment. Gilmore v. Hirst, 56 Kan.
626; Chandler V. Kennedy, supra.
Fourth, the stipulation is void but
nevertheless it destroys the nego
tiability of the instrument. Bul
lock v. Taylor, supra; Altman V.
Rittershofer, supra; Tinsley v.
Hoskins, 111 N. C. 340; First
Nat. Bank v. Bynun, 84 N. C.
24; Huffcut's Neg. Inst. 218.
Sec. 5. When promise is unconditional.—An unquali
fied order or promise to pay is unconditional within the
meaning of this act, though coupled with:
First, An indication of a particular fund out of
which reimbursement is to be made, or a particular ac
count to be debited with the amount; or
Second, A statement of the transaction which gives
rise to the instrument.”
But an order or promise to pay out of a particular
fund is not unconditional.”
1—An indication of a particular
fund out of which the drawer is
to reimburse himself or a direc
tion to charge the amount to a
particular account has never been
regarded as a qualification of the
general order to pay. The re
quisite of a valid bill of exchange
is an unconditional order to pay
on the general account of the
drawer. That order may be
coupled with a direction to charge
the amount to a particular fund
without invalidating the bill. For
example; an order in the follow
ing terms: Pay to the order of
A one thousand dollars out of the
dividends on my bank stock is
a non-negotiable bill, but an order
in the following terms: Pay to the
order of A one thousand dollars
and reimburse yourself out of
dividends On my bank Stock
or charge to dividends on my
bank stock, is a negotiable bill.
The real test to be applied is,
is the order to pay uncondition
al and absolute? If it is, then
any subsequent statement indi
cating a mode of reimbursement
does not make it conditional and
does not destroy negotiability. If
the drawee is confined to a par
ticular fund, the bill is not nego
tiable. If he is directed to pay
absolutely and to look to a par
ticular fund for his reimburse
ment, the bill is negotiable; Mun
ger v. Shannon, 61 N. Y. 251;
Schmittler v. Simon, 101 N. Y.
554. This case involved the nego
tiability of a draft drawn upon
and accepted by an executor. The
draft contained the Words “and
charge the amount against me
and Of my mother's estate.” It
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was held that the reference to
the estate was not an order to pay
Out of it but that the estate was
referred to simply as a means of
reimbursement.
In Macleed V. Snee, 2 Stra.
762, the plaintiff declared upon a
bill wherein. A requested the, de
fendant to pay plaintiff or order
a principal sum “as my quarterly
half pay to be due from 24th
June to 27th of September next,
by advance.” The court held
that the mention of half pay
was only by Way of direction
how the drawee Should reim
burse himself. The instrument
was held to be a bill of ex
change.
Redman V. Adams, 51 Me.
429, is a leading case. The
bill involved in this case Was as
follows: “For Value received
please pay to order of G. F. and
C. A. Tilden $40 and charge the
same against whatever may be
due me for my share of fish
caught on board Schooner “Morn
ing Star, for the fishing Season
of 1860.” It was held that this
was an order to pay absolutely
and without contingency and that
the last clause merely indicated
the means of reimbursement, and
the payment of the order was
not made to depend upon his hav
ing any share of the fish, nor
was the call limited to the pro
ceeds thereof. To the same ef
fect, Whitney v. Eliot Nat. Bank,
137 Mass. 351; Nichols v. Rug
gles, 76 Me. 27; Corbett v. Clark,
45 Wis. 403; Ellett v. Britton, 6
Tex. 229; Griffin v. Weatherby,
L. R. 3 Q. B. 753. See Shepard
V. Abbott, 179 Mass. 300, in which
the order read: “and charge the
Same to the $1800 payment.” It
was held that the negotiability
Of the draft was not affected by
this provision (this case was de
cided after the statute went into
effect in Massachusetts, but no
reference is made to it).
In Crofton V. Crofton, 33 Ch.
D. 612, the bill involved was
as follows: “At sight pay to my
order the sum of 7,000l sterling,
which sum is on account on the
dividends and interests due on the
capital and dividends registered
in the books of the governor and
of the Bank of England and
Company, in the name of Col
clough and Boyse, which you will
please charge to my account and
credit according to a registered
letter I have addressed to you.”
The instrument was held to be a
good bill of exchange under the
corresponding provision of the
bills of exchange act, section 3,
(3). p
2-Beardelee v. Horton, 3 Mich.
560; Littlefield v. Hodge, 6 Mich.
326; Preston v. Whitney, 23 Mich.
260; Wright v. Irwin, 33 Mich.
32; Howry v. Eppinger, 34 Mich.
29; Hudson v. Emmons, 107 Mich.
549; Markey v. Corey, 108 Mich.
184; Choate v. Stevens, 116 Mich.
28; Siegel V. Chicago Trust and
Savings Bank, 131 Ill. 569; Wells
v. Brigham, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 6;
Hereth v. Meyer, 33 Ind. 511;
Roberts v. Jacks, 31 Ark. 597.
The transactions for which the
notes in the foregoing cases were
generally given involved the pur
chase of goods, chattels, or the
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performance of Some contract. AS
an illustration; in Preston V.
Whitney there was added at the
foot of the note this provision:
“this note is to be Valid as part
pay of a pianoforte of me at a
retail price.” In Siegel V. Chi
cago Trust and Savings Bank the
promise was to pay three hundred
dollars “for the privilege of one
framed advertising sign etc.” But
See Post V. Kinzua Hemlock R’y
Co., 171 Pa. St. 615.
3-The reason for this is that
in such a case the payment de
pends upon the Sufficiency of the
particular fund indicated which
may prove inadequate. Munger
v. Shannon, 61 N. Y. 251; Aver
ett's Admr. V. Booker, 15 Gratt.
163; Kelly V. Bronson, 26 Minn.
359; Hoagland V. Erck, 11 Neb.
580; West v. Foreman, 21 Ala.
400. But see Corbett v. Clark,
45 Wis. 403; Price v. Jones, 105
Ind. 543.
In Nat. Savings Bank V. Cable,
73 Conn. 568, 48 Atl. 428 (a case
under the statute) it was held
that an order to pay A or order
$300 “or what may be due on
Imy deposit book” was not nego
tiable.
This order would appear to
be in contravention of Section
3 subdivision 2 and non-negotia
ble in that it is not an order for
the payment of a sum certain.
Sec. 6. Determinable future time; what constitutes.—
An instrument is payable at a determinable future time,
within the meaning of this act, which is expressed to be
payable:
First, At a fixed period after date or sight; or
Second, On or before a fixed or determinable future
time specified therein;” or
Third, On or at a fixed period after the occurrence of
a specified event, which is certain to happen, though the
time of happening be uncertain.”
An instrument payable upon a contingency is not ne
gotiable, and the happening of the event does not cure
the defect."
1—Where the parties insert a
specific date of payment the in
strument is payable then at all
events,—and this although in the
same instrument an uncertain and
different time of payment may be
mentioned, as, that it shall be
payable upon a particular day or
upon the completion of a house
or the performance of other Con
tracts and the like. Siegel V.
Chicago Trust and Savings Bank,
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131 Ill. 569. The Wisconsin act
makes Special provision for a con
tingency of this sort. See note 4.
2–In such a case the legal
rights of the holder are clear
and certain. The instrument is
due at a time fixed and it is not
due before. True, the maker may
pay sooner if he choose, but this
option if exercised would be a
payment in advance of the legal
liability to pay and nothing more.
Mattison v. Marks, 31 Mich. 421;
Helmer V. Krolick, 36 Mich. 371;
Smith v. Ellis, 29 Me. 422; Bu
chanan v. Wren (Tex.), 30 S. W.
1077; Charlton v. Reed, 61 Iowa
166; Jordan v. Tate, 19 Ohio St.
586; Ernst v. Steckman, 74 Pa.
St. 13; Albertson v. Laughlin, 173
Pa. St. 525. In this case the
note was made payable twelve
months after date or before, if
the money was made out of the
sale of a machine.
3—The requirement is absolute
that the event is sure to happen
at some future time. So, if the
event might not happen, no mat
ter how probable its happening
may be, it is not, according to
the weight of authority, and it
would seem of reason, a nego
tiable instrument. Thus, if it is
payable when X shall come of age
it is not a good bill or note, be
cause X may die before he comes
of age. Rice v. Rice, 43 App.
Div. N. Y. 458, 60 N. Y. Supp.
97. If payable at or within a
certain time after one's death it
is good, because death is some
thing sure to occur. Cooke v.
Colehan, 2 Str. 1217; Bristol v.
Warner, 19 Conn. 7; Shaw v.
Camp, 160 Ill. 425, 43 N. E. 608;
Hegeman v. Moon, 60 Hun 412,
30 N. E. 487. For further illus
trations See Chandler V. Cary, 64
Mich. 238; Brooks V. Hargreaves,
21 Mich. 255; Smith v. Wan
Blark.com, 45 Mich. 371; First
Nat. Bank V. Carson, 60 Mich. 432;
Pearson v. Garrett, 4 Mod. 242;
Husband v. Epling, 81 Ill. 172.
A note payable at a certain time
after peace between the Confed
erate States and the United States
is not contingent, Since peace
must come at some time, Mortee
V. Edwards, 20 La. Ann. 236.
There are some cases to the
effect that moral certainty, as
distinguished from absolute cer
tainty is sufficient to satisfy the
rule. Thus, it has been held that
an instrument payable at a cer
tain time after a government ship
is paid off, would be negotiable,
because the government is sure
to pay. Andrews V. Franklin, 1
Str. 24; Evans v. Underwood, 1
Wils. 262. But this holding has
been criticized and distrusted.
Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec. 46.
Mr. Bigelow says that the doc
trine should be taken with hesi
tation because it cannot be found
ed on any custom. Bigelow's Bills,
Notes and Cheques, 2nd. ed., 36.
Certain expressions falling short
of absolute certainty have been
interpreted to mean a reasonable
time. And instruments loaded
with such expressions have been
held negotiable. For example: a
note payable as soon as collected
from my accounts at P was held
negotiable and payable in a rea
Sonable time. Ubsdell V. Cun
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ningham, 22 Mo. 124. So of a
note payable “as soon as I re
ceive the sum mentioned from
the government, or as soon as
Otherwise convenient.” Jones W.
Isler, 3 Kan. 128.
4-Where an instrument is
made payable when a certain per
Son shall become of age, his
actually coming of age does not
make the instrument negotiable.
Goss v. Nelson, 1 Burr 226; Kel
ley v. Hemmingway, 13 Ill. 604;
First Nat. Bank V. Alton, 60
Conn. 402; Duffield V. Johnston,
96 N. Y. 369; Carlos V. Fancourt,
5 T. R. 482.
The Wisconsin act contains an
additional subdivision, number 4.
“At a fixed period after date or
sight, although payable before
then, on a contingency.”
Sec. 7. Additional provisions not affecting negotia
bility.—An instrument which contains an order or
promise to do any act in addition to the payment of
money is not negotiable." But the negotiable character
of an instrument otherwise negotiable is not affected
by a provision which:
First, Authorizes the sale of collateral securities in
case the instrument be not paid at maturity,” or
Second, Authorizes a confession of judgment if the
instrument be not paid at maturity;” or
Third, Waives the benefit of any law intended for
the advantage or protection of the obligor; or
Fourth, Gives the holder an election to require some
thing to be done in lieu of payment of money.”
But nothing in this section shall validate any provi
sion or stipulation otherwise illegal.”
1–In determining whether pa
per is negotiable it alone can be
looked to. First Nat. Bank V.
Greenville Nat. Bank, 84 Tex. 40.
The instrument must not contain
an order or promise to do any
act in addition to the payment
of money; otherwise it will be
rendered non-negotiable. Hum
phrey v. Beckwith, 48 Mich. 151;
Davies v. Wilkinson, 10 A. & E.
98; Leonard v. Mason, 1 Wend.
522; Cook v. Satterlee, 6 Cow.
108; Killam v. Schoeps, 26 Kan.
310; Bunker v. Athearn, 35 Me.
364.
Agreement to pay taxes: An
instrument is non-negotiable
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which contains a promise to pay
a Specified amount and all taxes
assessed against the land de
Scribed in a mortgage given to
Secure Such instrument Or against
the mortgagee's interest in said
land. Walker V. Thompson, 108
Mich. 686. And this, even though
at the time of the execution of
the note there is no statute au
thorizing an assessment upon the
interest of the mortgagee. Car
mody v. Crane, 110 Mich. 508.
And so, too, where the interest
of a mortgagee in lands was tax
able as Such under the law in
force at the time of the execu
tion of the mortgage; since the
amount payable to or on behalf of
the mortgagee is thereby rendered
uncertain. Brooke V. Struthers,
110 Mich. 562. But a mortgage
note is not rendered non-nego
tiable by a provision in the mort
gage requiring the mortgagor to
pay all taxes and assessments
upon the mortgaged premises,
where the same obligation rested
upon him by law at the time the
instruments were executed, inde
pendent of any such stipulation.
Wilson v. Campbell, 110 Mich.
580. Accord: Cox v. Cayan, 117
Mich. 599. On the general import
of this provision see Thorpe v.
Mindeman (Wis.), 101 N. W. 417
(a case under the statute).
2—An instrument does not lose
its negotiable character because
of a recital that the maker has
deposited collateral security for
its payment which he agrees may
be sold in a specified manner. Cox
v. Cayan, supra; Goss v. Emerson,
23 N. H. 38; Valley Nat. Bank v.
Crowell, 148 Pa. St. 284, 23 Atl.
1068.
A provision authorizing the Sale
of collateral in case of non-pay
ment does not render the note non
negotiable. Wise V. Charlton, 4
A. & E. 786; Towne v. Rice, 122
Mass. 67; Perry v. Bigelow, 128
Mass. 129; Arnold V. Rock River
&c. Co., 5 Duer. 207; Heard v.
Bank, 8 Neb. 16; Kirkwood V.
Carroll, 72 L. J. K. B. 208 (a
case under the corresponding pro
Vision of the bills of exchange
act). But a note on the margin
Of Which are Written the Words
“given as collateral security with
agreement” is not negotiable; Cas
tello v. Crowell, 127 Mass. 293.
3-This provision, says Mr.
Crawford, who drew the New
York act, was inserted in the act
to meet the requirements in
Some of the states where judg
ment notes are in use. It changes
the law of Michigan as declared
in Conrad Seipp Brewing Co. v.
McKittrick, 86 Mich. 191. It may
be questioned, however, whether
the Court declared the note in
that case non-negotiable by rea
Son of the following provision:
“And to secure the payment of
said note I hereby authorize ir
revocably any attorney of any
court of record to appear for me
in such court in term time or
Vacation, at any time hereafter
and confess a judgment without
process, in favor of the holder
of this note, for such amount as
may appear to be unpaid thereon,”
or by reason of the further pro
vision “together with costs and
usual attorney's fees.” It ap
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pears that Judge Champlin based
his holding “that the instrument
is not a promissory note” upon
cases which had held instruments
non-negotiable by reason of a stip
ulation therein for the payment
of costs of collection and attor
ney's feeS.
In Pennsylvania it was held
that a warrant of attorney ren
dered a note non-negotiable.
Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. St. 346;
Sweeney V. Thickstun, 77 Pa. St.
131.
Mr. Daniel States that the
later cases maintain that such a
provision does not render the
note non-negotiable. Daniel's Neg.
Inst. 5th ed. Sec. 61; Osborn V.
Hawley, 19 Ohio 130; Clements v.
Hull, 35 Ohio St. 141; Gilmore v.
Hirst, 56 Kan. 626, 44 Pac. 603;
Mumford v. Tolman, 157 Ill. 258,
41 N. E. 617.
In Wisconsin Yearly Meet
ing &c. V. Babbler, 115 Wis.
289 (a case under the statute)
it was held that a power
of attorney contained in a note
“to confess judgment any time
after the date of the note wheth
er due or not” destroyed its nego
tiability, as the statute authorized
a confession only at maturity.
4—This provision of the act is
designed to meet the practice,
common in some of the States,
of inserting in promissory notes
a waiver of the benefits of home
stead and exemption laws. It has
generally been held that the pro
vision in a negotiable instrument
waiving such benefits does not im
pair the negotiable character of
the instrument. Hughitt v. John
son, 28 Fed. 865; Lyon v. Mar
tin, 31 Kan. 411. In Zimmerman
V. Anderson, 67 Pa. St. 421, the
Court said that a provision of
this kind instead of clogging the
negotiability of the instrument
adds to it and gives additional
Value to the note. Accord: First
Nat. Bank v. Slaughter, 98 Ala.
602; Zimmerman v. Rote, 75 Pa.
St. 188; Walker v. Woollen, 54
Ind. 164.
5-The negotiable quality of an
instrument is not affected by a
provision which leaves a choice
With the holder to receive some
thing other than money, but
leaves no election to the debtor
to pay in anything less than
money. For example, the holder's
right to elect to take stock of a
corporation in lieu of a payment
in money. Hodges V. Shuler, 22
N. Y. 114; Hosstatter V. Wilson,
36 Barb. 307; Dinsmore v. Dun
can, 57 N. Y. 573; Mosley v.
Walker, 84 Ga. 274; Owen v.
Barnum, 7 Ill. 461.
6—The full significance of this
provision can be understood only
by taking into consideration the
fact that this statute was drawn
with a view to ultimate adoption
throughout the United States. See
Introduction. The object of this
provision is to rebut the infer
ence of an intent to make Valid
any agreement or stipulation made
invalid by the settled policy of
the state or by any statute, such
for example as the “Bohemian
oats” statute, so called, Mich. C.
L. '97, secs. 11370-11372.
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Sec. 8. Omissions; seal; particular money.—The val
idity and negotiable character of an instrument are not
affected by the fact that:
First, It is not dated; or
Second, Does not specify the value given, or that any
value has been given therefor;” or
Third, Does not specify the place where it is drawn
or the place where it is payable;” or
Fourth, Bears a seal," or
Fifth, Designates a particular kind of current money
in which payment is to be made.”
But nothing in this section shall alter or repeal any
statute requiring in certain cases the nature of the con
sideration to be stated in the instrument."
1-It has never been deemed
necessary to the validity of a
negotiable instrument that it
should be dated. Husbrook V.
Wilder, 1 Pin. (Wis.) 643; Mich.
Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt. 11.
When an instrument is dated the
date expressed is only presump
tive evidence of the actual time
of execution. When an instru
ment is not dated the time of its
maturity should be computed
from its delivery. Cowing v. Alt
man, 71 N. Y. 435.
As between immediate parties
parol evidence is admissible to
show the true date of a misdated
note. Biggs v. Piper, 86 Tenn.
589. But not as between remote
parties, if an innocent purchaser
or indorser would be prejudiced
by the correction. Almich V.
Downey, 45 Minn. 460, 48 N. W.
197; Huston v. Young, 33 Me. 85.
See Sec. 19, subdivision 3.
2-The words “value received,”
although almost invariably ex
pressed in bills and notes, are not
necessary. Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th
ed., sec. 108; Mehlberg v. Tisher,
24 Wis. 607. In Edgerton v. Ed
gerton, 8 Conn. 6; and Bristol v.
Warner, 19 Conn. 7, it was held
that a promissory note not pur
porting on its face to be for value
received did not import considera
tion.
In Missouri, under a statute,
the words “value received” were
necessary in notes: Taylor v. New
man, 77 Mo. 263. Likewise in
certificates of deposit; Savings
Bank v. Nat. Bank of Commerce,
38 Fed. 800.
The omission of the words “for
value received” does not impair
the note, affect its legal import,
or weaken the presumption that
it was given for value. McLeod
v. Hunter, 29 N. Y. Misc. 558, 61
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N. Y. Supp 73 (a case under the
Statute.)
3-This affirms the general rule.
Mehlberg v. Tisher, supra.
4-This changes the rule of the
law merchant. The presence of a
seal on an instrument destroyed
its negotiable character, and ren
dered it a covenant, governed by
the rules relating to instruments
under seal. Rawson v. Davidson,
49 Mich. 607; Hopkins V. Rail
way Co., 3 Watts & Sarg. 410;
Parkinson v. McKim, 1 Pin
(Wis.) 214; Muse v. Dantzler, 85
Ala. 359; Laidley's Admr. V.
Bright's Admr., 17 W. Va. 779;
Clark v. Farmers Mfg. Co., 15
Wend. 256; Brown v. Jordhal, 32
Minn. 135. Whether the seal of
a corporation destroyed the nego
tiability of its note has been dif
ferently decided by different
courts. The paper of a corpora
tion is not deprived of its nego
tiability by being executed under
seal. Chase Nat. Bank V. Faurot,
149 N. Y. 532; Marine Mfg. Co.
v. Bradley, 105 U. S. 175; Mercer
County v. Hacket, 1 Wallace 83;
Bank V. R. R. Co., 5 S. C. 156;
Weeks v. Esler, 143 N. Y. 374.
The paper of a corporation is de
prived of its negotiability by be
ing executed under Seal. Conine
V. Junction & B. R. R. Co., 3
Houst. (Del.) 289.
Before this statute Was enacted
it was provided in many states
that a promissory note under seal
was negotiable.
5—Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11
Mich. 501; Smith V. Kendall, 9
Mich. 241; Phelps v. Town, 14
Mich. 374; Johnson V. Frisbie, 15
Mich. 286; Black v. Ward, 27
Mich. 191; see note 6, sec. 3.
6–See note 6, sec. 7.
Sec. 9. When payable on demand.—An instrument is
payable on demand:
First, When it is expressed to be payable on demand,
or at sight, or on presentation; or
Second, In which no time for payment is expressed.”
Where an instrument is issued, accepted, or indorsed
when overdue, it is
,
a
s regards the person so issuing,
accepting, o
r indorsing it
,
payable on demand.”
1—This changes the rule in
Michigan. By the law merchant
all instruments payable at sight
were entitled to grace; instru
ments payable on demand were
not entitled to grace. Daniel’s
Neg. Inst., secs. 617-619, and cases.
This rule prevails in Michigan by
the additional force of the sta
tute; C. L. '97, secs. 4871-72. The
rule of the law merchant is illus
trated by Walsh v. Dart, 12 Wis.
709; Lucas v. Ladew, 28 Mo. 342;
Hart v. Smith, 15 Ala. 807; Cribbs
V
. Adams, 13 Gray, 597; Thorn
burg v. Emmons, 23 W. Va. 325;
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The distinction is abolished by
the statute. By this provision “at
sight,” “on demand,” and “at
presentation,” are synonymous
terms. “On demand,” “when de
manded,” “on call,” “at any time
called for,” are equivalent ex
pressions. Bowman V. McChesney,
22 Grat. 609.
Paper payable on demand is
due forthwith and suit may be
brought without demand. Palmer
V. Palmer, 36 Mich. 487; In re
Estate of King, 94 Mich. 411;
Beardsley v. Webber, 104 Mich.
88; Peninsular Savings Bank v.
Hosie, 112 Mich. 351; Citizens
Savings Bank V. Vaughan, 115
Mich. 156.
The statute of limitations runs
against demand paper from the
time of its date, if that is coin
cident with delivery. Palmer V.
Palmer, supra; In re Estate of
King, supra; Curran v. Witter,
68 Wis. 16.
Interest on a demand note pro
viding for interest after maturity
begins to run from the time de
mand is made. In re Estate of
King, supra.
2—Instruments which express
no time of payment are payable
on demand. This is the rule of
the law merchant. Aldous V.
Cornwell, L. R. 3 Q. B. 573; Col
lins v. Trotter, 81 Mo. 278; Hall
v. Toby, 110 Pa. St. 318; Mess
more v. Morrison, 172 Pa. St.
300, 34 Atl. 45; Porter v. Porter,
51 Me. 376; Bowman v. McChes
ney, supra; Keyes v. Fenstermak
er, 24 Cal. 329; Herrick v. Ben
nett, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 374; Ray
mond V. Sellick, 10 Conn. 485;
Jones v. Brown, 11 Ohio St. 601;
Bank v. Price, 52 Iowa 570; Lib
by V. Mikelburg, 28 Minn. 38;
Mitchell v. Easton, 37 Minn. 335,
sub nom. Mitchell v. Wilkins, 33
N. W. 910; Sheldon v. Heaton, 88
Hun 535; McLeod v. Hunter, 29
N. Y. Misc. 558 (a case under the
Statute). -
3—Where there is an indorse
ment after maturity, a note or
bill as to the indorser becomes
payable within a reasonable time
upon demand. Leavitt V. Put
nam, 3 N. Y. 494. Where a note
was protested and afterwards
sold by the indorsers without
erasing their indorsement they
were held liable for the payment
Of the same Without further no
tice. St. John v. Roberts, 31 N.
Y. 441. See Bills of Exchange
act, sec. 10 (2). Chalmers, com
menting on this provision, says:
“Before this enactment the En
glish law on the subject dealt
with was very obscure; but it had
been held in the United States
that where a bill Was indorsed
after maturity the indorser was
entitled to have it presented for
payment and to receive notice of
dishonor in the event of non-pay
ment within a reasonable time,
citing Patterson v. Todd, 18 Pa.
St. 433; Eisenlord V. Dillenback,
15 Hun (N. Y.) 23; aliter, if
the indorser take up a dishonored
bill and reissue it on his original
indorsement, if his liability was
then already fixed, citing St. John
v. Robert, 31 N. Y. 441.
This provision of the statute ex
presses the American rule. The in
dorsement of a bill or note which
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is overdue is the equivalent of
drawing a new instrument paya
ble at sight. Bishop V. Dexter,
2 Conn. 219; Mudd V. Harper, 1
Md. 110. In such cases, present
ment for payment must be made
and notice of dishonor given as
in Other instances of instruments
payable on demand. Berry V.
Robinson, 9 Johns. 121; Rosson V.
Carroll, 90 Tenn. 90. Where a
note negotiated before due is fur
ther negotiated, after it has been
dishonored, the holder takes the
legal title and can maintain a
Suit upon it in his own name in
the same manner as if he had
received it before due. French V.
Jarvis, 29 Conn. 353; Crawford's
An. Neg. Inst. Law, 18.
Sec. 10. When payable to order.—The instrument is
payable to order where it is drawn payable to the order
of a specified person or to him or his order." It may
be drawn payable to the order of:
First, A payee who is not maker, drawer, or drawee;
Or"
Second, The drawer or maker,” or
Third, The drawee,” or
£ourth, Two or more payees jointly; or
Fifth, One or some of several payees;" or
Sixth, The holder of an office for the time being.”
Where the instrument is payable to order, the payee
must be named or otherwise indicated therein with
reasonable certainty."
1—This is a change from the
similar provision in the Bills of
Exchange Act, which provides that
“a bill is payable to order which
is expressed to be so payable or
which is expressed to be payable
to a particular person and does
not contain words prohibiting
transfer or indicating an inten
tion that it should not be trans
ferred.” See Bills of Exchange
Act, sec. 8 (4). The American
statute affirms the rule of the
common law on this point, that
an instrument payable to a speci
fied person is not negotiable
Smith V. Kendall, 6 T. R. 123, 1
Esp. 231; Bank V. Apperson, 4
Fed. 25; Maule v. Crawford, 14
Hun 193; Carnwright V. Gray, 127
N. Y. 92.
2—An instrument payable to
the drawer or maker is without
legal inception until it is in
dorsed by the payee. Moses v.
Bank, 149 U. S. 298; Pickering
v. Cording, 92 Ind. 306, 47 Am.
Rep. 145; see sec. 186. In Cham
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berlain v. Young, 1893, 2 Q. B.
206 (a case under the Bills of
Exchange Act) the material part
of the bill was as follows: “Five
months after date pay to
order the sum of etc.” It was
held that this must mean: pay
to my order, and hence it was
a Valid bill.
3—The validity of a bill is not
destroyed by the fact that the
drawee and payee are identical.
Wildes v. Savage, 1 Story 22, Fed.
Cas. No. 7653; Witte v. Williams,
8 S. C. 290, 28 Am. Rep. 294;
Commonwealth v. Buttrick, 100
Mass. 12. See Bills of Exchange
Act, Sec. 5 (1).
4—A note payable to two or
more persons imports presump
tively a joint and coequal inter
est, but this does not preclude
proof that the consideration
moved from them in separate and
unequal amounts and values. Tis
dale v. Maxwell, 58 Ala. 40; Gor
don V. Anderson, 83 Iowa 224. The
note in this case reading “pay
to Charles R. Whitsell et al or
order” was held non-negotiable.
5—Mr. Crawford illustrates the
meaning of this subdivision by
the following example: “A draft
payable to A, B & C or either
of them or any two of them.”
Crawford's Ann. Neg. Inst. LaW,
19. If this illustration cor
rectly interprets the meaning of
this Subdivision—and Mr. Craw
ford's construction is entitled to
great consideration,-the existing
law has been changed because the
statute recognizes an instrument
payable to two payees in the al
ternative as negotiable whereas,
under the law merchant an in
strument payable to two persons
in the alternative is not negotia
ble. Musselman V. Oakes, 19 Ill.
81; Carpenter v. Farnsworth, 106
Mass. 561; Walrad v. Petrie, 4
Wend. 575; Blanckenhogen V.
Blundell, 2 B. & Ald. 417. But
See Watson V. Evans, 1 Hurl. &
Colt. 663; Spaulding V. Evans,
2 McLean, 139, Fed. Cas. No.
13216; Record v. Chisum, 25 Tex.
348.
The question has not been
passed upon by the courts.
6–Thus, a note payable to
White, Davis and McLane, trus
tees Apalachicola Land Co., or
their successors in office, or or
der, is negotiable. Davis V.
Garr, 6 N. Y. 124. See also
Storm v. Sterling, 3 El. & Bl.
832; Holmes V. Jacques, 1 Q. B.
376. The Bills of Exchange Act,
Sec. 7 (2) changed the prior
English law as laid down in Cow
ie v. Sterling, 6 El. & Bl. 333.
7-It is not essential that the
payee be named; it is sufficient
if he be indicated With reason
able certainty. The maxim id
certum est quod certum reddi po
test applies. Thus, a note pay
able to “the administrators of
Abner Chase deceased” was held
sufficiently certain as to the
payee. Adams v. King, 16 Ill.
169. See United States v. White,
2 Hill 59; Moody v. Threlkeld,
13 Ga. 55; Blackman v. Lehman,
63 Ala. 547; Knight v. Jones, 21
Mich. 161.
A check drawn without the
name of a payee and with a line
drawn through the space reserved
4
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for the name of the payee is in
Valid for the reason that it is
without a payee. Where the
drawer of a check not only fails
to insert the name of a payee or
leave a blank where the name of
the payee may be inserted, but
draws a line through the blank
Space, making it impossible for
anyone else to do so, he indicates
very clearly not only that he de
clined to name a payee but in
tended to make it impossible for
anyone else to do so. Gordon V.
Lansing State Bank, 133 Mich. 143.
Sec. 11. When payable to bearer.—The instrument is
payable to bearer:
First, When it is expressed to be so payable; or
Second, When it is payable to a person named therein
or bearer;” or
Third, When it is payable to the order of a fictitious
or non-existing person, and such fact was known to
the person making it so payable;” or
Fourth, When the name of the payee does not pur
port to be the name of any person; or
Fifth, When the only or last indorsement is an in
dorsement in blank."
1—Illustration: Pay to the bear
er hereof, as in bonds and coupons.
2—A note payable to the Order
of A or bearer is the same as
payable to bearer. Bitzer v. Wa
gar, 83 Mich. 223. It is not nec
essary to use the word bearer. A
note payable to A or holder is
payable to bearer. Putnam V.
Crymes, 1 McMullen (S. C.) 9, 36
Am. Dec. 250; Eddy v. Bond, 19
Me. 461; see Sec. 32.
3–Compare Bills of Exchange
act, sec. 7 (3). The difference be
tween the two statutes is impor
tant. The element of knowledge
is the distinguishing feature. Un
der the English statute the paper
is payable to bearer if the payee
be a fictitious or non-existing per
Son. Under the American statute
paper payable to a fictitious or
non-existing person is not payable
to bearer unless the maker or
drawer knew that the payee was
a fictitious or non-existing person.
Under the English statute the
fact governs; under the Ameri
can statute the fact coupled with
knowledge governs. Thus there
has been carried into the two stat
utes the differences heretofore ex
isting in the authorities, as will
appear from the following: The
authorities agree that if the mak
er Or drawer of an instrument
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knew at the time of making or
drawing it that the payee was a
fictitious or non-existing person,
the instrument is payable to bear
er. The authorities disagree upon
the effect of absence of knowl
edge. Some courts hold that pa
per payable to a fictitious or non
existing person is not payable to
bearer unless the paper was put
in circulation by the maker with
knowledge that the name of the
payee does not represent a real
person. A statute in New York
prior to the enactment of the Ne
gotiable Instrument Law provided
that paper made payable to the
order of a fictitious person and
negotiated by the maker should
have the same Validity as against
the maker and all persons hav
ing knowledge of the facts as if
payable to bearer. Shipman V.
Bank, 126 N. Y. 318, was a case
in which a clerk of the plaintiff
made out checks to fictitious per
sons and indorsed the names of
the payees and procured the
checks to be cashed at the drawee
bank. It was held that such pa
per could not be treated as pay
able to bearer. The court said:
“We are of the opinion upon ex
amination of the authorities that
this rule applies only to paper
put in circulation by the maker
with the knowledge that the name
of the payee does not represent
a real person. The maker's in
tention is the controlling consid
eration which determines the char
acter of such paper. It cannot
be treated as payable to bearer
unless the maker knows the payee
to be fictitious and actually in
tends to make the paper payable
to a fictitious person.” To the
same effect: Armstrong v. Bank,
46 Ohio St. 512; Chism v. Bank,
96 Tenn. 641; First Nat. Bank V.
Farmer's Bank, 56 Neb. 149; Tat
lock v. Harris, 3 T. R. 174. The
contrary view is upheld by Mr.
Daniel, Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th
ed., Sec. 139, wherein the author
Says, that it will be no defense
for the maker to set up the fact
that he did not know the payee
to be fictitious. The weight of
authority would appear to be
against the learned author, but
he is supported by: Kohn V.
Watkins, 26 Kan. 691; Lane V.
Kreekle, 22 Iowa 404; Meridian
Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 7 Ind.
App. 322, 33 N. E. 247, on rehear
ing 34 N. E. 608. The state of
the law in England prior to the
enactment of the Bills of Ex
change act is summed up by
Bowen, L. J., in Vagliano V. Bank
of England, 23 Q. B. Div. 243, as
follows: “Down to the date of
the passing of the recent statute
(Bills of Exchange Act) the ex
ception that bills drawn to the
Order of a fictitious or non-exist
ing payee might be treated as
payable to bearer was based uni
formly upon the law of estoppel
and applied only against the par
ties who at the time they became
liable Were cognizant of the fic
titious character or of the non
existence of the supposed payee.”
And it was held in that case that
the Bills of Exchange Act affirmed
the then existing law on this
point. On appeal the judgment
was overruled, Bank of England
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V. Vagliano H. L. [1891] A. C.
107, wherein it was held that
the section in question changed
the existing law. Lord Her
Schell, referring to the words
Of the SubSection said: “I con
fess they appear to me to be free
from ambiguity. “Where the payee
is a fictitious or non-existing per
son, means surely according to
ordinary canons of construction,
in every case where this can, as a
matter of fact, be predicated of
the payee. I can find no warrant
in the statute itself for inserting
any limitation or condition. * * *
I find it impossible, without doing
violence to the language of the
statute, to give any other answer
than this,—in all cases in which
the payee is a fictitious or non
existent person. The majority of
the Court of Appeal read the sec
tion thus: Where the payee is a
fictitious or non-existent person,
the bill may, as against any party
who had knowledge of the fact,
be treated as a bill payable to
bearer. It seems to me that this
is to add to the words of the
statute and to insert a limitation
which is not to be found in it Or
indicated by it. It is said that
when the acceptor is the person
against whom the bill is to be
treated as payable to bearer ‘fic
titious’ must mean fictitious as
regards the acceptor, and to his
knowledge. I am unable to See
why it must mean this.” This
case is followed by Clutton v. At
tenborough [1897] A. C. 90. In
this case the plaintiff drew cer
tain checks in favor of a perSOn
named Brett, believing him to be
a real person. There was in fact
no such person, but the name was
provided by a clerk who intended
to commit a fraud and appropri
ate the money of his employers.
The clerk negotiated the checks
by endorsing the name of Brett
upon the same. It was held that
these checks were within the lan
guage of the act; that they were
payable to a fictitious and non-ex
isting person and therefore pay
able to bearer.
See C. L. Mich. 4870; Shaw v.
Brown, 128 Mich. 573.
4—Illustrations: Checks drawn
payable to the order of “bills
payable,” or “cash,” or “sun
dries,” etc. Such instruments are
payable to bearer for the reason
that the use of the Words “or or
der” indicates an intention that
the paper shall be negotiated. Mc
Intosh v. Lytle, 26 Minn. 336, 3
N. W. 983, 37 Am. Rep. 410; Wil
lets v. Phoenix Bank, 2 Duer 121.
5-Howry v. Eppinger, 34 Mich.
29; Curtis V. Sprague, 51 Cal.
239; Unaka Nat. Bank V. Butler
(Tenn. 1904), 83 S. W. 65 (a case
under the statute); Mass. Nat.
Bank v. Snow (Mass. 1905), 72 N.
E. 959 (a case under the statute).
Where a note indorsed in blank
by a payee is afterwards trans
ferred by special indorsement it
is still transferable by delivery
and the party to whom it is so
transferred may make title by
filling up the blank indorsement
to himself and striking out subse
quent ones. Watervliet Bank v.
White, 1 Den. (N. Y.) 608.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN GENERAL. 53
Sec. 12. Terms when sufficient.—The instrument need
not follow the language of this act, but any terms are
sufficient which clearly indicate an intention to conform
to the requirements hereof."
1-Illustration: An ex p r e SS
promise is requisite to a promis
sory note, but the use of the word
“promise” is not neceSSary.
“Agree,” “undertake,” “engage,” or
“stipulate,” would probably be
held equivalent, or any word
which would amount to a decla
ration of the maker's will to pay.
The imperative form need not be
used in a bill of exchange. Lan
guage indicating an expression of
the drawer's will that the money
should be paid is sufficient. The
instrument may be written in pen
cil as well as in ink. Geary V.
Physic, 5 B. & C. 234; Brown v.
Butchers Bank, 6 Hill 443. It
may be written in a foreign lan
guage. Debebian V. Galá, 64 Md.
262. An order written under a
note, “please pay the above note
and hold it against me in our
settlement,” signed by the draw
er and accepted by the drawee,
was held a good bill. Leonard v.
Mason, 1 Wend. 522. An instru
ment in the following form: “Na
thaniel O. Winslow cr. by labor
16-3/4 days at $4 per day, $67,
good to bearer, signed, William
Vanick,” was held a negotiable
promissory note payable on de
mand. Hussey v. Winslow, 59 Me.
170.
In certificates of deposit there
is sometimes an express prom
ise to pay, but the promise
is most frequently implied from
the word “payable,” used in con
nection with the acknowledgment
of the deposit, or receipt of a
named sum of money, by or for
the benefit of the person to whom
or to whose Order the payment is
to be made. First Nat. Bank V.
Greenville Nat. Bank, 84 Tex. 40.
Sec. 13. Date, presumption as to.—Where the instru
ment or an acceptance or any indorsement thereon is
dated, such date is deemed prima facie to be the true
date of the making, drawing, acceptance, or indorse
ment, as the case may be."
1—Anderson v. Weston, 8 Scott
583.
The presumption is that the
note was executed and delivered
on the day of its date, but such
presumption is removable. May
bury v. Berkery, 102 Mich. 126;
Hill v. Dunham, 7 Gray 543. If
the date be a dies mon, the law
adopts the nearest day. Thus, a
note dated September 31, will be
considered to have been made Sep
tember 30. Wagner v. Kenner, 2
Rob. (La.) 120. See note 1, Sec. 8.
54 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.
Sec. 14. Ante-dated and post-dated.—The instrument
is not invalid for the reason only that it is ante-dated
or post-dated, provided this is not done for an illegal
or fraudulent purpose. The person to whom an instru
ment so dated is delivered acquires the title thereto as
of the date of delivery."
1—The indorsee of a bill post
dated and indorsed by the payee
who died before the day of its
date derives title through the in
dorsement and can recover from
the drawer. Pasmore V. North, 13
East. 517. This case was fol
lowed by Brewster v. McCardel, 8
Wend. 478.
Where a false date is put
in to evade some law, the in
strument is void as to all par
ties having notice. Bayley V. Ta
ber, 5 Mass. 286; Serle v. Norton,
9 M. & W. 309. So, too, if its
purpose is to effect a fraudulent
design. Lansing V. Gaine, 2
Johns. (N. Y.) 300; Vail v. Van
Doren, 45 Neb. 450, 63 N. W. 787.
The fact that a note is negotiated
prior to the day of its date is not
a Suspicious circumstance against
which parties must guard. Brew
ster V. McCardel, supra. On the
general proposition of the section
see Gatty v. Fry, 2 Ex. D. 265,
36 L. T. (n. S.) 182, and cases
cited. A post dated draft purport
ing to be payable at sight is for
all the legal purposes of present
ment, demand, protest, and pay
ment, a draft payable a certain
time after date, for example, ac
tual date 10th, post date 20th, ma
turity thirteen days after actual
date. New York Iron Mine V.
Citizens Bank, 44 Mich. 344.
Sec. 15. Date; when may be inserted.—Where an in
strument expressed to be payable at a fixed period after
date is issued undated, or where the acceptance of an
instrument payable at a fixed period after sight is
undated, any holder may insert therein the true date
of issue or acceptance, and the instrument shall be
payable accordingly. The insertion of a wrong date
does not avoid the instrument in the hands of a subse
quent holder in due course; but as to him, the date
so inserted is to be regarded as the true date.”
1—When a note is made for an- date and delivered to him, he is
other's accommodation without authorized to fill in the date as
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the sees fit. Androscoggin V. Kim
ball, 10 Cush. 373; see next sec
tion.
2-First State Savings Bank V.
Webster, 121 Mich. 149.
Where a note was made on
June 10th, payable thirty days
date So as to read June 1st, 1859,
it Was held he could recover
against a prior accommodation in
dorser on the ground that he had
implied authority from both mak
er and prior indorsers to fill the
blank With any day in the month.
after date, dated June –, 1859, Page v. Morrel, 3 Abb. Dec. (N.
and a subsequent indorser to Y.) 433; Inglish v. Breneman, 5
whom it was negotiated June Ark. 377, holding to the contrary
15th, filled in the blank in the is not supported by authority.
Sec. 16. Blanks; when may be filled.—Where the
instrument is wanting in any material particular, the
person in possession thereof has a prima facie author
ity to complete it by filling up the blanks therein."
And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the
person making the signature, in order that the paper
may be converted into a negotiable instrument, operates
as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any
amount.” In order, however, that any such instrument,
when completed, may be enforced against any person
who became a party thereto prior to its completion, it
must be filled up strictly in accordance with the author
ity given, and within a reasonable time; but if any
such instrument, after completion, is negotiated to a
holder in due course, it is valid and effectual for a
ll
purposes in his hands, and h
e may enforce it as if it
had been filled up strictly in accordance with the au
thority given, and within a reasonable time.”
1–One who executes a promis
sory note by filling in all the
blanks on the printed form ex
cept the one designed for the rate
o
f interest, which blank is there
after filled without his knowl
edge, is liable to a bona fide
holder without notice of the al
teration. Weidman v
. Symes, 120
Mich. 657.
The maker of a note who care
lessly leaves room for an altera
tion to be made without defacing
the note, o
r exciting the suspicion
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of a careful man will be liable
upon it to a bona fide holder
without notice, when the oppor
tunity he has offered has been
embraced. First Savings Bank V.
Webster, 121 Mich. 149. To
the Same effect are the fol
lowing cases: Holmes V. Trum
per, 22 Mich. 427; Bank of Pitts
burgh V. Neal, 22 How. (U. S.)
96; Mitchell v. Culver, 7 Cow.
336; Kitchen v. Place, 41 Barb.
465; Page v. Morrel, 3 Abb. Dec.
(N. Y.) 433; Van Etta v. Even
son, 28 Wis. 33; Johnston Har
Wester Co. V. McLean, 57 Wis.
258; Yocum v. Smith, 63 Ill. 321;
Garrard V. Lewis, 10 Q. B. D. 30;
Cruchley v. Clarance, 2 M. & S.
90; Harvey v. Cane, 34 L. T. (n.
s.) 64; Boyd v. McCann, 10 Md.
118.
2—This is the Settled rule of
the law merchant. A person in
dorsing such paper to another is
liable on it when it is filled up
according to the prima facie au
thority which it gives, though
contrary to actual instructions. In
Russel V. Langstaffe, 2 Doug. 514,
a person indorsed his name upon
the back of certain checks, blank
as to sum, date and time of pay
ment. The checks were filled in
by the person to whom the in
dorser gave them, with sums,
dates, and time of payment, dif
ferent from those authorized. The
court held the indorser liable, say
ing: “The indorsement upon a
blank note is a letter of credit
for an indefinite sum.”
In Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal,
22 How. (U. S.) 107, the court
said: “Where a party to a ne
gotiable instrument intrusts it to
the custody of another, with
blanks not filled up, whether it
be for the purpose to accommo
date the person to whom it is in
trusted, or to be used for his own
benefit, such negotiable instru
ment carries on its face an im
plied authority to fill up the
blanks and perfect the instrument,
and as between such party and in
nocent third parties, the person to
whom it was so intrusted must
be deemed the agent of the party
who committed such instrument
to his custody, or in other words
it is the act of the principal, and
he is bound by it.”
See also Market Nat. Bank V.
Sargent, 85 Me. 349; Ives v. Farm
ers' Bank, 2 Allen (Mass.) 236;
Violett v. Patton, 5 Cranch 142;
Angle v. Ins. Co., 92 U. S. 330;
DePauw v. Bank, 126 Ind. 553, 25
N. E. 705, 26 N. E. 151; Brad
ford Nat. Bank v. Taylor, 75 Hun,
297, 27 N. Y. Supp. 96; Frank v.
Lilienfeld, 33 Gratt. 384; London
& Southwestern Bank V. Went
worth, 5 Ex. D. 96.
3–Boston Steel and Iron Co. v.
Steuer, 183 Mass. 140 (a case un
der the Statute). In this case a
check was brought to the plain
tiff by the defendant's husband,
signed in blank by the wife and
all filled up except the amount.
With the husband's consent the
plaintiff filled in the amount for
$400. It was held that this was
an incomplete instrument under
sections 16 and 17 and that evi
dence to show the
real
authority
of the husband was admissible.
In Guerrant v. Guerrant, 7 Wa.
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Law. Reg. 659 (1902) (a case un
der the statute) it was held that
One taking a negotiable instru
Iment before the blank in it was
filled, is put upon notice and
must ascertain the real authority
of the person intrusted with the
incomplete instrument, and that
the statute reverses the previous
Tule as established in Frank V.
Iilienfeld, 33 Gratt. 384.
Under the corresponding pro
Vision of the Bills of Exchange
act, sec. 20 (2), it has been held
that the word “negotiated” does
Inot include “issue.” Herdman V.
Wheeler, 86 L. T. (N.S.) 48. The
facts in this case were that W
gave A a note, signed in blank
and stamped with a 9d Stamp,
sufficient for a note of 75 l,
coupled with authority to fill it
up for 15 l, and make it payable
to himself and get a loan on it
for W. A. applied to H for a
loan of 25 l, saying it was for
Sec. 17.
W, who was willing to pay 5 l
for the accommodation. A filled
the amount blank with 30 l, de
livered it to H, who had no
knowledge that W had not him
Self made the note complete for
the sum of 30 l. A did not turn
the money over to W. It was
held that A's delivery of the note
to H did not “negotiate” it with
in the meaning of the act, and
H could therefore not recover.
The court Said that if the Sec
tion had been intended to include
Such a case, appropriate words
should have been used. The lan
guage Should have been “issued
or negotiated,” instead of simply
“negotiated”; that negotiation
simply meant transfer by one
holder to another, and that the
payee was not a holder in due
course. See further as to payee
being a holder in due course,
note 3, sec. 54.
Incomplete instrument not delivered.—
Where an incomplete instrument has not been delivered
it will not, if completed and negotiated, without author
ity, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder,
as against any person whose signature was placed
thereon before delivery."
1—The well established rule of
the law merchant is here af
firmed; and so a party will incur
no liability on an instrument
which bears his signature put
thereon when the instrument Was
incomplete, if such incomplete in
strument was completed and ne
gotiated without authority. Led
wich v. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307;
Davis Sewing Machine Co. v.
Best, 105 N. Y. 67; Baxendale v.
Bennett, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 525
(1878), 47 L. J. Q. B. 624. The
case last above cited is the lead
ing English case on the proposi
tion. The facts were: One
Holmes had asked the defendant
*A*-*
t.A
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for his acceptance of an accom
modation bill and the defendant
had Written his name across the
paper, which had an impressed
bill Stamp On it, and had given
it to Holmes to fill in his name
and then to use it for the pur
pose of raising money on it.
Afterwards Holmes, not requiring
accommodation, returned the pa
per to the defendant in the Same
State in which he had received it
from him. The defendant then
put it into a drawer, which was
not locked, of his writing table,
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at his chambers, to which his
clerk, laundress, and other per
sons going there, had access. He
had never authorized any person
to fill up the paper with the
drawer's name. Held, there could
be no recovery on the acceptance,
inasmuch as there was no deliv
ery; that the disposition which
the defendant made of the bill
after it was returned to him did
not amount to negligence on
which delivery could be predicat
ed. Boston Steel and Iron Co. V.
Steuer, supra, note 3.
Sec. 18. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed.
—Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incom
plete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for
the purpose of giving effect thereto." As between im
mediate parties, and as regards a remote party other
than a holder in due course, the delivery, in order to
be effectual, must be made either by or under the
authority of the party making, drawing, accepting,” or
indorsing, as the case may be; and in such case the
delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or
for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of
transferring the property in the instrument.” But
where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due
course, a valid delivery thereof by all the parties prior
to him, so as to make them liable to him, is conclusively
presumed." And where the instrument is no longer in
the possession of a party whose signature appears
thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is
presumed until the contrary is proved.”
1–Instruments of the law mer
chant, like other written con
tracts, are without legal inception
or valid existence until they have
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been delivered according to the
purpose and intent of the par
ties. Burson V. Huntington, 21
Mich. 416; Baxendale v. Bennett,
3 Q. B. D. 525 (1878); Cox v.
Troy, 5 B. & Ald. 474; Mass.
Nat. Bank V. Snow (Mass. 1905),
72 N. E. 959 (a case under the
statute).
Delivery may be made (a) by
intention, (b) by agency, (c) by
negligence, (d) by conclusive pre
sumption. Actual transfer of the
instrument from the maker to
the payee is not indispensable,
but it must appear that the mak
er in some way evidenced an in
tention to make the instrument
an enforceable obligation against
himself, according to its terms,
by surrendering control over it
and intentionally placing it in the
power of the payee or some third
person, for his use. Purviance V.
Jones, 120 Ind. 162, 21 N. E. 1099.
Intent to deliver is not sufficient;
act and intent must concur. Drum
v. Benton, 13 App. Cas. (D. C.)
245.
2—The word “accepting” is
omitted from the North Carolina
act.
3–As to conditional delivery
see Hyde v. Tenwinkel, 26 Mich.
93; McCormick Harvesting Co. v.
McKee, 51 Mich. 426; Brown v.
St. Charles, 66 Mich. 71; Central
Savings Bank v. O'Connor, 132
Mich. 578; Burke v. Dulaney, 153
U. S. 228; Bell v. Lord Ingestre,
12 Q. B. 317, 19 L. J. Q. B. 71;
Burns and Smith Lumber Co. v.
Doyle, 71 Conn. 742, 43 Alt. 483;
Merchants' Bank v. Luckow, 37
Minn. 542; Juilliard v. Chaffee,
92 N. Y. 529; Stewart v. Ander
son, 59 Ind. 375; Jones V. Shaw,
67 Mo. 667; Garner v. Fite, 93
Ala. 405; Carter v. Moulton, 51
Kan. 9. The last four cases are
to the effect that there can be no
delivery in escrow to the payee
himself.
New London Credit Syndicate
V. Neale [1898], 2 Q. B. 487,
(a case under the correspond
ing provision of the Bills of
Exchange act). The action in
this case was upon a bill by
which the defendant undertook to
pay 110 l at the end of three
months. The bill was signed and
handed over as a bill of ex
change, but there was an oral
agreement that at maturity it
Should be renewed if the defend
ant required it. “In other words,
although the written document
States that the bill is to be met
upon a day certain, the parol evi
dence is that it is not to be then
met. Nothing is more clearly
Settled than that evidence of such
an agreement is not admissible
* * * I do not think that it
was intended by the act to alter
the general law of evidence
which renders parol evidence in
admissible for the purpose of con
tradicting the terms of a written
document.”
4—This changes the rule in
Michigan as established in Bur
son V. Huntington, supra, but af
firms what is probably the nu
merical weight of authority. In
accord with Burson v. Hunting
ton: Palmer V. Poor, 121 Ind.
135; Branch v. Sinking Fund, 80
Va. 427, 56 Am. Rep. 596; Dodd
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v. Dunne, 71 Wis. 578; Hillsdale
College V. Thomas, 40 Wis. 661.
To the contrary: Kinyon V.
Wohlford, 17 Minn. 239; Faulk
ner v. White, 33 Neb. 199, 49 N.
W. 1122; Martina v. Muhlke, 186
Ill. 327, 57 N. E. 954; Gould v.
Segee, 5 Duer (N. Y.) 260; Wor
cester Bank v. Dorchester Bank,
10 Cush. 488.
72 N. E. 959; Greeser V. Sugar
man, 37 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 799,
76 N. Y. Supp. 922; Poess v.
Twelfth Ward Bank, 86 N. Y.
Supp. 857 (cases under the Sta
tute).
5–Possession of the instrument
and its production at the trial is
prima facie evidence of the plain
tiff's title, and right to Sue upon
It is presumed conclusively that
one of two joint makers of a note
had authority from the other to
deliver it, if he does so. Beman
V. Wessels, 53 Mich. 549. “Deliv
ery * * * is conclusively pre
Sumed in case a note has been
stolen and transferred by the thief
to a bona fide holder.” Mass.
Nat. Bank v. Snow (Mass. ’05),
it. Hogan v. Dreifus, 121 Mich.
453. See also Hovey V. Sebring,
24 Mich. 232; Hall V. Wortman,
123 Mich. 304; Worth V. Case, 42 N.
Y. 362; Newcombe V. Fox, 1 App.
N. Y. Div. 389, 37 N. Y. Supp
294; Moak V. Stevens, 45 Misc.
Rep. 147, 91 N. Y. Supp. 903 (a
case under the statute).
Sec. 19. Construction where instrument is ambigu
ous.—Where the language of the instrument is ambigu
ous, or there are omissions therein, the following rules
of construction apply:
First, Where the sum payable is expressed in words
and also in figures, and there is a discrepancy between
the two, the sum denoted by the words is the sum pay
able; but if the words are ambiguous or uncertain,
reference may be had to the figures to fix the amount;”
Second, Where the instrument provides for the pay
ment of interest, without specifying the date from
which interest is to run, the interest runs from the date
of the instrument, and if the instrument is undated,
from the issue thereof;”
Third, Where the instrument is not dated, it will be
considered to be dated as of the time it was issued;"
Fourth, Where there is conflict between the written
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and printed provisions of the instrument, the written
provisions prevail;”
Fifth, Where the instrument is so ambiguous that
there is doubt whether it is a bill or note, the holder
may treat it as either, at his election;"
Sixth, Where a signature is so placed upon the in
strument that it is not clear in what capacity the per
son making the same intended to sign, he is to be
deemed an indorser;"
Seventh, Where an instrument containing the words
“I promise to pay,” is signed by two or more persons,
they are deemed to be pointly and severally liable there
On.”
1—Thus, where the bill ex
pressed the sum payable in fig
ures, as 245 l, and in words two
hundred pounds, although a Stamp
was affixed applicable to the high
er amount, it was held that evi
dence to show that the words
“and forty-five” had been omit
ted by mistake was not admiss
ible. The rule is absolute that
in case of a discrepancy between
the sum expressed in words and
the sum expressed in figures, the
sum expressed in words governs.
Saunderson v. Piper, 5 Bing. N.
C. 425; Mears v. Graham, 8
Blackf. (Ind.) 144.
2–Witty v. Mich. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 123 Ind. 411. In this case
there was no sum expressed in
words. The marginal figures
expressed the sum $147.70. In
Smith v. Smith, 1 R. I.
398, 53 Am. Dec. 652, the sum
expressed in words was three hun
dred seventy-five 94/100 dollars,
in figures $175.94. The clerk of
the bank discounting the bill had
altered the figures to conform to
the written words, and the de
fendant therefore objected to its
admission in evidence as avoided
by the alteration. The court said:
“We do not think the marginal
notation constitutes any part of
the bill. It is simply a memo
randum or abridgment of the con
tents of the bill for the conven
ience of reference. The contract
is perfect without it.” This hold
ing naturally suggests the in
quiry, how that which is not a
part of the bill can be appealed
to to determine what the bill is.
It would seem that inasmuch as
the marginal figures are so gen
erally and extensively employed,
it cannot be said that they form
no part of the instrument. The
Very language of the statute,
which is an affirmation of the
general rule, indicates that the
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marginal figures may be appealed
to in case of ambiguity and un
certainty. Burnham V. Allen, 1
Gray 496; Williamson v. Smith,
1 Cold (Tenn.) 1.
3-See “Issue,” sec. 2.
See Bills of Exchange Act,
Sec. 9.
An instrument made payable
with interest, but without speci
fying the rate of interest or the
time from Which it was to be
computed, carries interest at the
legal rate and from the date of
complete execution. Campbell
Printing Co. v. Jones, 79 Ala. 475;
Belford V. Beatty, 145 Ill. 414. An
instrument payable on demand
and providing for the payment of
interest carries interest from its
date Without a demand. Proctor
v. Whitcomb, 137 Mass. 303; Pate
v. Gray, Fed. Cas. No. 10794 a ;
Paine v. Caswell, 68 Me. 80; Colby
v. Bunker, id. 424. For the purpose
of suit paper payable on demand
reaches maturity from the day of
its issue. In re Estate of King,
supra; Palmer v. Palmer, 36
Mich. 487, and the statute of lim
itation runs against it from that
time. For the purpose of trans
fer, paper payable on demand is
considered overdue after the lapse
of a reasonable time after its
issue; but before the lapse of a
reasonable time knowledge of ac
tual dishonor will not be pre
Sumed. What is a reasonable time
depends upon circumstances. Ran
dolph’s Com. Pap., 2d ed., secs.
1041-3. An instrument payable on
demand with interest after ma
turity carries interest from the
date of actual demand or the in
stitution of suit, which is treated
as a sufficient demand. In re Es
tate of King, supra.
4-Maybury v. Berkery, 102
Mich. 126; Richardson v. Ellett,
10 Tex. 190; Knisely v. Sampson,
100 Ill. 573.
5-American Express Co. v.
Pinckney, 29 Ill. 392.
6-Heise v. Bumpass, 40 Ark.
547; Funk v. Babbitt, 156 Ill.
408; Brazelton v. McMurray, 44
Ala. 323; Planters' Bank V. Ev
ans, 36 Tex. 592; Lloyd v. Oliver,
18 Q. B. 471; Edis v. Burry, 6
B. & C. 433. In the case last
cited the instrument was in the
following form: “Three months
after date I promise to pay Mr.
John Bury, or order, 44 l, 11 s,
5 d, value received, John Bury.”
It Was addressed to “J. B. Gruth
erot, 35 Montague Place,” whose
Iname appeared in the lower left
hand corner, and whose accept
ance Was Written across the face.
Bury's name was written across
the back as an indorsement.
Held that the instrument might
be treated either as a bill or note,
at the option of the holder.
7—Herring v. Woodhull, 29 Ill.
92; Walton v. Williams, 44 Ala.
347. The statute in this provi
Sion and in Section 66 has Settled
the Vexed question of What lia
bility is incurred by an irregular
indorser. The comment of Mr.
Crawford on this section is:
“Throughout the act it has been
the policy to make all irregular
parties indorsers.”
8—See Bills of Exchange Act,
Sec. 85 (2).
Dederick V. Barber, 44 Mich.
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19; Dow Law Bank v. Godfrey,
126 Mich. 521; Scraper Co. V.
Locklin, 100 Mich. 339; Dart V.
Sherwood, 7 Wis. 523; Dill v.
White, 52 Wis. 169; Salomon v.
Hopkins, 61 Conn. 47, 23 Atl. 716;
Arbuckle v. Templeton, 65 Vt. 205,
25 Atl. 1095.
Where a person signs a note in
place of the maker and adds
thereto the word “surety,” he does
not thereby change the nature of
his liability to the payee or hold
er. Inkster V. First Nat. Bank,
30 Mich. 143; Dart v. Sherwood,
supra. The liability of one who
signs a note as surety is not co
extensive with that of the maker.
If the fact of surety ship is dis
closed by the note itself (as in
above cases) the holder must re
spect the suretyship relation. He
cannot make agreements to ex
tend the time of payment to the
surety’s detriment. The same rule
prevails if the holder of the pa
per has knowledge of the surety
ship relation, independent of facts
disclosed by the paper. Barron V.
Cady, 40 Mich. 259. If the fact
of suretyship was a private mat
ter between principal and Surety,
undisclosed, in any manner, to
the holder, it has no bearing upon
the rights of the holder. As to
him there might as well have
been no special understanding and
no suretyship relation in fact. As
between the parties signing a
note as makers, it is competent
to show that part of them were
mere sureties. Stevens V. Oaks,
58 Mich. 343; Eastman V. Cleav
er, 72 Mich. 167. Where the payee
in a note sold it before maturity,
for a valuable consideration, and
at the request of the purchaser
signed his name below that of the
payer, it was held that his lia
bility would be measured accord
ing to that of a maker, although
he claimed to have signed as in
dorser, and supposed his legal lia
bility would be measured accord
ing to the standard of the in
dorser; that such mistake was
One of law and no defense to the
action. Cook v. Brown, 62 Mich.
473.
The Wisconsin act adds the fol
lowing subdivision: “8. Where
several writings are executed at
Or about the same time, as parts
of the same transaction, intended
to accomplish the same object,
they may be construed as one and
the same instrument as to all par
ties having notice thereof.”
Sec. 20. Liability of person signing in trade or as
sumed name.—No person is liable on the instrument
whose signature does not appear thereon, except as
herein otherwise expressly provided." But one who
signs in a trade or assumed name will be liable to the
same extent as if he had signed in his own name.”
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1—See Bills of Exchange Act,
Sec. 23 (1).
Thus, an agent cannot by Sign
ing his own name to a negotiable
instrument, and adding the word
“agent,” thereby bind his princi
pal. To bind his principal, he
must either sign his principal's
name, or it must appear on the
face of the paper in Some Way
that it was drawn for the prin
cipal. Anderton V. Shoup, 17
Ohio St. 126; Sparks v. Transfer
Co., 104 Mo. 531; Bradlee v. Bos
ton Glass Mfg. Co., 16 Pick. 347;
Manufacturers Bank v. Love, 13
App. Div. (N. Y.) 561, 43 N. Y.
Supp. 812.
An oral guaranty of payment
is not within this provision of
the statute. Swanson V. Stoltz,
36 Wash. 318, 78 Pac. 999 (a case
under the Statute).
2–Trade name: Notes Were
made payable to the order of Na
tional Publishing Co. and indorsed
in that name to the plaintiff. The
claim was made that the notes
were made payable to a company
that had no existence, and that
therefore the paper was fictitious,
and that as the indorsement Was
fictitious and spurious no title
Sec. 21.
passed to the notes. Held, that
the defendant was estopped from
alleging that the notes were made
payable to a fictitious payee.
Jones v. Home Furnishing Co., 9
App. Div. N. Y. 103; 41 N. Y.
Supp. 71. The court said: “The
notes were as much payable to
Jones when they were made pay
able to the name under which he
Carried on his business as though
he had been named therein. It
is not in legal contemplation a
fiction, but it was the plaintiff,
under this business name, and rep
resented him.”
Assumed name: One may be
bound by any mark or designation
he thinks it proper to adopt, pro
Vided it be used as a substitute
for his name and he intend to
bind himself. Brown V. Butchers'
Bank, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 443; Fiore
V. Ladd, 22 Ore. 202, 29 Pac. 435;
Anderson v. Bank, 66 Hun, 613,
21 N. Y. Supp. 925. But see Bart
lett v. Tucker, 104 Mass. 336;
Brown v. Parker, 7 Allen 337.
The fact whether the party
could Write is immaterial. Baker
v. Dening, 8 Ad. & El. 94, 35 E.
C. L. 498.
Signature by agent; authority; how shown.
—The signature of any party may be made by a duly
authorized agent. No particular form of appointment
is necessary for this purpose; and the authority of the
agent may be established as in other cases of agency."
1—Authorization may be by pa
rol. Odd Fellows v. Bank, 42
Mich. 461; Coy v. Stiner, 53 Mich.
42. The signing by One person
of another's name in his presence
and by his direction is sufficient.
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Sager v. Tupper, 42 Mich. 605. It
is not necessary that a person
unable to Write his own name
should, in the execution of a
note, touch the pen while another
is signing for him. It is only nec
essary that such person be au
thorized to sign. Kennedy v. Gra
ham, Admr., 9 Ind. App. 624, 35
N. E. 925, 37 N. E. 25. Where a
Sec. 22.
party or a partnership is sought
to be charged on a signature
made by an agent or by a partner,
if authority so to sign is dis
puted, the burden is upon the
plaintiff to Show due authoriza
tion. New York Iron Mine V. Cit
izens Bank, 44 Mich. 344; Good
ing v. Underwood, 89 Mich. 187.
Liability of person signing as agent, etc.—
Where the instrument contains, or a person adds to his
signature, words indicating that he signs for or on
behalf of a principal, or in a representative capacity,
he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly au
thorized; but the mere addition of words describing
him as an agent, or as filling a representative character,
without disclosing his principal, does not exempt him
from personal liability.”
1—See Bills of Exchange Act,
sec. 26. The original draft submitted
to the Conference of Commission
ers on Uniformity of Laws by Mr.
Crawford, adopted in terms and
substantially in language the pro
vision of the Bills of Exchange
Act, above referred to, thus adopt
ing the English rule, and the rule
prevailing in New York prior to
that time. The Section as it now
stands was substituted for that
Submitted in the original draft.
Crawford's Annotated Neg. Inst.
Law, 28. The result is a change
in the rule as recognized by the
weight of authority in the United
States. Heretofore the person
signing, for or on behalf of an
other, would not, though he were
unauthorized, be liable on the in
strument, but would be liable only
on his implied warranty that he
had such authority. Bartlett v.
Tucker, 104 Mass. 336; White v.
Madison, 26 N. Y. 117; Taylor v.
Nostrand, 134 N. Y. 108; Miller v.
Reynolds, 92 Hun, 400; Taylor v.
Shelton, 30 Conn. 122; Kroeger
v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. St. 311; Shef
field v. Ladue, 16 Minn. 388;
Simpson v. Garland, 76 Me. 203;
Hall v. Crandall, 29 Cal. 572. To
the contrary: Byars v. Doores'
Admr., 20 Mo. 284; Dale v. Don
aldson, 48 Ark. 188; Weare v.
Gove, 44 N. H. 196. The statute
makes the agent liable on the in
strument, if he were unauthor
ized to sign on behalf of his prin
cipal. In Tuttle v. Bank (Mass.
1905), 73 N. E. 560 (a case under
5
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the statute), it was held that
Where a trustee executed a note
without authority he was person
ally liable on it without regard
to the form in which the note
Was executed, even though the note
was given as evidence of a loan
for the benefit of the estate.
2–Thus, one is not relieved
from personal liability by adding
to his name the descriptive term
trustee, administrator, guardian,
agent, president, Secretary, treas
urer, etc. One signing as “ves
tryman Grace church” is not re
lieved from personal liability. Til
den V. Barnard 43 Mich. 376. The
mere impression of the Seal of a
corporation upon paper, signed by
individuals with added words de
scribing them as chairman, preS
ident, or secretary, does not show
the representative character of the
signers nor relieve them from
personal liability. Dutton v. Marsh,
L. R. 6 Q. B. 361; 4 Eng. Rul.
Cas. 278; Daniel V. Buttner,
(Wash. 1905) 80 Pac. 811 (a case
under the statute).
..
. The general rule of the law
*pierchant is expressed in Nash v.
Towne, 5 Wallace 689, as follows:
“Parol evidence can never be ad
mitted to exonerate an agent, who
has entered into a Written Con
tract in which he appears as prin
cipal, even though he should pro
pose to show, if allowed, that he
disclosed his agency and men
tioned the name of his principal
at the time the contract Was ex
ecuted.” To the same effect: An
derson v
. Pearce, 36 Ark. 293;
Richmond, etc. v. Moragne, 119
Ala. 80, 24 So. 824; Stinson V
.
Lee, 68 Miss. 113, 8 So. 272; Mc
Clellan v. Robe, 93 Ind. 298; Rog
er Williams Bank V. Groton Mfg.
Co., 16 R. I. 504, 17 Atl. 170; Ins.
Co. v. Burkett, 72 MO. App. 1
;
Pugh V
. Moore, 44 La. Ann. 209,
10 So. 710; Penn Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Conoughy, 54 Neb. 124,
74 N. W. 422. But in Michigan,
a contrary rule is recognized in
Keidan V
. Winegar, 95 Mich. 430,
Wherein it was held that in a
Suit by a payee against the mak
er of a promissory note who
added the word “agent” to his sig
nature, the defendant may show
by parol testimony that the paper
is really that of his principal,
Who, to the knowledge of the
payee, Was the real party to the
transaction. The rule thus ex
pressed is affirmed by the statute.
In Megowan V. Peterson, 173 N.
Y. 1 (a case under the Statute),
the words “without disclosing his
principal,” Were construed. It was
held that the representative char
acter need not be disclosed upon
the face o
f
the paper so far as
immediate parties were concerned,
but the case might be different so
far as innocent purchasers for
Value Were concerned. The court
adds: “We do not understand
that the statute to which we have
alluded was designed to change
the common law rule in this re
gard, Which is to the effect that
as between original parties and
those having notice of the facts
relied upon as constituting a de
fense, the consideration and the
conditions under which the note
was delivered may be shown.”
In Daniel v. Buttner, supra, ac
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tion was upon paper in the fol
lowing form: “German-American
Investment Co., Inc., No. 409,
$600.00. Seattle, Washington, Feb
ruary 8th, 1902. Received from
Herman Daniel $600.00 (six hun
dred dollars), which we promise
to pay six (6) months after date,
With interest at the rate of eight
(8) per cent per annum. William
H. Buttner, President; H. M. Glid
den, secy.” The note bore the
corporate seal, but there was no
reference by which it was made
a part of the instrument. It was
executed upon a lithographed
form, bearing the name of the
corporation, as indicated. Held,
that the instrument did not pur
port to be executed by the cor
poration, and that it came Within
Sec. 23.
this section of the statute; that
the defendants were personally
liable thereon. In the two last
preceding cases the facts out of
which the transaction grew were
known to the respective parties.
The case last cited seems to con
Strue the words “without disclos
ing his principal” as meaning
that Such disclosure must be made
upon the face of the instrument.
For further illustrations of in
Struments executed by agents, see:
Finan v. Babcock, 58 Mich. 305;
Cadillac State Bank V. Cadillac
Stave and Heading Co., 129 Mich.
15; McGraw v. Union Co., (Mich.)
99 N. W. 758; Nunnemacher v.
Poss, 116 Wis. 444; Wis. Trust
Co. v. Chapman, 121 Wis. 479;
Chipman v. Foster, 119 Mass. 189.
Signature by procuration; operation of.—
A signature by “procuration” operates as notice that
the agent has but limited authority to sign, and the
principal is bound only in case the agent in so signing
acted within the actual limits of his authority."
1–Procuration signifies a con
sensual contract in writing by
which one party confides the
carrying on or execution of one
or more matters of business to
another, who takes it in his
charge. William v. Conger, 125
U. S. 422. As a term applied to
negotiable instruments it is tech
nical. In form it is usually ex
pressed per proc., or p.p. The
use of the term is uncommon in
the United States, but common in
England. Attwood v. Munnings,
7 B. & C. 278, 4 Eng. Rul. Cas.
364. The phrase is an express
intimation of a special and lim
ited authority and the person who
takes a bill or note so drawn, ac
cepted or indorsed, is bound to
inquire into the extent of the au
thority. Daniel’s Neg. Inst., 5th
ed., sec. 299. But where an agent
has such authority his abuse of it
does not affect a bona fide holder
for Value. Bryant V. La Banque
du Peuple (1893) A. C. 170. But
see Reid v. Rigby (1894) 2 Q. B.
68 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.
40, a case under the Bills of Ex
change act, Sec. 25, where the
signature to a check was Rigby
and Company, per procuration of
J. Alport, manager, it was held
that such signature conveyed to
the bank the intimation that Al
port had only limited authority
to sign, and the bank could not
recover inasmuch as Alport had
exceeded his authority. Alport
had authority to draw on his
principal's bank account for the
purpose of the business but had
no authority to overdraw their
account, or borrow money on
their behalf, both of which he
did in this case.
Sec. 24. Indorsement by infant or corporation; effect
of.—The indorsement or assignment of the instrument
by a corporation or by an infant passes the property
therein, notwithstanding that from want of capacity
the corporation" or the infant* may incur no liability
thereon.
1–Thus an indorsement of an
instrument by a corporation will
transfer title to the instrument,
although for want of capacity to
bind itself, the corporation would
incur no liability as indorser.
2—This changes the law. Here
tofore an infant’s indorsement
could be avoided by him. Roach
In re Soltykoff [1891], 1 Q. B.
413 (a case under the Bills of
Exchange act, Sec. 22 (2),) in
which it was held that an infant
cannot bind himself by the ac
ceptance of a bill of exchange
even though the bill is given for
the price of necessaries Supplied
to him during infancy.
v. Woodall, 91 Tenn. 206. See
Sec. 25. Forged signature; effect of.—Where a sig
nature is forged or made without the authority of the
person whose signature it purports to be, if it is wholly
inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument or to
give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof
against any party thereto, can be acquired through or
under such signature, unless the party against whom
it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from
setting up the forgery or want of authority.”
1—One can never be bound on has been forged or affixed with
an instrument to which his name out authority. Robarts V. Tuck
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er, 16 Q. B. 560; Lancaster V.
Baltzell, 17 G. & J. (Md.) 468;
Whiteford V. Munroe, 17 Md. 135;
Pettyjohn v. Nat. Bank, 101 Va.
111, 43 S. E. 203 (a case under
the statute); Buckley V. Bank,
35 N. J. Law 400. Tolman V.
American Nat. Bank, 22 R. I.
462, 48 Atl. 480 (a case under
the statute). In this case the
facts were: C gave A a check,
upon the fraudulent representa
tions of A that he was B. A
indorsed B's name on the check
which was payable to the Order
of B, and transferred it to D,
who collected it at the bank. It
was held that C could recover
from the bank under this provi
sion of the statute, as the Sig
nature here was clearly One
“made without the authority of
the person whose signature it
purports to be,” and was there
fore “wholly inoperative.” The
contrary view was maintained in
Hoffman v. American Nat. Bank
(Neb.) 96 N. W. 112. The sta
tute was not in force in Nebras
ka when this decision was ren
dered (but is now, see Introduc
tion), but the court referred to
it and cited the case of Tolman
v. Bank, supra. In the Nebras
ka case B No. 1, an impostor,
bore the same name as another
B No. 2, represented himself to
be B No. 2, and induced A to
believe that he was B No. 2. A
believing him to be B No. 2 pro
cured a draft to his own order,
indorsed it to the order of Peter
W. Brubaker, a name common
to the two Bs, and delivered
it to B No. 1. B No. 1 indorsed
the draft, was identified at the
defendant bank on which the
draft Was drawn, as Peter W.
Brubaker, and received the
amount of the draft. A brought
Suit against the drawee bank. It
WaS held he could not recover.
This case, however, has two
points which distinguish it from
Tolman v. Bank, supra. Here
the parties bore the same name,
and here also the bank re
quired identification and obtained
it, through a notary. See also
Land Title & Trust Co. V. N. W.
Nat. Bank (Pa. 1905) 60 Atl.
723, wherein it was held that
the drawer of a check, draft, or
bill of exchange, who delivers it
to an impostor, supposing him
to be the person whose name he
has assumed, must as against
the drawee, or bona fide holder,
bear the loss where the impostor
Obtains payment of or negotiates
the same. Beattie V. Nat. Bank,
174 III. 571, 51 N. E. 602. In
this case a draft designed for
Geo. P. Bent was, by mistake,
made payable to Geo. A. Bent, to
whom it was mailed and by Whom
it was received. Geo. A. Bent
indorsed the draft and sold it to
the plaintiff. It was held that the
indorsement was a forgery and
plaintiff acquired no title to the
instrument.
Sec. 24 of the Bills of Ex
change act is identical with this
section except this prefix: “sub
ject to the provisions of this
act.” This prefix requires sec.
60 to be read in connection with
Sec. 24. The English statute was
passed upon in Lacave & Co. v.
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Credit Lyonnais [1897], 1 Q. B.
148, but as sec. 24 of the English
act is restricted in the manner
above stated the case does not
aid in the construction of the
American Statute.
Forgery embraces a case where
one unwittingly signs an instru
ment in the form of a negotiable
promissory note, relying upon
false representations made to him
at the time, that the instrument
he is signing is a contract of an
entirely different nature. Gibbs
V. Linabury, 22 Mich. 479; Ander
son v. Walter, 34 Mich. 113.
2-AS to the ratification of a
forgery there is a conflict of au
thority. Some courts hold that
a person can adopt and affirm
his signature made by another
without authority, and thereby
subject himself to liability on the
instrument. Ashpitel V. Bryan,
3 B. & S. 492; Seaver V. Weston,
163 Mass. 202; Bowlin V. Creel,
63 Mo. App. 229; Casco Bank
v. Keen, 53 Me. 103; Forsythe v.
Bonta, 5 Bush 547; Greenfield
Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen 447. In
the case last cited the court said:
“It was clearly competent, if duly
authorized (i. e., the signing),
thus to sign the note. It is, as
it seems to us, equally competent
for the party, he knowing all the
circumstances as to the signa
ture and intending to adopt the
note, to ratify the same and thus
confirm what was originally an
unauthorized and illegal act. We
are supposing the case of a party
acting with full knowledge of
the manner the note was signed,
and the want of authority on
the part of the actor to sign his
name, but who understandingly
and unequivocally adopts the sig
nature and assumes the note as
his own. It is difficult to per
ceive why such adoption should
not bind the party, whose name
is placed on the note as promisor
as effectually as if he had adopt
ed the note when" executed by
one professing to be authorized,
and to act as an agent as indi
cated by the form of the signa
ture, but who in fact had no au
thority. It is, however, urged
that public policy forbids sanc
tioning the ratification of a forg
ed note as it may have a ten
dency to stifle prosecutions for
criminal offenses. It would seem,
however, that this must stand
upon the general principles ap
plicable to other contracts, and
is only to be defeated where the
agreement was upon the under
standing that if the signature
was adopted the guilty party was
not to be prosecuted for the crim
inal offense.” To the contrary: Mc
Hugh v. County of Schuylkill, 67
Pa. St. 391; Building and Loan
Assn. v. Walton, 181 Pa. St. 201;
Workman v. Wright, 33 Ohio St.
405, 31 Am. Rep. 547; Smith v.
Tramel, 68 Iowa 488; Henry v.
Heeb, 114 Ind. 280; Brooke v.
Hook, 24 L. T. (n. S.) 34. One
whose name has been forged may
be estopped from setting up the
forgery as a defense.
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Article II. Consideration.
Sec.
26. Consideration; presumption
Of.
27. Consideration, what consti
tutes.
28. Holder for value, what con
Stitutes.
Sec.
29. When lien on instrument
constitutes holder for Value.
30. Want of consideration, effect
Of.
31. Accommodation party, liabil
ity of.
Sec. 26. Consideration; presumption of.—Every ne
gotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been
issued for valuable consideration; and every person
whose signature appears thereon to have become a
party thereto for value."
1—Herein lies one controlling
distinction between contracts of
the law merchant and contracts of
the common law. It is presumed
that negotiable instruments were
given for a valid consideration
and the burden is upon the party
alleging no consideration to prove
his allegation. Rood v. Jones, 1
Doug. (Mich.) 188; Matteson v.
Morris, 40 Mich. 52; Manistee
Nat. Bank V. Seymour, 64 Mich.
59; Conrad Seipp Brewing Co. v.
McKittrick, 86 Mich. 191; Beath
v. Chapoton, 124 Mich. 508;
Young v. Shepard's Est. Id. 552;
Farnsworth V. Fraser (Mich.),
100 N. W. 400; Taylor v. Taylor's
Est. (Mich.) 101 N. W. 832; Un
ion Trust Co. v. Morgans (Mich.)
103 N. W. 568. When the con
sideration of a promissory note
is named therein it is part of
the contract itself and the COn
tract cannot be so varied by parol
as to show another consideration.
Johnson v. Sutherland, 39 Mich.
579. The plaintiff does not lose
the benefit of the presumption by
Offering evidence to show consid
eration, Durland v. Durland, 153
N. Y. 67. Consideration is pre
Sumed although the words “value
received” be omitted and no con
sideration be expressed. Taylor V.
Taylor's Est. supra; Bristol v.
Warner, 19 Conn. 7. See note 2,
Sec. 8.
Under the law merchant a bill
of exchange non-negotiable by rea
Son of lacking the words “to or
der,” or “bearer” nevertheless im
ports a consideration. But a bill
non-negotiable by reason of be
ing payable out of a particular
fund does not import a consider
ation under either the law mer
chant or the statute. Daniel's Neg.
Inst. (5th ed.) sec. 161; Nat
Sav. Bank v. Cable, 73 Conn.
568, 48 Atl. 428; Louisville etc.
R. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 98 Ind.
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251; Cowan v. Hallack, 9 Col.
576. For cases under the Statute
See: Bringman V. Von Glahn, 71
N. Y. App. Div. 537, 75 N. Y.
Supp. 845; Towles v. Tanner, 21
App. (D. C.) 530; Black v. Bank,
96 Md. 399; Hickok v. Bunting,
92 App. Div. 167, 86 N. Y. Supp.
1059; Moak v. Stevens, 91 N.
Y. Supp. 903, 45 Misc. Rep. 147;
Karsch V. Pottier etc. Co., 82
App. Div. 230, 81 N. Y. Supp.
782; Bank V. Dooley, 113 Wis.
590. Under the statute a non
negotiable note does not import
consideration. Deyo V. Thompson,
53 N. Y. App. Div. 9, 65 N. Y.
Supp. 459.
Sec. 27. Consideration, what constitutes.—Value is
any consideration sufficient
tract."
value, and is deemed such
payable on demand or at a
1-A valuable consideration is
necessary to support a negotiable
instrument as well as any other
contract. This is the settled rule.
A note given by a father to his
son as the son's share in the fa
ther's estate being but a promise
to make a gift in the future is
without consideration and unen
forceable against the estate by the
payee or by the indorsee with
knowledge of the facts. Conrad V.
Manning's Est., 125 Mich. 77;
Phelps v. Phelps, 28 Barb. 121;
Richardson V. Richardson, 148 Ill.
563, 36 N. E. 608. But see Eaton
v. Libbey, 165 Mass, 218, 42 N.
E. 1127, where the privilege of
naming a child was held a valid
consideration for a promise.
Sufficient consideration: Rood
v. Jones, 1 Doug. 188; Miller v.
Finley, 26 Mich. 249; Wright v.
Irwin, 35 Mich. 347; Taylor v.
Dansby, 42 Mich. 82; Parsons
v. Frost, 55 Mich. 230; Hanold v.
Kays, 64 Mich. 439; McCabe V.
to support a simple con
An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes
whether the instrument is
future time.”
Caner, 68 Mich. 182; Steers V.
Holmes, 79 Mich. 430; Aultman
etc. V. Gorham, 87 Mich. 233;
Walton v. Mason, 109 Mich. 486;
Hilbert v. Barry, 111 Mich. 698;
Union Banking Co. V. Martin’s
Est., 113 Mich. 521; Stevens v.
McLachlan, 120 Mich. 285; Wal
bridge v. Tuller, 125 Mich. 218.
Lack of Consideration: Kulen
kamp v. Groff, 71 Mich. 675;
Thornton v. Damm, 120 Mich.
510; Graham V. Alexander, 123
Mich. 168; Taylor v. Weeks, 121
Mich. 233; Brown v. Smedley,
(Mich.) 98 N. W. 856; Nowack
v. Lehmann, (Mich.) 102 N. W.
992.
Illegal consideration: Where a
note is given upon an illegal con
sideration or one contrary to pub
lic policy, it is as if it were
given for no consideration at all
and is unenforceable. Comstock
v. Draper, 1 Mich. 481; Paton V.
Coit, 5 Mich. 505; People v.
Twp., 11 Mich. 222; O'Hara v.
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Carpenter, 23 Mich. 410; Buck v.
First Nat. Bank, 27 Mich. 293;
Hannah v. Fife, 27 Mich. 180;
Hill v. Callaghan, 31 Mich. 424;
Snyder v. Willey, 33 Mich. 483;
Williams v. Guarde, 34 Mich. 82;
Lyon v. Waldo, 36 Mich. 345;
Wisner v. Bardwell, 38 Mich.
278; Mut. Assn. v. Hoyt, 46 Mich.
473; Shaw v. Clark, 49 Mich.
384; Tinker v. Hurst, 70 Mich.
159; Turnbull v. Twp., 74 Mich.
621; Fosdick v. Van Arsdale, 74
Mich. 302; Ward v. Doane, 77
Mich. 328; Goodrich V. McDonald,
77 Mich. 486; Chapman v. Rem
ington, 80 Mich. 552; Wolf v.
Troxell Est., 94 Mich. 573; French
v. Talbot Pav. Co., 100 Mich.
443; Case v. Smith, 107 Mich. 416;
Heffron v. Daly, 133 Mich. 613;
Hubbard v. Freiberger, 133 Mich.
139.
-
2—This affirms the rule in
Michigan and many other states.
Bostwick v. Dodge, 1 Doug. 413;
Outhwite V. Porter, 13 Mich. 533;
Hanold v. Kays, 64 Mich. 439;
Crump v. Berdan, 97 Mich. 293;
Burroughs v. Ploof, 73 Mich. 607.
In the case last cited it was held
that the debt must have been ex
tinguished to render the holder,
a holder for value. See also Hen
riques v. Ypsilanti Sav. Bank,
84 Mich. 168; City Bank v. Dill,
id. 549; Currie v. Misa, L. R.
10 Ex. 153.
Whether this section extends
the rule that an antecedent or
preéxisting debt constitutes value
to include instruments given
merely as collateral security for
such a preéxisting debt seems to
be still in doubt. In Michigan
the giving or transfer of an in
Strument as collateral security
for a preéxisting debt does not
constitute a valuable considera
tion. The rule is thus expressed:
One who takes a note as addi
tional security for a preéxisting
debt, without releasing any se
curity already held or agreeing
to extend the time of payment
is not a bona fide holder for
value. Boxheimer v. Gunn, 24
Mich. 372; Hanold v. Kays, 64
Mich. 439; Burroughs v. Ploof,
73 Mich. 607; Maynard v. Davis,
127 Mich. 571. The former New
York rule as established in Cod
dington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 636,
was that when a note is given
aS payment or as collateral Se
curity for the payment of a pre
éxisting debt it is not based on
Sufficient consideration. This rule
has been followed by a minority
of the other states. Thompson
V. Maddux, 117 Ala. 468, 23 So.
157; Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo.
106; Penn. Bank v. Frankish, 91
Pa. St. 339; First Nat. Bank V.
Strauss, 66 Miss. 479, 6 So. 233;
Jenkins v. Schaub, 14 Wis. 1;
Roach v. Woodall, 91 Tenn. 206;
Bank v. Wright, 63 Ark. 604;
Bone V. Tharp, 63 Iowa 223.
The United States courts and
a majority of the state courts
have taken a different view.
Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 1.
In Railroad Co. v. National Bank,
102 U. S. 25 the court said, “Our
conclusion, therefore, is that the
transfer before maturity of nego
tiable paper, as security for an
antecedent debt, merely, without
other circumstances, if the paper
* *
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be so indorsed that the holder
becomes a party to the instru
7ment although the transfer is
without express agreement by the
creditor for indulgence, is not
an improper use of such paper,
and is as much in the usual
course of commercial business as
its transfer in payment of Such
debt. In either case the bona
fide holder is unaffected by equi
ties or defenses between prior
parties of which he had no no
tice. This conclusion is abundant
ly sustained by authority. A
different determination by this
court would, we apprehend, great
ly surprise both the legal pro
fession and the commercial
World.” Maitland V. Citizens’
Nat. Bank, 40 Md. 540; Alexan
der v. Bank, 19 Tex. Civ. App.
620, 47 S. W. 840; Rockville Nat.
Bank V. Citizen's Gas Light Co.,
72 Conn. 581, 45 Atl. 361; Nat.
Revere Bank V. Morse, 163 Mass.
383; Dunham v. Peterson, 5 N.
Dak. 414, 67 N. W. 293, 57 Am. St.
Rep. 556; Spencer v. Sloan, 108
Ind. 183; Bonaud v. Genesi,
Ga. 639; McPherson V. Boundreau,
48 La. Ann. 431; Barker V. Lich
tenberger, 41 Neb. 751, 60 N.
W. 79.
Thus the authorities were in
irreconcilable conflict.
the evident purpose of the statute
to settle the question, but it
would appear that the purpose
has failed of accomplishment. This
provision of the statute has been
passed upon by the courts of
Virginia, North Carolina and
New York.
In Payne v. Zell, 98 Va. 294, it
42 "
It was .
was held that a preëxisting debt
constitutes value for the transfer
of negotiable paper and a person
to whom a negotiable instrument
has been pledged as collateral is
a holder to the extent of the
amount due him. In Brooks v.
Sullivan, 129 N. C. 190 it was
held that when a negotiable in
Strument is transferred before
maturity as collateral security for
a preéxisting debt, the assignee is
Such a holder for value to the
extent of the debt secured, that
he takes the paper free from all
equities of which he had no no
tice; changing the prior law of
North Carolina.
In Mohlman Co. v. McKane, 60
N. Y. App. Div. 546, 69 N. Y.
Supp. 1046, it was held that un
der the statute, receiving a note
as security for a debt or for
bearance to sue upon a present
claim or debt, constitutes a con
sideration for the note or an in
dorsement of the note made for
the purpose of procuring its ac
ceptance. See also Petrie V. Mil
ler, 57 App. Div. 17, 173 N. Y.
596.
: Brewster v. Shrader, 26 Misc.
Rep. 480, 57 N. Y. Supp. 606, was
* the first New York case in which
! this provision of the statute was
specially construed. The court
Said: “Prior to the enactment of
the said law it was the settled
rule in this state that one who
receives a promissory note as col
lateral security merely, for an
antecedent debt, cannot enforce
Such note against a maker or in
dorser thereof when the same has
been obtained by fraud, or has
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been fraudulently diverted from
the purpose for . which it was
made.” (Citing Coddington v. Bay,
20 Johns, 637).
The court says of this provi
sion, “The language of this sec
tion. When given its usual and
ordinary signification, ought to
leave no room for doubt upon
the subject. There is, however,
Such a universal disposition
among lawyers to look for SOme
hidden or subtle meaning in the
most simple language, that it has
become quite the fashion to re
quire the courts to construe sta
tutes, which, to the average lay
mind, Seem to require no construc
tion.” The court holds that this
section changes the prior law as
announced in Coddington v. Bay
and subsequent cases and affirms
the rule laid down in Railroad Co.
V. Nat. Bank, Supra; Swift V.
TySOn, Supra. This case WaS
thought to settle the matter once
and for all, but in 1903 the ques
tion was again raised in Suther
land v. Mead, 80 App. Div. 103,
80 N. Y. Supp. 504, 1149. In this
case the court seems partially if
not wholly to reaffirm the old
rule of Coddington v. Bay. The
court said that this provision
standing alone had not changed
the existing law as laid down in
Coddington v. Bay, and added:
“All of these sections (27, 28, 31,
54, 57, 58, 59, 61) can be har
monized in their entirety, With
out any subtle refinement of rea
soning, by construing section 27
to mean that, to constitute an
antecedent or preéxisting debt a
valuable consideration in Support
of a promissory note that had
been fraudulently diverted, as
valid in the hands of a bona fide
holder, the latter must have been
cancelled, and, in legal effect,
paid and discharged the antece
dent or preéxisting debt. By still
holding the debt, he in fact parts
With no value. It was not in
tended thereby that, where a debt
continued to remain in existence
and enforceable as such, and the
note is taken as collateral secur
ity for its payment, such debt, un
discharged, constitutes a valuable
consideration, or the holder of
the note one in due course, as
against the accommodation maker
or indorser who has been de
frauded by the negotiation of the
instrument. We are not to im
pute to the Legislature an intent
to change a rule of law which
has existed in uniform course of
enforcement for over three-quar
ters of a century, without a clear
and unequivocal expression so to
do. We may take judicial notice
that the commission appointed to
revise and codify the statutes
was created, in the main, to codi
fy existing laws and not make
new rules; and certainly it was
never intended that settled usages
in respect of commercial paper,
founded upon decisions covering
a period of 80 years, and uni
form in application, should be
overthrown in the construction of
ambiguous and obscure expres
sions used by such body. The
harmony of these provisions of
the statute is in no measure dis
turbed by a construction which
causes them to read that an an
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tecedent and preëxisting debt
must be paid and discharged, in
Order to constitute the holder of
commercial paper, which has been
fraudulently diverted, a bona fide
holder and, as such, capable of
enforcing the same as against the
accommodation maker Or indorser.
Merely taking such paper as col
lateral Security for the payment
of a prečxisting or antecedent
debt does not constitute such
debt Value, within the meaning
of this statute.” The court in
Speaking of the construction of
the statute in Brewster v Shrader,
supra, said, “We are not dis
posed to adopt this construction
of the law.” Roseman v. Mahony,
86 N. Y. App. Div. 377, 83 N. Y.
Supp. 749, followed Sutherland V.
Mead. The court held that to
make an antecedent or prečxist
ing debt constitute value the
Sec. 28.
holder of the note must give up
the debt, either wholly or quali
fiedly. He must part with some
thing, if not with the debt, at
least with the right to sue upon
it for some determinate period.
Bank of America v. Waydell,
92 N. Y. Supp. 666, was decided
in March, 1905, and the rule laid
down in Sutherland V. Mead and
Roseman v. Mahoney was af
firmed. See also Milius V. Kauff
man, 93 N. Y. Supp. 669.
The Wisconsin Legislature re
moved the question from the field
of controversy by adding to the
section the following: “But the
indorsement or delivery of nego
tiable paper as collateral Security
for a prečxisting debt, Without
Other consideration, and not in
purSuance of an agreement at
the time of delivery, by the mak
er, does not constitute Value.”
Holder for value, what constitutes.—Where
value has at any time been given for the instrument,
the holder is deemed a holder for value in respect to
all parties who became such prior to that time.”
1–Elliott v. Miller, 8 Mich.
131; Hunter v. Wilson, 4 Ex. 489,
19 L. J. Ex. 8; Hoffman v. Bank,
12 Wall. 181; DeWitt v. Perkins,
22 Wis. 451; Griffiths V. Kellogg,
39 Wis. 290; Simon v. Merritt,
33 Iowa 537.
The section is referred to in:
Black v. Bank, 96 Md. 399; Petrie
v. Miller, 173 N. Y. 596.
An indorsee of negotiable paper
must have relinquished some
right, incurred some responsibil
ity, or parted with some value
upon the Credit of the paper at
the time of the transfer, else
he will not be a holder for value
So as to shut out the equities of
antecedent parties. Phoenix Ins.
Co. v. Church, 56 How. Pr. 29,
81 N. Y. 218. If a party becomes
a bona fide holder for value of a
bill before its acceptance, it is
not essential to his right to en
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force it against a subsequent him to the drawee. Heuertomatte
acceptor, that an additional con- V. Morris, 101 N. Y. 63.
sideration should proceed from
Sec. 29. When lien on instrument constitutes holder
for value.—Where the holder has a lien on the instru
ment, arising either from contract or by implication of
law, he is deemed a holder for value to the extent of
his lien."
1—Compare Bills of Exchange
Act, sec. 27 (3).
A lien generally is a mere right
to hold a thing till a debt is paid.
It differs from a pledge in that
the pledgee has a special property
in the thing pledged. The per
son who has a lien On a nego
tiable instrument is the holder
thereof, with the corresponding
rights and duties. He has more
than an ordinary lien on an or
dinary chattel. The lien of a
banker will protect a bank hav.
ing possession of the bills or
notes of a customer to the extent
of the balance due such bank
from such customer. Nat. Bank
v. Ins Co., 104 U. S. 54; Reynes
v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354; Straus
V. Tradesman Nat. Bank, 122 N.
Y. 379; Clark v. Bank, 160 Mass.
26. Transfer of Such an instru
ment to any other holder as col
lateral Security for the payment
3f a debt due such holder from
the person who transferred the in
strument, gives the holder a lien
to the extent of the debt. Attenbor
ough v. Clarke, 27 L. J. Ex. 138;
Anderson v. Bank, 98 Mich. 543;
Stoddard v. Kimball, 6 Cush. 469;
Collins v. Martin, 1 Bos. & Pul.
648. The following are cases
under the Statute: Mersick V.
Alderman, (Conn. 1905) 60 Atl.
109. In this case plaintiff
was the indorsee and holder
of a note and the owner of the
claim it was indorsed to secure.
The defendants Were the makers.
Held, that the plaintiff's assignor
was a lien holder, and a holder
for value to the extent of his
lien, and to that extent a holder
in due course. The plaintiff suc
ceeds to the rights of the assign
or and holder in due course,
whether he be a holder in due
course or not; see Sec. 60. Payne
v. Zell, 98 Va. 294; Brooks v.
Sullivan, 129 N. C. 190; Redfern
V. Rosenthal, 85 L. T. 313, 86
L. T. 855 (under the correspond
ing section of the Bills of Ex
change Act). If the securities are
sold to pay the debt, the pur
chaser, if he be a holder in due
course, under sec. 54, would be
entitled to recover the full face
value under sec. 59, although he
paid a less amount for them.
Sec. 30. Want of consideration, effect of.—Absence
or failure of consideration is matter of defense as
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against any person not a holder in due course; and
partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto”
whether the failure is an ascertained and liquidated
amount or otherwise.”
1–It is the invariable rule Of
the law merchant that as be
tween immediate parties want of
consideration is always available
as a defense. The defendant may
show by parol that there was
insufficient consideration, that the
consideration was the perform
ance of a certain agreement
which has not been performed, or
that the consideration has failed
in some other way. Reeves V.
Kelly, 30 Mich. 132; Taylor v.
Dansby, 42 Mich. 82; Maltz V.
Fletcher, 52 Mich. 484; Manistee
Nat. Bank V. Seymour, 64 Mich.
59; Farwell v. Ensign, 66 Mich.
600; Shaw v. Stein, 79 Mich. 77;
Macomb v. Wilkinson, 83 Mich.
486; Funk v. Chambers, 95 Mich.
508; Keidan v. Winegar, 95 Mich.
430; Van Tuyle v. Pratt, 101
Mich. 38; Perkins v. Brown, 115
Mich. 41; Kelley v. Guy, 116
Mich. 43; English v. Yore, 123
Mich. 702; Keystone Mfg. Co. v.
Forsyth, 126 Mich'98, Brown v.
Smedley, (Mich. 1904) 98' N. W.
.856.
When the Want of consider
ation is total it affect: the Va
lidity of the Pnstrument, in its
entirety, when it is partial it af
fects the validity of the instru
ment pro tanto. Allaire V. Hart
shorne, 21 N. J. L. 665. If a per
son who sues on a note is bound
by the equities existing between
the maker and the indorser the
Qf
consideration for the indorsement
is a material question. Kelly V.
Freedman, 56 Mich. 321. Lack or
failure of consideration is a good
defense against any holder bound
by the equities existing between
maker and payee. Sutton V.
Beckwith, 68 Mich. 303. But if
the maker says to the proposed
purchaser of his note that it is
all right and that he will pay it
at maturity, he is estopped after
its purchase in reliance upon
Such a statement, from asserting
failure of consideration or plead
ing any other invalidity, against
it. Id.
Where parties exchange their
bills, notes or checks although
for mutual accommodation, the
paper so exchanged is sup
ported by a , valuable consid
eration. Farber v. 'Nat. Forge
and Iron Co., 140 Ind. 54, 39 N.
E. 249; Union Trust Co. v. Rig
don, 93 Ill. 459. This is so, al
though one of such notes is un
paid at maturity and such dis
honor is no defense of failure of
consideration on the other. New
man v. Frost, 52 N. Y. 422; Rice
v. Grange, 131 N. Y. 149, 30 N.
E. 46.
2—Sebring v. Hazard, 128 Mich.
330; Stacy v. Kemp, 97 Mass.
166.
The rule is that whenever
a party is entitled to go into
the question of consideration at
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all, he may set up a partial as
Well as a total failure. This
rule does not, however, extend to
a case of a note given for an
article purchased for much more
than it is Worth. If the article
for which the note was given be
of any value at all, the defense
of partial failure of considera
tion is not available. Harness
v. Horne, 20 Ind. App. 134, 50 N.
E. 395. Courts Will not as a rule
inquire into the adequacy of the
consideration. Shattuck V. Hart,
98 Mich. 559. -
3-Partial failure of considera
tion will not be available as a
defense unless the facts are such
that the amount to be deducted
because of the partial failure can
the amount is liquidated or in
the nature of a certain debt. This
is the rule of the law merchant
in England and in many of the
States. Trickey v. Larne, 6 M.
& W. 278; Sully v. Frean, 10
Exc. 535; Greenleaf v. Cook, 2
Wheat. 13; Packwood V. Clark,
Fed. Cas. No. 10656. The Statute
has changed this rule.
Partial failure of consideration
is available as a defense in some
States, although the amount be
unliquidated. Wentworth V.
Dows, 117 Mass. 14; Davis v.
Wait, 12 Ore. 425; Wyckoff v.
Runyon, 33 N. J. Law 107. The
Statute affirms this rule.
See secs. 54-8 as to What is
necessary to constitute one a
be definitely computed, or unless holder in due course.
Sec. 31. Accommodation party, liability of.—An ac
commodation party is one who has signed the instru
ment as maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without
receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lend
ing his name to some other person. Such a person
is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, not
withstanding such holder at the time of taking the
instrument knew him to be only an accommodation
party." .
-
*
1—An accommodation party is merce v. Qoumbe, 47 Mich. 358.
liable to a holder for value ac. An underständing between the ac
cording to the position he has commodition maker of a note and
assumed on the paper, and ac-‘the payee that the latter will
cording to the terms of the con- take care of it, of which un
tract. If he assumes thé position derstanding the indorsee had full
of maker or acceptor he is pri- notice when he took the note,
marily liable. The accommodation is no defence to an action on the
contract stands upon its legal note by the indorsee against the
form. Canadian Bank of Com- accommodation maker. Thatcher
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V. West River Nat. Bank, 19
Mich. 196. Parol proof that a
maker of a note Was induced to
sign it by agreement of the payee
that he should not be held liable
thereon is inadmissible to Vary
or contradict the legal effect of
the instrument. Kulenkamp V.
Groff, 71 Mich. 675; Warder & Co.
v. Gibbs, 92 Mich. 29; Cristy v.
Campau, 107 Mich. 172; Grocers'
Bank v. Penfield, 69 N. Y. 502.
The fact that an accommodation
maker of a note has written his
name across the back instead of
signing on the face of the note,
tends, though not conclusively, to
indicate that he did not intend to
sign as joint maker but only as
surety and is enough to put the
original creditor on inquiry.
Moynahan v. Hanaford, 42 Mich.
3.29.
Accommodation paper has no
validity until it is negotiated and
does not become binding upon the
accommodation party until such
negotiation, that is, Value must
have been given by some one be
fore the accommodator can be
held. Any accommodation party
may withdraw his signature as
maker, drawer, acceptor or in
dorser before the paper has been
negotiated. Second Nat. Bank V.
Howe, 40 Minn. 390; Patterson v.
Bank, 26 Ore. 509, 38 Pac. 818.
Where one signs a note for the
accommodation of another with
Out the Solicitation of the payee
or for his benefit, the fact that
there was no consideration as to
the one so signing does not
make him an accommodation
maker. Capital Bank v. Des
Moines etc., 84 Iowa 561, 51 N.
W. 33. Accommodation paper can
not exist Without a loan of credit
to the accommodated party. Dunn
V. Weston, 71 Me. 270. Exchange
of paper for the mutual benefit
and convenience of the parties
constitutes consideration for the
paper so exchanged. So a prom
issory note given by the maker
in exchange for a note given to
him by the payee is not an accom
modation note. Whittier V. Eager,
1 Allen (Mass.) 499. Corpora
tions as a general rule are with
out the power to become accom
modation parties. Beecher V.
Dacey, 45 Mich. 92; Steiner V.
Steiner Land & Lumber Co., 120
Ala. 128, 26 So. 494; Bacon v.
Farmers' Bank, 79 Mo. App. 406;
Worthington V. Schuylkill Electric
Co., 195 Pa. St. 211, 45 Atl. 927.
This section does not apply to
corporations nor enlarge their
power to become accommodation
parties. Oppenheim v. Simon Rei
gel Cigar Co., 90 N. Y. Supp. 355
(a case under the statute). A
partner has no implied authority
to bind the firm as an accommo
dation party and when he does
so, any holder with notice of
such fact cannot recover against
the firm. Heffron W. Hanaford,
40 Mich. 305; Burke v. Wilbur,
42 Mich. 329; National Bank v.
Law, 127 Mass. 72; Bank of Fort
Madison V. Alden, 129 U. S. 372.
The following cases have been
decided under the statute: Willard
v. Cook, 21 App. D. C. 237;
Black v. Bank of Westminister,
96 Md. 399; Rowe v. Bowman, 183
Mass. 488; Packard v. Windholz,
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88 App. Div. 365, 84 N. Y. Supp.
666. Strickland v. Henry, 66 N.
Y. App. Div. 23, 73 N. Y. Supp.
12. The facts in this case were
that a note was made by defend
ant for the accommodation of
the payee who transferred it be
fore maturity to a third person
at a discount of 40%. This in
effect made the interest reserved
40 per cent per annum. Held:
The note did not represent a le
gal transaction. It had no legal
existence when sold to the plain
tiff and, having no legal exist
ence, could not be the subject of
sale and purchase. In point of
law the sale of accommodation
paper is merely a loan of money,
the purchaser being the lender,
the seller the borrower; and if
the sale be at a usurious dis
count it is invalid. The statute
has not changed this rule. In
Nat. Citizen's Bank v. Toplitz,
81 App. Div. 593, 81 N. Y. Supp.
422 an accommodation note Was
discounted by a bank for the in
dorser with full knowledge that
it was accommodation paper. It
was not paid at maturity and at
the request of the indorser, for
whose benefit it was discounted,
the time of payment was extend
ed without the knowledge of the
maker. Held, the maker was
primarily liable and not released.
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Article III.
Sec.
32. Negotiation, what consti
tutes.
Indorsement, how made.
34. Indorsement must be of en
tire instrument.
35. Indorsement, kinds of.
36. Special indorsement; in
dorsement in blank.
37. Blank indorsement; how
changed to Special indorse
ment.
38. When indorsement is restrict
ive.
39. Restrictive indorsement; ef
fect of; right of indorsee.
40. Qualified indorsement.
Conditional indorsement.
Indorsement of instrument
payable to bearer.
41.
42.
Qoo4.Sec.
Megotiation.
Sec.
43. Indorsement where payable
to two or more persons.
44. Effect of instrument drawn
or indorsed to a person as
cashier.
45. Indorsement where name of
payee is misspelled, etc.
46. Indorsement in representative
capacity.
47. Time of indorsement, pre
Sumption.
48. Place of indorsement, pre
Sumption.
49. Continuation of negotiable
character.
50. Striking out indorsement.
51. Transfer Without indorse
ment; effect of.
52. When prior party may nego
tiate instrument.
Negotiation, what constitutes.—An instru
ment is negotiated when it is transferred from one
person to another in such manner as to constitute the
transferee the holder thereof. If payable to the bearer"
it is negotiated by delivery; if payable to order” it is
negotiated by the indorsement of the holder” completed
by delivery."
1—As to what instruments are
payable to bearer see section 11.
2—AS to what instruments are
payable to order see section 10.
3—Indorsement: See next SeC
tion.
4—Indorsement is not consum
mated without delivery in fact,
or by what, in legal construction
and effect, amounts to delivery.
Kinzie V. Farmers' and Mechan
ics' Bank, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 104;
Spencer V. Carstarphen, 15 Col.
445; Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed.,
Sec. 665. In Swenson V. Stoltz,
36 Wash. 318, 78 Pac. 999 (a
case under the statute) it was
held that sections 32-3 state mere
ly how negotiation may be com
pleted, and do not affect section
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51, which provides that “where
the holder of an instrument pay
able to his order transfers it for
value without indorsing it, the
transfer vests in the transferee
such title as the transferer had
therein.” In Day V. Longhurst
(1893) 41 W. R. 283 (a case
under the corresponding provi
Sion of the Bills of Exchange
Act) it was held that where bills
not payable to bearer were trans
ferred, but not indorsed, to a
party as security for a debt and
were subsequently indorsed by
the transferer, such indorsement
constituted the first negotiation
under this section.
Nat. Bank v. Pick (N. D.
1904), 99 N. W. 63. In this
case this provision of the sta
tute was referred to but Was
not construed further than that
the Word “assigns” as used in
Section 3255 of the Revised Code
of 1899 does not include the in
dorsee of negotiable paper who
takes the same before maturity
for value, and without notice of
defense thereto. The Word “aS
signs” was used in connection
with a statute which provided
that every contract made by a
corporation which had not com
plied with certain statutory pro
visions, would be Void on behalf
of such corporation and its as
signs.
An executory contract to as
sign a promissory note on per
formance of certain conditions
does not operate of itself to trans
fer title. Nat. City Bank v.
Torrent, 130 Mich. 259. A parol
agreement, although entered into
at the time of making negotiable
paper, that the, payee will not
negotiate it, and will renew it,
etc., is inadmissible to vary the
effect of the paper. Parol evi
dence is inadmissible to vary the
written contract evidenced by the
instrument. Hyde V. Tenwinkel,
26 Mich. 93; Cook v. Brown, 62
Mich. 473; Kulenkamp v. Groff,
71 Mich. 675; Hutchinson v.
Hutchinson, 102 Mich. 635;
Hitchcock v. Frackelton, 116
Mich. 487. Thus, evidence is in
admissible to show that the mak
er was not to be held liable;
Gumz v. Giegling, 108 Mich. 295;
that the maker was to be liable
only as an indorser, Aultman
Taylor Co. v. Gorham, 87 Mich.
233; that the paper was not to
be negotiated at all, Heist V.
Hart, 73 Pa. St. 286; Knox V.
Clifford, 38 Wis. 651; that it was
to be negotiated only at a cer
tain bank, Stubbs v. Goodall, 4
Ga. 106; that it would be re
newed, United States Nat. Bank
V. Geer, 55 Neb. 462, 75 N. W. 1088.
But as between original par
ties and others taking with no
tice, a conditional delivery may
be shown, Ricketts V. Pendleton,
14 Md. 320; Higgins v. Ridgway,
153 N. Y. 130.
An insane person cannot make
a valid assignment of a nego
tiable instrument during insanity.
Evidence that the payee of a ne
gotiable instrument, payable to
order, was insane during all
the time from the issuance
of the paper until the death
of the payee is admissible to dis
prove the validity of the trans
fer. Hannahs V. Sheldon, 20
Mich. 278.
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Sec. 33. Indorsement; how made.—The indorsement
must be written on the instrument itself or upon a
paper attached thereto." The signature of the indorser
without additional words, is a sufficient indorsement.”
1–“Indorsement is an act
whereby a person not being ac
ceptor, or quasi acceptor, surety,
or guarantor, writes his name
upon the back or face of a duly
executed negotiable bill of ex
change, promissory note, or
cheque, with or without terms of
contract, or liability, according
to the law merchant, or writes an
equivalent contract On a Separate
paper annexed to the bill or
cheque.” Bigelow's Bills, Notes
and Cheques 83. Indorsement lit
erally signifies a writing on the
back. Hartwell V. Hemmenway, 7
Pick. 117; Com. v. Spilman, 124
Mass. 327. The ordinary mode
of indorsing a note is by the in
dorser's writing his name upon
the back thereof, but the indorse
ment may be made upon the face
of the note with the same effect
as if made upon the back. Shain
v. Sullivan, 106 Cal. 208, 39 Pac.
606; Haines v. Dubois, 30 N. J.
L. 259; Partridge v. Davis, 20
Vt. 499. The “paper attached
thereto” is called “allonge.” The
indorsement may be on the al
longe whenever the interest or
convenience of the parties require
it. It is, not necessary that there
should be physical impossibility
of writing the indorsement on
the instrument itself. Crosby V.
Roub, 16 Wis. 645; Folger v.
Chase, 18 Pick 63; French v.
Turner, 15 Ind. 59. Some of
the foreign codes provide that the
first indorsement on the allonge
must begin on the bill and end
on the allonge. This provision is
designed to secure identification
and to prevent an allonge from
being taken from one bill and
Stuck to another. Chalmers'
Bills of Exchange, 5th ed. 107.
Full indorsement embraces two
contracts; first, transfer of title
an executed contract; second, as
Sumption of personal liability
upon performance of conditions
precedent-an executory contract.
Aniba V. Yeomans, 39 Mich. 171.
Departures from the regular form
Of indorsement—i. e., the mere
writing of the indorser's name
upon the back of the paper—have
been held Sufficient to transfer
the title, e. g., “I hereby assign
the within note to M. & S.”
Markey v. Corey, 108 Mich. 184;
Stevens V. Hannan, 86 Mich. 307;
Phelps v. Church, 65 Mich. 232;
Green v. Burrows, 47 Mich. 70;
Russell v. Klink, 53 Mich. 161;
Hall v. Toby, 110 Pa. St. 318;
Trust Co. v. Nat. Bank, 101 U.
S. 68; Elgin City Banking Co. v.
Zelch, 57 Minn. 487; Dunham v.
Peterson, 5 N. Dak. 414. But
See Aniba V. Yeomans, supra;
Spencer V. Halpern, 62 Ark. 595,
36 L. R. A. 120. See further as
to sufficiency of indorsement War
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der v. Gibbs, 92 Mich. 29; Whit
worth v. Pelton, 81 Mich. 98;
Marskey v. Turner, 81 Mich. 62.
In Thorpe V. Mindeman (Wis.
'04) 101 N. W. 417 (a case under
the statute) it was held that an
indorsement reading “For value
received I hereby sell, transfer
and assign, the within note and
the coupons thereto attached;
without recourse,” was a good
commercial indorsement, and not
a mere assignment.
The signature of the indorser is
not essential to a valid indorsement.
Any substitute for the name, if
intended as an indorsement, Will
meet the requirement of the rule.
Thus a payee writes upon the in
strument “1, 2, 8” as a substi
tute for his name, and transfers
the instrument; The act is an
indorsement. Brown V. Butchers
Bank, 6 Hill 443. The maker of
a note payable to his own order
must indorse it to pass title, but
by indorsing his name upon the
back of the note and delivering
it in that form to the holder, the
maker does not become an in
dorser in the commercial accep
tation of that term. He is, never
theless, the maker of the note,
his signature on its back being
an essential part of its execu
tion, and his liability continues
to be that of a maker only. Ewan
V. Brooks-Waterfield, 55 Ohio St.
596.
AS to indorsement of non
negotiable notes, see Steere V.
Trebilcock, 108 Mich. 464; Mer
chants’ Nat. Bank v. Gregg, 107
Mich. 146.
2—The legal title to a bill or
note may be transferred by blank
indorsement and the holder has
absolute control of and may
recover on the instrument by
proving the indorsement. Whit
worth v. Pelton, 81 Mich. 98. An
indorsement in blank by the
payee of the instrument is pre
Sumed to have been intended as
a transfer thereof, but the pre
sumption may be rebutted by pa
rol proof that it was intended to
show a receipt of the money
from the agent of the maker.
Davis V. Morgan, 64 N. C. 570;
U. S. Nat. Bank V. Geer, 55 Neb.
462, 75 N. W. 1088, 70 Am. St.
R. 390.
Sec. 34. Indorsement must be of entire instrument.—
The indorsement must be an indorsement of the entire
instrument. An indorsement which purports to transfer
to the indorsee a part only of the amount payable, or
which purports to transfer the instrument to two or
more indorsees severally, does not operate as a nego
tiation of the instrument; but where the instrument
has been paid in part it may be indorsed as to the resi
due.
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1—Indorsement of less than the
entire title to an instrument does
not operate as a negotiation there.
of; e. g., an order by the payee
of a note to pay a sum out of it
less than the entire Sum is not
an indorsement thereof. Lindsay
v. Price, 33 Tex. 282. The holder
of a bill for 100 l indorses it
“pay to D, or order 30 l.” This
is invalid unless C also acknowl
Sec. 35.
edges the receipt of 70 l. Hawkins
v. Cardy, 1 Ld. Raymond 360.
Where two indorsements for parts
of the amount of a note were
made, both together purporting
to transfer the whole, it was
held that two Vicious indorse
ments could never constitute a
good one. Hughes V. Kiddell, 2
Bay (S. C.) 324.
Indorsement, kinds of.—An indorsement
may be either special or in blank; and it may also be
either restrictive or qualified or conditional."
t 1—(Special indorsement, or in
dorsement in full: )
Pay to Walter Brooks, or order.
Oscar Adams.
(Indorsement in blank.)
Walter BrookS.
(Qualified indorsement.)
Without recourse.
Charles Clark.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(Conditional indorsement.)
Pay to Seth Eaton, or Order, on
the completion of the Atlas Build
ing.
Aaron DaViS.
(Restrictive indorsement.)
Pay Henry Fox, or order, for
collection for my account.
Seth Eaton.
Sec. 36. Special indorsement; indorsement in blank.
—A special indorsement specifies the person to whom
or to whose order the instrument is to be payable; and
the indorsement of such indorsee is necessary to the
further negotiation of the instrument. An indorsement
in blank specifies no indorsee, and an instrument so
indorsed is payable to bearer and may be negotiated by
delivery."
indorsed in blank, though after
wards indorsed specially, it will
still be payable to bearer, though
1-See: Sections 11 and 35.
Bills of Exchange Act, section 34.
Where an instrument is once
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as against the special indorser sham V. Lehman, 63 Ga. 383;
himself, title must be made Johnson v. Mitchell, 50 Tex. 212.
through his indorsement. Haber
Sec. 37. Blank indorsement; how changed to special
indorsement.—The holder may convert a blank indorse
ment into a special indorsement by writing over the sig
nature of the indorser in blank any contract consistent
with the character of the indorsement."
1—The reaSOn Of the rule em
bodied in this provision is stated
by Mathews, J. in Martin v. Cole,
104 U. S. 37. “The contract
created by the indorsement and
delivery of a negotiable note,
even between the immediate par
ties to it, is a commercial con
tract and is not in any sense a
contract implied by the law, much
less an inchoate or imperfect
contract. It is an express con
tract, and is in writing, some of
the terms of which, according to
the custom of merchants and for
the convenience of commerce, are
usually omitted, but not the less
on that account perfectly under
stood. All its terms are certain,
fixed, and definite, and, when nec
essary, Supplied by that common
knowledge, based on universal cus
tom, which has made it both Safe
and convenient to rest the rights
and obligations of parties to such
instruments upon an abbrevia
tion. So that the mere name of
an indorser, signed upon the
back of a negotiable instrument,
conveys and expresses his mean
ing and intention as fully and
completely as if he had writen
out the customary obligation of
his contract in full.” Vincent W.
Horlock, 1 Camp. 442; State Nat.
Bank v. Haylen, 14 Neb. 482;
Beckwith V. Angell, 6 Conn. 317.
A qualified blank indorsement
may be changed to a special in
dorsement. Lyon V. Ewings, 17
Wis. 63.
In Scott V. Calkin, 139 Mass.
529, it was held that an indorsee
might write over a blank indorse
ment, “I guarantee payment of
the Within note.” But in Belden
V. Hann, 61 Iowa 42, the con
trary was held upon the ground
that the effect Would be to de
prive the indorser of his right
to notice in case of non-payment.
In the latter case the writing put
in above the blank indorsement
was, “Guarantee payment at ma
turity to bearer.”
A holder under a blank indorse
ment cannot fill it up so as to
make the note payable in part to
One person and in part to anoth
er. Erwin v. Lynn, 16 Ohio St.
547.
Sec. 38. When indorsement is restrictive.—An in
dorsement is restrictive," which either:
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First, Prohibits the further negotiation of the in
strument;” or
Second, Constitutes the indorsee the agent of the in
dorser;” or
Third, Wests the title in the indorsee in trust for or
the use of some other person." But the mere absence of
words implying power to negotiate does not make an
indorsement restrictive.”
1-A restrictive indorsement
limits the first element of the
indorser's contract, - transfer of
title. See note 1, Sec. 33.
2—Thus: “Pay the contents
to J. P. only.” Power v. Finnie,
4 Call. (Va.) 411.
3–Thus: “For deposit my ac
count”, “Pay H. A. Bedfield, cash
ier, or order, for collection.” Locke
V. Leonard Silk Co., 37 Mich. 479.
“The indorsement for collection
does not transfer the title to the
note, nor its proceeds to the in
dorsee, but makes him merely the
agent of the indorser to take the
necessary steps to Secure pay
ment of the instrument for the
Owner. Locke V. Leonard Silk
Co., supra; Reading v. Beards
ley, 41 Mich. 123; Sutherland V.
First Nat. Bank, 31 Mich. 230;
Fuller v. Bennett, 55 Mich. 357;
Commercial Nat. Bank V. Arm
strong, 39 Fed. 684; Nat. B. &
D. Bank v. Hubbell, 117 N. Y.
384; Northwestern Nat. Bank v.
Kansas City Bank, 107 Mo. 402;
Freeman’s Nat. Bank V. National
Tube Works, 151 Mass. 413.
Liability of banks as indorsees
for collection:
On this subject the holdings are
at variance, but for the purpose
of illustration they may be
grouped as follows:
First, the bank with whom pa
per has been deposited for collec
tion is absolutely liable for any
negligence or default of the no
tary, agent, or correspondent, as
well as of its own immediate ser
vants. Simpson v. Waldby, 63
Mich. 439; Finch v. Karste, 97
Mich. 26. This is the rule of the
Supreme Court of the United
States; and of New York, as es
tablished in the leading case of
Allen v. Merchants Bank, 22
Wend. 215, and of other states.
Second, the bank is liable only
for the exercise of due care in
Selecting its correspondent bank
and is exonerated from all liabil
ity beyond making such selection.
Third, the bank is absolutely
liable for collections in cases
where the primary party is resi
dent at the place of the bank or
where the bank undertakes the
collection of the paper by its own
officers, but where the instrument
is to be collected at a point dis
tant, the bank is liable according
to the second rule above given.
Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec.
341, and cases cited.
It is negligence for a bank to
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which paper has been sent for
collection, to send it directly to
the drawer Or maker, and Such
negligence makes the Sender lia
ble for any loss resulting. Car
son, Pirie, Scott & Co. v. Fincher,
129 Mich. 687; First Nat. Bank v.
Citizens Bank, 123 Mich. 336.
4—Thus: “Pay C. J. or order,
on account of B. G. & S.” Blaine
v. Bourne, 11 R. I. 119; Hook V.
Pratt, 78 N. Y. 371; Sigourney
V. Lloyd, 8 B. & C. 622. Such in
dorsement passes title, but gives
notice that the indorsee can col
lect only, not pass the inStru
ment for his Own benefit.
5–Thus: “Pay the within to
A. Thatcher,” omitting the words,
“Or Order,” is not a restrictive in
dorsement. Leavitt v. Putnam, 3
N. Y. 494. An indorsement is not
rendered restrictive by the men
tion of the consideration for which
it is made. Thus, “pay contents
to A. B., being part of payment
of goods sold him by me.” The
nature of such an indorsement is
not to restrict the payment to a
particular person. It is not equiv
alent to “pay contents to A. B.
only.” Potts V. Reed, 6 Esp. 57.
Sec. 39. Restrictive indorsement; effect of; rights of
indorsee.—A restrictive indorsement confers upon the
indorsee the right:
First, To receive payment of the instrument;
Second, To bring any action thereon that the indorser
could bring;"
Third, To transfer his rights as such indorsee, where
the form of the indorsement authorizes him to do so.
But all subsequent indorsees acquire only the title of
the first indorsee under the restrictive indorsement.
1—This affirms the rule in
Michigan. An agent to whom ne
gotiable paper is indorsed for col
lection may sue thereon in his
own name. Wintermute V. Tor
rent, 83 Mich. 555; Brigham v.
Gurney, 1 Mich. 349; Boyd v. Cor
bitt, 37 Mich. 52; Moore v. Hall,
48 Mich. 143; Coy v. Stiner, 53
Mich. 42; Watkins v. Plummer,
93 Mich. 215; Benjamin v. Early,
123 Mich. 93. To same effect:
Cummings V. Kohn, 12 Mo. App.
585; Wilson v. Tolson, 79 Ga.
137; Regina Flour Mill Co. v.
Holmes, 156 Mass. 11; Ward v.
Tyler, 52 Pa. St. 393; Roberts V.
Parrish, 17 Ore. 583; Smith v.
Bayer, (Ore. 1905) 79 Pac. 497 (a
case unde, the statute). In this
case it was held that the indorsee
had the right to sue in his own
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name but the paper Was Open to
all defenses which could have
been made if it had remained in
the hands of the indorser, and
action had been brought by him.
Where a check is indorsed in
blank, and deposited with a bank
for credit and the bank forwards
it for collection to another bank,
such latter bank, as against the
depositor, can regard the paper .
as that of the first bank and re
fuse to surrender it to the de
positor. Cody v. City Nat. Bank,
55 Mich. 379.
Sec. 40. Qualified indorsement.—A qualified indorse
ment constitutes the indorser a mere assignor of the
title to the instrument. It may be made by adding to
the indorser’s signature the words “without recourse,”
or any words of similar import.” Such an instrument
[indorsement] does not impair the negotiable character
of the instrument.”
1—A qualified indorsement lim
its the second element of the in
dorser's contract, — personal lia
bility. See note 1, sec. 33.
2—“Pay to M. R. at his own
risk,” or “indorser not holden,”
are words of similar import. Rice
v. Stearns, 3 Mass. 225; Ticonic
Bank v. Smiley, 27 Me. 225; Han
kerson v. Emery, 37 Me. 16.
The words used in qualifying
an indorsement must be such as
clearly express an intention on
the part of the indorser to dis
claim liability. Fassin v. Hub
bard, 55 N. Y. 470. Where
the payee writes above his
signature the following: “I
hereby assign the within note to
M & S”, he is not relieved from
liability as an indorser. Markey
v. Corey, 108 Mich. 184.
Where the Words “Without re
course” follow the name of one
and precede the name of another
of two indorsers, thus:
Horton
Without recourse
Gage,
parol evidence is admissible to
show to which indorser the limi
tation applies. Corbett v. Fett
zer, 47 Neb. 269, and this al
though a Subsequent indorsee
took the paper, believing that
the limitation applied to the one
when it in fact applied to the
other. Fitchburg Bank V. Green
Wood, 2 Allen 434.
When one has indorsed unquali
fiedly, in full, or blank, evidence
is inadmissible to show an agree
ment that the indorsement should
have been without recourse. Mar
tin V. Cole, 104 U. S. 30.
“Where the law furnishes Such
apt, brief, and well known ex
pressions, for making the indorse
ment accomplish exactly what the
parties may desire, wise policy
demands that each form of in
dorsement should conclusively
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carry with it the liability which
it implies.” Dolittle v. Ferry, 20
Kan. 230, 27 Am. Rep. 166.
3—An instrument retains its ne
gotiable character after qualified
indorsement. Stevenson v. O'Neal,
71 Ill. 314; Kelley v. Whitney, 45
Wis. 110.
-
out of due course of trade, and
is not notice to the transferee to
put him on inquiry as to any de
fects in the instrument. Borden
V. Clark, 26 Mich. 410; Bisbing
v. Graham, 14 Pa. St. 4; Thorpe
v. Mindeman (Wis.), 101 N. W.
417 (a case under the statute).
A qualified indorsement is not
Sec. 41. Conditional indorsement.—Where an in
dorsement is conditional, a party required to pay the
instrument may disregard the condition, and make pay
ment to the indorsee or his transferee, whether the con
dition has been fulfilled or not. But any person to whom
an instrument so indorsed is negotiated will hold the
same, or the proceeds thereof, subject to the rights of the
person indorsing conditionally."
1—See Bills of Exchange Act,
Sec. 33.
A conditional Indorsement in
volves Some fact or event
upon the occurrence of which the
validity of the indorsement is ulti
mately to depend and which is
either to give effect to it or avoid
it. The condition may be prece
dent or subsequent. Story on
Prom. Notes, sec. 149. Such in
dorsement does not affect the ne
gotiability of the instrument, its
only effect is to give notice of
the consideration to Subsequent
holders. Tappan V. Ely, 15 Wend.
362.
The distinction between a con
dition in the instrument and a
condition in the indorsement must
be observed. The former makes
the instrument bad as negotiable
paper, the latter does not alter
the negotiable character of the in
Strument.
In his note on the correspond
ing provision of the Bills of Ex
change Act, sec. 33, p. 110, Judge
Chalmers says: “It alters the law.
It was formerly held that if a
bill was indorsed conditionally,
the acceptor paid it at his peril if
the condition was not fulfilled.”
If the condition upon which the
indorsement is made be not ful
filled, the title of the indorsee and
every subsequent holder becomes
void and the right to the instru
ment reverts to the original in
dorser. Robertson v. Kensington,
4 Taunt. 30.
Sec. 42. Indorsement of instrument payable to bearer.
—Where an instrument, payable to bearer, is indorsed
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specially it may nevertheless be further negotiated by
delivery;' but the person indorsing specially is liable
as endorser to only such holders as make title through
his indorsement.”
1—A note on its face payable up the blank indorsement to him
to bearer or one indorsed in blank self and striking out the subse
by the payee and afterwards quent ones. Watervliet Bank v.
transferred by special indorsement Hoyt, 1 Den. 608; Mitchell v.
is still transferrable by delivery. Fuller, 15 Pa. St. 268.
A party to whom it is so trans- 2-Bates v. Butler, 46 Me, 387.
ferred may make title by filling
Sec. 43. Indorsement where payable to two or more
persons.—Where an instrument is payable to the order
of two or more payees or indorsees who are not part
ners, all must indorse, unless the one indorsing his
authority to indorse for the others."
1—When the joint payees are ment of all is required to trans
partners the indorsement of one fer the instrument. Ryhiner v.
will transfer the instrument; when Feickert, 92 Ill. 305; Wood. V.
they are not partners the indorse- Wood, 16 N. J. L. 428.
Sec. 44. Effect of instrument drawn or indorsed to a
person as cashier.—Where an instrument is drawn or
indorsed to a person as “cashier” or other fiscal officer
of a bank or corporation, it is deemed prima facie to be
payable to the bank or corporation of which he is such
officer, and may be negotiated by either the indorse
ment of the bank or corporation or the indorsement of
the officer."
1—The rule of the law mer- The bank may maintain suit upon
chant is that an instrument pay- such instrument without the cash.
able to or indorsed to a cashier ier's indorsement. Bank V. Troy
of a bank is payable to the bank City Bank, 1 Doug. 457; Garton
of which he is cashier, not to v. Union City Nat. Bank, 34 Mich.
him in his individual capacity. 278; First Nat. Bank v. John
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Bank V.
Fleckner V.
Fol
son, 133 Mich. 700;
Bank, 29 N. Y. 619;
to whether paper payable to or in
dorsed to the fiscal officer of cor
Bank U. S., 8 Wheat. 338; porations other than banks was
ger v. Chase, 18 Pick. 63. payable to the corporation or to
This section settles whatever such fiscal officer individually.
conflict has heretofore existed as
Sec. 45. Indorsement where name of payee is mis
Spelled, etc.—Where the name of the payee or indorsee
is wrongfully designed or misspelled, he may indorse
the instrument as therein described, adding, if he
thinks fit, his proper signature."
1—This is an affirmation of ex
isting law.
The uSual and proper Way
is for the holder to indorse
in the wrongly designated or mis
spelled name and then to add his
proper signature. Chalmers Bills
of Exchange, 108. A bill was in
dorsed to J. Smythe, whose true
name was T. Smith. Indorsing the
bill as J. Smythe was a valid ne
gotiation. Willis v. Barrett, 2
Stark. 29.
One who, while carrying on bus
iness on his own account, in the
name of a company, incorporated
but not organized, receives, in pay
ment of a debt contracted with
him in such business, a promis
Sory note payable to the Order of
the corporation, may, by indorsing
the note in his own name, make
a valid transfer thereof. Bryant
V. Eastman, 7 Cush. 111.
One will be bound by paper made
by him in the name he adopts in his
business. Salomon v. Hopkins, 61
Conn. 47. An indorsement of a
note payable to John P. Reed by
and in the name of Joseph P.
Reed, he being the person to
whom the note was intended to
be made payable, was held insuffi
cient to pass title, there being in
the town a person whose name
Was John P. Reed. Bolles V.
Stearns, 11 Cush. 320.
Sec. 46. Indorsement in representative capacity.—
Where any person is under obligation to indorse in a
representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms
as to negative personal liability."
like purpose. Schmettler v. Si
mon, 101 N. Y. 554; Towne V.
Rice, 122 Mass. 67; Grafton Nat.
Bank v. Wing, 172 Mass. 513.
1-To negative personal liability
the indorser in a representative
capacity should indorse in the
same manner as the maker or ac
ceptor would sign to effect the
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Sec. 47. Time of indorsement, presumption.—Except
where an indorsement bears date after the maturity
of the instrument, every negotiation is deemed prima
facie to have been effected before the instrument was
overdue."
1—The instrument is presumed
to have been negotiated before
maturity unless the contrary ap
pear on the instrument itself.
Higgins v. Watson, 1 Mich. 428.
Manistee Nat. Bank V. Seymour,
64 Mich. 59; City Bank v. Dill,
84 Mich. 549; Lewis v. Parker, 4
A. & E. 838; Mason v. Noonan,
7 Wis. 609; Smith v. Nevlin, 89
Ill. 193. But contra: Ruddell V.
Landers, 25 Ark. 238; Clendennin
V. Southerland, 31 Ark. 20.
“It seems that circumstances of
strong suspicion short of direct
evidence, may rebut the prima
facie presumption and make it a
question for the jury whether the
bill was negotiated before or after
maturity.” Chalmers' Bills of Ex
change, 5th ed., 119.
Where defendant alleges that an
indorsement was made after ma
turity, the burden is on him to
ShOW the fact. Ranger V. Carey,
1 Met. (Mass.) 369. Indorsement
can take effect only from the time
it is made and must be governed
by the laws then in force. It
cannot be made to relate back to
the date of the instrument. Dan
iel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec. 728;
Brown v. Hull, 33 Gratt. 23.
Sec. 48. Place of indorsement, presumption.—Except
where the contrary appears, every indorsement is pre
sumed prima facie to have been made at the place
where the instrument is dated."
1—The contract of indorsement
is made where delivery is effected,
not where the signature is at
tached. Chapman v. Cottrell, 34
L. J. Ex. 186; Maxwell v. Wan
sant, 46 Ill. 58.
Sec. 49.
The law of the place where the
indorsement is made governs as
to notice to indorsers. Snow V.
Perkins, 2 Mich. 238; Glidden V.
Chamberlin, 167 Mass. 486; Freese
v. Brownell, 35 N. J. L. 285.
Continuation of negotiable character.—An
instrument negotiable in its origin continues to be ne
gotiable until it has been restrictively indorsed or dis
charged by payment or otherwise."
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1-Paper negotiable before ma
turity continues to be negotiable
after maturity. “A bill of ex
change is negotiable ad infinitum
until it has been paid by, or dis
charged, on behalf of the ac
ceptor.” Callow v. Lawrence, 3
M. & S. 95; Charles V. Marsden,
1 Taunt. 224; Nat. Bank V. Tex
as, 20 Wall. 72; Leavitt v. Put
nam, 3 N. Y. 494; Britton v.
Bishop, 11 Vt. 70; Powers v. Nel
son, 19 Mo. 190; McSherry V.
Brooks, 46 Md. 103.
Accommodation paper is within
this rule. It is negotiable after
maturity. Seyfert v. Edison, 45
N. J. L. 393. There is, however,
in respect to time of payment, a
difference between indorsements
made before maturity and indorse
ments made after maturity. In
indorsements before maturity, time
of payment is fixed at a future
day by the express agreement of
the parties; in indorsements after
maturity, time of payment is de
termined by law to be within a
reasonable time, on demand. Leav
itt v. Putnam, supra. The dis
tinction between the rights of the
indorsee before maturity and of
the indorsee after maturity, is
sharp. See Sec. 54.
“Where an overdue bill is ne
gotiated it can only be negotiated
subject to any defect of title af
fecting it at its maturity, and
thenceforward no person who takes
it can acquire or give a better
title than that Which the perSon
from whom he took it had.” In
these words the Bills of Exchange
Act affirms the general rule of the
law merchant. Bills of Exchange
Act Sec. 36 (2).
Sec. 50. Striking out indorsement.—The holder may
at any time strike out any indorsement which is not
necessary to his title. The indorser whose indorsement
is struck out, and all indorsers subsequent to him, are
thereby relieved from liability on the instrument."
1—A party suing as indorsee
may strike out all intervening in
dorsements and aver that the first
indorser in blank indorsed im
mediately to himself. Rand v.
Dovey, 83 Pa. St. 280; Mayer v.
Jadis, 1 Moody & R. 247; Merz v.
Kaiser, 20 La. Ann. 377; Morris
v. Cude, 57 Tex. 337; Middleton
V. Griffith, 57 N. J. L. 442, 31 Atl.
405. The intervening indorsements
need not be stricken out before
the trial, but may be after the
plaintiff has finished his case. May
er V. Jadis, 1 Moody & R. 247.
Where the plaintiff's own indorse
ment appears on the paper, he
still has the right to sue. Atkin
son v. Weidner, 79 Mich. 575;
Kerrick v. Stevens, 58 Mich. 297;
Collins v. Panhandle Nat. Bank,
75 Tex. 255; Middleton v. Grif
fith, 57 N. J. L. 442; Royce v.
Nye, 52 Vt. 375. Where the plain
tiff has indorsed the note to an
other for collection, he may sue
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on the instrument, and it is im
material Whether he strikes Out
his indorsement or not. Reading
V. Beardsley, 41 Mich. 123; Locke
v. Leonard Silk Co., 37 Mich. 479;
Best v. Nakomis Nat. Bank, 76
Ill. 608. See also New Haven
Manuf'g Co. v. N. H. Pulp & Board
Co., 76 Conn. 126 (a case under
the statute).
When there appears upon
the instrument an indorsement
by the plaintiff and indorse
ments subsequent to his, there has
been conflict of authority as to
whether he can maintain suit
Sec. 51.
without showing a re-transfer to
himself. The better View seems
to be that he can. Dugan v. U.
S., Wheat. 172; Bank of Kansas
City v. Mills, 24 Kan. 604; Wick
ersham V. Jarvis, 2 Mo. App. 279.
The holder has no right to strike
out the name of a person men
tioned in a special indorsement
and insert his own name in place
thereof. Porter W. Cushman, 19
Ill. 572. Nor can he, by striking
out the name, convert such Spe
cial indorsement into a blank in
dorsement. Bank of U. S. V.
Moore, Fed. Cas. No. 930.
Transfer without indorsement, effect of.—
Where the holder of an instrument payable to his order
transfers it for value without indorsing it
,
the transfer
vests in the transferee such title as the transferer had
therein, and the transferee acquires, in addition, the
right to have the indorsement o
f
the transferer." But
for the purpose of determining whether the transferee
is a holder in due course, the negotiation takes effect as
o
f
the time when the indorsement is actually made.”
1—Where the instrument is
transferred without indorsement,
the transferee cannot Sue and re
cover in his own name, and he
takes the paper subject to all equi
ties to which it was subject in
the hands of his transferrer. Rob
inson v. Wilkinson, 38 Mich. 299;
Spinning v. Sullivan, 48 Mich. 5
;
Minor v. Bewick, 55 Mich. 491;
Mattison V. Morris, 40 Mich. 52;
Simpson v. Hall, 47 Conn. 417;
Osgood v
. Artt, 17 Fed. 575;
Goshen Nat. Bank v. Bingham,
118 N. Y. 349, 23 N. E. 180. In
the last case the failure to in
dorse was by mistake but it was
held that an intention to indorse
was not sufficient to cut off equi
ties.
In Meuer v. Phoenix Nat. Bank,
94 App. Div. (N. Y.) 331, 88 N.
Y. Supp. 83 (a case under the
Statute), it was held that where a
bank at the request of the holder
certified a check not indorsed by
the payee, the bank not knowing
whom it was being certified for,
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN GENERAL. 97
the bank was liable on such cer
tification as the holder had ob
tained title to the check by its de
livery to him without indorsement
though such delivery destroyed its
negotiability and rendered the
transferee's title subject to any
equities existing between drawer
and payee. See also Lawless v.
State, 114 Wis. 189 (a case under
the statute).
2-Defenses which have come to
the notice of the transferee be
fore he Secures the indorsement
of the transferrer, are not cut off
by securing such indorsement. Os
good V. Artt, supra; Whistler V.
Forster, 32 L. J. C. P. 161; Gosh
en Nat. Bank v. Bingham, supra.
But in Beard v. Dedolph, 29 Wis.
136, it was held that though in
dorsement, as well as delivery be
fore maturity, was necessary to
cut off equities existing between
maker and payee before delivery,
a bona fide holder of such note
by delivery only is protected
against everything Subsequent to
such delivery, especially if the
note be afterwards indorsed by
him; such indorsement being held
to relate back to the time of de
livery, as to an equity outside of
the note itself. But compare with
this case: Sackett v. Montgomery,
57 Neb. 424, 77 N. W. 1083; State
V. Stebbins, 132 Mo. 332, 33 S. W.
522; Kampmann V. McCormick,
24 Tex. Civ. App. 462, 59 S. W.
832. See also Day V. Longhurst
(1893), 41 W. R. 283 (a case un
der the corresponding provision
of the Bills of Exchange Act).
Sec. 52. When prior party may negotiate instru
ment.—Where an instrument is negotiated back to a prior
party, such party may, subject to the provisions of this
act, reissue and further negotiate the same. But he is
not entitled to enforce payment thereof against any
intervening party to whom he was personally liable."
1—See Bills of Exchange Act,
Sec. 37.
This Section should be construed
in connection with section 49. At
tenborough v. Mackenzie, 25 L. J.
Ex. 244; Curtis v. Sprague, 51
Cal. 239; Oliphant v. Vannest, 58
N. J. L. 162.
One of several joint makers of
a promissory note to whom it is
assigned by the payee, cannot by
its indorsement before maturity to
a third party convey any right, ex
cept to bring suit for contribu
tion, the appearance of his name
as one of the makers being suffi
cient notice to his indorsee. Ste
vens v. Hannan, 86 Mich. 305, 88
Mich. 13.
f
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Article I W. Rights of the Holder.
Sec.
53. Right of holder to sue; pay
ment.
54. Holder in due course; what
Constitutes.
55. When person not deemed hold
er in due course.
56. Notice before full amount
paid.
57. When title defective.
Sec.
58. Notice of defect; what consti
tuteS.
59. Holder in due course; rights
of.
60. When subject to original de
fenses.
61. Holder in due course; who
deemed.
Sec. 53. Right of holder to sue; payment.—The holder
of a negotiable instrument may sue thereon in his own
name" and payment to him in due course discharges the
instrument.”
1-The holder of negotiable pa
per may sue thereon in his own
name, even though the paper be
restrictively indorsed to him. See
Sec. 39 and note. The possession
of a negotiable instrument payable
to bearer, or indorsed in blank, is
prima facie evidence of owner
ship. Wilson Sewing Machine
Co. v. Spears, 50 Mich. 534;
Barnes v. Peet, 77 Mich. 391; Bat
tersbee v. Calkins, 128 Mich. 569.
A bank holding a note as col
lateral security may sue on it in
its own name. Lobdell v. Me
chanics and Mnfrs. Bank, 33 Mich.
408; Hilton v. Waring, 7 Wis.
418; Curtis v. Mohr, 18 Wis. 645.
Where the plaintiff has acquired
the equitable title to the prom
issory note he sues upon prior to
bringing suit, the indorsement of
the same over to him by his
vendor is a mere matter of form
and may be made at the time of
the trial. Brown v. McHugh, 35
Mich. 50. The note sued on in
this action was secured by mort
gage, and the plaintiff had taken
an assignment of the debt and
Securities. The note was not
formally indorsed over by the
payee until the trial came on.
Non-ownership of the note at
the time suit is brought on it is
a complete defense. Hannahs V.
Sheldon, 20 Mich. 278; Hovey v.
Sebring, 24 Mich. 232; Reynolds
V. Kent, 38 Mich. 246; Coon V.
Dennis, 111 Mich. 450; Hogan V.
Dreifus, 121 Mich. 453. In this
case the court Said: “It is Settled
in this state that the possession
by the plaintiff of a promissory
note sued on and its production
by him upon the trial is pre
sumptive evidence of his title or
right to Sue upon it, and the
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plaintiff need not be the real or
beneficial OWner to entitle him to
recover, but the maker of the
note has a right to rebut Such
presumption and show that the
plaintiff has no title, or that he
did not acquire title until after
the commencement Of Suit and
thus defeat recovery thereon in
such action.”
It seems that such exceptions
to the general rule as exist, exist
by reason of the provision of
the code requiring suit to be
brought in the name of the
real party in interest. By statute
in Some of the States action will
lie upon a negotiable instrument
by the equitable owner in his
own name and the possession of
the note is itself evidence of such
ownership. Hudson etc. v. Wier,
29 Ala. 294; Garner v. Cook, 30
Ind. 331; Harriman v. Hill, 14
Me. 127; Guest V. Rhine, 16 Tex.
549. An indorsee Suing On a note
must prove his title thereto. Spi
cer V. Smith, 23 Mich. 96. The
authority by which the indorse
ment was made must be proved
as well as the fact of indorse
ment. Neither the statute allow
ing the note to be given in evi
dence under the money counts,
nor the rule, (circuit court rule
8, former rule 79) dispensing
with proof of execution when not
denied under oath relieves the
plaintiff from proving the indorse
ment. Redmond V. Stansbury, 24
Mich. 445; Hinkley v. Weather
wax, 35 Mich. 510; Hamilton V.
Powers, 80 Mich. 313; St. Johns
Table Co. v. Brown, 126 Mich.
592; Newton v. Principaal, 82 Mich.
271. In this case it was held that
Where an indorsee claims title
through an indorsement made by
an agent in the firm name, the
burden is upon, him to prove the
authority of the agent.
Proof of indorsement is not nec
essary in a case where it ap
pears that plaintiffs were succes
sors to the firm to which the
note was made payable. Gray v.
Willcox, 56 Mich. 58. The plain
tiffs were Francis Gray, William
C. Gray, and Homer C. Nellis, a
firm doing business under the
firm name of F. Gray & Co., and
successors to F. Gray, O'Farrell &
Co., the payees named in the note.
The note did not bear the in
dorsement of F. Gray, O’Farrell
& Co. See also: Bellis V. Lyons,
97 Mich. 398; Hall v. Wortman,
123 Mich. 304.
Where a note is payable to or
der, and the payee without having
indorsed it, loses it, he can recoV
er in a suit against the maker,
and at common law the Suit could
not be defeated by the fact that
the note was in possession of a
third person. Hoil v. Rathbone,
98 Mich. 323; McKinney v. Ham
ilton, 53 Mich. 497. In New Hav
en Mfg. Co. v. N. H. Pulp and
Board Co., 76 Conn. 126 (a case
under this section of the statute)
it was held that mere possession
of a note indorsed in blank was
sufficient evidence of ownership to
support suit.
2-A payee in a note who has
discounted it and so received pay
ment on it is estopped from af
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terwards disputing such payment,
Whatever the case might be With
an indorser who had come into
possession of it. Haughton V.
Maurer, 55 Mich. 323.
In order to constitute payment
by the maker before maturity a
valid defense against a subsequent
indorsee, the maker must show
that the indorsee had notice of
the payment. Yenney V. Central
City Bank, 44 Neb. 402.
Payment of a certified check by
a bank in due course to a bond
fide holder entitled to payment,
discharges the check, and the
payee who has received payment
but has repaid the money to the
bank when threatened with Suit
cannot maintain an action against
the bank on its certification.
Poess v. Twelfth Ward Bank, 86
N. Y. Supp. 857 (a case under the
statute).
Sec. 54. Holder in due course; what constitutes.—A
holder in due course" is a holder who has taken the in
strument under the following conditions:
First, That it is complete and regular upon its face;”
Second, That he became the holder of it before it was
overdue, and without notice that it had been previously
dishonored, if such was the fact;"
Third, That he took it in good faith 4 and for value;"
Fourth, That at the time it was negotiated to him he
had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect
in the title of the person negotiating it."
1-Holder in due course is a
term employed in the Bills of
Exchange Act, section 29 (1),
and adopted here as a substitute
for the more involved term “bond
fide holder for value without no
tice before due.” In substance
this section is declaratory of the
common law.
2—Paper is not complete and
regular upon its face when it it
Self furnishes evidence that it
has been taken from the posses
Sion of its maker before inten
tion to part with it had been
fully formed, and that the maker
Still designed to add some provi
sion or formality to give the pa
per validity and effect. Thus, it
appeared on the face of the paper
Of a corporation that it was de
signed that the president of the
- corporation should sign the same.
A blank space was left for his
signature and it was indicated by
the word “president” being 'print
ed thereon. Davis Sewing Ma
chine Co. v. Best, 105 N. Y. 59.
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As to the right to fill up blanks
in incomplete instruments, see
section 59 and note.
The effect of an irregularity ap
pearing on the face of the paper
cannot be avoided by subsequent
correction. Losee v. Bissel, 76
Pa. St. 459.
The transfer of a post dated
note on the day of its date does
not furnish cause for suspicion or
put the indorsee on inquiry or
subject him to equities existing
between the parties. Brewster V.
McCardel, 8 Wend. 478.
As to post dated checks see
Mayer v. Mode, 14 Hun 155.
3—Although a note does not
lose its negotiable character after
maturity, if it be transferred
after maturity it is subject to all
equities in the hands of any
holder because the face of the
instrument itself gives the holder
notice that the instrument has
been dishonored. McKenna V.
Kirkwood, 50 Mich. 544. The
motives of a purchaser, good or
bad, of a past due note are un
important. He gets no better title
than his vendor had. Church V.
Clapp, 47 Mich. 257; Simons v.
Morris, 53 Mich. 155; City Bank
v. Dill, 84 Mich. 549.
A person who acquires paper af
ter maturity from one who had
become a holder in due course
before maturity is protected be
cause of the good title of his
transferrer. Barker . V. Lichten
berger, 41 Neb. 751, 60 N. W. 79.
A note transferred on the day
it matures is transferred before
maturity. Cont'l Nat. Bank V.
Townsend, 87 N. Y. 8. A note
transferred on the last day of
grace is transferred before matur
ity. Crosby V. Grant, 36 N. H.
273. Contra: Pine V. Smith, 11
Gray 38. Conversely, suit brought
on a note on the last day of
grace, is prematurely brought, as
the party has all that day in
which to make payment. Wiesin
ger v. First Nat. Bank, 106 Mich.
291.
A note payable in instalments
is overdue in its entirety when
the first instalment is overdue. It
becomes subject to equities as
Soon as any instalment is overdue
and unpaid. Hart v. Stickney, 41
Wis. 630; Vinton v. King, 4 Allen
562. The transferee of a note on
which interest is overdue does
not take the note subject to equit
ies. A note matures only, when
by its terms the principal be
comes due. Patterson v. Wright,
64 Wis. 289; Kelley v. Whitney,
45 Wis. 110.
4-Lack of good faith alone
will prevent one from being a
holder in due course. Thus,
where one purchased a promis
Sory note for $300, the maker
Whereof was in fair credit and
able at the time to respond, pay
ing therefor $5, it was held that
the element of good faith neces
Sary to a holder in due course
was entirely lacking. DeWitt v.
Perkins, 22 Wis. 451. The words
“good faith” refer only to the
case of the indorsee. Helmer v.
Krolick, 36 Mich. 373. In this case
it was held that the motives and
interests of the seller of the paper
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are unimportant in determining
the rights of the buyer. Haugan
v. Sunwall, 60 Minn. 367, 62 N.
W. 398; Barnum v. Phenix, 60
Mich. 388. In this case it was
said: “It has always been the
law of this state that a person
obtaining negotiable paper for a
valuable consideration and before
maturity, is protected in its ac
quisition, unless obtained in bad
faith.”
5—One who purchases, at less
than its face value, a note of a
person employed by the original
parties to negotiate it
,
is not on
that account any the less a holder
for Value. Vinton V. Peck, 14
Mich. 287; Henriques v
. Savings
Bank, 84 Mich. 168.
A bank which discounts a note
for a customer, crediting the pro
ceeds thereof to his account, is
not a bona fide purchaser for
value, unless such credit was
drawn upon before the maturity
of the note and before notice of
facts invalidating it in the hands
o
f
the payee. Drovers' Nat. Bank
v
. Blue, 110 Mich. 31; First Nat.
Bank W
.
Wills Creek Coal Co. id.
447; Fredonia Nat. Bank v. Tom
mei, 131 Mich. 674; Garrison v
.
Union Trust Co. (Mich.) 102 N.
W. 978; Albany Co. Bank v. Peo
ple's Ice Co., 92 N. Y. App. Div.
47, 615; 86 N. Y
. Supp. 773, 1128
(a case under the statute). In
this case the facts were similar
to those in Drover's Nat. Bank V.
Blue, supra. It was held that the
bank was not a holder in due
Course. To Same effect: Citizens
State Bank V. Cowles, 180 N. Y.
346 (a case under the statute).
6-As to what constitutes no
tice of defect, see section 58.
The following cases illustrate
the Various circumstances requir
ed to constitute a holder in due
course: Gibson v. Miller, 29 Mich.
355; Hull v. Swarthout, 29 Mich.
249; Tilden v. Barnard, 43
Mich. 376; Barnum v. Phenix,
60 Mich. 388; Davis V
. Seeley,
71 Mich. 209; Miller v. Ottaway,
81 Mich. 196; Williams v. Keyes,
90 Mich. 290; First Nat. Bank V.
Shue, 119 Mich. 560; Stevens v
.
McLachlan, 120 Mich. 285; Tex
arkana Nat. Bank v. Stillwell,
121 Mich. 154; Glines v. State
Savings Bank, 132 Mich. 638. See
the following cases under the sta
tute: Ketcham V
. Govin, 71 N.
Y. Supp. 991, 35 Misc. 375; Bene
dict v. Kress, 89 N. Y. Supp. 607,
97 App. Div. 65; Greeser V
. Sug
arman, 76 N. Y. Supp. 922, 37
Misc. 799; Karsch v. Pottier etc.
Co., 81 N. Y. Supp. 782, 82 App.
Div. 230; Packard V. Windholz,
84 N. Y. Supp. 666, 88 App. Div.
365; M. Groh's Sons Co. v. Schnei
der, 68 N. Y. Supp. 862, 34 Misc.
195; German American Bank V.
Cunningham, 89 N. Y. Supp. 836,
97 App. Div. 244; Black v. Bank of
Westminster, 96 Md. 399; White
v
. Dodge (Mass. 1905) 73 N. E
.
549; Nat. Bank v. Pick (N. D
.
1904) 99 N. W. 63; Drinkall v.
Movius State Bank, 11 N
.
D
.
10,
8
8 N
.
W. 724; Rowe v. Bowman,
183 Mass. 488; Mehlinger v. Har
riman, 185 Mass. 245; Mass. Nat.
Bank v. Snow (Mass. 1905) 72
N
.
E
.
959; McNamara v. Jose, 28
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Wash. 461; Keegan v. Rock (Iowa
1905) 102 N. W. 805.
Payee as holder in due course.
Boston Steel and Iron Co. V.
Steuer, 183 Mass. 140 (a case un
der the statute). The facts in
volved were these: A check made
payable to the plaintiff was hand
ed by the drawer to her husband
to be delivered by him to the
payee in payment of a debt to
become due from the drawer to
the payee. The husband frau
dulently turned the check over
to the payee in payment of a debt
due from him. The check was
accepted by the payee in good
faith in payment of the hus
band's debt. Held, that the payee
was a holder in due course. The
Sec. 55.
fact that the plaintiff is the payee
of a negotiable security does not
prevent him from becoming a
bona fide purchaser of it at com
mon law with all the rights in
cident to a purchaser thereof for
value, without notice. He is like
Wise a holder in due course With
in this Section of the statute. See
Herdman v. Wheeler [1902] 1 K.
B. 361 (a case under the Bills of
Exchange Act). The payees of a
note given to a certain person as
their agent, and by him trans
mitted to them, cannot claim to
hold it as merely bona fide pur
chasers. Rickle v. Dow, 39 Mich.
91; Johnston Harvester Co. v.
Miller, 72 Mich. 265.
Holder in due course; when person not
deemed.—Where an instrument payable on demand is
negotiated an unreasonable length of time after its issue,
the holder is not deemed a holder in due course."
1-AS to paper payable On de
mand See Section 9. Paper pay
able on demand reaches its ma
turity within a reasonable time
after its issue. After the lapse
of Such time it is deemed Over
due. Losee v. Duncan, 7 Johns.
70; LaDue v. First Nat. Bank, 31
Minn. 33, 16 N. W. 426; see sec
tion 73 and notes. There is no
certain rule by which it can be
determined what constitutes a
reasonable time as the term is
here used. See section 2. The
cases furnish illustrations rather
than rules and are severally de
termined on the special facts and
circumstances involved. Carll V.
Brown, 2 Mich. 401. It will be
found that time ranging from
One Week to several months is
considered as a reasonable time
according to circumstances.
Transfer made within a rea
Sonable time after date: Mitchell
v. Catchings, 23 Fed. 710; Thurs
ton v. M'Kown, 6 Mass. 428;
Wethey v. Andrews, 3 Hill 582;
Pindar v. Barlow, 31 Vt. 529.
Transfer not made within a rea
Sonable time after date: Paine V.
Central Vermont R. Co., 14 Fed.
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269; Nevins v. Townsend, 6
Conn. 5; Hemmenway v. Stone, 7
Mass. 58; Herrick V. Woolverton,
41 N. Y. 581; LaDue v. First
Nat. Bank, supra. In this case
it was said: “In View of the well
known fact that Bills of Exchange
are not always transmitted im
mediately for payment, but first
pass through the hands of several
intermediate holders in the or
dinary course of business, and in
Other cases are purchased by
travelers to be carried by them
instead of currency or coin, to
be negotiated as occasion may
require, we are not disposed to
lay down any narrow rule on
this subject.”
Sec. 56. Notice before full amount paid.—Where the
transferee receives notice of any infirmity in the instru
ment or defect in the title of the person negotiating the
same before he has paid the full amount agreed to be paid
therefor, he will be deemed a holder in due course only
to the extent of the amount theretofore paid by him."
1–Dresser v. Mo. etc. Co., 93
U. S. 92. Action on three prom
issory notes for the aggregate
amount of ten thousand dollars.
William Irwin was the payee. Be
fore maturity the notes were
transferred to plaintiff for a val
uable consideration, a part of
which, $500, the plaintiff paid.
Before making further payment
he was notified that there was
fraud in the inception of the
notes and was directed to pay no
further part of the consideration.
It was held that he was entitled
to recover only the amount paid
before receipt of notice of infirm
ity. The case is governed by the
rule that the portion of an un
performed contract, which is com
pleted after notice of the fraud,
is not within the principle which
protects a bona fide holder. The
principle applies to a bank
which discounts a note, placing
the proceeds to the credit of the
assignor and, before it honors
checks drawn against this ac
count, obtains knowledge of facts
invalidating the note in the hands
of such assignor. After receiving
Such notice it pays at its peril.
Drovers' Nat. Bank v. Blue, 110
Mich. 31; Fredonia Nat. Bank v.
Tommei, 131 Mich. 674. The
reason of the rule is that the
credit by the bank of the pro
ceeds of a note to the account
of a customer is not of itself
payment. It is simply the prom
ise by the bank to pay such pro
ceeds to the customer by honoring
his checks or drafts in the or
dinary way pursued by banking
institutions. Albany Co. Bank v.
People's Ice Co., 92 N. Y. App.
Div. 47, 86 N. Y. Supp. 1128 (a
case under the statute).
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Sec. 57. When title defective.—The title of a person
who negotiates an instrument is defective within the
meaning of this act when he obtained the instrument, or
any signature thereto, by fraud, duress,” or force and
fear,” or other unlawful means, or for an illegal considera
tion," or when he negotiates it in breach of faith, or under
such circumstances as amount to a fraud.”
1—See sec. 29 (2) Bills of Ex
change Act.
One whose title is defective
must be distinguished from One
who has no title at all and who
can give none, as, for instance, a
person making title through a
forged indorsement. Chalmers'
Bills of Exchange, 5th edition,
92. Fraud as used in this Section
is of two kinds; 1st, fraud,
amounting to a want of con
tract, or fraud in esse con
tractus (Bigelow); and 2nd,
fraud in the inducement. They
should be sharply distinguished.
There are two kinds of fraud
practised in the execution of an
instrument, the first is where the
instrument is misread to the par
ty signing it, or where there is a
Surreptitious substitution of one
instrument for another, or where
by some other trickery or device
a party is made to sign an in
strument which he did not in
tend to execute. The second con
sists in inducing a party to sign
an instrument or execute it by
misrepresentations or fraudulent
representations as to collateral
matters, or as to the nature or
value of the consideration. Papke
v. G. H. Hammond Co., 192 Ill.
631, 61 N. E. 910. Fraud amount
ing to a want of contract, or
fraud in esse contractus, is well
illustrated in Brown v. Reed, 79
Pa. St. 370, where the instru
ment involved was in the fol
lowing form:
North East, April 3d, 1872.
Six months after date 1 promise to pay to J. B. Smith or bearer $50.00 when I sell by
order TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY DOLLARS worth of Hay& Harvest Grinders,
for value received, with legal interest, withoutiappeal, and also without- i
defalcation or stay of execution.
T. H. Brown. Agent for Hay and Harvest
The instrument upon which the the left hand part of the above,
plaintiff sought to recover was the right hand part having been
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cut off at the place indicated by
the vertical line. Porter v. Hardy,
10 N. D. 551, 88 N. W. 458, il
lustrates fraud practised in sub
stantially the same manner. There
can be no recovery on such in
struments at the suit of any one,
but the party whose name and
signature appears upon such paper
must have been free from negli
gence in order to escape liabil
ity. Gibbs v. Linabury, 22 Mich.
479; Anderson v. Walter, 34 Mich.
113; Soper v. Peck, 51 Mich. 563;
First Nat. Bank v. Deal, 55 Mich.
592; Beard v. Hill, 131 Mich. 246.
In Soper v. Peck it is said “The
party will not be liable unless his
own negligence was so gross as
to preclude his defending against
a bona fide purchaser. See Holmes
v. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427; Walker
v. Ebert, 29 Wis. 194; Keller V.
Ruppold, 115 Wis. 636; Baldwin
v. Bricker, 86 Ind. 222; But See
Bedell v. Herring, 77 Cal. 572.
The following additional provision
appears in the Wisconsin Act:
“And the title of such person is
absolutely void when such instru
ment or signature Was SO procured
from a person who did not knoW
the nature of the instrument and
could not have obtained such
knowledge by the use of ordinary
care.”
Fraud in the inducement. This
kind does not amount to a want
of contract, nor create a defense
as against a holder in due course.
Lenheim v. Fay, 27 Mich. 70;
Campbell v. Skinner, 30 Mich. 32;
Shaw v. Stein, 79 Mich. 77; Hunt
v. Rumsey, 83 Mich. 136; Beath V.
Chapoton, 115 Mich. 506; First
Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 133 Mich.
700; Slacom v. Wishart, 3 Mc
Lean 517, Fed. Cas. No. 12933;
Smith V. Livingston, 111 Mass.
342; Clothier v. Adriance, 51 N.
Y. 322; Drinkall v. Movius State
Bank, 11 N. D. 10, 88 N. W. 724
(a case under the statute). A
cashier’s check was endorsed over
by the plaintiff, when the plain
tiff was partially intoxicated, to
one Maxwell as the result of a
gambling transaction. It was
held that the indorsee, under this
section, had a defective title and
that the bank was liable under
sec. 90 because when the bank
paid the amount to the indorsee
it had knowledge of the facts and
had been told by the plaintiff to
cancel the check. See also Kee
gan v. Rock (Ia. 1905) 102 N.
W. 805, (a case under the sta
tute).
2—Whether a negotiable instru
ment executed under duress is
void in the hands of a holder
in due course is a question upon
which decisions are in conflict. In
Michigan, it has been held that
duress is not a defense against a
holder in due course. Farmers &
Mechanics Bank v. Butler, 48
Mich. 192.
In accord with this View are:
Beals v. Neddo, 1 McCrary 206;
Clark v. Pease, 41 N. H. 414.
Opposed, are: Palmer v. Poor,
121 Ind. 135; Barry v. Equitable
Life Society, 59 N. Y. 587; Berry
v. Berry, 57 Kan. 691. Daniel's
Neg. Inst. 5th ed. sec. 858.
As to what constitutes du
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ress see Beath V. Chapoton, 115
Mich. 506; Barger v. Farnham,
130 Mich. 487; Jones Co. v. Board
of Education, 51 N. Y. Supp. 950.
3–These Words were inserted
in the Bills of Exchange Act aS
equivalent to the technical term
“duress” which is a term un
known to the Scotch law. Chal
mers’ Bills of Exch a ng e,
supra. The introduction of these
Words into the American Act
shows with what fidelity it fol
lows the English Statute.
Sec. 58.
4-AS to illegality of consider
ation See note 1, Sec. 27.
5-Where a note has been di
verted or negotiated in violation
of an agreement under which it
was given such negotiation con
Stitutes a breach of faith and
amounts to a fraud upon the
maker. German American Bank
V. Cunningham, 97 App. Div. 244,
89 N. Y. Supp. 836 (a case under
the statute). See also M. Groh's
Sons Co. v. Schneider, 34 N. Y.
Miss. 195, 68 N. Y. Supp. 862 (a
case under the statute).
Notice of defect; what constitutes.—To con
stitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument, or defect
in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person
to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge
of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts
that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad
faith."
1–This Section Was construed
in McNamara V. Jose, 28 Wash.
461. The court said: “The hold
er's title to the paper is not to be
overthrown by slight circum
stances. He does not owe to the
party who puts the paper afloat
the duty of active inquiry in or
der to avert the imputation of
bad faith; his rights are to be
determined by the simple test of
honesty and good faith, not by a
speculative inquiry into diligence
or negligence. Although he may
have been negligent in taking the
paper and omitted precautions
which a prudent man would have
taken, nevertheless, unless he act
ed mala fide his title will pre
Vail.”
In Valley Savings Bank v.
Mercer, 97 Md. 478, the court in
Construing this section held that
mere suspicion of defect of title
or knowledge of circumstances
which would excite such suspi
cions in the mind of a prudent
man or gross negligence on the
part of the taker of the note at
the time of transfer Will not de
feat his title. This section was
also construed in Unaka Nat.
Bank v. Butler, (Tenn., 1904) 83
S. W. 655. Other cases under this
section are: Ketcham v. Govin,
35 N. Y. Misc., 375, 71 N. Y. Supp.
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991; Mass. Nat. Bank v. Snow
(Mass. 1905) 72 N. E. 959; Black
v. First Nat. Bank (Md.) 54 Atl.
88. Negligence, however gross, is
not equivalent to notice, but mere
ly evidence of bad faith. New
York Iron Mine v. Citizens' Bank,
44 Mich. 344; Mace v. Kennedy, 68
Mich. 389; Davis v. Seeley, 71
Mich. 209; Stevens v. McLachlan,
120 Mich. 285; Glines v. State
Savings Bank, 132 Mich. 638;
Hotchkiss v. Nat. Bank, 21 Wall.
354; Goodman v. Simonds, 20
How. (U. S.) 343; Phelan v.
Moss, 67 Pa. St. 59; Seybel V.
Nat. Currency Bank, 54 N. Y. 288.
The following Michigan cases
illustrate circumstances amounting
to notice of defect: Miller V. Fin
ley, 26 Mich. 249; Borden v.
Clark, 26 Mich. 410; Lenheim V.
Fay, 27 Mich. 70; McNamara v.
Gargett, 68 Mich. 454; Abele v.
McGuigan, 78 Mich. 415; Car
penter v. Greenop, 84 Mich. 49;
Stevens v. Hannan, 86 Mich., 305,
88 Mich. 13; Lockwood v. Noble,
113 Mich. 418; Conrad V. Mann
ing's Est., 125 Mich. 77.
The following cases illustrate
circumstances falling Short of not
ice of defect: Vinton V. Peck, 14
Mich. 287; Howry v. Eppinger, 34
Mich. 29; Bottomley v. Goldsmith,
36 Mich. 27; Chicago & N. E. R. R.
Co. v. Edson, 41 Mich 673; Shaw
v. Clark, 49 Mich. 384; Cristy v.
Campau, 107 Mich. 172; Drovers’
Nat. Bank v. Potvin, 116 Mich.
447.
The agents' knowledge of a
defect is knowledge of the prin
cipal. Tilden v. Barnard, 43
Mich. 376; Johnston Harvester
Co. v. Miller, 72 Mich. 2
Thompson v. Union Trust Co.,
Mich. 508. Knowledge of
president of a corporation,
payee in a note, of a defect
the note cannot be imputed
the bank through him as its ca.
ier. State Savings Bank V. Mo
gomery, 126 Mich. 327; Peopl
Savings Bank v. Hine, 131 Mi
181. See also World Mfg. Co.
Cycle Co., 123 Mich. 623.
Where a note is given in t
firm name by a member of t
firm the presumption is that it
given for partnership purpos
Carrier v. Cameron, 31 Mich. 37
Nichols V. Sober, 38 Mich. 67
Stevens V. McLachlan, sup:
Where one partner gives a fi
l
note for his private debt the p
Son taking such note with know
edge of the fact is charged wi
notice that it is given for an u
authorized purpose and cann
hold the other partners. Heffri
v
. Hanaford, 40 Mich. 305; RG
erts v. People, 55 Mich. 36
Towle v. Dunham, 76 Mich. 2:
84 Mich. 268; Carpenter v. Gree
op, supra, Mechanics Bank
Barnes, 86 Mich. 632.
Where the paper o
f
a corpor
tion appears on its face
have been duly issued in co
formity with the charter, a bon
fide holder can enforce the sam
Genesee Co. Savings Bank
Mich. Barge Co., 52 Mich. 43
But a person taking a note fro
an officer o
f
a corporation for ti
officer's individual obligation
with knowledge that it is n
given for corporation purpos.
does so at his peril. Prima fac
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the act is unauthorized, and un
less the holder can show special
authority he cannot enforce the
paper against the corporation.
New York Iron Mine V. First Nat.
Bank, 39 Mich. 644; McClellan v.
Detroit File Works, 56 Mich. 579;
Merchants Nat. Bank V. Detroit
Knitting & Corset Works, 68 Mich.
620; Wilson v. Metropolitan El.
R’y, 120 N. Y. 145. But see Doe
V. N. W. Coal etc. Co., 78 Fed.
62; Cheever v. Pittsburg etc.
R. Co., 150 N. Y. 59.
Sec. 59. Holder in due course; rights of.—A holder in
due course ("holds the instrument free from any defect
of title of prior parties and'free from defenses available
to prior parties among themselves," and may enforce pay
ment of the instrument for the full amount thereof *
against all parties liable thereon."
1-A payee may be a holder in
due course. See note 3, sec. 54.
2—Although the instrument is
invalid as between the immediate
parties the holder in due course
takes it discharged of equities.
Elliott v. Miller, 8 Mich. 132;
Hunter v. Parsons, 22 Mich. 96;
Miller v. Finley, 26 Mich. 249;
Wright v. Irwin, 33 Mich. 32;
Howry v. Eppinger, 34 Mich. 29;
Helmer v. Krolick, 36 Mich. 371;
Spinning v. Sullivan, 48 Mich. 8;
Barnum v. Phenix, 60 Mich. 388;
Davis v. Seeley, 71 Mich. 209;
Evans V. Struhrburg, 78 Mich.
145; Chapman v. Remington, 80
Mich. 552; Little v. Mills, 98
Mich. 423; First Nat. Bank v.
Housknecht, 121 Mich. 313.
This section of the statute has
been referred to in the following
cases: White V. Dodge, 73 N. E.
549; Greeser v. Sugarman, 37 N.
Y. Misc. 799, 76 N. Y. Supp. 922;
Albany Co. Bank v. Peoples' Ice
Co., 92 App. Div. 47, 86 N. Y.
Supp. 1128; Nat. Bank of Com
merce v. Pick (N. D. 1904) 99 N.
W. 63; German American Bank
V. Cunningham, 97 App. Div. 244,
89 N. Y. Supp. 836; Unaka Nat.
Bank V. Butler (Tenn. 1904) 83
S. W. 655; McNamara v. Jose,
28 Wash. 461; Ketcham V. Govin,
35 N. Y. Misc. 375, 71 N. Y. Supp.
991.
This provision effects a change
in the law Of those States
where it has been held that a
negotiable instrument given on
account of a gambling transaction
is void even in the hands of an
innocent holder for Value. Wirt
V. Stubblefield, 17 App. Cas. D. C.
283 (a case under the statute).
In this case the court said: “The
leading object of the act has been
to establish a uniform system of
law to govern negotiable instru
ments wherever they might cir
culate or be negotiated. It was
not only uniformity of rules and
principles that was designed, but
to embody in a codified form as
fully as possible all the law upon
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the subject, to avoid conflict of
decisions and the effect of mere
local laws and usages that have
heretofore prevailed. The great
object sought to be accomplished
by the enactment of the statute
was to free the negotiable instru
ment as far as possible from all
latent or local infirmities that
would otherwise inhere in it to
the prejudice and disappointment
of innocent holders as against all
of the parties to the instrument
professedly bound thereby. This
clearly could not be effected so
long as the instrument was ren
dered absolutely null and void by
local statute as against the orig
inal maker or acceptor.”
3—This provision settles a point
Over which the decisions have
been in conflict. In Vinton V.
Peck, 14 Mich. 287, Judge Camp
bell said,—“The maker of a note
has no concern With the amount
paid for it by a bona fide pur
chaser.” In Cromwell V. County
Sac, 96 U. S. 51, (6 Otto) the
court declares the rule to be:
“A purchaser of a negotiable se
curity before maturity in cases
where he is not chargeable per
sonally with fraud is entitled to
recover its full amount against its
maker though he may have paid
less than its par value, whatever
may have been its original in
firmity * * * * * * *. This
rule in no respect impinges upon
the doctrine that One Who makes
only a loan upon such paper or
takes it as collateral security for
a precedent debt may be limited
in his recovery to the amount ad
Vanced or Secured.” This rule,
however, has not met with unani
mous approval. Opposed to it
are: Holcomb v. Wyckoff, 35 N. J.
L. 13 Bank V. McNair, 116 N. C.
550, 21 S. E. 389; Harger v. Wil
son, 63 Barb. 237; Oppenheim v.
Farmers & Mechanics Bank, 97
Tenn. 19. In McNamara V. Jose,
28 Wash. 461, it was ruled that
the holder could recover the full
amount under this provision of
the statute. In Mersick v. Alder
Iman, (Conn. 1905) 60 Atl.
109, (a case under the statute)
the right of a holder in due
course to recover the full amount
Was recognized, but it was held
One who takes the paper as col
lateral security for a debt will
be limited in his recovery to the
amount of the debt. For cases
where notice of defect or fraud is
received before full payment see
Sec. 56 and note.
4-The Wisconsin Act has the
following additional provision:
“Except as provided in sections
1944 and 1945 of these statutes,
and also in cases where the title
of the person negotiating such
instrument is void under the pro
visions of sections 1676-25 (sec.
57) of this Act.”
Sec. 60. When subject to original defenses.–In the
hands of any holder other than a holder in due course, a
negotiable instrument is subject to the same defenses as
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if it were non-negotiable. But a holder who derives his
title through a holder in due course, and who is not him
self a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instru
ment, has all the rights of such former holder in respect
of all parties prior to the latter.”
1—Of this Section Mr. Craw
ford makes the following explana
ation: “It Was not deemed ex
pedient to make provision as to
what equities the transferee will
be subject to; for the matter may
be affected by the statutes of the
various States relating to set-off
and counterclaim. In an act de
signed to be uniform in the var
ious States, no more can be done
than fix the rights of holders in
due course.”
The law merchant is not more
explicit than the statute in de
fining the defenses which may be
urged against negotiable instru
ments, wisely leaving it, within
certain broad, general rules, to be
determined from the Status of
each case, what kind of defense
is available and to what extent it
may be carried.
There are two general classes
of defenses, absolute or real,
equities or personal. The former
is so named because it applies
to an instrument unenforceable in
whose hands soever it may be. It
is also called a real defense be
cause it lies against the res—the
thing itself. The latter is so
named because it is available
against certain persons only, and
because Of this fact the name
personal has been applied to it
instead of equities.
The following analysis of de
fenses (see Ames’ Cases on Bills
and Notes) exhibits comprehen
sively, but perhaps not complete
ly, the classification which the
law merchant recognizes:
I Absolute or Real.
(1) Incapacity to contract.
(a) Infancy.
(b) Coverture in some
jurisdictions.
(c) Insanity.
(d) Intoxication.
(e) Corporate incapa
city.
(2) Fraud (amounting to
want Of contract, in
eSSe contractuS, See Sec
tion 57).
(3) Illegality when contract
is declared void by sta
tute.
(4) Discharge of Instrument
by
(a) Alteration (see.
Sec. 126).
(b) Cancellation (see
sec. 125).
(c) Payment, renun
ciation or release
at Or after ma
turity (see sec.
124).
II Equities or Personal
(1) Fraud (in the induce
ment). See Sec. 57.
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(2) Duress (Some courts
hold otherwise. See Sec.
57).
(3) Want or failure of con
sideration either total
or partial (see Sec. 59).
(4) Illegality unless instru
ment is declared void
by statute (see sec. 59).
(5) Payment, renunciation,
or release before ma
turity.
(6) Discharge of party sec
ondarily liable by dis
charge of prior party
(see sec. 122).
This provision of the statute
Seems to allow all defenses, whe
ther collateral or inherent.
Whether only such equities pre
Vail against an indorsee as are
attached to the note itself or
Whether those arising out of col
lateral matters may also be as
Serted is a question upon which
the courts have disagreed.
The weight of authority is that
Such collateral matters may not
be asserted against a transferee of
over due paper. Daniel Neg. Inst.,
5th ed., Sec. 725.
In the leading case of Bur
rough v. Moss, 10 B. & C. 558,
the facts were that a promissory
note was made by the defendant,
payable to one Fearn and by him
indorsed to the plaintiff after it
became due. The defendant in
sisted upon his right to set off,
against the plaintiff's claim, a
debt due the defendant from
Fearn at the time of the transfer.
It was held that the indorsee of
an over due bill or note is liable
to such equities only as attach
On the note or bill itself, and not
to claims arising out of collater
al matters. This case has been
generally followed in the United
States and was reaffirmed in Eng
land in Whitehead v. Walker, 10
M. & W. 695, where the indorsee
received the bill With notice of
the set off; and in Oulds V. Har
rison, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 524, where
the bill was indorsed for the ex
press purpose of defeating the
Set Off. See Nat. Bank V. Texas,
20 Wall (U. S.) 72; Weader v.
First Nat. Bank, 126 Ind. 111,
25 N. E. 887; Davis v. Miller, 14
Gratt. 8; Simpson v. Hall, 47
Conn. 417; Tinsley v. Beall, 2 Ga.
134; Long v. Rhawn, 75 Pa. St.
128.
Other states have held that
Such set-offs are available as a
defense. McKenn V. Kirkwood,
50 Mich. 544; McDonald v. Mac
Kenzie, 24 Ore. 573, 14 Pac. 866;
Foot v. Ketchum, 15 Vt. 258, 40
Am. Dec. 678; Armstrong V.
Chadwick, 12 Mass. 156.
Any Set-Off between antecedent
parties, which arises after the
transfer, cannot be asserted
against the indorsee. Davis V.
Miller, 14 Gratt. 8; Henderson V.
Johnson, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 381;
55 S. W. 35.
2—This is an exception to the
general rule Stated in the first
half of the Section. Whenever
any person has acquired the pa
per as a holder in due course, he
can transfer his title to others
who will also take free from
equities though they may have
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knowledge of infirmities in the
instrument Wood v. Starling, 48
Mich. 592; Shaw v. Clark, 49
Mich. 384. The principle is that
the promise being good to the
prior indorsee or holder, free
from objection on the ground of
fraudulent or illegal considera
tion, such indorsee or holder has
the power of transferring it to
others with the same immunity,
as an incident to the legal right
which he had acquired in the in
strument. Kinney V. Kruse, 28
Wis. 183; Simon v. Merritt, 33
Iowa 537. Jennings v. Carlucci, 87
N. Y. Supp. 475 (case under the
statute), in which plaintiff's as
signor, in due course, transferred
a note to the plaintiff after ma
turity. It was held that the same
title passed to the plaintiff as his
assignor had and defenses avail
able between the original parties
were not available against the
plaintiff. See also the following
cases decided under the Statute:
Mersick V. Alderman (Conn.
1905) 60 Atl. 109; Black v.
First Nat. Bank, 96 Md. 399;
Bryan v. Harr, 21 App. Cas. (D.
C.) 190.
Where a payee becomes a pur
chaser from a bona fide holder
he takes it subject to all equities
and defenses originally existing
against it; as against him there is
a personal defense. Kost V. Ben
der, 25 Mich. 515; Andrews v.
Robertson, (Wis.) 87 N. W. 190
(a case under the statute).
The full import of this provi
Sion may be illustrated thus: A
note is invalid in the hands of
A., the payee, by reason of fraud
in the inducement; A. transfers
it to B. under circumstances that
make B. a holder in due course;
B. transfers it for a valuable con
sideration to C., who has full
knowledge of the fraudulent in
ducement; C. may enforce the
note against the maker relying on
the fact that B. Was a holder in
due course. If A. should thereaf
ter become the holder for a Val
uable consideration, he could not
recover on the note.
The Wisconsin Act inserts the
word “duress” after the Word
“fraud.” in the Second sentence
and substitutes the words “such
holder” for the words “the latter.”
Sec. 61. Holder in due course; who deemed.—Every
holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course,'
but when it is shown that the title of any person who has
negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is
on the holder to prove that he or some person under
whom he claims acquired the title as a holder in due
course.” But the last mentioned rule does not apply in
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favor of a party who became bound on the instrument
prior to the acquisition of such defective title.”
1-Bryan v. Harr, 21 App. Cas.
(D. C.) 190; German Am. Nat.
Bank V. Cunningham, 97 App.
Div. 244; 89 N. Y. Supp. 836;
Karsch V. Pottier & Stymus Mfg.
etc. Co. 82 App. Div. 230, 81 N.
Y. Supp. 782; Benedict v. Kress,
97 App. Div. 65, 89 N. Y. Supp.
607; Packard v. Windholtz, 88
App. Div. 365, 84 N. Y. Supp. 666
(cases arising under the statute).
2—The holder of a nego
tiable instrument is presumed to
be a holder in due course until
evidence on the part of the de
fendant Shows that the instru
ment had a fraudulent or illegal
inception; thereupon the burden
is on the holder to show that he
acquired the instrument in good
faith and for value and without
notice or that some person under
whom he claims so acquired it.
Paton v. Coit, 5 Mich. 505; Pol
hemus V. Ann Arbor Savings
Bank, 27 Mich. 44; Tilden v.
Barnard, 43 Mich. 376; Bottomley
v. Goldsmith, 36 Mich. 27; Conley
v. Winsor, 41 Mich. 253; Mace v.
Kennedy, 68 Mich. 389; Goodrich
v. McDonald, 77 Mich. 486; City
Bank v. Dill, 84 Mich. 549; Hor
rigan v. Wyman, 90 Mich. 121;
Little v. Mills, 98 Mich. 423;
French v. Talbot Paving Co., 100
Mich. 443; Rice V. Rankans, 101
Mich. 378; Drovers' Nat. Bank v.
Blue, 110 Mich. 31; Drovers' Nat.
Bank v. Potvin, 116 Mich. 474.
Stevens v. McLachlan, 120 Mich.
285; Tatam v. Haslar, 23 Q. B.
D. 345 (a case under the cor
responding provision of the Bills
Exchange Act). In Brown V.
Feldwert, (Ore. 1905) 80 Pac. 414
the court said that section 61
would seem to require “where
fraud has been shown in the in
ception, the purchaser of a note
must show affirmatively, among
Other things, that he had no
notice of such or any other in
firmities at the time he acquired
it.” To the same effect: Consoli
dation Nat. Bank v. Kirkland, 99
App. Div. 121, 91 N. Y. Supp. 353;
Mitchell v. Baldwin, 88 App. Div.
265, 84 N. Y. Supp. 1043; Keegan
v. Rock (Iowa 1905) 102 N. W.
805; Lucker v. Iba, 54 N. Y. App.
Div. 566, 66 N. Y. Supp. 1019; M.
Groh's Sons Co. v. Schneider, 34
Misc. 195, 68 N. Y. Supp. 862
(cases under the statute).
3-The fact that one who held
possession of a note for the payee
put it into circulation in fraud of
the payee's rights is no defense
in a suit by the holder against
the maker; nor does it change
the burden of proof so as to re
quire the plaintiff to show in the
first instance that he is a bona
fide holder for value. The fraud
in putting a note into circulation
which will operate as a defense
or change the burden of proof, in
such an action, must be fraud
against the maker. Kinney v.
Kruse, 28 Wis. 183.
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Article V. Liabilities of Parties.
Sec.
62. Liability of maker.
63. Liability of drawer.
64. Liability of acceptor.
65. When person deemed indor
Ser.
66. Liability of irregular indor
Ser.
67. Warranty; where negotiation
by delivery etc.
Sec
68. Liability of general indorsers.
69. Liability of indorser where
paper negotiable by deliv
ery.
70. Order in which indorsers are
liable.
71. Liability of agent or broker.
Sec. 62. Liability of maker.—The maker of a nego
tiable instrument by making it engages that he will pay
it according to its tenor, and admits the existence of the
payee and his then capacity to indorse.”
1—The contract of the maker
Speaks from the instrument it
Self. Evidence is inadmissible to
show any understanding or agree
ment other than that imported by
it. Thus, one who indorsed a
promissory note before it was
uttered and before the payee had
indorsed it—being liable thereon
as a joint maker (see section 66)
—cannot in an action against him
on the note give evidence that he
was induced to sign the note by
the promise of the payee that he
should not be liable thereon. Gumz
v. Giegling, 108 Mich. 295.
Evidence of a parol agreement
to reduce the amount agreed to
be paid is incompetent. Phelps
v. Abbott, 114 Mich. 88.
Evidence of an oral agreement
to renew a note is inadmissible.
Wood's Sons Co. v. Schaeffer, 173
Mass. 443; Hall v. First Nat.
Bank, 173 Mass. 16; Heist v.
Hart, 73 Pa. St. 289.
Where the signature is in the
usual place, the lower right hand
corner, the intention is thereby
fixed, the signing in that way is
an execution of the note as a
matter of law. If the Signature
be not in the proper place, a
question of fact arises as to whe
ther the due execution of the in
Strument was intended. The bur
den of proof to show due execu
tion under such circumstances is
on the holder. Bigelow, Bills,
Notes and Cheques, 41.
Where one of two or more per
sons who execute a note adds to
his signature the word “surety,”
he is not the less liable as maker.
Inkster V. First Nat. Bank. 30
Mich. 143; Dart v. Sherwood, 7
Wis. 446; Hoyt v. Mead, 13 Hun
327. See Ballard V. Burton, 64
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Vt. 387; Hubbard v. Gurney, 64 N.
Y. 457; see note 8, sec. 19.
The liability of the maker is
controlled by the law of the place
of execution of the note unless
it is made payable elsewhere when
the law of that place will con
trol. Strawberry Point Bank v.
Lee, 117 Mich. 122; Central Trust
Co. v. Burton, 74 Wis. 329.
2—The maker is estopped to
deny the existence of the payee
and his then capacity to indorse,
So if he is Sued by an indorsee
of the payee he cannot defend on
the ground that the payee being
an infant, married woman, etc.,
had no capacity to indorse. Wolke
v. Kuhne, 109 Ind. 313; Castor
v. Peterson, 2 Wash. 204, 26 Pac.
223. It has been held that the
maker may show the insanity of
the payee at the time the paper
was executed. Peaslee V. Rob
bins, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 164, but
this holding has been criticised
and disapproved.
Where a note, made payable to
a foreign corporation which has
not, at the time of execution and
delivery, complied with the laws
relative to the conditions which
would authorize doing business
within the state, was transferred
to a purchaser, before maturity,
for value and without notice, it
was held, under this provision,
that the defendant by giving the
note, which was not the subject
of statutory prohibition, thereby
conclusively admitted as to third
parties, purchasing before matur
ity and in good faith, the legal
existence of the payee and its
authority to take such note and
transfer it by indorsement. Mc
Mann v. Walker, 31 Col. 261, 72
Pac. 1055.
When the payee is a fictitious
or non-existing person, the in
strument is payable to bearer. See
Section 11.
When the note is payable to a
firm the maker is estopped from
denying the existence of such
firm, Griener v. Ulerey, 20 Iowa
266, or that the name of the
firm was indorsed by an infant
partner, Dulty v. Brownfield, 1
Pa. St. 497.
The maker of a note will not
be permitted to show that the
payee was not the real party in
interest at the time the note was
executed. Johnson V. Conklin,
119 Ind. 109.
Sec. 63. Liability of drawer.—The drawer by drawing
the instrument admits the existence of the payee and
his then capacity to indorse; and engages that on due
presentment the instrument will be accepted or paid, or
both, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored,
and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken,
he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any
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subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it
.
But the drawer may insert in the instrument an express
stipulation negativing o
r limiting his own liability to the
holder."
1-The drawer is ordinarily lia
ble as a secondary party but is
liable as a primary party if,
1st, his drawing is fraudulent,
that is, if he had no reasonable
expectation that his draft would
be honored,
2nd, if he draws on himself.
If he draws on a partnership of
which he is a member, this is
equivalent to drawing on him
self,
3rd, if he draws on a fictitious
or non-existing person or a per
Son not having capacity to con
tract. See Section 116.
From the Colorado Act the
word “subsequent” is omitted.
Sec. 64. Liability of acceptor.—The acceptor by ac
cepting the instrument engages that he will pay it accord
ing to the tenor o
f
his acceptance, and admits:
First, The existence of the drawer,” the genuineness of
his signature,” and his capacity * and authority to draw
the instrument,” and
Second, The existence o
f
the payee and his then capac
ity to indorse."
1—Before acceptance the drawee
is not liable on the instrument
and is a stranger to it. He
could himself discount the in
strument and transfer it to a
bona fide holder who could sue
and hold the drawer. Attensbor
ough v. McKenzie, 36 Eng. L. &
Eq., 562.
The acceptor of a bill like the
maker of a note is primarily lia
ble. His engagement runs not
only to each o
f
the indorsers but
to the drawer himself. Heuerte
matte V. Morris, 101 N. Y. 63.
An acceptance is not a collater
a
l engagement to pay the debt of
another. It is an absolute en
gagement to pay the money to
the holder o
f
the bill; and the
engagements of all the other par
ties are merely collateral. Prima
facie every acceptance affords a
presumption of funds of the draw
er in the hands of the acceptor,
and is, of itself, an express ap
propriation of those funds for the
use of the holder. The case may
indeed be otherwise, and then the
acceptor, in fact, pays the debt of
the drawer, but as between him
self and the payee, it is not a
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collateral, but an original and di
rect undertaking. The payee ac
cepts the acceptor as his debtor
and he cannot resort to the draw
er, but upon a failure of due
payment of the bill. Raborg V.
Peyton, 2 Wheat. 385.
2—The acceptor is required to
know that there is such a per
son as the one who purports to
draw the bill. Cooper V. Meyer,
10 B. & C. 468, 21 E. C. L. 202.
If the drawer be dead at the
time of acceptance, the acceptor
is precluded from setting up the
fact. Ashpitel v. Bryan, 3 B. &
S. 474, 113 E. C. L. 474.
3—The acceptor is estopped
from denying the genuineness of
the drawer's signature. He is
bound to know, when he accepts
the instrument, that such signa
ture is genuine. He is presumed
to know the handwriting of his
correspondent and if he accepts
or pays a bill to which the draw
er's name has been forged, he is
bound by the act and can neither
repudiate the acceptance nor re
cover the money from a bona fide
holder to whom he has paid it.
National Park Bank V. Ninth Na
tional Bank, 46 N. Y. 77; Gar
land V. Jacomb, L. R. 8 Ex. 216.
If a bill be drawn by an agent,
the drawee, by his acceptance, ad
mits the genuineness of the
agent's signature and his author
ity to draw, Robinson v. Yarrow,
7 Taunt. 455, 1 Moore 150; but
he does not admit the authority
of the agent to indorse the same
bill, although it is made payable
to the order of his principal and
is indorsed by the same agent in
the name of the principal. Story
on Bills, sec. 262.
The acceptor does not admit the
genuineness of the signature of
the indorser even though the bill
be drawn to the Order of the
drawer. First Nat. Bank V.
Northwestern Nat. Bank, 152 Ill.
296, 38 N. E. 739; Williams v.
Drexel, 14 Md. 566.
The acceptor does not admit the
genuineness of the body of the
bill. He is not presumed to know
the handwriting in the body of
the instrument. So if he payS a
bill or check that has been raised
and he is not himself negligent
he can recover from the perSon
to whom he paid it, the excessive
amount. White V. Continental
Nat. Bank, 64 N. Y. 317.
4—As he admits the legal capa
city of the drawer to draw the
bill, he cannot Set up as a de
fense that the drawer Was an
infant, Taylor V. Croker, 4 Esp.
187; or a married woman, Cow
ton v. Wickersham, 54 Pa. St.
302; or a corporation having no
legal authority to draw the bill,
Halifax v. Lyle, 2 Welsby, Hurl.
& G. (Exch.) 446.
5—He admits that he has funds
of the drawer in his hands to
pay the bill, so after acceptance
he is estopped from asserting
against a bona fide holder that
the acceptance was given without
consideration. Heuertematte v.
Morris, 101 N. Y. 63. As between
himself and the drawer it is only
prima facie evidence that he has
such funds in his hands and he
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may show that the acceptance
WaS merely for accommodation
and after paying the bill may re
COVer from the drawer in an ac
tion for money had and received.
Christian V. Keen, 80 Va. 369.
6–So, he is estopped from set
ting up that at the time of ac
ceptance the payee was an infant,
Jones v. Darch, 4 Price 300; a lu
natic or a married woman, Smith
V. Marsack, 6 C. B. 486; or a cor
poration without legal capacity
or existence, Brickley v. Edwards,
131 Ind. 3, 30 N. E. 708.
Note that the acceptor
mits,” the indorser
(See sec. 67, 68.)
“ad
“Warrants.”
Sec. 65. When person deemed indorser.—A person
placing his signature upon an instrument, otherwise than
as maker, drawer or acceptor is deemed to be an indorser,
unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his in
tention to be bound in some other capacity."
1—Under this section a party
may assume some other liability
such as guarantor or surety but
that effect by some appropriate
expression. See sec. 19, subd. 6
and note; Sec. 66.
he must indicate his intention to
Sec. 66. Liability of irregular indorser.—Where a per
son, not otherwise a party to an instrument, places there
on his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as
indorser" in accordance with the following rules:
First, If the instrument is payable to the order of a
third person, he is liable to the payee and to all subse
quent parties;”
Second, If the instrument is payable to the order of
the maker or drawer, or is payable to bearer, he is liable
to all parties subsequent to the maker or drawer;”
Third, If he signs for the accommodation of the payee
he is liable to all parties subsequent to the payee."
1-This changes the law in
Michigan and in some other states
and Settles the conflict in the
decisions as to the liability of the
irregular or anomalous indorser.
In Michigan a person placing
his name on the back of a note
before delivery and before in
dorsement by the payee has been
held liable as a joint maker.
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Wetherwax v. Paine, 2 Mich. 555;
Rothschild v. Grix, 31 Mich. 150;
Herbage V. McEntee, 40 Mich. 337;
Stewart V. First Nat. Bank, 40
Mich. 348; Sibley V. Muskegon
Nat. Bank, 41 Mich. 196; Moyna
han V. Hanaford, 42 Mich. 329;
Robbins V. Brooks, 42 Mich. 62;
Greusel V. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 95;
Fay & Co. v. Jenks & Co., 78
Mich. 312; Tredway v. Antisdel,
86 Mich. 82; Allison V. Circuit
Judge, 104 Mich. 141; Gumz V.
Giegling, 108 Mich. 295; Dow Law
Bank V. Godfrey, 126 Mich. 521;
McGraw v. Union Trust Co.,
(Mich.) 99 N. W. 758; Citizens'
Bank V. Platt (Mich.), 97 N. W.
694. The same rule applies where
one indorses a note payable to
the maker at the time of execu
tion and before delivery, even
though his indorsement follows
that of the payee. Peninsular
Savings Bank V. Hosie, 112 Mich.
351. Or where a party indorses
after the payee has indorsed
but Writes his name above
that of the payee. Sweet v. Wood
in, 72 Mich. 393; Logan v. Og
den, 101 Tenn. 392. Some of the
Other State courts follow the Same
rule as the Michigan court. Union
Bank v. Willis, 8 Metc. (Mass.)
504; Childs v. Wyman, 44 Me.
441. In the case last cited the
irregular indorser added to his
signature, the words, “without re
course.” The court rejected these
words as mere surplusage, being
words applicable to an indorser,
not to an original promisor.
Other courts have held him
liable as indorser: as first indor
ser, Blakeslee V. Hewett, 76 Wis.
341; as second indorser, Phelps v.
Vischer, 50 N. Y. 69; Eilbert v.
Finkbeiner, 68 Pa. St. 243. Other
Courts have held him liable as
guarantor. Ranson V. Sherwood,
26 Conn. 437; Webster v. Cobb,
17 Ill. 459; Knight V. Dunsmore,
12 Iowa 35; Chandler v. Westfall,
30 Tex. 477.
Mr. Crawford says that the rule
adopted in the statute was taken
from the Civil Code of California,
Section 3117 of which is as fol
lows: “One who indorses a nego
tiable instrument before it is de
livered to the payee, is liable to
the payee thereon as an indorser.”
Crawford's Ann. Neg. Inst. Law
64. The rule of the Statute
accords With the intent of the
parties in nearly every case.
When One “backs” a note to
enable the maker to procure the
Same to be discounted, he does
so for the purpose of lending se
curity to the maker just as he
would if the note were made pay
able to his Order and he in
dorsed it for the accommodation
of the maker. In the transaction
of lending his credit to the mak
er he takes no thought of whe
ther he or some other person is
named as payee. In neither case
does he intend to pay the note
except in the event of the mak
er's failure SO to do.
It matters little, however, wheth
er the irregular indorser be re
garded as maker, guarantor or
technical indorser provided the rule
as to his relation be uniform.
The statute has settled a vexa
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tious conflict Without conceivable
injury to any interest.
In some jurisdictions the rela
tion of the irregular indorser to
the paper has been determined
from the face of the paper itself
(no parol evidence being admit
ted to explain his status); in oth
ers, from oral evidence showing
his true relation thereto. Thus
the Supreme Court of the United
States holds the irregular indors
er an original promisor, a guar
antor or an indorser according to
the nature of the transaction and
the understanding of the parties.
Oral evidence is admissible to
show the intent and undertaking.
If the indorsement was made to
give the maker credit with the
payee or if the indorser partici
pated in the consideration of the
note, he is to be considered a
joint maker, If the indorsement
was after the note Was delivered
to the payee at the request of
the maker to procure further in
dulgence or forbearance for the
maker, he can be held only as
guarantor, and there must be le
gal proof of a consideration to
uphold the promise unless it be
shown that he was connected
with the inception of the note.
If the note was intended for dis
count and the indorsement Was
to be inoperative until after the
payee indorsed, he is liable only
as second indorser. Good V. Mar
tin, 95 U. S. 90. In New York,
testimony was admissible to show
that the indorsement was made
to give the maker credit with the
payee and thus make the indors
er liable to the payee.
The statute seems to fix abso
lutely the status of the irregu
lar indorser and thus excludes
parol testimony to vary his liabil
ity. The only question of fact
would seem to be, -did the per
son, “not otherwise a party to
the instrument,” place his signa
ture thereon “before delivery.”
But see Kohn V. Consolidated etc.
Co., infra.
A statute of Connecticut simi
lar but Somewhat more compre
hensive in terms was con
strued in Spencer v. Allerton, 60
Conn. 410, wherein it was held
that parol evidence was inadmis
sible, the status of the anoma
lous indorser being absolutely
fixed by the statute.
This section was considered by
the Supreme Court of New York
in Kohn V. Consolidated Butter
& Egg Co., 30 Misc. 725, 63 N. Y.
Supp. 265, but the case was out
side the statute in that it was al
leged that the maker made and
delivered the note to the payee
and that “thereafter the other
defendants indorsed the note.”
McAdam, J., said: “The true in
tention of indorsers as between
themselves can always be shown
by oral evidence. To go further
and decide that the statute in
tended to create an incontestable
liability against irregular indors
ers would be to impute to the leg
islative wisdom a design repug
nant to every notion of judicial
procedure, especially in a provi
sion enacted in the interests of
law reform.”
2-Thus if it is drawn by A
payable to B, or order and is in
122 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.
dorsed by C before delivery to
B, C is liable as indorser to B
and all subsequent parties. Leon
ard V. Draper, (Mass. 1905) 73
N. E. 644 (a case under the Sta
tute).
3—Thus if it is drawn by A
payable to A or order and in
dorsed by B, and subsequently de
livered to C, B is liable to C and
all subsequent parties.
4—Thus if it is drawn by A
payable to B, or order, and in
dorsed by C before the payee in
dorses but for his accommodation,
and the payee then gets it dis
counted, C is liable to all parties
Subsequent to B, the payee, but
not liable to the payee. Mr.
Crawford says that this Subdivi
sion was added to provide for a
case where, the payee being un
able to enforce payment, there
might be a question whether the
indorser would be liable to a
person claiming under the payee.
Crawford's Ann. Neg. Inst. Law,
Supra.
The following cases involve this
Section and hold the anomalous
signer liable as indorser: Corn v.
Levy, 97 App. Div. 48, 89 N. Y.
Supp. 658; McLean v. Bryer, 24
R. I. 599; Downey v. O'Keefe, (R.
I. 1905) 59 Atl. 929; Jenkins &
Sons v. Coomber, [1898] 2 Q. B.
168 (a case under the Bills of
Exchange Act.)
Sec. 67. Warranty; where negotiation by delivery, etc.
—Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or
by a qualified indorsement warrants:"
First, That the instrument is genuine and in all respects
what it purports to be;”
Second, That he has a good title to it;"
Third, That all prior parties had capacity to contract;"
Fourth, That he has no knowledge of any fact which
would impair the validity of the instrument or render it
valueless.”
But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the war
ranty extends in favor of no holder other than the imme
diate transferee." The provisions of subdivision three of
this section do not apply to persons negotiating public
or corporate securities, other than bills and notes."
1—See Bills of Exchange Act,
sec. 58 (3).
Compare secs.
The maker, the drawer, the ac
ceptor admits.
62, 63 and 64. These warranties are implied by
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law from the mere fact of de
livery or sale of the instrument.
2—The transferrer impliedly
warrants that all prior signatures
are genuine and that the instru
ment has not been altered and
that it is based on a good and
valid consideration. If it turn
out that any signatures thereto
were forged, the vendee may re
cover what he has paid to his
vendor, as he has not received
what he bargained for and his
consideration has failed. Aldrich
v. Jackson, 5 R. I. 218; Allen V.
Clark, 49 Vt. 390.
Where a bill has been raised
and the vendee recovers only the
original amount he may recover
the difference from his vendor.
Jones v. Ryde, 1 Marsh. 157, 5
Taunt. 488. The transferrer may,
however, at the time of sale ex
pressly refuse to warrant the gen
uineness of the instrument and
such refusal will prevail over the
implied warranty. Bell v. Dagg,
60 N. Y. 528. There is an im
plied warranty in the sale of com
mercial paper that it is what it
purports to be, the same as in the
sale of ordinary chattels. Han
nun v. Richardson, 48 Vt., 508.
In Meyer v. Richards, 163 U. S.
385, bonds were sold by one per
son to another, buyer and seller
regarding them as lawful obliga
tions, when in fact they were
void. The court in holding that
the seller must refund to the buy
er the amount paid, said: “Both
in England and in the United
States the doctrine is universally
recognized that where commercial
paper is sold without indorsement
or without express assumption of
liability on the paper itself, the
contract of sale and the obliga
tions which arise from it
,
a
s be
tween Vendor and vendee, are gov
erned by the common law, relat
ing to the sale o
f goods and chat
tels. So, also, the undoubted rule
is that in such a sale the obliga
tion of the vendor is not restrict
ed to the mere question of forg
ery vel mon, but depends upon
whether he has delivered that
which he contracted to sell, this
rule being designated, in England,
as a condition of the principal
Contract, as to the essence and
Substance of the thing agreed to
be sold, and in this country be
ing generally termed an implied
warranty of identity of the thing
sold.”
So where an instrument is void
for usury between the original
parties, though the vendor have
no knowledge of such fact, he is
liable to the Vendee for the
amount paid. Challiss v. Crum,
22 Kan. 157; Giffert v. West, 33
Wis. 617. In New York the con
trary has been held in Littauer
v
. Goldman, 72 N. Y. 506, but
this case was criticized and disap
proved in Meyer v. Richards, su
pra, and in Wood v. Sheldon, 42
N. J. L. 421.
There seems to be a conflict as
to whether there is an implied
warranty on the part of the ven
dor, of the solvency of the maker.
The correct rule would seem to be
that where commercial paper is
transferred by delivery o
r quali
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fied indorsement and the maker
is insolvent at the time, which
fact is not known to the vendor,
the loss should fall on the Ven
dee. Roads V. Webb, 91 Ma. 406,
40 Atl. 128; Hecht v. Batcheller,
147 Mass. 335. In Bicknall V.
Waterman, 5 R. I. 43, this rule
was followed, the court saying:
“The well known common-law
principle, applicable alike to sales
and exchanges of personal things,
is, that fraud or warranty is nec
essary to render the vendor or
exchanger liable, in any form, for
a defect in the quality of the
thing sold or exchanged. Apply
ing this principle to the sale or
exchange of the note of a third
person, transferred by indorse
ment without recourse or by de
livery merely, the vendee or per
son taking it in exchange takes
the risk of the past or future in
solvency of the maker, or other
party to it; unless indeed, in case
of past insolvency, the vendor or
exchanger is guilty of the fraud
of passing it off with knowledge
of that fact.”
There is no implied warranty
in the case of a Vendor or quali
fied indorser of a bill of exchange
that it was drawn against funds
or that it was not drawn for ac
commodation. In re Hammond,
6 DeGex, M. & G. 699; People's
Bank v. Bogart, 81 N. Y. 101.
3—Meriden Nat. Bank W. Gal
laudet, 120 N. Y. 298; Gompertz
v. Bartlett, 23 L. J. Q. B. 65.
4—Thus, where a corporation
had no authority to issue certain
bonds, the bonds being therefore
valueless, the transferrer was com
pelled to refund the considera
tion. Rogers v. Walsh, 12 Neb.
28. Likewise, where a prior in
dorsement was that of an infant.
Lobdell V. Baker. 3 Metc. (Mass.)
469.
The indorsement by a corpora
tion of a promissory note, paSSes
the property therein and the
want of power of the cor
poration to indorse is no defense
to a subsequent indorser who by
his indorsement warrants the gen
uineness of the paper, his own
property therein and the capacity
of all preceding parties to con
tract. Willard v. Crook, 21 App.
(D. C.) 237 (construing this sec
tion).
5—Thus where a person trans
fers notes knowing that the mak
er is insolvent and does not com
municate Such fact to his trans
feree, the latter may hold him re
sponsible. People's Bank V. Bo
gart, 81 N. Y. 106.
The vendor impliedly warrants
that the note, if it is overdue,
has not been paid. Howell V.
Wilson, 2 Blackf. (2d) 418; Das
kam V. Ullman, 74 Wis. 474.
6—The warranties of the qual
ified indorser extend to all sub
sequent holders; those of the
transferrer by delivery to his im
mediate transferee only.
7–In affirmation of the general
rule the statute exempts such se
curities from the implied war
ranties of the transferrer. Otis V.
Cullom, 92 U. S. 448. In this case
municipal bonds payable to bear
er Were under consideration. The
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action was against the vendor of
these bonds, which had been held
void, because the legislature had
no power to pass the acts in pur
suance of which the bonds were
issued. The court held that there
could be no recovery in the ab
sence of an express warranty.
Sec. 68. Liability of general indorsers.—Every in
dorser who indorses without qualification warrants to
all subsequent holders in due course:
First, The matters and things mentioned in subdivis
ions one, two and three of the next preceding section;"
and
Second, That the instrument is at the time of his in
dorsement valid and subsisting.”
And, in addition, he engages that on due presentment,
it shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be,
according to its tenor,” and that if it be dishonored and
the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he
will pay the amount thereof to the holder or to any sub
sequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it."
1—The indorser warrants that
the instrument is genuine and
that it has not been altered. Fish
v. First Nat. Bank, 42 Mich. 203;
Packard v. Windholtz, 84 N. Y.
Supp. 666, (a case under the stat
ute); Leonard v. Draper (Mass.
1905), 73 N. E. 644, (a case un
der the statute). But this rule
has not been applied to an in
dorser for collection. In United
States v. Am. Exchange Nat.
Bank, 70 Fed. Rep. 232, a draft
was indorsed for collection and
the collection agent paid over the
money to his principal before it
was discovered that the payee's
indorsement had been forged. It
was held that in such a case the
indorsement by the collecting
agent, who has no proprietary in
terest, does not import any guar
anty of the genuineness of all
prior indorsements, but only of
the agent's relation to the prin
cipal, as stated upon the face of
the draft; and as this relation is
evident upon the face of the draft
itself, the payer cannot claim to
have been misled by the indorse
ment of the agent, or any right
to rely upon that indorsement as
a guaranty of the genuineness of
the payee's indorsement. The same
was held where a check was raised
and the collecting agent paid over
the money before discovery of
that fact. National Park Bank V.
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Seaboard Bank, 114 N. Y. 28. See
First Nat. Bank V. First Nat.
Bank, 58 Ohio St. 207, 50 N. E.
723.
As the statute applies to every
indorser who indorses Without
qualification it includes indorsers
for collection and thus makes a
change in the law. Under the
statute a bank indorsing paper
forwarded for collection would be
liable as a general indorser though
the prior indorsement was for col
lection or for deposit.
2—An indorser of a promissory
note always warrants the exist
ence and legality of the contract
which he assigns; therefore, he
cannot urge in defense of a suit
by the indorsee against him that
the note was made on the Lord's
Day, Prescott Nat. Bank v. But
ler, 157 Mass. 548, or that the
note was given for a gaming debt,
Unger v. Boas, 1 Harr. 601.
3—An indorser of a promissory
note which contains a stipulation
for a reasonable attorney’s fee
in case of suit is as much liable
for the attorney's fee as for the
principal of the note. Benn v.
Kutzschan, 24 Ore. 28, 32 Pac. 763.
As a rule, parol evidence is in
admissible to change the legal im
port of the indorsement and con
Vert it into an undertaking rest
ing on Outside conditions. Ort
mann V. Canadian Bank of Com
merce, 39 Mich. 518; Doolittle v.
Ferry, 20 Kan. 230; Johnson V.
Glover, 121 Ill. 286; Charles v.
Denis, 42 Wis. 56; Martin v. Cole,
104 U. S. 37.
4—The conditional obligation of
the indorser becomes absolute
when the note has become dis
honored and the necessary pro
ceedings have been taken. His
contract, whether in blank or in
full, is determined by law. Charles
V. Denis, 42 Wis., 56. He has no
right to require the holder to sue
the maker or drawer; it is his
duty to take up the instrument.
Day v. Ridgway, 17 Pa. St. 303.
The holder of indorsed paper
has a right to rely on the con
tract of the indorser that the pa
per will be paid by the maker at
maturity and he is not bound to
anticipate and make provision for
a breach of the contract. Bart
lett V. Isbell, 31 Conn. 296.
Sec. 69. Liability of indorser where paper negotiable
by delivery.—Where a person places his indorsement on
an instrument negotiable by delivery he incurs all the
liabilities of an indorser."
1—Indorsement is not necessary
to pass an instrument payable to
bearer or indorsed in blank, but
if the holder choose to put his
name on the back he becomes as
much bound as an indorser as if
the instrument had been made
payable to him or order. Brush
v. Administrators, etc., 3 Johns.
439; Tam v. Shaw, 10 Ind. 469;
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Cover V. Myers, 75 Md. 406, 23 note a payee does not become lia
Atl. 850; Smith v. Rawson, 61 ble as an indorser. Haber v.
Ga. 208. Brown, 101 Cal. 445, 35 Pac. 1035.
By indorsing a non-negotiable
Sec. 70. Order in which indorsers are liable.—As re
spects one another, indorsers are liable prima facie in
the order in which they indorse, but evidence is admis
sible to show that as between or among themselves they
have agreed otherwise.” Joint payees or joint indorsees
who indorse are deemed to indorse jointly and severally.”
1-Successive indorsers are pri- sureties, Farwell v. Ensign, 66
*ma facie liable in the order in Mich. 600; Shufelt V. Moore, 93
which they indorse and not as co- Mich. 564; or that their under
Sureties, and this applies to ac
COmmodation indorsers as Well as
to indorsers for Value. For ex
ample, where a second indorser
of a promissory note pays and
takes up the note, he becomes a
holder for Value and may main
tain an action to recover the
amount thereof of the first indor
Ser although both are accommoda
tion indorsers. Kelly v. Bur
roughs, 102 N. Y. 93; Harrah v.
Doherty, 111 Mich. 175; Greusel
v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 95; McGurk
v. Huggett, 56 Mich. 187; Farwell
v. Ensign, 66 Mich. 600; Brewer
v. Boynton, 71 Mich. 254; Mc
Carty v. Roots, 21 How. (U. S.)
432; Wolf v. Hostetter, 182 Pa. St.
292, 37 Atl. 988; Russ v. Sadler,
197 Pa. St. 51; Easterly v. Bar
ber, 66 N. Y. 433.
2—Parol evidence is admissible
to show that by agreement among
themselves they were to be co
taking was joint, Harrah V. Do
herty, 111 Mich. 175. But parol
evidence is inadmissible to show
that what stands as a clear and
unambiguous contract of indorse
ment was not intended to be such.
An agreement made at the time
of indorsement that the indorser
was not to be liable is inadmis
Sible, as the indorsement must
stand upon its legal import.
Hitchcock V. Frackelton, 116
Mich. 487; Phelps v. Abbott, 114
Mich. 88; Kulenkamp v. Groff, 71
Mich. 675. If one indorser as the
result of a mistake sign before
another, this may be shown.
Rhinehart v. Schall, 69 Md. 352.
3—This changes the common
law rule which was that where
joint payees indorsed they were
only jointly liable. Lane v. Stacy,
8 Allen 41; Russ v. Sadler, 197
Pa. St. 51, 46 Atl. 903.
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Sec. 71. Liability of agent or broker.—Where a broker
or other agent negotiates an instrument without indorse
ment, he incurs all the liabilities prescribed by section
sixty-seven of this act, unless he discloses the name of
his principal, and the fact that he is acting only as agent."
1-Worthington v. Cowles, 112
MaSS. 30. Action to recover back
money paid by plaintiff to de
fendants for a promissory note
signed by one Hanson, the in
dorsement upon which was forged.
The defendants were note brok
ers who sold the note for Hanson
and paid him the purchase money,
less commissions, before the forg
ery was discovered. Held: that
to relieve an agent from liability
upon an implied warranty of the
genuineness of a promissory note
sold by him, which afterwards
proves to be forged, the transac
tion must have been such that
the purchaser understood, or ought
as a reasonable man to have un
derstood, that he was dealing
With the principal.
Lyons v. Miller, 6 Gratt. (Va.)
439.
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Article VI. Presentment for Payment.
Sec. Sec.
72. Want of demand on principal 82. When presentment not re
debtor; effect of. quired to charge the in
73. Presentment. Where instru- dorser.
ment is not payable on de 83. When delay in making pre
mand. Sentment is excused.
74. Sufficient presentment; what
84. When presentment may beconstitutes. dispensed with.
75. Place of presentment.
76. Instrument must be exhib- 85. When instrument dishonored
ited.
by non-payment.
77. Presentment, where instru- 86. Liability of party secondarily
ment payable at bank. liable, when instrument
78. Presentment, where person dishonored.
primarily liable is dead. 87. Time of maturity.
79. Presentment to persons liable 88. Time; how computed.
aS partnerS.
80. Presentment to joint debtors. 89. Where instrument
payable at
81. When presentment not re-
bank.
quired to charge the draw- 90. Payment in due course; what
er. constitutes.
Sec. 72. Want of demand on principal debtor; effect
of.—Presentment for payment is not necessary in order to
charge the person primarily liable on the instrument,"
but if the instrument is
,
by its terms, payable at a special
place, and he is able and willing to pay it there at ma
turity, such ability and willingness are equivalent to a
tender o
f payment upon his part.” But except as herein
otherwise provided, presentment for payment is necessary
in order to charge the drawer and indorsers.”
1—This is an affirmation of the
general rule. The primary party
is liable, by the terms of his con
burg Trust Co. v. Shufeldt, 78
Fed. 292; Greeley v. White
head, 3
5 Fla. 523, 17 So. 643;
tract, without any demand prior
to commencement of suit. Harris
Howard v
. Boorman, 17 Wis. 459;
Hills v. Place, 48 N. Y. 520. The
9
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rule applies to one who has guar
anteed the payment of the instru
ment by the maker or acceptor.
Presentment for payment, either
to the principal debtor or to the
guarantor, is not a condition prece
dent to the liability of the guar
antor of payment. Roberts v.
Hawkins, 70 Mich. 566; Walton
V. Mascall, 13 M. & W. 452; Gage
V. Lewis, 68 Ill. 605. The rule
applies to the accommodation
maker; although he is a Surety
in fact, he is liable Without pre
sentment for payment. Torrey V.
Foss, 40 Me. 74; American Nat.
Bank V. Junk Bros. 94 Tenn. 624,
30 S. W. 753, 28 L. R. A. 492.
This provision should not be
considered as an absolute rule.
It is to be construed in connec
tion with sections relating to
qualification of acceptance. Ob
Viously it Was not designed to
change the general rule that the
acceptor may, by the terms of a
qualified acceptance, make pre
Sentment for payment a condition
precedent to his liability.
The Wisconsin Act omits the re
mainder of this sentence.
2-AS against the maker of a
note payable at a bank or other
particular place it is not neces
sary to allege or prove present
ment or demand for payment at
such a place. Reeve v. Pack, 6
Mich. 240; McIntyre v. Mich.
State Ins. Co., 52 Mich. 188; How
ard V. Boorman, 17 Wis. 459. The
only consequence of neglect to
make presentment for payment at
the place named is to relieve the
primary party from damages and
costs incident on Suit brought
without such presentment. Such
neglect will bar interest and costs,
not the cause of action. But if
actual loss or damage has at
tended failure to make present
ment at the place named, such
loss or damage may be offset
against the instrument. Cox V.
Nat. Bank, 100 U. S. 713; Armis
tead V. Armisteads, 10 Leigh. 525;
Bank V. Zorn, 14 S. C. 444. The
bringing of a suit upon a certifi
cate of deposit, which is held to
be a promissory note payable on
demand, is a sufficient demand of
payment. Beardsley v. Webber,
104 Mich. 88; Tripp v. Curtenius,
36 Mich. 494; Curran v. Witter,
68 Wis. 16; Lynch V. Goldsmith,
64 Ga. 42; Hunt v. Divine, 37
Ill. 137. Some courts have made
this distinction between a promis
Sory note payable on demand and
a certificate of deposit: in the
case of a note the maker might
be sued without a demand, but in
the case of a certificate of de
posit, a demand for payment must
be made. Riddle V. First Nat.
Bank, 27 Fed. 503; Pardee v. Fish,
60 N. Y. 265; Shute v. Pacific
Nat. Bank, 136 Mass. 487; Mc
Gough v. Jamison, 107 Pa. St. 336.
In the New York Act this addi
tional clause appears between the
words “maturity” and “such”:
“and has funds there available for
that purpose.” Concerning these
words Mr. Crawford says: “They
were added by the laws of 1898,
chap. 336. They seem to be su
perfluous. It is difficult to see
how a man can be able to pay,
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unless he has the funds with
which to make such payment. Be
sides, if taken literally, they im
pose a condition not deemed nec
essary by the courts. If, for ex
ample, the special place' where
the paper is payable is the office
of the maker or acceptor, this pro
Vision requires that he have the
funds there, and it would not be
enough that he have them in
bank. The interpolation is not
only at variance with the decisions
on the subject, but is contrary to
good sense, and to the practice of
the business World.” Crawford's
Ann. Neg. Inst. Law, 72.
3–Demand upon the real maker
is necessary to charge the irreg
ular indorser. Peck v. Easton, 74
Conn. 456 (a case under the Stat
ute). The statute changes the
rule in Michigan in this regard.
Demand is necessary although
the indorser has become the per
Sonal representative of the maker.
Magruder V. Union Bank, 3 Pet.
90; SO too, to charge the accom
modation indorser, although the
indorsement was made for the sole
purpose of giving the note credit
and currency. Buck V. Cotton, 2
Conn. 126; so too, where the
maker has become insolvent, Law
rence v. Langley, 14 N. H. 70;
So too, where the indorser has re
ceived security. Moses v. Ela, 43
N. H. 557; Whittier v. Collins, 15
R. I. 44.
This provision of the statute
was referred to in In re Swift, 106
Fed. 65.
Sec. 73. Presentment where instrument is not payable
on demand.—Where the instrument is not payable on
demand, presentment" must be made on the day it falls
due.” Where it is payable on demand, presentment must
be made within a reasonable time after its issue,” except
that in the case of a bill of exchange, presentment for
payment will be sufficient if made within a reasonable
time after the last negotiation thereof.
1-Presentment and demand are
usually spoken of as a single act;
they are, however, separate and
distinct acts, and both acts must
be performed in order to fix the
liability of secondary parties. The
demand must be made according
to the tenor of the instrument.
Thus, a holder demands payment
in gold coin on presentment of an
instrument payable in silver. Due
presentment is not made. Lan
genberger v. Kroeger, 48 Cal. 147.
2—As to date of maturity see
Section 87.
In Ryerson V. Tourcotte, 121
Mich. 78, it was held that where
orders were payable only on the
tenth day of each month, it was
unnecessary to make presentment
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to the drawee on that day, if pay
ment had been refused on earlier
presentment on the ground that
the drawee did not owe the draw
er.
In case of paper payable in in
stalments, demand for each in
stalment is necessary to charge
the indorser. Eastman V. Tur
man, 24 Cal. 380.
3—See Sec. 2.
No delay is reasonable beyond
that which would fairly be re
quired in the ordinary course of
business Without Special inconveni
ence to the holder or by special
circumstances of the particular
case. Phoenix Ins. Co., V. Gray,
13 Mich. 191; Carll v. Brown, 2
Mich. 401; Home Savings, Bank
V. Hosie, 119 Mich. 116.
In England a note payable on
demand has been regarded as a
continuing security whether it be
with or without interest, imme
diate payment not being contem
plated by the parties; so if pay
ment be not demanded Within any
definite time, the holder is not
chargeable with neglect and the
instrument is not considered Over
due. Brooks v. Mitchell, 9 M. &
W. 15. In this case two years
Was not considered unreasonable
time. Chartered Bank V. Dickson,
L. R. 3 P. C. 574. The same rule
prevailed in New York prior to
the statute. Wheeler v. Warner,
47 N. Y. 519; Parker v. Stroud,
98 N. Y. 379; Shutts v. Fingar,
100 N. Y. 541. In the United
States as a general rule, the courts
have followed the rule embodied
in the Statute. Martin V. WinS
low, Fed. Cas. No. 9172; Perry v.
Green, 19 N. J. L. 61; Bassen
horst v. Wilby, 45 Ohio St. 333,
13 N. E. 75; Field v. Nickerson,
13 Mass. 131. In the case last
cited seven months’ delay in mak
ing presentment was held to dis
charge the accommodation indor
ser, who had been told by one of
the makers that payment was not
to be demanded immediately.
As Overdue instruments are
made payable on demand by sec
tion 9, the requirements of this
Section apply to such paper.
A statute of Massachusetts pro
Vided that a note payable on de
mand Should be considered over
due if presentment and demand
of payment were not made within
sixty days from the date thereof.
This was the statutory definition
of reasonable time as applied to
notes payable on demand. In Mer
ritt v. Jackson, 181 Mass. 69 (a
case under the statute), it was
held that in the absence of any
evidence of usage of trade or facts
of the particular case to bring it
within the provisions of the Ne
gotiable Instruments LaW, defin
ing reasonable time (Sec. 2) a de
mand on a promissory note pay
able on demand must be made
within sixty days of the date in
order to hold an indorser, and
this, too, although the statute first
above referred to was repealed by
the Negotiable Instruments Law.
The presentment for payment of
a note payable on demand is pre
sumptively within a reasonable
time; an indorser, to raise the
issue that its presentment was de
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layed for an unreasonable time
must plead and prove such mat
ter as a defense. German-Ameri
can Bank V. Mills, 99 App. Div.
312, 91 N. Y. Supp. 142 (a case
under the statute). The ordinary
certificate of deposit, when it is
negotiable, has been considered as
a continuing security and imme
diate demand of payment is not
contemplated; so the indorser re
mains liable on the certificate al
though demand be not made with
in the time required in the case
of other negotiable instruments.
Birch v. Fisher, 51 Mich. 36; Nat.
Bank v. Washington County Nat.
Bank, 5 Hun, 605. In this case
the certificate was not presented
until seven years after its issue.
When the material facts are ad
mitted or not in dispute, the ques
tion as to what constitutes a rea
Sonable time is one of law for the
court, Turner V. Iron Chief Min
ing Co., 74 Wis. 355; Parker v.
Reddick, 65 Miss. 242; when the
facts are complicated and conflict
ing the question is one for the
jury, under instructions from the
court. Muilman v. D'Equino, 2 H.
Black. 565.
Sec. 74. Sufficient presentment; what constitutes.—
Presentment for payment, to be sufficient, must be made:
First, By the holder, or by some person authorized to
receive payment on his behalf;"
Second, At a reasonable hour on a business day;”
Third, At a proper place, as herein defined;”
Fourth, To the person primarily liable on the instru
ment, or, if he is absent or inaccessible, to any person
found at the place where the presentment is made.”
1—Mere possession of a negotia
ble instrument payable to bearer
or indorsed in blank, is sufficient
to entitle one to make presentment
and demand. Jackson V. Love, 82
N. C. 405. Payment to such per
son is always good unless the
payer knows that the holder is
not rightfully possessed of the in
strument, Sussex Bank v. Bald
win, 17 N. J. L. 487. But posses
sion of a note payable to the or
der of a third person and not in
dorsed by him, is not sufficient to
entitle the holder to demand pay
ment. Barnett V. Ringgold, 80
Ky. 289; Doubleday V. Kress, 50
N. Y. 413. Any duly authorized
agent of the holder may make
presentment and the authorization
need not be in writing. Hartford
Bank v. Stedman, 3 Conn. 489;
Hartford Bank V. Barry, 17 Mass.
93. Upon the holder's death pre
Sentment should be made by
his personal representative, even
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though the note has been specific
ally bequeathed. Crist v. Crist, 1
Carter (Ind.) 570.
One to whom negotiable paper
has been transferred as collateral
security or as a pledge, must make
presentment for payment, give no
tice, etc., otherwise he will make
the paper his own and will be
liable for any loss sustained by
reason of his neglect. Jennison V.
Parker, 7 Mich. 355; Phoenix Ins.
Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501; Whit
ten V. Wright, 34 Mich. 92; Pea
cock V. Pursell, 14 C. B. (n. S.)
728.
In the case of foreign bills
there may be two presentments,
one by the holder or his agent in
the usual way, the other by a no
tary or other proper person for
the purpose of protest. This
might also occur in the case of
inland bills or promissory notes,
but as to these protest is permis
sible, not compulsory.
Mr. Bigelow says that for the
purpose of fixing the liability of
secondary parties, presentment
must be made by one who can
compel, not merely receive, pay
ment. Bigelow, Bills, Notes and
Cheques, 124. No authority is
cited to support the statement and
the distinction assumed seems un
warranted in View of the statute
which declares presentment suffi
cient if made by some person “au
thorized to receive payment” on
behalf of the holder.
2—In the case of paper not pay
able at bank, presentment is made
within a reasonable time if made
at an hour at which, taking into
COnSideration the habits of the
community or district in which
he lives, the maker may reason
ably be expected to be in condi
tion to attend to ordinary busi
ness. Farnsworth v. Allen, 4
Gray, 453; Estes V. Tower, 102
Mass. 65; Wilkins v. Jadis, 2 B.
& Ad. 188. Presentment should
be made within hours not given
over to rest. What might be a
reasonable hour in one community
might be an unreasonable hour in
another. The difference between
country residence and urban resi
dence, in the hours of retiring and
rising, will affect the reasonable
ness of the hour of making pre
sentment. The question whether
a presentment is within reason
able time cannot be made to de
pend on the private and peculiar
habits of the maker of a note, not
known to the holder; but it must
be determined by a consideration
of the circumstances which, in or
dinary cases, would render it sea
Sonable Or otherwise. Farnsworth
v. Allen, supra. If presentment
be made at the place of business
of the payer it must be during
the hours when such places are
usually open. Dana v. Sawyer, 22
Me. 244; Triggs v. Newnham, 1
Car. & P. 631; Waring v. Betts,
90 Va. 46. As to time of pre
sentment of paper payable at a
bank See Sec. 77.
3—See next section.
4-Presentment to the clerk of
an acceptor or promisor at his
office or place of business is suf
ficient without showing any spe
cial authority given to the clerk.
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Stewart v. Eden, 2 Caines (N. Y.)
121; Draper V. Clemens, 4 Mo. 52;
Stainback V. Bank, 11 Gratt. 260.
To render an indorser liable on
a note signed by one who affixes
the word “agent” to his name
without disclosing his principal,
payment must be demanded of
and refused by the agent. De
mand on the principal is not suffi
cient. Stinson v. Lee, 68 Miss.
113, 9 L. R. A. 830, 24 Am. St. R.
257; Hall v. Bradbury, 40 Conn.
32.
Sec. 75. Place of presentment.—Presentment for pay
ment is made at the proper place:
First, Where a place of payment is specified in the in
strument and it is there presented;"
Second, Where no place of payment is specified, but
the address of the person to make payment is given in
the instrument and it is there presented;
Third, Where no place of payment is specified and no
address is given and the instrument is presented at the
usual place of business or residence of the person to make
payment;”
Fourth, In any other case if presented to the person to
make payment wherever he can be found,” or if presented
at his last known place of business or residence.
1—Secondary parties will be
discharged unless presentment be
made at the place specified in the
instrument, but primary parties
will not be affected by failure of
presentment at the specified place
unless the place be especially re
stricted by the words “only and
not elsewhere,” or words of sim
ilar import. Cases arise where
the drawer of a bill of exchange
designates in the instrument the
place of payment, and the de
cisions are that in Such case both
the drawer and the indorser will
be discharged unless the bill be
there presented for payment at
maturity; but the same decisions
hold otherwise as to the maker of
a note and the acceptor of a bill.
Cox v. Nat. Bank, 100 U. S. 704;
Struthers V. Kendall, 41 Pa. St.
214, 80 Am. Dec. 610; Brooks v.
Higby, 11 Hun, 235; Wolcott v.
Van Santvoord, 17 Johns. 248. In
Regan v. Sorenson (N. D. 1904),
100 N. W. 1093 (a case under the
statute), it was held that where
the notary presented a note—
made payable to one Grondahl “at
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his store in Fargo, North Dakota.”
-at the store to some person Con
nected therewith, it was a suffi
cient presentment to charge the
payee indorser, although there
was no personal demand made On
the maker.
2—If presentment be made with
in office hours at the place of
business of the payer, though
there be no one there to answer,
it is sufficient to charge the in
dorser. Wallace v. Crilley, 46
Wis. 577; West V. Brown, 6 Ohio
St. 542.
If the party presenting the pa
per for payment find the place of
business closed but the payer has
a residence in the place where his
business is conducted, which can
be found With reasonable dili
gence, presentment must be made
at Such residence. Farnsworth V.
Mullen, 164 Mass. 112, 41 N. E.
131; Reinke v. Wright, 93 Wis.
368, 67 N. W. 737. See also Sulz
bacher Bros. V. Bank Of Charles
ton, 86 Tenn. 201.
Presentment at the place of
business Within business hours is
sufficient unless the place has
been permanently closed. Baum
gardner V. Reeves, 35 Pa. St. 250.
The presumption that a note
which specifies no place of pay
ment is to be paid where the note
is dated, at the residence of the
person liable upon it, is one that
applies to indorsers. McIntyre v.
Mich. State. Ins. CO., 52 Mich. 188.
But see Blodgett v. Durgin, 32
Vt. 361.
The making and dating of a
promissory note at a particular
place is not equivalent to making
it payable there nor does it super
sede the necessity for presentment
and demand at the residence or
place of business of the maker, if
Such place of busineSS Or resi
dence be known or can be ascer
tained by due diligence in make
ing inquiry. Anderson V. Drake,
14 Johns. 114; Oxnard V. Varnum,
111 Pa. St. 193.
If the primary party has
changed his residence to another
place within the state the holder
is bound to use due diligence in
endeavoring to ascertain the new
place of residence and make pre
sentment there, but if the change
of residence is to a place with
out the state, the holder is not
bound to inquire further or take
further steps. Nailor V. Bowie, 3
Md. 251; Taylor V. Snyder, 3
Den. 145; Foster v. Julien, 24
N. Y. 28.
It has been held that diligence
must be exercised to obtain pay
ment even where the primary
party has absconded. Pierce v.
Cate, 12 Cush. 190; contra, Leh
man V. Jones, 1 Watts & Sarg.
126; Duncan v. McCullough, 4
Serg. & R. 480.
The place of presentment and
demand is immaterial if the mak
er or acceptor, on demand made,
expressly or impliedly refuses to
pay. Parker V. Kellogg, 158 Mass.
90, 32 N. E. 1038.
3—In King V. Cromwell, 61 Me.
244, demand made on the street
was held sufficient to charge the
indorser. The court Said: “It
would seem that such a demand
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would be more satisfactory than
a mere formal ceremony of a de
mand gone through at his place
of residence during the maker's
absence.” But see King v.
Holmes, 11 Pa. St. 456.
Sec. 76. Instrument must be exhibited.—The instru
ment must be exhibited to the person from whom payment
is demanded, and when it is paid must be delivered up
to the party paying it."
1-The instrument must be ex
hibited in Order that the maker
or acceptor may be able to judge
(1st) of the genuineness of the
instrument; (2d) of the right of
the holder to receive payment;
and (3d) that he may immediate
ly reclaim possession of the in
strument upon paying the amount.
Waring v. Betts, 90 Va. 46; Mus
son v. Lake, 4 How. (U. S.) 262;
Hansard V. Robinson. 7 B. & C.
90; Freeman V. Boynton, 7 Mass.
483. In the case last cited de
mand was held insufficient be
cause it appeared that the party
demanding payment did not have
the bill with him. If, on demand
of payment, the exhibition of the
instrument is not asked for, and
the party to whom demand is
made declines On other groundS, a
Sec. 77.
formal presentment by actual ex
hibition of the paper is consid
ered waived. Waring V. Betts,
supra; Lockwood v. Crawford, 18
Conn. 361; King V. Cromwell, 61
Me. 244; Fall River Union Bank
v. Willard, 5 Met. (Mass.) 216.
In case the instrument has been
lost, presentment of a copy with
offer of indemnity will be suffi
cient. Hinsdale v. Miles, 5 Conn.
331. When the maker pays the
instrument he has a right to its
possession and also a right to re
ceive any collaterals which have
been deposited with the holder as
security for its payment. He may
refuse to pay unless such collat
erals are tendered With the note.
Ocean Nat. Bank V. Fant, 50 N. Y.
474.
Presentment where instrument payable at
bank.—Where the instrument is payable at a bank, pre
sentment for payment must be made during banking
hours, unless the person to make payment has no funds
there to meet it at any time during the day, in which case
presentment at any hour before the bank is closed on that
day is sufficient."
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1-In the case of paper payable
at a bank actual presentment and
exhibition of the paper is not re
quired and obviously is not pos
sible. Presentment of such paper
Stands upon a footing of its own
and differs from presentment and
demand as understood in other
cases. Presentment of paper pay
able at bank is complete on the
concurrence of two facts: 1st,
presence of the paper at maturity
in the bank; 2d, knowledge of
the bank of such fact. See Mar
tin v. Smith, 108 Mich. 278; Chic
opee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank,
8 Wall. 641. This case affords an
interesting illustration of the rule
above stated. The facts were: a
letter in which a bill had been
transmitted, was, when brought
from the post office to the bank,
lain down with other papers on
the cashier's desk and before be
ing taken up or seen by the cash
ier had slipped through a crack
in the desk and so disappeared.
The fact of the bill being thus
physically present in the bank did
not of itself amount to present
ment, because it was there With
out knowledge of the bank of
such fact. This rule of present
ment applies 1st, to paper payable
at bank (generally); 2nd, to
paper payable at a specified bank;
3d, to paper payable at a speci
fied bank but lodged with the
holder's bank for collection. Pa
per payable at bank is payable
at any bank in the place of pay
ment and may be lodged for pay
ment accordingly. Hazard V.
Spencer, 17 R. I. 561. But to
lodge paper with a trust company
would not be a sufficient demand.
Nash v. Brown, 165 Mass. 384.
Paper on its face payable at a
designated bank may be lodged
by the holder thereof with his
own bank for collection. In such
a case the practice is for the
bank with which the paper is
lodged to notify the maker,
drawee or acceptor, as the case
may be, that it holds such paper
for collection and requests ac
ceptance or payment. Paper thus
lodged with the holder's bank and
left until maturity will satisfy the
rule for presentment. Mechanics
Bank v. Merchants Bank, 6 Metc.
(Mass.) 13; West V. Brown, 6
Ohio St. 542. If the bank desig
nated has branches, presentment
should be made at that branch
where the maker keeps his ac
count. Prince v. Oriental Bank,
3 L. R. App. Cas. 325; Woodland
V. Fear, 7 El. & B. 519.
Presentment as used in this sec
tion was clearly designed to in
clude demand. Presentment made
after banking hours is good if
there have been no funds of the
maker at the bank during the
day, and there is a proper offi
cer at the bank to whom present
ment can be made. Salt Springs
Bank v. Burton, 58 N. Y. 432. If
the maker has funds at the bank
any time during business hours
and then withdraws them, no pre
sentment having been made, the
indorsers are discharged, because
no valid presentment could be
subsequently made though an offi
cer were in the bank after busi
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neSS hours. Id. Authorities are
at Variance as to when suit may
be brought on a dishonored note
payable at a bank. It has been
held that the maker has until ex
piration of banking hours to pro
vide funds for payment and Suit
cannot be commenced until then,
but if payment is demanded and
refused, right of action accrues at
the close of such banking hours.
Church v. Clark, 21 Pick. 310. It
has been held, on the other hand,
that suit cannot be brought until
the day following the dishonor of
the paper. Blackman v. Nearing,
43 Com. 56. It has been held
also that suit may be brought as
soon as payment is refused. Hum
phrey v. Sutcliffe, 192 Pa. St. 336.
German-American Nat. Bank V.
Milliman, 31 N. Y. Misc. 87, 65 N.
Y. Supp. 242 (a case under the
statute). It was sought, in this
case, to charge the maker with
protest fees, the protest having
been made before four o’clock on
the day of maturity. The note
was presented at the bank at
which it was made payable at 10
O'clock A. M. and also at 3:30
P. M. There were no funds pro
vided for payment at the time of
either presentment. After the
Second presentment the note was
protested, but before the close of
banking hours the maker deposit
ed sufficient funds to make his
account Cover the note. It was
held that although demand for
payment had been previously
made, and the note protested for
non-payment, the protest became
Of no avail on deposit of the
amount of the said note and in
terest, and the maker cannot be
compelled to pay the protest fees
thus incurred. Sutherland, J., said:
“In my opinion it was not the in
tention of the legislature by sec.
135 (77) to change the law as it
stood up to that time, giving the
maker of the note all of the bank
ing hours to meet his note pay
able at the bank.”
Sec. 78. Presentment where person primarily liable
is dead.—Where the person primarily liable on the in
strument is dead, and no place of payment is specified,
presentment for payment must be made to his personal
representative, if such there be, and if
,
with the exercise
o
f
reasonable diligence, he can be found."
1-The statute makes definite
the proper course to be pursued
in the case of the death of the
maker or acceptor and affirms the
general rule, Gower V
. Moore, 25
Me. 16; Toby v. Maurian, 7 La.
493; and does not recognize the
exception made by certain courts
in cases where the representa
tive of the deceased is exempt
from suit for a certain period.
Hale v. Burr, 12 Mass. 86; Orien
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tal Bank v. Blake, 22 Pick. 206;
Landry V. Stansbury, 10 La. Ann.
484. Hale W. Burr is criticized in
Gower v. Moore, 25 Me. 16, where
in it is held that knowledge of
the indorser that the note Would
not be paid on presentment, that
the maker had died and that his
estate was insolvent, would not
relieve the holder from his obli
gation to make presentment. Pre
sentment to the personal repre
sentative of the deceased is re
quired even though the indorser
and personal representative are
one and the Same person. Ma
gruder v. Union Bank, 3 Pet. 87.
It has been held that if there be
no personal representative pre
Sentment should be made at the
former residence or place of busi
ness of the deceased. Bank of
Washington v. Reynolds, Fed. Cas.
No. 954.
Sec. 79. Presentment to persons liable as partners.–
Where the persons primarily liable on the instrument
are liable as partners, and no place of payment is speci
fied, presentment for payment may be made to any one
of them, even though there has been a dissolution of the
firm."
1-Presentment to and demand
On one of the partners primarily
liable on an instrument is suffi
cient, inasmuch as each partner
represents the partnership. Be
fore dissolution it would not be
necessary to make demand on the
several partners, nor could it be
necessary after dissolution, for the
partnership as to all antecedent
transactions continues until they
are closed. Crowley V. Barry, 4
Sec. 80. Presentment to
Gill. (Md.) 194; Mt. Pleasant
Branch Bank v. McLeran, 26 Iowa
306; Fourth Nat. Bank V. Heusch
en, 52 Mo. 207; Coster v. Thom
ason, 19 Ala. 717; Gates v. Beech
er, 60 N. Y. 518. When one part
ner is dead presentment should
not be made to his personal rep
resentative but to the Survivor.
Cayuga County Bank v. Hunt, 2
Hill 635.
joint debtors.—Where there
are several persons, not partners, primarily liable on the
instrument, and no place of payment is specified, present
ment must be made to them all."
1—There is some authority to
the effect that presentment to and
demand upon one of the joint
makers is sufficient to charge the
indorser. Harris V. Clark, 10 Ohio
6; Greenough v. Smead, 3 Ohio
St. 416; but the statute is de
claratory of the general rule of
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Arnold V.
Shutts V.
Blake V.
the law merchant.
Dresser, 8 Allen 435;
Fingar, 100 N. Y. 539;
McMillen, 33 Iowa 150.
“Where the joint debtors are at
different places at the maturity
of the note, and it could only be
presented to one, due diligence
would only require its present
ment to the others in such
time as they could be reached;
and the impossibility of present
ing to all on the day of maturity
would excuse non-presentment to
those at other places.” Daniel,
Neg. Inst., 5th ed., Sec. 595. See
Sec. 84.
Sec. 81. When presentment not required to charge the
drawer.—Presentment for payment is not required in
order to charge the drawer where he has no right to
expect or require that the drawee or acceptor will pay the
instrument."
1—See Bills of Exchange Act,
Sec. 46 (2) (C).
Failure to make presentment
and to give notice of dishonor
cannot be successfully interposed
as a defense in an action against
the drawer (of a check) when he
had no funds in the bank and had
no expectation that the check
would be paid. Carson, Pirie,
Scott & Co. V. Fincher (Mich.),
101 N. W. 844; Compton v. Blair,
46 Mich. 1. But see note 3, Sec.
187, distinction between drawer
Of check and drawer of bill.
The mere fact that the drawer
of a bill has no funds in the
hands Of the drawee Will not ex
cuse presentment if the drawer
had a right to expect or require
the bill to be accepted or paid.
Knickerbocker Life InS. Co. V.
Pendleton, 112 U. S. 696; Welch
v. B. C. Taylor Mfg. Co., 82 Ill.
579. See Sec. 63.
Drawing without funds of the
drawer in the hands of the
drawee is presumptively fraudu
lent, but the presumption may be
Overcome by showing reasonable
grounds for belief on the part of
the drawer that his draft would
be honored notwithstanding the
want of funds. Reasonable ground
for drawing is the test. Har
ness V. Davies Co. Savings
Assn., 46 Mo. 357, and cases
supra. Reasonable ground for
drawing may relate to the
time of drawing or to the time
of presentment. If at the time of
drawing the drawer has funds in
the hands of the drawee but with
draws them, presentment is not
necessary to charge him with lia
bility, but if the drawer has funds
in the hands of the drawee when
the bill is presented, but did not
when the bill was drawn, he is
entitled to notice. Gage Hotel Co.
v. Union Bank, 171 Ill. 531. Where
a bill is accepted for the accom
modation of the drawer, present
ment to the acceptor is not neces
sary to charge the drawer.
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Sec. 82. When presentment not required to chal
indorser.–Presentment for payment is not requi
order to charge an indorser where the instrumel
made or accepted for his accommodation and he
reason to expect that the instrument will be paid
sented."
1-This section deals with cases
where the indorser is the primary
debtor. In Such cases he is not
entitled to presentment, demand
or notice any more than he would
have been had he appeared on the
paper in his true character. The
reason is obvious, no one is bound
to indemnify him. We
Mitchell, 22 Fed. 871; A
Bank v. Junk Bros., 94 Te
30 S. W. 753, 28 L. R.
Holman v. Whiting, 19 A
Witherow v. Slayback, 1:
660; McVeigh v. Bank,
785.
Sec. 83. When delay in making presentment is el
—The delay in making presentment for payment
cused when the delay is caused by circumstances l
the control of the holder, and not imputable to
fault, misconduct or negligence. When the cause o
ceases to operate, presentment must be made with 1
able diligence."
1–For example, delay in the mail,
Pier v. Heinrichshoffen, 67 Mo.
163; Windham Bank v. Norton,
22 Conn. 213; see sec. 107; delay
caused by war, House v. Adams,
48 Pa. St. 261; delay caused by
illness, Wilson v. Senier, 14 Wis.
411. But, as was said in the case
last cited, the illness must not
only be shown to have been Sud
den, but likewise so severe as to
have prevented the ow
agent from employing
person to make the pre:
or to give the notice,
aS to have preclude
possibility of his doing
self; and then it must b
that the proper steps we
as soon as the disability
moved.
Sec. 84. When presentment may be dispensed
Presentment for payment is dispensed with:
First, Where, after the exercise of reasonable di
l
presentment a
s required b
y
this act cannot be mad
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Second, Where the drawee is a fictitious person;”
Third, By waiver of presentment, express or implied.”
1-Reasonable diligence is all
that is required. The holder is
not expected to do the impossi
ble, but the burden is upon him
to show that he has exercised
such reasonable diligence. Mar
tin v. Grabinski, 38 Mo. App. 359.
It is impossible to define what
constitutes reasonable diligence,
because it depends upon the cir
cumstances of each particular
case. It is clear that the holder
must take all steps which are like
ly to give him information as to
the whereabouts of the party to
whom presentment is to be made.
He must make all reasonable ef
forts to discover the residence of
the maker or acceptor. Merely
consulting the directory is not
sufficient when other sources of
accurate information may be with
in convenient reach. If the in
strument be put into the hands of
a notary to be presented by him,
the holder should give him all the
facts within his knowledge as to
the whereabouts or place of busi
ness or residence of the maker or
acceptor. Reasonable diligence is
not exercised if the holder omits
to inquire of the indorsers or
other parties to the instrument as
to the whereabouts of the princi
pal debtor. Smith v. Fisher, 24
Pa. St. 222. If, after due dili
gence has been exercised, the
maker, his place Of business or
residence cannot be found, pre
Sentment will be excused. In
solvency of the maker will not ex
CuSe presentment. Reinke V.
Wright, 93 Wis. 368. It has been
held that in case the maker is in
Solvent when the note falls due
and is without property sufficient
to pay it the holder has an im
mediate right of action against
the indorser without presentment
and demand. Forbes V. Rowe, 48
Conn. 413; Hawkinson V. Olson,
48 Ill. 277; Couch v. First Nat.
Bank, 64 Ind. 92. But under this
holding the insolvency must be
absolute and so notorious as to
leave no doubt of the fact. Oliver
V. Munday, 3 N. J. L. 982.
What is due diligence is a ques
tion of law when the facts are ad
mitted or clearly established; it
is a mixed question of law and
fact when the facts are in dis
pute. Fourth Nat. Bank V.
Heuschen, 52 Mo. 207; Bank of
Columbia v. Lawrence, 1 Pet. 578.
2-Smith V. Bellamy, 2 Starkie
223.
3—Waiver of presentment need
not be in any particular form;
any language or conduct from
which it appears that a waiver is
intended, is sufficient. Quaintance
v. Goodrow, 16 Mont. 376, 41 Pac.
76.
Where an indorser makes a
parol promise to pay the note at
the time of his indorsement, he
has been held to have waived pre
Sentment. Annville Nat. Bank V.
Kettering, 106 Pa. St. 531. See
contra: Davis V. Gowan, 19 Me.
447.
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If the waiver be embodied
in the instrument itself, it be
comes a part of the contract and
Subsequent indorsers become par
ties to it and are bound by it.
Lowry v. Steele, 27 Ind. 170. If
the waiver be written in connec
tion with the signature of an in
dorser it affects only him. Wood
man v. Thurston, 8 Cush. 157. But
See Parshley V. Heath, 69 Me. 90.
In re Swift, 106 Fed. 65 (a case
under the statute). The facts
Were, a firm had given a note in
dorsed by one partner. Shortly
before maturity the indorser held
a conference with the holder and
declared that neither the firm nor
he could pay at maturity. Sub
sequently, and before the matur
ity of the note, the partnership
assigned for the benefit of cred
itors. It was held that the in
dorser had impliedly waived pre
Sentment.
Congress Brewing Co. v. Habe
nicht, 83 App. Div. 141, 82 N. Y.
Supp. 481 (a case under the sta
tute). The defendant was indors
er of a demand note. Some time
before demand was made, the
payee informed the indorser of
the amount of the maker's then
indebtedness and the indorser
Said he would see the maker and
if the latter did not make his ac
count good “he would go and
shut him up.” Held, not a waiv
er of demand.
Sec. 85. When instrument dishonored by non-payment.
—The instrument is dishonored by non-payment when:
First, It is duly presented for payment and payment is
refused or cannot be obtained; or
Second, Presentment is excused and the instrument is
overdue and unpaid."
1—This section is entirely con
sistent with the proposition that
a note payable at a bank is not
dishonored provided funds to meet
it are deposited before the close
of banking hours. German-Amer
ican Nat. Bank V. Milliman, 31 N.
Y. Misc. 87, 65 N. Y. Supp. 242
(a case under the statute). See
Sec. 77.
Sec. 86. Liability of party secondarily liable, when in
strument dishonored.—Subject to the provisions of this
act, when the instrument is dishonored by non-payment
an immediate right to recourse to all parties secondarily
liable thereon accrues to the holder."
1-If the instrument has been en to the indorser, his condi
dishonored and proper notice giv- tional liability is changed into an
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absolute liability, his status is
changed from that of mere Surety
to that of principal debtor.
Though the holder have in his
hands collateral Security for the
payment of the paper, the indors
er cannot compel him to Sue the
maker or to enforce his security.
If the indorser desires the benefit
of any security held by the cred
itor, he must pay the debt, fulfill
the contract and enforce his right
of subrogation to such securities.
First Nat. Bank v. Wood, 71 N.
Y. 405; German-American Bank V.
Milliman, 31 N. Y. Misc. 87, 65
N. Y. Supp. 242 (a case under the
statute). The note involved in
this case was payable at a bank.
Defendant contended that the note
was not dishonored if funds were
deposited in the bank at any time
before the close of banking hours
although demand was made ear
lier in the day and payment re
fused. Sutherland, J., Speaking
for the court said,—“This section
is not inconsistent with the de
fendant's position, because the
note is not dishonored absolute
ly if the deposit is made before
the close of banking hours. If
Sec. 144 (86) is to be construed
as applying to notes payable at
a bank, it might be argued, with
much force, that the legislature
intended to permit an indorser to
be sued on the day the note falls
due, and even before the close of
banking hours provided an early
demand be made. I hardly think
any such startling innovation was
intended.”
This section does not apply to
a guaranty of Collection and Oth
er conditional guaranties. In such
cases, further steps must be taken
to fix the liability of the guaran
tor. There is no right of action
against the guarantor until the
holder has first made due
effort to collect from the princi
pal debtor. Cowles v. Peck, 55
Conn. 251; Summers v. Barrett,
65 Ia. 292. A distinction must be
made between a right of recourse
and a right of action. The hold
er's right of action against the
drawer or indorser dates from
the time when notice of dishonor
is or ought to be received by such
drawer or indorser. Castrique v.
Barnabo [1884] 6 Q. B. 498.
Sec. 87. Time of maturity.—Every negotiable instru
ment is payable at the time fixed therein without grace.
When the day of maturity falls upon Sunday or a holi
day, the instrument is payable on the next succeeding
business day. Instruments falling due on Saturday are
to be presented for payment on the next succeeding busi
ness day, except that instruments payable on demand
may, # the option of the holder. be presented for pay
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ment before twelve o’clock noon on Saturday when that
entire day is not a holiday."
1—This changes the law in
Michigan and repeals 4871-2 C. L.
1897, in virtue of which, as well
as of the law merchant, grace has
prevailed in Michigan. This sec
tion differs from the correspond
ing section of the Bills of Ex
change Act Sec. 14 (1) by which
days of grace are preserved. In
addition to those states which
have adopted the negotiable in
struments law (See introduction),
California, Illinois, Maine, Min
nesota and Vermont have abol
ished days of grace. The Massa
chusetts Act has, in addition to
the first sentence, the following:
—“except that three days of grace
shall be allowed upon a draft or
bill of exchange made payable
Within this commonwealth at
sight, unless there is an express
stipulation to the contrary.” The
New York Act as amended 1898
(see introduction) contains the
additional words “or becoming
payable” after the words “instru
ment falling due.” The Colorado
Act Substitutes the following for
the third sentence,—“Instruments
falling due on any day, in any
place where any part of such day
is a holiday are to be presented
for payment on the next succeed
ing business day, except that in
struments payable on demand
may, at the option of the holder,
be presented for payment during
reasonable hours of the part of
such day which is not a holiday.”
In the North Carolina Act an
Other proVision is added, as fol
lows,—“The laws now in force in
this state with regard to days of
grace Shall remain in full force
and shall not be construed to be
repealed by this act.”
The Wisconsin Act omits the
last Sentence.
By virtue of Sec. 4880 C. L.
1897, as amended by laws of 1903,
420, promissory notes falling due
on Saturday are presentable for
payment and payable on the next
secular day or business day suc
ceeding such Saturday, unless
Such Succeeding day is a legal
holiday, in which case they are
payable on the next succeed
ing day. Notes maturing on Sun
day, are payable on Monday.
Hitchcock v. Hogan, 99 Mich. 124.
Sec. 88. Time; how computed.—Where the instrument
is payable at a fixed period after date, after sight, or
after the happening of a specified event, the time of pay
ment is determined by excluding the day from which the
time is to begin to run and by including the date of pay
ment."
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN GENERAL. 147
1—This is declaratory of the
common law rule. Campbell v.
French, 6 T. R. 200; Roehner v.
Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 63 N.
Y. 163.
According to the law merchant
a month means a calendar month.
A note dated January 1, payable
one month after date, matures
(grace excluded) February 1. One
dated January 31, payable one
month after date matures (grace
excluded) February 28, 29th if
leap year. Roehner V. Knicker
bocker, supra.
When the last day of grace falls
upon a non-business day, the pa
per reaches maturity on the next
preceding business day. Capital
Nat. Bank V. Am. Exc. Nat. Bank,
51 Neb. 707.
Sec. 89. Where instrument payable at bank.—Where
the instrument is made payable at a bank it is equiva
lent to an order to the bank to pay the same for the
account of the principal debtor thereon."
1—This section settles a matter
which has been the subject of
disagreement among the courts.
Some courts have held that there
is no implied authority for a
bank to pay a third party a note
made payable at its place of busi
ness simply because of the fact
that the maker has funds Suffi
cient for that purpose. Grissom
V. Commercial Nat. Bank, 87
Tenn. 350, 3 L. R. A. 273; Ridge
ly Nat. Bank v. Patton, 109 Ill.
479; Nat. Exchange Bank V. Nat.
Bank, 132 Mass. 151. Other courts
have maintained the rule aptly
stated by Rapallo, Judge, in Indig
v. Nat. City Bank, 80 N. Y. 106,
in these words: “A note payable
at a bank where the maker
keeps his account is equivalent to
a check drawn by him upon that
bank.” State Bank v. McCabe,
(Mich.) 98 N. W. 20; Lazier v.
Horan, 55 Iowa 75; First Nat.
Bank v. Hall, 119 Ala. 64, 24 So.
526; Bedford Bank V. Acoam, 125
Ind. 584, 25 N. E. 713, 9 L. R. A.
560.
The statute follows,
the words above quoted.
In case the bank is holder of
paper there payable it is its right
to apply to the payment of the
note any funds standing to the
credit of the maker, unless such
funds are specially applicable to
Some particular purpose. Daw
son v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Pike
284; Alpena Nat. Bank V. Green
baum, 74 Mich. 157. It has been
held that it is its duty as well
as its right to make such applica
tion, because the note is, in effect,
a draft on the bank in favor of
the holder and in discharge of
the indorser. German Nat. Bank
v. Foreman, 138 Pa. St. 474; Com
mercial Bank v. Henninger, 105
Pa. St. 496. But see Mechanics
& Traders Bank v. Seitz Bros.,
150 Pa. St. 632, wherein it is
in effect,
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held that while a bank which
has discounted a promissory note
may appropriate funds in its
hands belonging to any party to
the note, to the payment of the
note when payment is not made
at the time and place named, yet
it is not bound to do so as to
any party except the maker. But
inasmuch as the maker is liable
to the indorser, he cannot require
the bank to appropriate the in
dorser's funds to the payment of
his own note nor complain if the
bank refuses so to do.
Sec. 90. Payment in due course; what constitutes.—
Payment is made in due course when it is made at or
after the maturity of the instrument" to the holder there
of in good faith and without notice that his title is de
fective.”
1-See Bills of Exchange Act,
Sec. 59.
A payment before maturity is
not in the usual course of busi
ness and if the paper should sub
sequently get into the hands of a
bona fide holder before maturity
he could enforce a second pay
ment, Williams v. Keyes, 90 Mich.
290; Wheeler v. Guild, 20 Pick.
545; Watson v. Wyman, 161 Mass.
96.
2-The party having actual pos
session of the instrument is the
One prima facie entitled to re
ceive payment. The party paying
cannot assume that the paper has
not been transferred and make
payment to the Original holder
without demanding the return of
the instrument. If he does so,
and the instrument has been
transferred, though he take a re
ceipt from the party to whom he
pays the amount, he will be liable
to pay it again to a bona fide
holder. Dutton v. Ives, 5 Mich.
515; Williams V. Keyes, supra;
Markey v. Corey, 108 Mich. 184;
Brooke V. Struthers, 110 Mich.
562; Wilson v. Campbell, 110
Mich. 580; Texarkana Nat. Bank
v. Stillwell & Co., 121 Mich., 154;
Bloomer V. Dau, 122 Mich. 522;
Wheeler v. Guild, supra; Davis
V. Miller, 14 Gratt. 1.
If an instrument has been lost
and the party primarily liable has
notice Of Such fact, he should re
quire the person presenting it to
establish his identity and his title
to the note. Page Woven Wire
Fence Co. v. Pool, 133 Mich. 323.
Drinkall v. Movins State Bank,
(N. D. 1901) 88 N. W. 724 (a
case under the Statute). This
case involved the question of the
defendant's notice when it paid
the check that the holder's title
Was defective.
See Sec. 2, “holder.”
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92.
93.
94.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
Article VII. Notice of Dishonor.
Notice of dishonor, to whom
must be given.
By whom given.
Notice given by agent.
Effect of notice given on
behalf of holder.
Effect where notice is given
by party entitled to give
notice.
When agent may give notice
When notice sufficient.
Form of notice.
To whom notice may be
given.
Notice when party is dead.
Notice to partners.
Notice to joint parties.
Notice to bankrupt.
Time Within which notice
must be given.
Where parties
same place.
Where parties reside in dif
ferent places.
reside in
Sec.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
When sender deemed to
have given due notice.
Deposit in post-office, what
constitutes.
Notice to antecedent parties,
time of.
Where notice must be sent.
Waiver of notice.
Whom affected by waiver.
Waiver of protest.
When notice dispensed with.
Delay in giving notice, how
excused.
When notice need not be
given to drawer.
When notice need not be
given to indorser.
Notice of non-payment
where acceptance refused.
Omission to give notice of
non-acceptance, effect of.
When protest need not be
made; when must be made.
Sec. 91. Notice of dishonor; to whom must be given.
—Except as herein otherwise provided, when a negotiable
instrument has been dishonored by non-acceptance or non
payment, notice of dishonor must be given to the drawer
and to each indorser, and any drawer or indorser to whom
such notice is not given is discharged."
1—This Section follows the Bills
of Exchange Act, sec. 48, and is
declaratory of the common law.
Daniel, Neg.
970.
InSt., 5th ed., Sec.
Knowledge that the paper has
been dishonored is not enough to
charge the secondary party; no
tice is absolutely requisite. Union
Bank v. Magruder, 7 Pet. 287;
Bank v. McVeigh, 29 Gratt. 546;
Juniata Bank V. Hale, 16 S. &
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R. 157. The same results follow
from the omission to give notice
as from the Omission to make de
mand of payment. A party dis
charged from liability on the in
Strument by omission to give no
tice of dishonor is discharged
from liability on the debt evi
denced by the instrument.
Bridges v. Berry, 3 Taunt. 131;
Jones v. Savage, 6 Wend. 659;
Woodcock v. Bennet, 1 Cow. 711.
The rule of the Section does not
apply to guarantors who are not
discharged by omission to give no
tice. Roberts v. Hawkins, 70
Mich. 566; Hungerford v. O'Brien,
37 Minn. 306. But the same per
SOn may be guarantor and in
dorser of a negotiable instrument;
in Such case failure to give him
notice of dishonor will discharge
him as indorser but not as guar
antor. Daniel Neg. Inst., 5th ed.,
Sec. 1754.
The indorsee is only required
to give notice to his immediate
indorser who may then notify
antecedent indorsers and secure
himself; so the notary need not
make any inquiry as to the resi
dence of any of the indorsers ex
cept the last. Wood v. Callaghan,
61 Mich. 402; West River Bank
v. Taylor, 34 N. Y. 128; Linn v.
Horton, 1 Wis. 157. But such in
dorsee could look for indemnity
only to the party to whom he had
given notice unless notice to oth
er antecedent parties had been
given, which would inure to him.
This section has been referred
to in the following cases arising
under the statute: Ebling Brewing
Co. v. Reinheimer, 32 N. Y. Misc.
594, 66 N. Y. Supp. 458; Fon
seca v. Hartman, 84 N. Y. Supp.
131; Peck v. Easton, 74 Conn.
456. In the case last cited a party
indorsing before delivery to the
payee was held entitled to notice
of dishonor.
Sec. 92. By whom given.—The notice may be given
by or on behalf of the holder or by or on behalf of any
party to the instrument who might be compelled to pay
to the holder, and who, upon taking it up, would have a
right to reimbursement from the party to whom the notice
is given."
1—See Bills of Exchange Act,
Sec. 49 (1).
For about fifty years the ques
tion was in doubt whether a party
other than the holder could give
valid notice. In Tindal V. Brown,
1 T. R. 167 (1786) it was held
that no party could give a valid
notice unless he were a holder
at the time. This rule was dis
approved in Chapman v. Keane, 3
A. & E. 193, 30 E. C. L. 69 and
the rule embodied in the statute
was declared to be the true rule
and in accordance with the prac
tice in commercial circles. AuS
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ten v. Miller, Fed. Cas. No. 661;
Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns.
230; Cromer v. Platt, 37 Mich.
132. A mere stranger cannot give
valid notice. Chanoine V. Fow
ler, 3 Wend. 173; Lawrence V.
Miller, 16 N. Y. 235. A party
who cannot in any event bring
an action on the instrument is
deemed a stranger. Harrison Y.
Ruscoe, 15 M. & W. 231, 15 L. J.
Ex. 110; Traders' Nat. Bank v.
Jones, 93 N. Y. Supp. 768 (a case
under the statute). Notice by
the drawee who has refused ac
ceptance is not sufficient. Stanto
V. Blossom, 14 Mass. 116.
Sec. 93. Notice given by agent.—Notice of dishonor
may be given by an agent either in his own name or in
the name of any party entitled to give notice, whether
that party be his principal or not."
1—Notwithstanding a party,
who cannot in any event bring an
action on the instrument, cannot
give valid notice on his own be
half (see preceding section), he
may nevertheless give notice as
agent of any party who is entitled
to give notice. Traders' Nat.
Bank v. Jones, 93 N. Y. Supp.
768 (a case under the statute);
Drexler V. McGlynn, 99 Cal. 143,
33 Pac. 773; Renick v. Robbins,
28 Mo. 339. Some cases are to
the effect that the acceptor “or
any party to the bill” may give
Valid notice independent of
any question of agency, Rosher
v. Kieran, 4 Camp. 87; Douglas
V. Bank, 97 Tenn. 133. But the
doctrine of these cases so far as
it is to be accepted can only be
explained on the ground that the
acceptor was the authorized agent
of the holder in the matter; oth
erwise the doctrine is unsound.
There must be an agency, if the
notice is not given by an indors
er, at the time of giving the
notice and in the act of doing it.
New York Co. V. Selma Sav.
Bank, 51 Ala. 305; Bigelow Bills,
Notes & Cheques, 144. In giving
notice, a notary public acts as the
agent of the party he serves, not
as a public officer. Bank V. Ober,
31 Kan. 599, 3 Pac. 324. But a
notice made out by a notary public
and signed, by mistake, with the
name Of the maker instead of
With his own name Without the
authority of the maker is insuffi
cient. Cabot Bank v. Warner, 10
Allen 522. A bank which re
ceives paper for collection is
deemed the holder thereof for
the purpose of giving notice of
dishonor. Burnham V. Webster,
19 Me. 232; Crocker v. Getchell,
23 Me. 392; Blackeslee v. Hewett,
76 Wis. 341, 44 N. W. 1105. Man
chester Bank v. Fellows, 28 N.
H. 302; Worden v. Nourse, 36
Vt. 756.
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Sec. 94. Effect of notice given on behalf of holder.—
Where notice is given by or on behalf of the holder, it
enures for the benefit of all subsequent holders and all
prior parties who have a right of recourse against the
party to whom it is given."
win. The notice given by Gage
inures “for the benefit” of Horton
and Irwin.
Again: Adams, Brooks, Clark
and DaViS are Successive indorsers
On a note dishonored in the hands
of Eaton. Eaton gives notice to
1—Lysaght v. Bryant, 9 C. B.
46; Chapman v. Keane, 3 Ad. &
El. 193; Stafford V. Yates, 18
Johns. 327.
The section deals with notice by
inurement. Illustration:-A note
is dishonored while in the hands
The noticeof Gage, as holder; he gives notice
in due form to all secondary par
ties; he transfers the note to Hor
ton who in turn transfers to Ir
Davis and Adams.
given to Adams inures “for the
benefit” of Brooks, Clark and
Davis.
Sec. 95. Effect where notice is given by party entitled
to give notice.—Where notice is given by or on behalf
of a party entitled to give notice, it enures for the benefit
of the holder and all parties subsequent to the party to
whom notice is given."
1–Illustration: Adams, Brooks,
Clark and Davis are successive in
dorsers of a note dishonored in
the hands of Eaton. Eaton gives
notice to Davis, Davis to Clark,
Clark to Brooks, and Brooks to
Adams. The notice given by
Brooks to Adams inures, “for the
benefit” of Eaton. See cases sec.
94.
Sec. 96. Where agent may give notice.—Where the in
strument has been dishonored in the hands of an agent,
he may either himself give notice to the parties liable
thereon, or he may give notice to his principal. If he
gives notice to his principal, he must do so within the
same time as if he were the holder, and the principal,
upon the receipt of such notice, has himself the same time
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for giving notice as if the agent had been an independent
holder."
1-This section follows the Bills
of Exchange Act, sec. 49 (13),
and is declaratory of the common
law.
An agent to whom a negotiable
instrument is intrusted for col
lection, whether by indorsement
or mere delivery, may give notice
of dishonor direct to secondary
parties thereto, but he is under
no obligation so to do. His ob
ligation is to his principal alone
and that obligation as a matter
of law does not in any case re
quire him to give notice to any
one except his principal. Such an
agent is treated in the matter of
giving notice of non-payment as
an indorsee of the note and the
reason of this is, that the agent
may not know which of the prior
parties the principal may desire
to hold or where they may be
found. The agent is entitled to
the usual time to notify his prin
cipal of non-payment and the
principal to the usual time there
after to notify antecedent indors
ers. But if the agent fails to
give notice to his principal in
due time, the principal is cut off
notwithstanding he may thereafter
use due diligence in giving notice
to antecedent parties. Rosson V.
Carroll, 90 Tenn. 90; Ohio Life
Ins. Co. v. McCague, 18 Ohio 54;
Farmers' Bank v. Vail, 21 N. Y.
485; Firth v. Thrush, 8 B. & C.
387.
The rule applies to the several
branches of the same bank. For
the purpose of giving notice of
dishonor each of the branch banks
is considered as an independent
indorsee. For example, a bill of
exchange was indorsed by plain
tiffs to the Portmadoc Branch of
the National Provincial Bank
from whence it was sent to the
Pwllheli Branch of the same bank,
by Whom it was indorsed to the
head establishment of the bank
in London. The bill was duly
presented and dishonored. It was
then returned With notice of its
dishonor by that day's post from
the bank in London to the branch
bank at Pwllheli; from thence to
the branch bank at Portmadoc
and from the Portmadoc bank to
the plaintiffs, who gave notice to
the defendant indorser. The no
tice was sufficient. Clode v. Bay
ley, 12 M. & W. 51; Bray v. Had
wen, 5 M. & S. 68; Fielding &
Co. v. Corry [1898] 1 Q. B. 268
(a case under corresponding pro
vision of the Bills of Exchange
Act).
Sec. 97. When notice sufficient.—A written notice need
not be signed, and an insufficient written notice may be
supplemented and validated by verbal communication.
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A misdescription of the instrument does not vitiate the
notice unless the party to whom the notice is given is in
fact misled thereby."
1-In connection with the cor
responding provision of the Bills
of Exchange Act there is added:
“The return of a dishonored bill
to the drawer or an indorser is,
in point of form, deemed a suffi
cient notice of dishonour.” (Sec.
49 (6). Concerning this added
provision Mr. Chalmers says:
“This subsection approves a com
mon practice of collecting bank
ers which was previously of
doubtful validity.” The practice
is peculiar to England.
According to the law merchant
the written notice should be sign
ed or at least it should indicate
from whom it proceeds. Bank v.
Dibrell, 91 Tenn. 301; Klocken
baum v. Pierson, 16 Cal. 375;
Walmsley V. Acton, 44 Barb. 312;
Walker v. State Bank, 8 Mo. 705.
In providing that the notice need
not be signed, the statute changes
the law. Inasmuch as the entire
notice may be oral, (see next sub
section) the provision that an im
perfect or invalid written notice
may be supplemented or made
valid by oral communication is
natural and consistent.
The law requires that the no
tice should describe the dishonor
ed paper with such particularity
as will apprise the person to
whom the notice is given of the
instrument in question. Dodson
V. Taylor, 56 N. J. L. 19. A mis
description which does not mis
lead is immaterial.
Misdescription as to amount:
A note of $200 described as note
of $175 with interest, not mis
leading. Snow V. Perkins, 2
Mich. 238. A note of $1,400 er
roneously described as a note of
$1,457, but correctly described in
other respects, not misleading,
there was no other note signed by
the person named in the notice
and indorsed by the person to
whom the notice was sent. Bank
of Alexandria V. Swann, 9 Pet. 33.
Misdescription as to date: Note
dated July 20th, incorrectly de
scribed as dated Sept. 20th, cor
rect in other respects, except as
to Omission of holder’s name, not
misleading, Mills v. Bank, 11
Wheat. 431. The cases are only
illustrative. Each case is to be
determined on the special facts
involved. The test is, was the
party misled?
Sec. 98. Form of notice.—The notice may be in writing
or merely oral, and may be given in any terms which
sufficiently identify the instrument and indicate that it
has been dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment.”
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It may in all cases be given by delivering it personally
or through the mails.”
1—The rule as to sufficiency of
notice of dishonor has undergone
a number of changes before aS
suming the generally recognized
form now expressed in the statute.
The law merchant has always re
quired that the indorser be ap
prised of the paper dishonored.
The first rule on the Subject im
portant to refer to, required that
the notice should apprise the in
dorser in express terms or by
necessary implication of the dis
honor of the paper. Solarte V.
Palmer, 7 Bing. 530, 1 Bing. N.
C. 194. Any notice failing to
show that the paper had been
dishonored was deemed insuffi
cient.
Then it was held that the no
tice was sufficient if it showed by
reasonable intendment that the
bill had been presented to the
acceptor and not paid by him and
if that would be inferred by any
man of business. The doctrine of
reasonable intendment was duly
established. Armstrong v. Chris
tiani, 5 C. B. 687; Everard v.
Watson, 1 El. & Bl. 801.
A notice containing a state
ment that the instrument had not
been paid was held sufficient and
whether preceding steps had been
taken was a matter of evidence
to be established at the trial.
Mills v. Bank, 11 Wheat., 431. A
notice declaring that a note is
unpaid and the holders look to
the indorser for payment is suffi
cient. Cromer V. Platt, 37 Mich.
132.
The Bills of Exchange Act pro
vides that notice shall be suffi
Cient in form if it intimate that
the bill has been dishonored; the
section above, if it indicate that
it has been dishonored. Both
Statutes follow the rule of reason
able intendment.
NO particular form of notice is
required. The object of the no
tice is to inform the party to
whom it is sent, that the instru
ment has been dishonored and
that the holder looks to him for
payment. Any form in which
these facts are communicated is
sufficient. Bank v. McVeigh, 29
Gratt. 558; Dodson v. Taylor, 56
N. J. L. 11.
A notice that a note has been
protested for non-payment and
that the holders look to the in
dorser for payment was deemed
not sufficient in Platt v. Drake, 1
Doug. 296; followed in Newberry
v. Trowbridge, 4 Michi. 390; over
ruled in Burkam v. Trowbridge,
9 Mich. 209, distinguished in
Spies v. Newberry, 2 Doug. 424;
Snow v. Perkins, 2 Mich. 238.
It is not necessary to state in
terms that the holder looks for pay
ment to the party to whom no
tice is sent. Notice that the in
Strument is dishonored for non
payment is in itself sufficient no
tice that the indorser is looked to
for payment. Nelson V. First Nat.
Bank, 69 Fed. 798.
It is not necessary that a copy
of a foreign bill should accompany
the notice of its dishonor. At
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water v. Streets, 1 Doug. (Mich.)
455.
The Section is referred to in
Second Nat. Bank V. Smith, 118
Wis. 18; Am. Exch. Nat. Bank V.
American Hotel Co., 92 N. Y.
Supp. 1006.
2—This changes the prior rule
which required personal notice
where the parties resided in the
same place. Notice Sent through
the mail was insufficient in such
cases if it did not in due time
actually reach the indorser to
whom it was addressed. Newberry
v. Trowbridge, 4 Mich. 390; Nev
ius v. Bank, 10 Mich. 547; Cabot
Bank v. Warner, 10 Allen 522;
Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 29 W.
Va., 547.
If the parties live in different
places it has always been held
that notice deposited in the post
office in due time was sufficient
through it never reached the ad
dressee. Lindenberger v. Beall, 6
Wheat. 104; Shelburne Falls Nat.
Bank v. Townsley, 102 Mass. 177.
Many exceptions have been en
grafted onto the rule that where
parties reside in the same place
notice by mail is insufficient un
less actually received by the ad
dressee in due time. One of the
most important of these excep
tions is made in the case of per
Sons living or doing business in
a place where there is a daily de
livery of letters through mail car
riers. In Such a case it is the
rule that if the notice be de
posited in the post office in time
to be delivered the same day it
will be sufficient. Walters V.
Brown, 15 Md. 292; Shoemaker v.
Mechanics Bank, 59 Pa. St. 83.
Again, an indorser who has re
ceived notice by mail from a holder
living in a different town may give
valid notice by mail to a prior
indorser living in the same town
as himself. Eagle Bank V. Hath
away, 5 Met. (Mass.) 213.
Sec. 99. To whom notice may be given.—Notice of dis
honor may be given either to the party himself or to his
agent in that behalf."
1-This is similar in language
and identical in effect with Sec.
49 (8) of the Bills of Exchange
Act and is declaratory of the
common law.
Agent within the meaning of
this section is one who is author
ized to make and indorse paper
for his principal, or to transact
his banking business, or to act
as the general agent in the con
duct of his principal's business,
or to liquidate the affairs of his
principal, or to have general
charge of his principal's acts and
dealings with his bank and man
agement of the principal's paper
handled by the bank. Fassin V.
Hubbard, 55 N. Y. 465; Persons
v. Kruger, 60 N. Y. Supp. 1078.
But an attorney or Solicitor with
out being specially empowered in
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that behalf is not such an agent
as is authorized to receive no
tice. Louisiana State Bank V. El
lery, 4 Mart. (n. S.) 87.
Authority to indorse negotiable
paper has been held to carry with
it authority to receive notice of
its dishonor. Firth V. Thrush, 8
B. & C. 387; but there is author
ity to the contrary. Louisiana
State Bank V Ellery, supra; Valk
V. Gaillard, 4 Strob. 99; Story on
Prom. Notes, sec. 309; Crosse V.
Smith, 1 M. & S. 545.
Notice given to a secretary of
Sec. 100.
One COmpany is not notice to
another company of which he is
also secretary unless it comes to
him under circumstances which
make it his duty to communicate
it. Fenwick & Co. re, 86 L. T.
(n. S.) 193 (a case under the
corresponding provision. Bills of
Exchange Act).
The section is referred to in
Am. Exch. Nat. Bank V. American
Hotel Victoria Co., 92 N. Y. Supp.
1006; Mohlman Co. v. McKane, 69
N. Y. Supp. 1046.
Notice when party is dead.—When any
party is dead, and his death is known to the party giving
notice, the notice must be given to a personal representa
tive, if there be one, and if
,
with reasonable diligence, he
can be found." If there be no personal representative,
notice may be sent to the last residence o
r
last place o
f
business of the deceased.”
1–Goodnow v. Warren, 122
Mass. 83; Dodson V
. Taylor, 56
N. J. L. 11; Bank v. Darling 91
Hun 236; Cayuga CO. Bank V.
Bennett, 5 Hill 236.
Notice to one of several execu
tors or administrators is notice to
all. Beals V. Peck, 12 Barb. 245.
Notice to an executor named but
not qualified is sufficient. Shoen
berger's Ex'r v. Lancaster Sav
ings Institution, 28 Pa. St. 459;
Drexler v. McGlynn, 99 Cal. 143.
But notice to a person afterwards
appointed administrator is not
Sufficient. Mathewson V
.
Strafford
Bank, 45 N. H. 104. Notice
should be addressed to the per
Sonal representative by his name,
not by his office merely, a
s “Ex
ecutors J. M. Quimby, deceased,”
although notice addressed as last
above is good if the personal rep
resentative actually and duly re
ceives it. Smalley v. Wright, 40
N. J. L. 471.
2—Stewart v. Eden, 2 Caines
(N. Y.), 121; Goodnow v. War
ren, supra; Merchant's Bank v.
Birch, 17 Johns. 25; Massachu
setts Bank v. Oliver, 10 Cush. 557.
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Sec. 101. Notice to partners.—Where the parties to be
notified are partners, notice to any one partner is notice
to the firm, even though there has been a dissolution."
1—Notice to any member of a
firm is sufficient either before or
after dissolution. A partnership,
though dissolved, must be treated
as still in existence so far as the
question of demand, protest and
notice is concerned, and the acts
of one partner in such cases must
be considered as binding on all.
Fourth Nat. Bank v. Heuschen, 52
Mo. 207; Fourth Nat. Bank v.
Altheimer, 91 Mo. 190; Hubbard
v. Matthews, 54 N. Y. 50; Brown
v. Turner, 15 Ala. 832. If one
partner die, notice to the surviv
ing partner or partners will bind
the estate of the deceased part
ner. Slocomb v. de Lizardi, 21 La.
Ann. 355.
Sec. 102. Notice to joint parties.—Notice to joint par
ties who are not partners must be given to each of them,
unless one of them has authority to receive such notice
for the others."
1—People's Bank v. Keech, 26
Md. 521; Boyd v. Orton, 16 Wis.
495; Miser v. Trovinger's Exr's, 7
Ohio St. 281 The distinction be
tween joint parties who are part
ners and joint parties who are not
partners rests upon the fact that
partners are but one person in
legal contemplation; that each part
ner acting in such capacity is not
only capable of performing what
all can do but by such acts nec
essarily binds them all; that as
an incident to such joint relations
all the partners are affected by
the knowledge of one; hence no
tice to one is notice to all. But
these things do not pertain to the
relation of joint parties who are
not partners. The law does not
create the relation of agency be
tween them. While their act in
making the contract is joint each
cannot perform what all can do
nor by his individual act bind his
co-contractors; all of Such joint
contractors are not affected by the
knowledge of one of them. Gates
v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 523. If there
be no agency of their own making
between joint indorsers, not part
ners, notice to a part of the num
ber will not bind even them;
since they are liable only jointly
with the rest. Jarnagin V. Strat
ton, 95 Tenn. 621.
Sec. 103. Notice to bankrupt.—Where a party has been
adjudged a bankrupt or an insolvent, or has made an
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assignment for the benefit of creditors, notice may be
given either to the party himself or to his trustee or
assignee."
1—See Bills of Exchange Act,
sec. 49 (10), concerning which
Mr. Chalmers says: “All that had
been decided before the act was
that notice given to the bankrupt
in ignorance that a trustee had
been appointed was sufficient.”
The act enlarged the rule in this
respect. This section is some
what more comprehensive than
the corresponding provision of the
English Act.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court of Ten
nessee have held that notice to
the assignee of an indorser who
had made an assignment would
bind the indorser and his estate.
Callahan V. Bank of Kentucky, 82
Ky. 231; American Nat. Bank V.
Junk Bros., 94 Tenn. 634. The
Supreme Court of Ohio disap
proved the holding and refused
to follow it, making a distinction
between an assignee under a Vol
untary general aSSignment and an
assignee in bankruptcy. House V.
Vinton Nat. Bank, 43 Ohio St. 346.
In this case two judges dissent
from the majority opinion, and
approve the rule of Callahan V.
Bank of Kentucky.
Sec. 104. Time within which notice must be given.—
Notice may be given as soon as the instrument is dis
honored; and unless delay is excused as hereinafter pro
vided, must be given within the time fixed by this act."
1-It is settled that the holder
may send notice of dishonor upon
its happening and need not wait
until the close of business hours.
Bank Of Alexandria V. Swann, 9
Pet. 33; Lenox v. Roberts, 2
Wheat. 373; Coleman v. Carpen
ter, 9 Pa. St. 178; Ex parte Mo
line, 19 Wes. Jr. 216. In Kennedy
v. Thomas [1894] 2 Q. B. 759, (a
case under corresponding provi
sion of the Bills of Exchange
Act) it was held that where an
acceptor refused payment at any
time within the day on which the
bill fell due the holder might give
immediate notice of dishonor to
drawer and indorser but could not
commence Suit against them. Or
the acceptor until after the ex
piration of the last day of grace.
Paper payable at a bank is not
absolutely dishonored before the
close of banking hours. If de
mand should be made before the
close of banking hours and there
were no funds provided for pay
ment of the paper, the holder
could not treat the paper as dis
honored and give notice accord
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ingly. German-American Bank V.
Milliman, 31 N. Y. Misc. 87, 65 N.
Y. Supp. 242 (a case under the
Statute).
Sec. 105. Where parties reside in same place.—Where
the person giving and the person to receive notice reside
in the same place, notice must be given within the follow
ing times:"
First, If given at the place of business of the person to
receive notice it must be given before the close of busi
ness hours on the day following;”
Second, If given at his residence, it must be given
before the usual hours of rest on the day following;”
Third, If sent by mail, it must be deposited in the post
office in time to reach him in the usual course on the day
following."
1–In the giving of notice of dis
honor the law merchant only re
quired that reasonable diligence
should be used but it interpreted
reasonable diligence to be con
fined in point of time to the day
of dishonor and the first Secular
day following. The occurrence of
non-secular days while reducing
the period of grace increased the
time for giving notice. Farns
worth V. Mullen, 164 Mass. 112;
Bank of Utica v. Bender, 21 Wend.
643. The Statute has confirmed
this rule except as to the matter
of grace. The holder may send
notice on a non-secular day but
is not required to do so. The in
dorser is not bound to open the
letter containing the notice or to
act on it until the next day. Deb
lieux V. Bullard, 1 Rob. (La.) 66.
If there be several indorsers the
holder may notify any of them
he sees fit but he has no more
time in which to notify the first
than the last indorser. For ex
ample there are four successive
indorsers of a dishonored promis
sory note. The maximum time the
holder has to give notice is two
days, but if notice were given to
the indorsers in succession, the
maximum time for giving the
first indorser notice would be five
days. Notice by holder to first in
dorser five days after dishonor
would not be good. See sections
94, 109.
2—Adams v. Wright, 14 Wis.
408; Rowe v. Tipper, 13 C. B.
249; Lockwood v. Crawford, 18
Conn. 361; Barker v. Webster, 10
Iowa, 593.
3—Rosson v. Carroll, 90 Tenn.
90. If service be properly made
at the place of business or resi
dence it is immaterial that the
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party to be notified did not in ing presentment for payment ap
fact receive the notice. Adams v. ply. See sec. 74.
Wright, supra. In the case of 4—See note 2, Sec. 98. See note
personal notice the rules govern- 1, Sec. 106.
Sec. 106. Where parties reside in different places.—
Where the person giving and the person to receive notice
reside in different places, the notice must be given within
the following times: *
First, If sent by mail, it must be deposited in the post
office in time to go by mail the day following the day of
dishonor, or, if there be no mail at a convenient hour on
that day, by the next mail thereafter;"
Second, If given otherwise than though [through] the
postoffice, then within the time that notice would have been
received in due course of mail if it had been deposited in
the postoffice, within the time specified in the last sub
division.”
1—The Status of the unwritten
law on the subject covered by
this SubSection is thus Stated by
Earl, J., in Smith v. Poillon, 87
N. Y. 590: “It is clear that the
law is not precisely settled. It
appears that at first it was Sup
posed to be necessary that notice
of dishonor would be given by
the next post after dishonor, on
the same day, if there was one.
That rule was found inconveni
ently stringent, and then it was
held that when the parties lived
in different places, between which
there was a mail, the notice could
be posted the next day after the
dishonor or notice of dishonor.
Some of the authorities hold that
the party required to give the no
tice may have the whole of the
next day. Other authorities lay
down the rule, in general terms,
that the notice must be posted by
the first practical and convenient
mail of the next day; and that
rule seems to be supported by the
most authority in this state. What
is a practical and convenient mail
depends upon circumstances. It
may be controlled by the usages
of business and the customs of
the people at the place of mail
ing, and the condition, situation
and business engagements of the
person required to give the no
tice. The rule should have a rea
Sonable application in every case,
and whether sufficient diligence
has been used to mail the notice,
the facts being undisputed, is a
question of law.” To the same
11
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effect: Lawson v. Farmers' Bank,
1 Ohio St. 206; Western Wheeled
Scraper Co. v. Sadilek, 50 Neb.
105; Corbin V. Planters’ Nat.
Bank, 87 Va. 666; Brown v.
Jones, 125 Ind. 375; Hawkes V.
Salter, 4 Bing. 715.
Stainback V. Bank, 11 Gratt.
260. This was an action against
the indorser of a bill drawn on a
drawee in London, and protested
for non-acceptance April 5th. No
tice was sent in a mail leaving
Liverpool, April 19, by a Cunard
steamship, that being the first
Steamship leaving England for
the United States after the dis
honor of the bill. But between
the 5th and the 19th several Sail
ing packets left England for the
United States. It was the usage
of the London post-office to for
ward all mail by the Cunard line
unless specially directed to be
forwarded by other vessels. The
indorser defended on the ground
that the notice should have been
sent by one of the sailing pack
ets departing from England on an
earlier day than the steamship.
The sending of the notice by the
first steamship that left England
for the United States after the
dishonor of the bill was held to
be within the stringent rule re
quiring that notice be sent by the
first mail.
Notice must be sent by the
first ship bound to any port of
the United States, and it is not
sufficient to send it by the first
ship bound for the port where
the indorser resides. Fleming v.
McClure, 1 Brevard (S. C.) 428.
Indorser resided in Charleston, S.
C. Holder, in England, waited for
ship sailing for Charleston, S. C.,
by which he sent notice. In the
meantime there were Several Sail
ings of mail ships for other
ports of the United States. Held:
notice not seasonably sent.
Fielding & Co. v. Corry [1898]
1 Q. B. 268 (a case under corre
sponding provision of the Bills of
Exchange Act), Mohlman V. Mc
Kane, 60 App. Div. 546, 69 N. Y.
Supp. 1046 (a case under this sec
tion).
2—The holder need not send
the notice by mail. He may send
it by special messenger, and if
he does So it is Sufficient if it be
Served Within the time it would
have been received in due course
by mail as provided in subsection
“first.” It has been held that al
though the notice by messenger
reaches the party after the time
it would have been received in
due course it is nevertheless Suffi
cient if Served Within business
hours. Bancroft v. Hall, Holt.
476, 3 E. C. L. 190; Corbin V.
Planters' Bank, 87 Va. 666.
The Statute would seem to be
mandatory in requiring notice
“given otherwise than through the
post office” to be served within
the time it would have been re
ceived in due course of mail.
Sec. 107. When sender deemed to have given due
notice.—Where notice of dishonor is duly addressed and
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deposited in the postoffice, the sender is deemed to have
given due notice, notwithstanding any miscarriage in the
mails."
1—Shelburne Falls Nat. Bank
v. Townsley, 107 Mass. 444; Farm
ers' Bank v. Gunnell, Adm'x, 26
Gratt. 137; Wooley v. Lyon, 117
Ill. 244; Phelps v. Stocking, 21
Neb. 443; Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick.
401; Stocken v. Collin, 7 M. & W.
515, 10 L. J. Ex. 227; State
Bank V. Soloman, 84 N. Y. Supp.
976 (a case under the statute).
All who deal in mercantile pa
per are presumed to assent, and
even to expect, that such infor
mation as they want will be com
municated through the medium of
the post office. And thus the post
office becomes their agent; and
if it happen to fail from any un
expected cause, he who made the
right use of it by placing his let
ter there, properly directed, has
done all his duty, and the con
Sequences must fall upon him who
has to receive. Shred v. Brett,
Supra.
Sec. 108. Deposit in postoffice; what constitutes.—
Notice is deemed to have been deposited in the postoffice
when deposited in any branch postoffice or in any letter
box under the control of the postoffice department."
1—Wood v. Callaghan, 61 Mich.
402; Johnson v. Brown, 154
Mass. 105; Casco Nat. Bank V.
Shaw, 79 Me. 376.
It has been held that delivery
of notice to an Official letter car
rier is the full equivalent of de
positing it in a receiving box or
in the post office. Pearce v.
Langfit, 101 Pa. St. 507. The rule
of the foregoing case is not with
in the terms of the Statute. Mr.
Crawford says that it was not
deemed wise to adopt this rule.
Crawford's Ann. Neg. Inst. Law,
97.
Sec. 109. Notice to antecedent parties; time of.—
Where a party receives notice of dishonor he has, after
the receipt of such notice, the same time for giving notice
to antecedent parties that the holder has after the dis
honor."
1-It is an established princi
ple of mercantile law that if the
holder of a bill or note chooses
to rely upon the responsibility of
his immediate indorser, there is
no necessity for his giving notice
to any previous party; and if
such notice be properly given, in
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due time, by the other parties, it
will inure to the benefit of the
holder, and he may recover there
on against any of them. Thus, if
the holder notifies the sixth in
dorser, and he the fifth, and so
on to the first, the latter will be
liable to all the parties. And it
is no objection to such notice that
it is not in fact received SO SO.On
by the first or any prior indorser,
as if it had been transmitted di
rectly by the holder or notary,
provided it has been seasonably
sent by each indorser as he re
ceives it. And the same degree
of diligence must be exercised on
the part of the indorser in for
warding notice as is required of
the holder. Ordinary diligence
must be used in both cases. Linn
v. Horton, 17 Wis. 151; Corbin v.
Planters' Nat. Bank, 87 Va. 666;
Seaton v. Scovill, 18 Kan. 433.
See note, sec. 94.
Sec. 110. Where notice must be sent.—Where a party
has added an address to his signature, notice of dishonor
must be sent to that address; but if he has not given such
address, then the notice must be sent as follows:
First, Either to the postoffice nearest to his place of
residence, or to the postoffice where he is accustomed to
receive his letters;” or
Second, If he live in one place and have his place of
business in another, notice may be sent to either place;” or
Third, If he is sojourning in another place, notice may
be sent to the place where he is so sojourning." But where
the notice is actually received by the party within the time
specified in this act, it will be sufficient, though not sent
in accordance with the requirements of this section.”
1—An indorser has the right to
designate, when he indorses, a
place to which notice shall be
Sent. Notice must be addressed
to him at the place designated in
order to bind him. So held where
an indorser added to his signa
ture the words, “214 E. 18th St.,”
and the notice was addressed
“City of New York.” Bartlett v.
Robinson, 39 N. Y. 187, and it
was so held notwithstanding a
statute which provided that no
tices of non-payment, etc., may be
served by depositing them * * *
in the post office * * * di
rected to the indorser at such city
or town. This statute, it was said,
was not intended to and did not
abridge the right of such indorser
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to designate the place within such
town or city to which notice
should be sent.
Peters v. Hobbs,
Eastern Bank V. BrOWI),
356. -
2-Citizens Nat. Bank V. Cade,
73 Mich. 449; Northwestern Coal
Co. v. Bowman, 69 Iowa 150.
The general rule is that notice
must be sent to the place where
the indorser will be most likely
to receive it. American Bank V.
Junk Bros., 94 Tenn. 624; Bank
of America v. Shaw, 142 Mass.
290; Casco Bank v. Shaw, 79 Me.
376. In View of this rule the true
interpretation of this subsection
would seem to be this: that no
tice must be sent to the post office
nearest the indorser's place of res
idence, but if he is accustomed to
receive his letters at another post
office, and that fact is known to
the holder, notice should be sent
there, and not that the holder has
the option to send to the one or
the other. See the following cases
in which this subdivision was re
ferred to but not construed. Eb
ling Brewing Co. v. Reinheimer, 66
N. Y. Supp. 458; Mohlman Co. v.
McKane, 60 App. Div. 546, 69 N. Y.
Supp. 1046; Fonseca v. Hartman,
84 N. Y. Supp. 131.
25 Ark. 67;
17 Me.
3-Montgomery County Bank V.
Marsh, 7 N. Y. 481; Simms v.
Larkin, 19 Wis. 412.
4–Sojourning signifies a tem
porary residence as that of a trav
eler in a foreign land; to live,
and not at home; it applies to
temporary as contra distinguished
from permanent residence. Wit
tenbrock V. Mabius, 10 N. Y.
Supp. 733, 57 Hun, 146; Henry v.
Ball, 14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 1. Thus,
a Senator or member of the House
having an abode in Washington
during the session of Congress is
“sojourning” there and notice may
be sent to such temporary abode.
Chouteau v. Webster, 6 Met.
(Mass.) 1; Tunstall v. Walker, 2
Smedes & M. 638; Bank of Com
merce v. Chambers, 14 Mo. App.
152. But see Bayly's Adm'r V.
Chubb, 16 Gratt. 284; Walker V.
Stetson, 14 Ohio St. 89.
5-Notice is good if actually re
ceived by the indorser. A party
who receives notice in due time
cannot object to the means em
ployed. Dicken v. Hall, 87 Pa.
St. 379; Terbell v. Jones, 15 Wis.
253.
Notice by telegraph is good if
delivered in due season. Fielding
v. Corry, [1898] 1 Q. B. 268.
Sec. 111. Waiver of notice.—Notice of dishonor may
be waived, either before the time of giving notice has
arrived, or after the omission to give due notice,” and
the waiver may be express or implied.”
1—Any conduct on the part of and inducing, the holder to omit
the indorser calculated to induce, serving him with regular notice
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of non-payment, will have the ef
fect to waive it. Hale V. Dan
forth, 46 Wis. 554; Boyd V. Bank,
32 Ohio St. 526; Glaze v. Fer
guson, 48 Kan. 157; Tailer v.
Murphy Furnishing Co., 24 Mo.
App. 420. A promise by the in
dorser before the maturity of the
note to pay the same is a waiver
of all steps. Sigerson V. Math
ews, 20 How. (U. S.) 496; Gove v.
Vining, 7 Met. (Mass.) 212.
Waiver, at or before maturity,
of presentment and notice upon
an instrument indorsed by a part
nership may be by one of the
partners as agent of the others,
and this even though the part
nership is dissolved, since it does
not create a new liability. Seld
ner V. Mount Jackson Nat. Bank,
66 Md. 488; Star Wagon Co. v.
Swezey, 52 Iowa 391. But it seems
that waiver after maturity, the
firm being discharged for want of
presentment or notice, would not
revive its obligation. Daniel Neg.
Inst., 5th ed., sec. 1109a, and cases
cited.
An oral waiver of notice may
be revoked before the time of giv
ing notice has expired. Second
Nat. Bank V. McGuire, 33 Ohio St.
295, 31 Am. Rep. 539.
2—Notice is waived by a sub
sequent promise to pay the note,
with full knowledge of all the
facts. Burden of proof, however,
is on the plaintiff to show that
the indorser had such knowledge.
State Bank v. McCabe (Mich.
1904), 98 N. W. 20; Newberry v.
Trowbridge, 13 Mich. 263; Par
sons v. Dickinson, 23 Mich. 56;
Woods v. Dean, 32 L. J. Q. B. 1.
A promise to pay made by the
indorser after maturity and after
he is discharged for want of de
mand or notice is binding in anal
ogy with the promise to pay a
debt barred by the statute of lim
itations. Rindge V. Kimball, 124
Mass. 209; Ross v. Hurd, 71 N.
Y. 14; Oxnard V. Varumn, 111
Pa. St. 193.
The indorser to be bound by
such subsequent promise must
have knowledge of the laches and
all the material facts constituting
such laches. Parks v. Smith, 155
Mass. 26. But it is not necessary
he should understand the legal
effect of Such laches.
3-The waiver need not take
any particular form. Any lan
guage, whether oral or written, or
any understanding between the
parties, is sufficient if it can be
Seen that a waiver was intended.
Quaintance v. Goodrow, 16 Mont.
376, 41 Pac. 76; Schwartz & Sons
v. Widmer, 90 Md. 136 (a case
under the statute). See In re
Swift, 106 Fed. 65, in which, sec
tion 84, subdivision 3, a provision
identical with this except that it
applies to presentment, was con
Strued.
Sec. 112. Whom affected by waiver!—where the waiv
er is embodied in the instrument itself, it is binding upon
all parties; but where it is written above the signature
of the indorser, it binds him only.”
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1-A Waiver embodied in the in
strument is a part of the contract
and applies to every indorser of
the paper. Phillips V. Dippo, 93
Iowa 35; Farmers' Bank v.
Ewing, 78 Ky. 266; Lowry v.
Steele, 27 Ind. 168; Jacobs v. Gib
son, 77 Mo. App. 244; Woodward
v. Lowry, 74 Ga. 148.
2—“Such an indorsement is
sometimes spoken of as a facul
tative indorsement. It relates
only to the indorser's liability,
and does not otherwise affect the
negotiation of the bill. Such stip
ulations are resorted to when the
payment of the bill is doubtful,
and the drawer or indorser Wishes
to save expense in case of its re
turn.” Chalmers' Bills of Ex
change, 5th ed., 40. Some courts
have held, contrary to the gen
eral rule, that such an indorse
ment dispenses with the neces
sity of notice to all subsequent in
dorsers. Daniel, Neg. Inst., 5th
ed., sec. 1092 a; Parshley v. Heath,
69 Me. 90; Johnson v. Parker, 86
MO. App. 660; Farmers' Exchange
Bank V. Altura & Co., 129 Cal.
263. The statute settles the rule.
Sec. 113. Waiver of protest.—A waiver of protest,
whether in the case of a foreign bill of exchange or other
negotiable instrument, is deemed to be a waiver not only
of a formal protest, but also of presentment and notice of
dishonor."
1—Strictly, protest is a single
step in fixing the liability of sec
ondary parties and pertains only
to foreign bills of exchange. Prac
tically, however, it has long since
come to be used as a term in
cluding all the steps necessary to
charge the indorser.
The general rule of the law
merchant on the subject is em
bodied in this section. Union
Bank v. Hyde, 6 Wheat. 572; John
son V. Parsons, 140 Mass. 173;
First Nat. Bank V. Hartman, 110
Pa. St. 196; Coddington v. Da
vis, 1 N. Y. 186; First Nat. Bank
v. Falkenhan, 94 Cal. 141, 29 Pac.
866.
A Waiver of notice will not be
construed to extend beyond the
plain and clear import of the
terms used and Will not include
Waiver of demand. Voorhies V.
Atlee, 29 Iowa 49; Drinkwater v.
Tebbetts, 17 Me. 16; Backus V.
Shipherd, 11 Wend. 629; Sprague
v. Fletcher, 8 Ore. 367.
Sec. 114. When notice dispensed with.—Notice of dis
honor is dispensed with when, after the exercise of
reasonable diligence, it cannot be given to, or does not
reach, the parties sought to be charged."
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1—The law does not require ac
tual notice. It requires reason
able efforts, made in good faith,
to give it. And if sufficient in
quiries have been made, and in
formation received upon which the
holder has a right to rely, a mis
take as to the nearest post office
or usual post office does not de
prive him of his remedy. He has
done all that the law requires,
and the notice thus sent fixes the
liability of the indorser as effect
ually as if he had actually re
ceived it
.
Lambert V
. Ghiselin, 9
How. (U. S.) 552.
The meaning of reasonable dili
gence as used in this section is
thus interpreted by the Supreme
Court of New York in Brewster V.
Schrader, 26 Misc. 480, 57 N. Y.
Supp. 606: “The reasonable dili
gence required by the statute in
giving notice, depends upon the
circumstances of each particular
case. The question of what is
reasonable diligence must be de
termined With reference to what
would have suggested itself as
necessary, under the existing cir
cumstances, to the man of ordi
nary prudence and intelligence.”
The Section is referred to in Fon
seca v
. Hartman, 84 N. Y. Supp.
131. See Studdy v. Beesty, 60 L.
T. (n. S.), 647 (a case under the
corresponding provision of the
Bills of Exchange Act).
Merely consulting directories is
not reasonable diligence in mak
ing inquiry. The information they
afford may be misleading. Their
help may be invoked, but their
error, though it may excuse the
notary, will not charge the in
dorser. Bacon V
. Hanna, 137 N.
Y. 379.
Sec. 115. Delay in giving notice; how excused.—Delay
in giving notice of dishonor is excused when the delay is
caused by circumstances beyond the control o
f
the holder
and not imputable to his default, misconduct o
r negli
gence. When the cause o
f delay ceases to operate, notice
must b
e given with reasonable diligence."
1—Thus delay caused by war
whereby communication was cut
off so that notice could not be
sent, James v. Wade, 21 La. Ann.
548; Norris v. Despard, 38 Md.
487. This section deals with what
is known as temporary excuse for
taking a given step in fixing the
liability of the secondary party.
See note, Sec. 83.
Sec. 116. When notice need not be given to drawer.—
Notice o
f
dishonor is not required to be given to the
drawer in either o
f
the following cases:
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First, where the drawer and drawee are the same per
son;"
Second, Where the drawee is a fictitious person or a
person not having capacity to contract;”
Third, Where the drawer is the person to whom the
instrument is presented for payment;”
Fourth, Where the drawer has no right to expect or
require that the drawee or acceptor will honor the instru
ment; or
Fifth, Where the drawer has countermanded paym:
1—Where the drawer and drawee
are the same person the bill is in
legal effect a promissory note and
no notice to the drawer is neces
sary. Planters' Bank V. Evans,
36 Tex. 592. Where a bill of ex
change is drawn by one partner
ship on another and the two have
a common partner, notice of the
dishonor of the bill is not neces
sary to charge the drawers. New
York, etc. Co. v. Selma Sav. Bank,
51 Ala. 305; Gowan V. Jackson,
20 Johns. 176.
2—Smith v. Bellamy, 2 Starkie,
223; Wyman v. Adams, 12 Cush.
210.
3—This subdivision applies to
the case of a drawer who has
been appointed executor or trustee
of the drawee's estate. Present
ment for payment having been
made to him in his representative
capacity he gets actual knowledge
of the dishonor of the paper.
Further notice would be superflu
OuS. KnOWledge of the dishonor
in such a case amounts to notice.
Caunt v. Thompson, 7 C. B. 400,
62 E. C. L. 399; Groth v. Gyger,
31 Pa. St. 271; Magruder v.
Union Bank, 3 Pet. 87.
4—Where the drawer has no
right to expect that the acceptor
will pay the bill, as where it is
an accommodation bill, So that he
could not be damnified by want
of notice, notice is not necessary.
Sharp v. Bailey, 9 B. & C. 44;
Knickerbocker Life Ins. CO. V.
Pendleton, 112 U. S. 696; French
V. Bank of Columbia, 4 Cranch,
141.
The mere fact that the drawee
has no funds of the drawer in his
hands will not dispense with due
presentment and notice. All
that is required is that the drawer
have reasonable grounds to expect
that his draft Will be honored.
Cathell V. Goodwin, Har. & Gill
(Md.) 468.
5–Sutcliffe v. M'Dowell, 2 Nott.
& McC. 251.
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Sec. 117. Where notice need not be given to indorser.
-Notice of dishonor is not required to be given to an
indorser in either of the following cases:
First, Where the drawee is a fictitious person or a per
son not having capacity to contract, and the indorser
was aware of the fact at the time he indorsed the instru
ment;"
Second, Where the indorser is the person to whom the
instrument is presented for payment;”
Third, Where the instrument was made or accepted for
his accommodation.”
1—The indorser, aware that the
drawee is a fictitious person, has
all the knowledge that the paper
cannot be accepted and will not be
paid that he could acquire from
notice; hence notice is properly
dispensed with. In case the
drawee were a person lacking ca
pacity to contract and the in
dorser were aware of the fact at
the time he endorsed, his knowl
edge that acceptance or payment
could not be compelled is as
complete as notice could make it.
2–Hull v. Myers, 90 Ga. 674.
In re Swift, 106 Fed. 65 (a case
under this subdivision of the stat
ute).
Sec. 118.
3–Webster v. Mitchell, 22 Fed.
871; American Nat. Bank V. Junk
Bros., 94 Tenn. 624; Morris v.
Birmingham Nat. Bank, 93 Ala
511, 9 So. 606.
Where one, as indorser, pro
Cures the note Of another to be
discounted by a bank for his
credit, and at the time the dis
count is effected makes a distinct
promise to the bank to pay the
note at maturity, his liability is
absolute, not conditional, and pro
test and notice of non-payment
are unecessary. Sieger V. Second
Nat. Bank, 132 Pa. St. 307.
Notice of non-payment where acceptance re
fused.—Where due notice of dishonor by non-acceptance
has been given, notice of a subsequent dishonor by non
payment is not necessary, unless in the meantime the in
strument has been accepted."
1–De La Torre v. Barclay, 1 Stark, 7; Campbell v. French,
6 T. R. 200.
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Sec. 119. Omission to give notice of non-acceptance;
effect of.—An omission to give notice of dishonor by non
acceptance does not prejudice the rights of a holder in
due course subsequent to the omission."
1—This section affirms the rule been dishonoured, because a for
declared in Dunn V. O'Keefe, 5
M. & S. 282, wherein Lord El
lenborough said: “No author
ity has pronounced that a bill
of exchange shall be a Void Se
curity, in the hands of an in
nocent indorsee, who has no
knowledge that the bill has ever
mer holder has omitted to give
notice to the drawer that the
drawee has refused acceptance.”
The Wisconsin Act contains
this further provision: “But this
Shall not be construed to revive
any liability discharged by such
Omission.”
Sec. 120. When protest need not be made; when must
be made.—Where any negotiable instrument has been
dishonored it may be protested for non-acceptance or non
payment, as the case may be; but protest is not required,
except in the case of foreign bills of exchange."
1-Foreign bills defined, section statute affirms the law merchant
131. See sections 154-162 and in requiring protest of foreign
notes as to protest generally. The bills only.
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Article VIII. Discharge of Negotiable Instrumen
Sec.
121.
122. Discharge of person second
arily liable on.
123. Rights of party paying in
Strument.
124. Renunciation by holder.
Sec
How instrument discharged. 125. Cancellation unintent.
burden of proof.
126. Alteration of instru
effect of.
127. Material alteration,
constitutes.
Sec. 121. How instrument discharged.—A negot
instrument is discharged:
First, By payment" in due course by or on beha
the principal debtor;”
Second, By payment in due course by the party ac
modated, where the instrument is made or accepted
accommodation.”
Third, By the intentional cancellation thereof by
holder;"
Fourth, By any other act which will discharge a si
l
contract for the payment o
f money;”
Fifth, When the principal debtor becomes the ho
o
f
the instrument a
t o
r
after maturity in his own ri
1-Payment and Surrender of a
negotiable instrument at the right
time, -at or after maturity (sec.
90), to the right person—the
holder—by the right person,—the
principal debtor or his agent in
that behalf,-extinguishes the lia
bility of all parties to the in
Strument.
The possession of a promissory
note by the maker makes a
prima facie case o
f payment, it
throws the burden upon the
plaintiff to prove non-payment.
Page Woven Wire Fence (
Pool, 129 Mich. 57.
As to what constitutes pay
See Morris V. Morris, 5
171; Appledorn v. Streete
Mich. 9
;
Sherwood v. M
Bank, 94 Mich. 78; State
v
. Byrne, 97 Mich. 7.
Whether a note given in r
al of another note is to b
garded as payment of the
note when the old note is r
ed, is a question in conflict
Child v. Pellet, 102 Mich.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN GENERAL. 173
it was held that unless there was
evidence of a contrary intention,
renewals at banks ought always
to be regarded as payment, be
cause the banks themselves SO
regard them. To the same effect
is Citizens Commercial & Savings
Bank V. Platt, (Mich.) 97 N. W.
694. But see McMorran V. Mur
phy, 68 Mich. 246. To the con
trary see Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th
ed., sec. 1266 and cases cited.
Where the old note is Sur
rendered the renewal note, accord
ing to the probable weight of
authority, does not constitute pay
ment of the old, but the giving
up of the old note is a mere con
ditional Surrender, and upon non
payment of the new, the obliga
tion of the old is revived, Dan
iel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., Sec. 1266 a.
The intention of the parties
will, however, always be allowed
to control. If the renewal note
be intended as payment of the
old, although the old be not sur
rendered, it will be considered as
payment. Hotchin v. Secor, 8
Mich. 494; Sage v. Walker, 12
Mich. 425; Dodge v. Stanton, id.
408; Brown v. Dunckel, 46 Mich.
29; Riverside Iron Works v.
Hall, 64 Mich. 165; Ellis v. Bal
lou, 129 Mich. 303; See also
Dudgeon v. Haggart, 17 Mich.
273; Burchard v. Frazer, 23 Mich.
228; Matter of the Utica Plowing
Co. 154 N. Y. 268.
When a debtor gives his note
for a preéxisting or contemporan
eous debt it amounts to condi
tional payment,. not to an ex
tinguishment of the debt. Breit
ung v. Lindhaur, 37 Mich. 217;
Marinette Iron Works Co. v. Cody,
108 Mich. 381; Smalley v. Gear
ing, 121 Mich. 190; Philadelphia
V. Neill, (Pa. 1905) 60 Atl. 1033.
The law does not raise a pre
Sumption of non-payment but of
payment when due. Bailey v.
Gould, Walk. Ch. 478; Bassett v.
Hathaway, 9 Mich. 28; George
V. Ludlow, 66 Mich. 176.
When the holder of a bill of
exchange, acting for the accom
modation of the drawer, sends it
to a bank for collection and the
bank, when the bill comes to ma
turity, passes the amount to the
credit of the holder, this is not
Such a payment as discharges
the acceptor; but the bank suc
ceeds to the rights of the holder
and may maintain an action on
the bill against the acceptor.
Pacific Bank v. Mitchell, 9 Met.
(Mass.) 297.
2—When an agent makes pay
ment on behalf of the principal
debtor the instrument is dis
charged. But when an indorser
makes part payment to the holder
not as agent for the principal
debtor, such a payment is not a
defense to the principal debtor;
he is liable for the whole amount
notwithstanding such payment.
Madison Square Bank V. Pierce,
137 N. Y. 444. See Sec. 123 as
to payment by party of secondary
liability.
3–See Lancey v. Clark, 64 N.
Y. 209.
4-See Sec. 125.
5-Thus a release of one joint
maker by the holder will dis
charge all the joint parties, for
such a release is a complete bar
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to any joint suit and no separ
ate suit can be maintained in
such cases. Daniel Neg. Inst.,
5th ed., Sec. 1294. Crawford W.
Roberts, 8 Ore. 324; but accord
ing to Shaw v. Pratt, 22 Pick.
305, such a release, to operate as
a discharge, must be under Seal.
6—This Subdivision was con
strued in Schwartzman V. Post,
94 App. Div. 474, 84 N. Y. Supp.
922, 87 Id. 872. In this case the
holder of a note for $5,000 sur
rendered it to the maker upon
payment by the latter of $3,250
and a promise to pay the balance.
It was held that under this pro
Vision of the statute the holder
was precluded from later main
taining an action against the
maker On the note to recover the
balance due. The court said: “The
words “in his own right, merely
exclude Such a case as that of
a maker acquiring the instru
ment in purely a representative
capacity.” The corresponding
provision of the Bills of Ex
change Act was construed in
Nash V. De Freville [1900] 2 Q.
B. 72. In this case A. gave B.
certain notes as security upon his
promise not to negotiate the
Same, and later gave renewal
notes but did not ask for the re
turn of the old notes. B. again
agreed not to negotiate the notes
but later transferred all of them
to C. A. paid the amount of
the notes to B. but did not get
the notes back at the time. Later
B. again obtained the notes from
C. by fraudulently giving C. his
check which was Worthless. B.
returned the notes to A. and then
absconded. A., thinking the trans
action closed, burned the notes.
It was held that inasmuch as B.
got title to the notes from C.
fraudulently, he could give A. no
better title than he had, and A’s
possession of the notes did not
discharge the same. It was held
further that the words “in his
OWn right” must mean Something
more than ‘not in a representa
tive capacity, as executor, for
instance. Collins, J., said: “I
think “in his own right must
mean having a right not subject
to that of any one else-good
against all the world.”
Sec. 122. Discharge of person secondarily liable on.—
A person secondarily liable on the instrument is dis
charged:
First, By any act which discharges the instrument;"
Second, By the intentional cancellation of his signature
by the holder;”
Third, By the discharge of a prior party;”
Fourth, By a valid tender of payment made by a prior
party;”
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Fifth, By a release of the principal debtor, unless the
holder’s right of recourse against the party secondarily
liable is expressly reserved;”
Sixth, By any agreement binding upon the holder to
extend the time of payment, or to postpone the holder’s
right to enforce the instrument," unless made with the
assent of the party secondarily liable," or unless the right
of recourse against such party is expressly reserved.”
1-Farmers & Mechanics Bank
V. Kingsley, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 379.
See preceding Section.
2–Bank of Scotland V. Domin
ion Bank [1891] App. CaS. 592.
3–This is the rule of the law
merchant and is general in its
application; whatever discharges
the maker of a note or the ac
ceptor of a bill discharges the
indorsers, and the discharge of an
indorser releases all indorsers
subsequent to him. Brewer V.
Boynton, 71 Mich. 254; Gunnis etc.
v. Weigley, 114 Pa. St. 194;
Shutts V. Fingar, 100 N. Y. 539.
In the case last cited it is said:
“Whatever discharges a prior in
dorser discharges all subsequent
indorsers, for the reason that he
stood between them and the hold
er, and on making payment each
one could have had recourse
against him but from which his
discharge precludes them. The
contracts of the parties to a note
are said to be like the links of a
pendant chain, if the holder dis
solves the first every link falls
with it.”
But this rule does not apply
where a prior party is discharged
by the holder's failure to give
him due notice, such discharge
not affecting the indorser Whose
liability has become fixed, West
River Bank v. Taylor, 34 N. Y.
128. Nor, where the party pri
marily liable is discharged be
cause of lack of capacity to con
tract, as an infant or a married
Wolman.
Where the holder has allowed
the statute of limitations to run
against the maker of a note, the
indorser is discharged. Bridges
V. Blake, 106 Ind. 332. But see
Villars v. Palmer, 67 Ill. 204.
4—The creditor, who declines
to accept a valid tender of pay
ment for which the surety is ob
ligated, discharges the surety.
Sears v. VanDusen, 25 Mich. 351;
Joslyn V. Eastman, 46 Vt. 258.
The Wisconsin Act has this ad
ditional provision: “4 a. By giv
ing up or applying to other pur
poses collateral securities appli
cable to the debt, or, there being
in the holder's hands or within
his control the means of com
plete or partial satisfaction, the
same are applied to other pur
poses.”
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Noble v. Murphy, 91 Mich. 653,
involves a case similar to the
foregoing provision.
5—Release of the principal
debtor discharges the drawer and
indorsers; as it takes away their
right of reimbursement. Mont
gomery v. Sayre, 100 Cal. 182,
34 Pac. 646. But if the holder
in making such release expressly
reserves his right of recourse
against the drawer and indorsers
they will not be discharged, as
their rights and remedies are
thus, by implication, reserved
against the party primarily lia
ble. Boatman's Sav. Bank V.
Johnson, 24 Mo. App. 317; Glou
cester Bank v. Worcester, 10 Pick.
528; Tombeckbe Bank v. Strat
ton, 7 Wend. 429.
6—The surety’s promise cannot
be enlarged in the slightest par
ticular without his consent; so
any extension of time given to
his principal, no matter how
short, will discharge him. Bul
lock v. Taylor, 39 Mich. 137;
Barron v. Cady, 40 Mich. 259;
Stevens v. Oaks, 58 Mich. 343;
Walter A. Wood etc. Co. v. Oli
ver, 103 Mich. 326; First Nat.
Bank v. Walker, 115 Mich. 434;
Hitchcock v. Frackelton, 116
Mich. 487.
In order to discharge the in
dorser by giving time to the
maker, there must be a contract
to that effect, express or implied,
that is, the holder must have put
it out of his power for the time
being to proceed against the
maker. Peninsular SaV. Bank V.
Hosie, 112 Mich. 351; Continental
Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 50 Cor
567.
The agreement for extension
time must be supported by a co
sideration, otherwise it will
unenforceable and will not su
pend the creditor's right to st
Briggs v. Norris, 67 Mich. 32
McInerney V. Lindsay, 97 Mic
238; Morse V. Blanchard, 1
Mich. 37; Shayler v. Gidding
122 Mich. 659.
Part payment of the debt a
tually due is not sufficient co
sideration for an extension
time. Briggs v. Norris, supra.
The taking by the creditor,
a new note, payable on deman
does not operate as an extensit
of time. Continental Life Ins. C
V. Barber, 50 Conn. 567; Merl
man v. Barker, 121 Ind. 7
Board of Education v. Fonda,
N. Y. 350. But when the ne
note is payable at a future da
the right of action on the o
is suspended and a surety is di
charged. Pomeroy v. Tanner, '
N. Y. 547; Okie v. Spencer,
Whar. 253; Bangs v. Moshe
23 Barb. 478. But see Conti
Austin v. Curtis, 31 Vt. 64; Whi
ney v. Goin, 20 N. H. 354.
Where two parties appear :
joint makers on a note, althoug
One is in fact a mere Suret
a fact unknown to the holder, a
extension given to the princip
debtor will not discharge th
Surety who appears Ostensibly :
a joint maker. Gano V. Heat
36 Mich. 440.
The individual promise of or
member of a banking firm to r
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lease an accommodation indorser
from liability on a note held by
the firm, and to pay the note
from means in his hands belong
ing to the maker, cannot be con
strued as a promise of the firm
and will not exonerate the in
dorser from liability on the note.
Webber v. French, 102 Mich. 638.
7—Where a party secondarily
liable gives his consent to an ex
tension he is not discharged. Pi
mental V. Marques, 109 Cal. 406,
42 Pac. 159; Bishop V. Eaton,
161 Mass. 496, 37 N. E. 665. The
burden of proving that the in
dorser gave such consent is on
the party seeking to charge him.
Sibeneck V. Anchor Sav. Bank,
111 Pa. St. 187.
In the Wisconsin Act the fol
lowing provision stands as a sub
stitute for subdivision 6, supra:
“By an agreement binding on
the holder to extend the time of
payment or to postpone the hold
er’s right to enforce the instru
ment unless made with the as
sent, prior or subsequent, of the
party secondarily liable, unless
the right of recourse against
such party is expressly reserved,
or unless he is fully indemni
fied.”
8—Where the right of recourse
against the secondary party is
reserved, he is not discharged,
because the objection that the
surety's rights are thereby post
poned, does not exist. Indorsers
are discharged by an extension
of time without reservation of
the right of recourse against
them, because their contract is
impaired; they cannot step in
and pay the instrument until af
ter the expiration of the period
of extension, so that their right
of recourse against the principal
debtor is postponed; but if the
agreement for extension express
ly reserves the right of the hold
er against the indorsers, the in
dorsers can step in immediately,
pay the instrument, take it from
the holder and sue their princi
pal for reimbursement. They
have thus lost nothing and their
right of reimbursement has not
been postponed. Big Rapids Nat.
Bank v. Peters, 120 Mich. 518;
Bank v. Simpson, 90 N. C. 467;
Sawyers v. Campbell, 107 Ia. 397,
78 N. W. 56; Hodges v. Elyton
Land Co., 109 Ala. 617, 20 So.
23; Boaler v. Mayor, 19 C. B.
(n. s.) 76, 115 E. C. L. 76;
Hagey v. Hill, 75 Pa. St. 108.
In the case last cited the court
said: “The ground upon which
an agreement to give time to
the maker, made by the holder
Without the consent of the in
dorsers, upon a valid considera
tion, is held to be a discharge
of the indorsers, is solely this,
that the holder thereby implied
ly stipulates not to pursue the
indorsers, or to seek satisfaction
from them in the intermediate
period. It can never apply to
any case where a contrary stipu
lation exists between the parties.
Hence, if the agreement for delay
expressly saves and reserves the
rights of the holder in the in
termediate time against the in
dorsers, it will not discharge the
12
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latter. In such case the very postponed against the maker if
ground of the objection is re- they should take up the note.”
moved, for their rights are not
Sec. 123. Rights of party paying instrument.—Where
the instrument is paid by a party secondarily liable there
on it is not discharged; but the party so paying it is re
mitted to his former rights as regards all prior parties,
and he may strike out his own and all subsequent endorse
ments, and again negotiate the instrument, except:
First, Where it is payable to the order of a third person
and has been paid by the drawer,” and
Second, Where it is made or accepted for accommoda
tion, and has been paid by the party accommodated.”
1—This section is obscured by
the arrangement of the clauses
containing the exceptions, but its
true meaning will be apparent
by reading it thus,—Where the
instrument is paid by a party
secondarily liable thereon it is
not discharged, but the party so
paying it is remitted to his for
mer rights as regards all prior
parties, except; where it is made
or accepted for his accommoda
tion and has been paid by the
party accommodated, and he may
strike out his own and all Sub
sequent indorsements and again
negotiate the instrument, except
where it is payable to the order
of a third person and has been
paid by the drawer.
Where a party secondarily lia
ble pays or discharges the in
struments its character as a Va
lid, subsisting obligation is not
destroyed. The party making such
payment always has the right of
recourse against all prior parties.
So when an indorser makes pay
ment to the holder, it is not such
payment as discharges the in
strument, but is, in effect, a re
purchase of the paper. All in
dorsers Subsequent to the party
making payment are discharged
and their names should be strick
en out if the paper is again ne
gotiated. French V. Jarvis, 29
Conn. 343; Coleman v. Dunlap,
18 S. C. 591; Fenn v. Dugdale, 40
Mo. 63. See Thurston V. Pren
tice, 1 Mich. 193; McDonough v.
Heyman, 38 Mich. 334; Hanish
V. Kennedy, 106 Mich. 455;
Twelfth Ward Bank V. Brooks,
63 App. Div. (N. Y.) 220, 71
N. Y. Supp. 388 (a case under
the statute). In this case the
Second indorser paid the amount
of the instrument to the holder.
It was held that such payment
was no defense to the first in
dorser, unless he could show that
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such payment had been made for
him.
2—Where the drawer pays a bill
payable to the order of a third
person, the bill is not discharged
and he may sue the acceptor and
recover on the instrument, save
that the acceptance was for the
drawer's accommodation. The
drawer of a bill, who pays it,
may leave it in the hands of the
indorsee to whom he makes pay
ment and have the indorsee Sue
upon it for his benefit. Williams
v. James, 15 Ad. & El. (n. S.)
499. But although the drawer
upon paying the instrument may
sue the acceptor on the bill, he
cannot reissue it, if it is payable
to the order of a third person.
Gardner V. Maynard, 7 Allen 456.
A bill cannot be indorsed or
negotiated after it has once been
paid, if such indorsement or ne
gotiation would make any of the
parties liable, who would other
wise be discharged. Beck V.
Robley, 1 H. Bl. (n.) 89.
3—Where the instrument is
paid by the party for whose ac
commodation it was made, it is
absolutely discharged the same as
if paid by the maker or acceptor.
The negotiability of a note ceases
after its payment by the party
who should rightfully pay it.
Bleen v. Lyford, 70 Me. 149;
Cottrell v. Watkins, 89 Va. 801;
Merrill v. First Nat. Bank, 94
Cal. 59; Cook v. Lister, 32 L. J.
C. P. 121; 13 C. B. (n. s.) 549.
See also Canadian Bank V
Coumbe, 47 Mich. 358.
Where a joint maker, who is
really a surety, takes up the
note, he cannot sue the princi
pal debtor on the note but may
Sue him as for money paid to
his use. McClatchie v. Durham,
44 Mich. 435. This is equally
true where an accommodation ac
ceptor pays the instrument. First
Nat. Bank v. Maxfield, 83 Me.
576. A surety can waive the
statute of limitations and pay a
note that has been kept alive as
to his joint maker and enforce
it against him. McClatchie V.
Durham, supra.
Where a person indorsing for
the accommodation of an accom
modation maker and a real mak
er, is compelled to pay the note,
he can sue the maker and the
accommodation maker jointly, the
rule as to contribution between
co-Sureties not applying in such a
case. Hanish v. Kennedy, 106
Mich. 455.
See as to the rights of indors
ers and sureties: Myres v. Yaple,
60 Mich. 339; Nash v. Burchard,
87 Mich. 85; Bliss V. Est. of
Plummer, 103 Mich. 181.
Where the acceptors of a bill
have paid the same, they cannot
recover the amount from the
payee on the ground that they
paid it under a mistake of fact
as to the value of their security
from the drawers; their remedy
is against the drawers. First
Nat. Bank v. Burkham, 32 Mich.
328.
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Sec. 124. Renunciation by holder.—The holder may
expressly renounce his rights against any party to the
instrument before, at, or after its maturity. An abso
lute and unconditional renunciation of his rights against
the principal debtor, made at or after the maturity of
the instrument, discharges the instrument; but a renun
ciation does not affect the rights of a holder in due course
without notice. A renunciation must be in writing, unless
the instrument is delivered up to the person primarily
liable thereon."
1—Where an obligee delivers
up the obligation, which he holds
against another party, with the
intent and for the purpose of dis
charging the debt, where there
is no fraud or mistake alleged
or proved, such surrender oper
ates, in law, as a release and
discharge of the liability thereon,
nor is any consideration required
to support such a transaction,
when it has been fully executed.
Larkin v. Hardenbrook, 90 N. Y.
333; Slade v. Mutrie, 156 Mass.
19, 30 N. E. 168. In the case last
cited the court Said that the de
livery of a promissory note by
the holder to the maker, with the
intention of transferring to him
the title to the note, is an as
signment of the note and a dis
charge of the obligation to pay it.
The corresponding provision of
the Bills of Exchange Act, Sec.
62 (1) was construed in Edwards
v. Walters, C. A. [1896] 2 Ch.
157. The facts were that there
was an oral renunciation of a
note, the note was delivered, not
to the maker, but to a devisee of
the maker. The devisee had real
estate of the maker in her hands
and such real estate was liable
for the payment of the debt. The
devisee had for some time paid
interest on the note. Notwith
Standing these circumstances it
was held that delivery to such
devisee Was not Sufficient under
sec. 62 of the Act (124) as a re
nunciation, because the acceptor
or maker did not include a lega
tee or devisee, though the legal
personal representatives might be
so included. The same section of
the Bills of Exchange Act was
also construed in In re George,
44 Ch. D. 627. The facts were
these: the payee of a note about
to die wished to destroy the note
in suit, but it could not be found.
He then declared to the maker
of the note in the presence of two
other persons that he wished to
give the note to him. The nurse
of the payee was then sent for
and the payee told her he want
ed the note destroyed. He made
the nurse promise that she would
see that the note was destroyed
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and that she would testify that
it was his Wish that it should
be destroyed. He told her to
write it down, which she did as
follows, “30th Aug., 1899. It is
by Mr. George's dying Wish that
the checque (sic.) for £2,000 of
the money lent to Mrs. Francis
be destroyed as soon as found.
Mr. George is perfectly conscious
and in his sound mind.” (signed
nurse T.) It was held that the
acts of the payee did not consti
tute a renunciation as required
by the statute. Chitty, J., said:
“Now it is plain that what must
be in Writing is an absolute and
unconditional renunciation of
rights. It is not necessary to put
those words in; but that must be
the effect of the document. Then
the document is not to be a note
or memorandum of the renuncia
tion or of an intention to do it,
but it must be itself the record of
the renunciation.” This case Was
followed in Leask v. Dew, 92 N. Y.
Supp. 891. The facts were these:
The note in Suit was found after
the death of the payee among his
papers enclosed in an envelope
together with a writing signed by
him addressed to his executors
as follows: “New York, Nov. 25,
1901. To my executors. Gentle
men: The enclosed note I wish
to be cancelled in case of my
death, and if the law does not
allow it I wish you to notify my
heirs that it is my wish and or
ders. Truly yours, Oliver Buck
ingham. Witness, Frank W. Wog
1am.” The court referred to the
provisions of the Bills of Ex
change Act and the provisions of
the Negotiable Instruments Law
and said: “It is readily seen that
these two statutes in character
and import are alike, the only
difference is change in the form
of phraseology, but it affects
neither the sense nor the con
Struction.” The court followed
the rule of construction adopted
in In re George and said:
“There is some obscurity in the
provisions of our statute. In its
first sentence it provides for the
renunciation of the rights of the
holder against any party to the
instrument which may be made
before, at, or after its maturity;
in the second sentence, it pro
Vides for an absolute and uncon
ditional renunciation of the
rights of the holder against the
principal debtor at, or after the
maturity of the instrument, and
discharges the instrument. The
first relates to the party; and
second, to the instrument. It is
somewhat difficult to see how
there could be an absolute dis
charge of a party to an instru
ment without discharging the in
strument as an obligation, so far
as he is concerned. We do not
clearly perceive why this distinc
tion should have been made. It
is immaterial, however, to the
rights of the parties to the pres
ent action. The instrument of
renunciation contains no express
declaration of the testator to
renounce his rights in the note
against the party, or of his right
to enforce it as a subsisting ob
ligation. The expression is, “I
Wish (the note) to be cancelled
in case of my death. There is
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nothing in these words which
can be construed as expressing a
renunciation of any rights either
against the party or upon the
instrument. Had it been deliv
ered to the defendant during the
lifetime of the testator, it would
not have precluded the latter at
any time upon maturity from
nothing indicating an intent upon
his part not to enforce it during
his lifetime. There was no de
livery of it, to anybody, and while,
doubtless, it was sufficiently au
thenticated to accomplish a re
nunciation, it had no operative
effect whatever, as it did not
fall within the statute or comply
enforcing the note. There is with its terms.”
Sec. 125. Cancellation unintentional; burden of proof.
—A cancellation made unintentionally, or under a mis
take, or without the authority of the holder, is inoper
ative; but where an instrument or any signature thereon
appears to have been cancelled the burden of proof lies
on the party who alleges that the cancellation was made
unintentionally, or under a mistake, or without authority."
1-Lyndonville Nat. Bank v. kinson v. Johnson, 3 B. & C. 428;
Fletcher, 68 Vt. 81; Humboldt Raper v. Birkbeck, 15 East 17;
Bank v. Rossing, 95 Ia. 1; Wil- Novelli v. Rossi, 2 B. & Ad. 757.
Sec. 126. Alteration of instrument; effect of.—Where
a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the
assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except
as against a party who has himself made, authorized, or
assented to the alteration, and subsequent indorsers."
But when an instrument has been materially altered and
is in the hands of a holder, in due course, not a party to
the alteration, he may enforce payment thereof accord
ing to its original tenor.”
*
1-A material alteration of an
instrument is one which changes
the legal effect of the instru
ment, is made with intent and
has become final, is made without
consent, is made by a party to
it or by one in lawful possession
or custody of it. Such an alter
ation releases all parties not as
senting. Wait v. Pomeroy, 20
Mich. 425; Holmes v. Trumper,
22 Mich. 427; Aldrich v. Smith,
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37 Mich. 468; Bradley v. Mann,
id. 1; Glover V. Green, 96 Ga.
126, 22 S. E. 664; Hulburt v.
Hall, 39 Neb. 889, 58 N. W. 538;
Horn v. Newton City Bank, 32
Kan. 518; Hoffman V. Planters
Nat. Bank, 99 Va. 480, 39 S. E.
134 (a case under the statute).
Where an instrument appears
to have been altered, the burden
is upon the party producing it to
show that it was in the shape in
which he produced it at the
time he received it. Willett V.
Shepard, 34 Mich. 106; Simpson
v. Stackhouse, 9 Pa. St. 186. In
the latter case the court said:
“Without a presumption to sus
tain him, the maker would in
every case be defenseless. It
may be said that the holder, with
such a presumption against him,
would also be defenseless. But
it is his fault to take Such a
note. As bills and notes are in
tended for negotiation, and as
payees do not receive them when
clogged with impediments to
their circulation, there is a pre
sumption that such an instru
ment starts fair and untarnished,
which stands until it is repelled;
and the holder ought, therefore,
to explain why he took it brand
ed with marks of suspicion,
which would probably render it
unfit for his purposes. The very
fact that he receives it, is pre
sumptive evidence that it was un
altered at the time, and to say
the least, his folly or his knav
ery raised a suspicion which he
ought to remove. The maker of
a note cannot be expected to ac
count for what may have hap
pened after it left his hands,’
but a payee or indorsee who
takes it, condemned and discred
ited on the face of it, ought to be
prepared to show What it was
When he received it.” See Baent
V. Kennicut, 57 Mich. 268.
An indorser's consent to an
alteration need not be in writing.
Parsons v. Dickinson, 23 Mich.
57; Stewart v. First Nat. Bank, 40
Mich. 348. See also Johnson V.
Johnson's Est., 66 Mich. 525.
Where an instrument has been
negligently executed by the mak
er, that is, where blanks are left
which may be filled in, without giv
ing the paper a suspicious appear
ance, the general rule is that the
maker will be liable on the instru
ment if any such alteration is
made. First State Bank V. Web
ster, 121 Mich. 149; Weidman v.
Symes, 120 Mich. 657; Noll v.
Smith, 64 Ind. 511. But see Wait
V. Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425; Green
field's Sav. Bank v. Stowell, 123
Mass. 203.
In England the rigid rules ap
plied to cases of alteration by
SOme party to the instrument
have also been applied to spolia
tion or alteration made by a
stranger. Master v. Miller, 4 T.
R. 320, 2 H. Bl. 140.
In the United States the more
liberal view that spoliation or al
teration by a stranger does not
Vitiate the instrument has pre
vailed. White Sewing Machine Co.
v. Dakin, 86 Mich. 581; Walsh v.
Hunt, 120 Cal. 46, 52 Pac. 115;
Union Nat. Bank v. Roberts, 45
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Wis. 373; United States V. Spald
ing 2 Mason 478, Fed. Cas. No.
16365.
This question was raised in
Jeffrey v. Rosenfield, 179 Mass.
506 (a case under the Statute).
The court left the question in
doubt, saying: “Quaere, whether
Sec. 124 (sec. 126) of the Negotia
ble Instruments Law relating to
alteration should be construed as
the English Bills of Exchange Act
probably would be that the effect
of a material alteration by whom
SOever made Would be to avoid
the paper as to all parties except
those consenting and Subsequent
indorsers or Whether the rule
laid down in Massachusetts (in
Drum v. Drum, 133 Mass. 566) and
generally followed in the United
States should be applied that a
material alteration of a note by
a stranger will not avoid it. But
considering the state of the law
at the time of the passage of
the Negotiable Instruments Law
We should hesitate to say that
the effect of sec. 124 (Sec. 126)
is not only to avoid a note in
case of a material alteration but
to cancel the debt for Which it
was given and to deprive the
party to the benefit of any Se
curity he may have taken.”
2—This provision makes a ma
terial change in the law of Mich
igan and most of the states.
Heretofore a holder in due
course could not recover on an in
strument which had been mater
ially altered, because the original
contract had been destroyed and
the altered contract was not the
contract of the maker. Wait V.
Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425; Holmes
v. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427; Brad
ley V. Mann 37 Mich. 1; Mers
man v. Werges 112 U. S. 141;
Greenfield SaV. Bank V. Stowell,
123 Mass. 196.
Scholfield v. Earl of Londens
borough [1896] A. C. 514 (a case
under the corresponding provision
of the Bills of Exchange Act).
In this case a bill for £500
Was, after acceptance, raised by
the drawer to £3500, this being
made possible by the drawer's
leaving certain spaces which he
could later fill up and by the bill's
being stamped higher than for
42500. It was held that the accep
tor was liable to the bona fide
holder only for the original amount
of the bill and he owed no duty
of precaution to the holder and was
chargeable with no negligence.
The following cases have aris
en under the statute: Bryan v.
Harr, 21 App. D. C. 190; Mass.
Nat. Bank v. Snow (1905) 72,
N. E. 959; Muscovitz v. Duetsch,
92 N. Y. Supp. 721; Mut. Loan
Ass’n V. Lasser, 81 App. Div.
138, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1112.
Sec. 127. Material alterations; what constitutes.—Any
alteration which changes:
First, The date;"
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Second, The sum payable, either for principal” or in
terest;" -
Third, The time * or place" of payment;
Fourth, The number or the relations of the parties;"
Fifth, The medium of currency in which payment is to
be made."
Or which adds a place of payment where no place of
payment is specified,” or any other change or addition,
which alters the effect of the instrument in any respect,”
is a material alteration.
1-Johnson V. Johnson’s Est.,
66 Mich. 525; Woods v. Steele, 6
Wall. 80.
2—It is a material alteration
Whether the amount be increased
or lessened, whether it be benefi
cial to the maker or not. People
v. Brown, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 9;
Walsh v. Hunt, 120 Cal. 46, 52
Pac. 115; Aetna Bank v. Win
chester, 43 Conn. 391; Hewins v.
Cargill, 67 Me. 554. In the case
last cited, the amount WaS re
duced from $500 to $400.
3—Any alteration which will
affect the interest, making it pay
able at a greater or less rate,
making the instrument bear in
terest when it originally did not,
or changing the time when in
terest should begin to run, is a
material alteration. Holmes V.
Trumper, 22 Mich. 427; Swift v.
Barber, 28 Mich. 503; Bradley V.
Mann, 37 Mich. 1; Willett v.
Shephard, 34 Mich. 106; Baent v.
Kennicutt, 57 Mich. 268.
Where a note is made payable
with interest but the rate is not
specified, an insertion of 7%, the
legal rate, is not a material al
teration. First Nat. Bank V.
Carson, 60 Mich. 432. Nor is the
addition of the Word “annual” to
an interest clause of a note made
payable in less than two years
a material alteration, as it does
not change the liability but only
shows that interest is to be earn
ed at the stipulated rate by the
year and does not require the
interest to be paid at the end of
a year from the date of the note.
Leonard's Adm'r V. Phillips, 39
Mich. 182.
4—Jourdan v. Boyce, 33 Mich.
302; Wyman v. Yeomans, 84 Ill.
403; Lewis v. Kramer, 3 Md. 265;
Miller v. Gilleland, 19 Pa. St. 119.
5—Ballard V. Ins. Co., 81 Ind.
239; Bank v. Lockwood, 13 W.
Va. 392.
6-It is not a material altera
tion to add the name of another
maker. Gano v. Heath, 36 Mich.
440; Union Banking Co. v. Mar
tin's Est., 113 Mich. 521; Merseman
V. Werges, 112 U. S. 139; Brown
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ell v. Winne, 29 N. Y. 400; Bab
cock V. Murray, 58 Minn. 385.
To the contrary: Sullivan V.
Rudisill, 63 Ia. 158.
The addition of a surety is not
a material alteration. Miller V.
Finley, 26 Mich. 248. Obviously
the statute changes this rule. The
addition of either a maker or a
surety would be a material al
teration.
7–AS Where the Word “gold”
was added after the Word “dol
lars,” Bogarth v. Breedlove, 39
Tex. 561; as where the words “in
specie” were added after the sum
payable, Darwin V. Rippey, 63
N. C. 318; Angle V. N. W. etc.
Ins. Co., 92 U. S. 330.
8–Burchfield v. Moore, 23 L. J.
Q. B. 261; Pelton V. Lumber Co.,
13 Cal. 21, 45 Pac. 12; Carl
ton v. Reed, 61 Ia. 166; White
sides v. Northern Bank, 10 Bush.
501. In the case last cited the
indorsee of a bill, which had
been accepted generally, caused
to be added to the word “accept
ed” the words “payable at the
First Nat. Bank of Franklin.” All
parties not consenting to the al
teration were discharged.
9–The words “or bearer” were
added to a note payable to the
order of Henry Bromley. It was
held not a material alteration.
Weaver v. Bromley, 65 Mich. 212.
A memorandum on a note quali
fying the Same Was cut off. Held
a material alteration. Wait v.
Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425.
In those states where a dis
tinction is made between at
tested and unattested instru
ments, the addition of the name
Of a witness, after delivery, is
a material alteration. Brackett
V. Mountford, 11 Me. 115; Homer
V. Wallis, 11 Mass. 309. In Rowe
V. Bowman, 183 Mass. 488 (a
case under the statute) the put
ting on of a revenue stamp and
its cancellation, in the name of
the maker, was held not a ma
terial alteration.
For cases where a simple con
tract of the common law is
fraudulently altered and made a
negotiable instrument, see note 1,
Sec. 57.
TITLE II.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
Article I. Form and Interpretation.
Sec.
128. Bill of exchange defined.
129. Bill not an assignment of
funds in hands of drawer.
130. Bill addressed to more than
One drawee.
Sec.
131. Inland and foreign bills of
exchange.
132. When bill may be treated
as promissory note.
133. Referee in case of need.
Sec. 128. Bill of exchange defined.—A bill of exchange
is an unconditional order in writing addressed by one
person to another, signed by the person giving it
,
requir
ing the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand
or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum certain in
money to order o
r
to bearer."
1—The form of the bill is not
material provided it be manda
tory. Any expression from which
an order or direction can be in
ferred is sufficient. Thus, “Mr.
Nelson will much oblige Mr.
Webb by paying I. Ruff, or or
der, on his account, twenty
guineas.” Ruff v. Webb, 1 Esp.
129. And so, “Please let the
bearer have, etc.” Biesenthall v
.
Williams, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 329. “Mr.
A. M. W. please pay J. J. $189
and charge the same to me.” Jar
vis V. Wilson, 46 Conn. 90. But
on the other hand, “Mr. Little,
please to let the bearer have £7,
and place it to my account, and
you will much oblige your hum
ble servant,” was held not a good
bill. Little V. Slackford, M. & M.
171, on the ground that there
was no order to pay but that the
words simply meant “You will
oblige me by doing it.”
“No particular form of words
is necessary to constitute a bill
of exchange.” Hasey. v. White
Pigeon Beet Sugar Co., 1 Doug.
193.
This Section is referred to in
Amsinck V. Rogers, 93 N. Y.
Supp. 87. The instrument in
Suit was drawn in New York On
187
188 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.
a firm in Vienna and was in
form: “On demand of this orig
inal check (duplicate unpaid)
pay to the order, etc.” The in
Strument was held a bill of ex
change and not a check.
The section clearly embraces
Within its terms, a check. Mc
Lean V. Clydesdale Banking Co.,
9 L. R. App. Cas. 95. (A case
under the corresponding provi
sion of the Bills of Exchange
Act.)
Sec. 129. Bill not an assignment of funds in hands of
drawee.—A bill of itself does not operate as an assign
ment of the funds in the hands of the drawee available
for the payment thereof, and the drawee is not liable on
the bill unless and until he accepts the same."
1-A draft is not an assign
ment of funds in the hands of
the drawee. Grammel V. Carmer,
55 Mich. 201; Edson v. Angell,
58 Mich. 336; Upham v. Clute,
105 Mich. 350; Stone v. Dowling,
119 Mich. 476. But Where the
draft was drawn for the exact
Sum claimed to be due from the
drawee to the drawer on account
of a bill of merchandise, the
statement of the account being
attached to the draft with the
evident purpose of being sent
forward with it, it was held an
assignment. Moore V. Davis, 57
Mich. 251; distinguishing Gram
mel v. Carmer, supra.
The authorities are in conflict
On the general proposition wheth
er the draft operates as an as
signment. As to the rule when
the drawing is for the whole
amount due, see Mandeville V.
Welch, 5 Wheat. 277; Corser v.
Craig, 1 Wash. C. C. 424, Fed. Cas.
No. 3255; Wheatley v. Strobe, 12
Cal. 92; Bank v. Bogy, 44 Mo. 13;
First Nat. Bank V. Dubuque, S.
R. Co., 52 Iowa 378; Cutts V. Per
kins, 12 Mass. 207. As to rule when
the drawing is for part of the
amount due: Brill v. Tuttle, 81 N.
Y. 457; Throop, etc. Co. v. Smith,
110 N. Y. 90; First Nat. Bank v.
Coates, 8 Fed. 540; Harris v.
Clark, 3 N. Y. 93; Cowper
thwaite v. Sheffield, 1 Sandf. (N.
Y.) 416; Christmas V. Russell,
14 Wall. 69; Lowery v. Steward,
25 N. Y. 241; Gibson v. Cooke,
20 Pick. 15. See also Hopkin
son V. Forster, L. R. 19 Eq. 74;
Schroeder V. Central Bank, 34 L.
T. (n. S.) 735.
When for a Valuable considera
tion from the payee, the order is
drawn upon a third party, and
made payable out of a particular
fund then due or to become due
from him to the drawer, the de
livery of the order to the payee
operates as an assignment pro
tanto of the fund, and the
drawee is bound after notice of
such assignment to apply the
fund as it accrues to the pay
ment of the Order and to no
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other purpose, and the payee may
by action compel Such applica
tion. Brill V. Tuttle, supra.
An intention to make an as
signment of the funds in the
hands of the drawee may be in
ferred from the circumstanceS at
tending the delivery of the draft
and the conduct of the parties.
Throop Grain Cleaner Co. v. Smith,
supra. Crawford's Ann. Neg. Insts.
Law, 115-16; Fulton v. Gesterding
(Fla. 1904) 36 So. 56 (a case under
Sec. 130.
the statute). In this case it was
held that a draft for an amount
equal to the precise amount of
deposit in the drawee's hands did
not operate as an assignment.
To same effect see: Nelson V.
Nelson Bennett Co., 31 Wash. 116,
71 Pac. 749; Wadhams v. Port
land etc. Ry. Co. (Wash. 1905),
79 Pac. 597 (cases under this sec
tion). As to check operating as
an assignment see Section 191.
Bill addressed to more than one drawee.—A
bill may be addressed to two or more drawees, jointly,
whether they are partners or not, but not to two or more
drawees in the alternative or in succession."
1—The words, “or in succes
Sion,” are not included in the
Wisconsin Act.
A bill was directed to A, or in
his absence to B. It was held
good. Anon. 12 Mod. 447. A bill
Was drawn upon partners and ac
cepted after notice of dissolution
had been given. Held, that only
the accepting partner was bound.
Tombeckbee Bank V. Dumell, 5
Mason 56, Fed. CaS. No. 14081.
Sec. 131. Inland and foreign bills of exchange.—An
inland bill of exchange is a bill which is
,
o
r
on its face
purports to be, both drawn and payable within this State.
Any other bill is a foreign bill. Unless the contrary ap
pears on the face o
f
the bill, the holder may treat it as
an inland bill."
1—The statute affirms the well
Settled rule of the law merchant.
Armstrong V. American Exchange
Nat. Bank, 133 U. S. 433; Joseph
v
. Salomon, 19 Fla. 623; Phoenix
Bank v. Hussey, 12 Pick. 483;
Yale v. Ward, 30 Tex. 18.
The test of determining a for
eign bill is whether it appears on
its face that it is drawn in One
state and payable in another.
Some claim has been made that
the residence of the drawer and
the drawee is the test. Grim
shaw v. Bender, 6 Mass. 157, sup
ports that view. The bill in
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volved in this case was drawn by
an English merchant living in
Manchester, upon an American
firm having their domicile in
Boston, payable in London. The
bill WaS accepted in Manchester
by one of the drawees. The
question was, whether the bill
was foreign or inland. The court
Said: “It appears that the bill
was drawn on a Boston house,
One of which was then at Man
chester, in England, but that his
domicile Was in Boston; and
that the acceptance by him in the
name of the firm Was made at
Manchester by which the firm
undertook to pay the bill in Lon
don. From this statement it is
manifest that the remedy con
templated by the parties, in the
event of the bill being dishon
ored, must be sought in this state,
where the acceptors lived. From
this View of the case the instru
ment must be considered as a
foreign bill, having the same ef
fect as if the payee had sent it
to Boston and it had been
cepted, payable in London by t
house here, in which case t
money must be remitted to Lo
dOn to meet the bill returned
the drawer after acceptance.”
is questionable whether, und
the circumstances, this case ml
be regarded as a dissent frc
the general rule above stated.
A check may be a check thou
drawn in one country and pa
able in another. Heywood
Pickering, L. R. 9 Q. B. 42
Roberts V. Corbin, 26 Iowa 31
See Sec. 187.
States of the American Uni
are foreign to each other. Bal
of United States v. Daniel,
Peters 32; Commercial Bank
Varnum, 49 N. Y. 269.
The only difference betwe
foreign and inland bills, is th
the former must be protests
While the latter need not l
See sec. 154, Buller v. Crips,
Mod. 29.
Sec. 132. When bill may be treated as a promissor
note.—Where, in a bill, drawer and drawee are the sam
person, or where the drawee is a fictitious person, or
person not having capacity to contract, the holder ma
treat the instrument, at his option, either as a bill of e.
change or a promissory note."
1—See Bills of Exchange Act,
sec. 5 (2); see sec. 19.
Hasey v. White Pigeon Beet
Sugar Co., 1 Doug. (Mich.) 193;
Funk v. Babbitt, 156 Ill. 408, 41
N. E. 166; Chicago etc. R. Co. v.
West, 37 Ind. 211; Com. v. B.
terick, 100 Mass. 12; Plantel
Bank V. Evans, 36 Tex. 592; M
ler V. Thomson, 3 M. & G. 57
Willans v. Ayers, L. R. 3 Ap
CaS. 133.
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“If both drawer and drawee
are fictitious persons the bill
might perhaps be treated as a
Sec. 133. Referee in case
note made by the first indorser.”
Chalmers' Bills of Exchange Act,
5th ed., 18.
of need.—The drawer of a
bill and any endorser may insert thereon the name of a
person to whom the holder may resort in case of need;
that is to say, in case the bill is dishonored by non-accept
ance or non-payment. Such person is called the referee
in case of need. It is in the option of the holder to resort
to the referee in case of need or not, as he may see fit."
1—This section is identical
with Section 15 of the Bills of
Exchange Act, q. V. The usual
form of Such a bill is: “In case
of need apply to Messrs. C and
D, at E.” Chitty on Bills, 165.
The reference may relate to non
payment aS Well as to non-accept
ance. The concluding sentence
of the section settled the mooted
point, whether presentment to
the “referee in case of need” is
obligatory or optional. Chal
mers' Bills of Exchange Act, 5th
ed., 38.
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Article II.
Sec.
134. Acceptance; how made, etc.
135. Holder entitled to accept
ance on face of bill.
136. Acceptance by separate in
Strument.
137. Promise to accept; when
equivalent to acceptance.
138. Time allowed drawee to ac
cept.
Sec. 134.
Acceptancé.
Sec.
139. Liability of drawee retain
ing or destroying bill.
140. Acceptance of incomplete
bill.
141. Kinds of acceptance.
142. General acceptance; what
constitutes.
143. Qualified acceptance.
144. Rights of parties as to qual
ified acceptance.
Acceptance; how made, etc.—The accept
ance" of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his
assent to the order of the drawer.” The acceptance must
be in writing and signed by the drawee.” It must not
express that the drawee will perform his promise by any
other means than the payment of money."
1—See Section 2.
2—Acceptance is usually maní
fested by writing or stamping
the word “accepted” across the
face of the paper, and by the
drawee’s adding his signature
thereto. But according to the
law merchant no particular form
is required. Thus, the drawee's
signature alone has been held
sufficient. Spear v. Pratt, 2 Hill
582. “Accepted” written upon
the paper without the signature
of the drawee has been held Suf
ficient. Clearly this would not
be an acceptance under the Stat
ute. The words, “seen”, “hon
ored”, “presented”, and “acted”
have severally been held suffi
cient to constitute an acceptance.
Peterson V. Hubbard, 28 Mich.
197. In this case it was held
that the mere writing of the
drawee's name across the face
was sufficient to constitute an
acceptance, and the words “paid
on this order $40” written above
the signature did not qualify the
acceptance or limit it to that
amount. But see Cook V. Bald
win, 120 Mass. 317.
The language of the bill and
the acceptance, are but parts of
an entire contract in Writing, all
the terms of which are expressed
in writing with just as much
certainty as if the acceptor was
the maker of a note for the
amount. Meyer v. Beardsley, 30
N. J. L. 236. Acceptance is re
BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 193
garded as a new contract. Su
perior City v. Ripley, 138 U. S.
93. The drawee as Such is un
der no liability on the instru
ment to anyOne.
3—This affirms
Michigan. C. L. '97, sec. 4873;
Elliott v. Miller, 8 Mich. 131;
Upham v. Clute, 105 Mich. 350.
According to the law merchant
an acceptance could be oral or
written, and if written could be
on the bill itself or on a Sep
arate paper. Acceptance by tele
gram has been held sufficient.
North Atchinson Bank V. Gar
the rule in
retson, 51 Fed. 168. Cases under
the statute are: Izzo V. Lud
ington, 79 App. Div. 272, 79 N.
Y. Supp. 744; Baltimore & O.
R. Co. v. First Nat. Bank (Va.
1904), 47 S. E. 837; Nelson v.
Nelson Bennett Co., 31 Wash.
116, 71 Pac. 749; Wadhams v.
Portland etc. Ry. Co. (Wash.)
79 Pac. 597.
An instructive case on the gen
eral proposition of acceptance is
Steele V. M'Kinlay, 5 App. Cas.
754, 29 W. R. 17.
4–Russell v. Phillips, 14 Q. B.
891.
Sec. 135. Holder entitled to acceptance on face of bill.
—The holder of a bill presenting the same for acceptance
may require that the acceptance be written on the bill,
and if such request is refused, may treat the bill as dis
honored."
1—The acceptance here spoken ceptance as the holder is en
of is what has been known as titled to demand.
“proper” acceptance, such ac
Sec. 136. Acceptance by separate instrument.—Where
an acceptance is written on a paper other than the bill
itself, it does not bind the acceptor except in favor of a
person to whom it is shown and who, on the faith thereof,
receives the bill for value."
1—Thus, one draws a bill upon
another and informs him of the
fact of drawing. The drawee
makes assurance by letter that
the bill will meet with due
honor from him. This is an ac
ceptance of the bill by the
drawee, and binds such acceptor
to any holder who took on the
faith of such acceptance. Clarke
v. Cock, 4 East 57. In this case
Lord Ellenborough said: “It may
be for the convenience of mer
cantile affairs that a bill may be
accepted by a collateral writing
without the bill itself coming to
13
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the actual touch of the acceptOr,
which would SOmetimes Create
great delay.”
In Bank V. Garretson, 51 Fed.
168, one had given assurance that
if a certain draft were drawn he
would accept the same. See Fair
child v. Feltman, 32 Hun, 398.
Sec. 137. Promise to accept; when equivalent to ac
ceptance.—An unconditional promise in writing to accept
a bill before it is drawn is deemed an actual acceptance
in favor of every person who, upon the faith thereof, re
ceives the bill for value."
1—An absolute unconditional
authority to make drafts is
equivalent to an acceptance of
the draft drawn in pursuance of
such authority. Bissell V. Lewis,
4 Mich. 450; Ruiz v. Renauld,
100 N. Y. 256; Merchants' Nat.
Bank V. Griswold, 72 N. Y. 472.
The promise to accept must be
unconditional. Germania Nat.
Bank V. Taaks, 101 N. Y. 442.
The unconditional character of
the promise is not impaired by
restrictions as to time, amount
or purposes. Bank of Michigan
v. Ely, 17 Wend. 508. Thus, au
thority to draw “from time to
time as may be necessary for the
purchase of lumber” does not
constitute a condition, but Only
an instruction to the agent. Mer
chants’ Bank V. Griswold, supra.
When the right to draw is
made conditional upon the per
formance of Some act Or the ex
istence of certain facts, such act
must have been performed or
such facts must exist. Bank of
Montreal V. Recknagel, 109 N. Y.
482; Bank of Atchinson Co. v.
Bohart Commission Co., 84 Mo.
App. 421.
The promise may be made be
fore the bill is drawn. Putnam
Bank V. Snow, 172 Mass. 569.
Or it may be made afterwards.
Central Bank V. Richards, 109
Mass. 413.
An oral promise was sufficient
at common law. Dull V. Brick
er, 76 Pa. St. 255; Scudder v.
Union Nat. Bank, 91 N. Y. 406;
Jarvis v. Wilson, 46 Conn. 91.
The American, rule on the sub
ject is declared in the leading
case of Coolidge V. Payson, 2
Wheat. 66, to be: “that a let
ter Written a reasonable time be
fore or after the date of the bill
of exchange, describing it in
terms not to be mistaken, and
promising to accept it is, if
shown to the person who after
Wards takes the bill on the credit
of the letter, a virtual accept
ance binding the person who
makes the promise. The bill is
considered accepted only in case
the promise is shown to the per
Son Who afterwards takes the bill
On the credit of Such promise.
— —
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Sec. 138. Time allowed drawee to accept.—The drawee
is allowed twenty-four hours after presentment in which
to decide whether or not he will accept the bill; but the
acceptance, if given, dates as of the day of presentation."
1-This is the rule of the law
merchant. Case V. Burt, 15 Mich.
82; Connelly v. McKean, 64 Pa.
St. 113; Overman V. Hoboken
City Bank, 31 N. J. L. 563; Dan
iel on Neg. Inst., Sec. 492.
Sec. 139. Liability of drawee retaining or destroying
bill.—Where a drawee to whom a bill is delivered for
acceptance destroys the same, or refuses within twenty
four hours after such delivery, or within such other period
as the holder may allow, to return the bill accepted or
non-accepted to the holder, he will be deemed to have
accepted the same."
1-Acceptance under the cir
cumstances Stated in this Section
has been termed acceptance by
conduct. The mere retention of
the bill has been construed as
not amounting to an acceptance.
Mason V. Barth, 2 B. & Ald. 26;
Col. Nat. Bank V. Boetcher, 5
Col. 185; Overman v. Hoboken
City Bank, 31 N. J. L. 563.
This Section of the Statute WaS
construed in Westburg v. Chi
cago, L. & C. Co., 117 Wis. 589,
wherein it was held that Where
conduct in retaining the bill
which had been presented for ac
ceptance is substantially tortious
and amounts to a conversion of
the bill, this is a phase of con
duct which this section of the
Statute has undertaken to define
and limit as refusal (not mere
neglect) to return the bill. The
court added: “In such a case
a party must not only have re
ceived the bill but must know
ingly have received it from the
payee, or his authorized agent,
and for acceptance.”
See State v. Weiss, 91 N. Y.
Supp. 276 (a case under the stat
ute). The consensus of authority
is that the duty rests on the hold
er to demand either acceptance or
return of the bill and that mere
inaction on the part of the
drawee has no effect.
The Wisconsin statute adds the
Words “mere retention of the bill
is not acceptance.”
Sec. 140. Acceptance of incomplete bill.—A bill may
be accepted before it has been signed by the drawer, or
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while otherwise incomplete or when it is overdue,” or
after it has been dishonored by a previous refusal to
accept,” or by non-payment." But when a bill payable
after sight is dishonored by non-acceptance and the
drawee subsequently accepts it
,
the holder, in the absence
o
f any different agreement, is entitled to have the bill
accepted as o
f
the date o
f
the first presentment.”
1–Bank V. Neal, 22 HOW. (63
U. S.) 107; Hopps v. Savage, 69
Md. 513.
2—Williams v. Winan,
J. L. 339.
3—Stockwell v. Bramble, 3 Ind.
428; Leavitt v. Putnam, 3 N. Y.
494; Spaulding v. Andrews, 48
Pa. St. 411.
4—Exchange Bank V. Rice, 98
Mass. 288; Grant V. Shaw, 16
Mass. 344.
5—The liability of the acceptor
14 N.
is primary and of the same na
ture as that of maker, therefore
the same reasons apply to his
accepting an incomplete bill as
to the maker's signing an incom
plete note. A bill is deemed
prima facie to have been accept
ed before maturity and within a
reasonable time after its issue
unless the terms of the bill make
the contrary to appear. Roberts
v
. Bethell, 12 C
.
B. 778.
Sec. 141. Kinds of acceptance.—An acceptance is
either general o
r qualified. A general acceptance assents
without qualification to the order o
f
the drawer. A quali
fied acceptance in express terms varies the effect o
f
the
bill as drawn."
1—An acceptance is an engage
ment to pay the bill according
to the tenor of the acceptance. A
general acceptance is an engage
ment to pay according to the
tenor of the bill. Cox V. Nat.
Bank, 100 U. S. 714. An accept
ance to pay when due is gen
eral. Sylvester V
. Staples, 44 Me.
496.
Whenever possible an accept
ance will be construed as general,
not qualified. The qualification
or condition must be clear and
distinct to make Out a qualified
acceptance. Corbett V
. Clark, 45
Wis. 403; Meyer & Co. v. De
Croix (1891), App. Cas. 520 (a
case under the corresponding pro
vision of the Bills of Exchange
Act). In this case the facts
were: Across the face of the bill
were stamped in printed letters
the Words, “accepted, payable at
Alliance Bank, London, for H.
Meyer & Co., limited.” Then fol
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lowed the signatures of two di
rectors of defendant COmpany,
and a countersign by the Secre
tary. Above the word “accepted”
defendants Wrote the Words “in
favor of Mr. L. Delobbel Flipo
only,” and between these words
and the word “accepted” they
Wrote “No. 28.” The Word “or
der” in the bill had been Strick
en out, but when or by whom it
did not appear. It was held that
the words Written above the ac
ceptance did not form any part
of it and could not be construed
as qualifying the acceptance un
der the act. The court Said in
substance: If a person Writes
across a bill that which unquali
fied would, in the ordinary course,
import a clear acceptance of the
bill, and intends to qualify its
operation, he must do so by plain
and intelligible language, and
make that qualification sufficient
ly a part of the acceptance itself
to be intelligible in the Ordi
nary course of business.
Sec. 142. General acceptance; what constitutes.—An
acceptance to pay at a particular place is a general ac
ceptance unless it expressly states that the bill is to be
paid there only and not elsewhere."
1—This rule was established in
England by Sergeant Onslow's
Act, 1 & 2 Geo. IV. Prior to
that time there had been conflict
as to whether a bill accepted pay
able at a particular place was
qualifiedly accepted, which con
flict was settled in Rowe v. Young,
5 Ad. & El. 86, in which case it
was held that Such an accept
ance was qualified, thus making
it necessary in an action against
the acceptor to aver and prove
presentment at such place. In
this case the acceptance Was in
the following language: “Accept
ed, payable at Sir John Perring
& Co., bankers, LOndon.” This
decision led to the passage of
the statute above mentioned which
provided that an acceptance pay
able at a particular place should
be deemed a general acceptance
unless expressed to be payable
there “only, and not otherwise or
elsewhere.” This Statute did not
apply to promissory notes. Dan
iel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec. 519.
By weight of authority the rule
in the United States is in ac
cord with the provisions of this
section. Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th
ed., Sec. 520. Wallace V. McCon
nell, 38 U. S. (13 Pet.) 136;
Cox v. Nat. Bank, 100 U. S. (10
Otto) 704.
When a bill is addressed to a
drawee in a city generally he
may designate a particular place
of payment in the same city
without making the acceptance
qualified. But he cannot desig
nate a place of payment in an
other town or city without mak
ing the acceptance qualified. My
ers V. Standart, 11 Ohio St. 29;
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Troy City Bank v. Lauman, 19
N. Y. 477; Niagara Bank V.
Sec. 143.
qualified, which is:
Fairman etc. Mfg. Co., 31 Barb.
403.
Qualified acceptance.—An acceptance is
First, Conditional; that is to say, which makes pay
ment by the acceptor dependent on the fulfillment of a
condition therein stated;"
Second, Partial; that is to say, an acceptance to pay
part of the amount for which the bill is drawn;”
Third, Local; that is to say, an acceptance to pay only
at a particular place;”
Fourth, Qualified as to time;"
Fifth, The acceptance of some one or more of the
drawees, but not of all."
1—Thus, to pay “when goods
consigned to me are sold.” Smith
V. Abbot, 2 Stra. 1152. To pay
“when a cargo of equal value is
consigned to me.” Mason v.
Hunt, 1 Doug. 297. “Payable
when house is ready for occu
pancy.” Cook v. Wolfendale, 105
Mass. 401. To pay “when lum
ber is run to market.” Lamon
V. French, 25 Wis. 37.
A conditional acceptance be
comes absolute upon the per
formance or happening of the
condition. Stevens v. Androscog
gin Water Power Co., 62 Me.
498. The acceptor is not bound
on his acceptance until the per
formance of the condition. New
hall V. Clark, 3 Cush. 376; Greene
V. Duncan, 37 S. C. 239.
Where an order is drawn upon
a fund to be paid upon the hap
pening of a condition, which or
der is accepted, the acceptor can
not either by his own act or by
acting in collusion with the
drawer of the order defeat the
condition and then Set up such
defeasance as a defense to an ac
tion upon the acceptance. Her
ter v. The Goss & Edsall Co., 57
N. J. L. 42, 30 Atl. 252.
2—Thus “I do accept this bill
to be paid half in money and
half in bills.” Petit V. Benson,
2 Comb 452. A bill for £127 ac
cepted for £100. Wegerslofe V.
Keene, 1 Stra. 214.
3—See section 142.
4—A bill drawn at sight was
presented to the drawee who
wrote he would pay, but could
not say when. It was held
that where a party upon whom a
bill is drawn at sight offers of
promises to pay at a future day,
that amounts to an acceptance if
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acceded to by the holder. Hatch
er V. Stalworth, 25 Miss. 376.
A bill drawn November 28th,
1836, payable forty-two months
after date was accepted thus, “ac
cepted on condition of its being
renewed until November 28, 1844.”
Russell V. Phillips, 14 Q. B. 891,
68 E. C. L. 891.
A bill accepted according to a
Contract is regulated by the terms
of the contract referred to in the
acceptance, although the bill WaS
in its body made payable on a
certain day. Kellog v. Lawrence,
Laylor's Supp. to Hill and Denio
332.
5—Thus, a bill was drawn on
a firm and accepted by one mem
ber thereof after dissolution. He
only was bound by the accept
ance. Tombeckbee Bank V. Du
mell, 5 Mason 56, Fed. Cas. No.
14081.
An order drawn upon a com
mittee as an official body may
be accepted by the several per
sons composing the committee.
In Such a case although a bill
may be treated as dishonored if
not accepted by all the members
of the committee, if accepted by
a part, it will be a good accept
ance as to them. Smith V. Mil
ton, 133 Mass. 369.
Sec. 144. Rights of parties as to qualified acceptance.
—The holder may refuse to take a qualified acceptance,
and if he does not obtain an unqualified acceptance, he
may treat the bill as dishonored by non-acceptance."
Where a qualified acceptance is taken, the drawer and
endorsers are discharged from liability on the bill unless
they have expressly or impliedly authorized the holder
to take a qualified acceptance, or subsequently assent
thereto.” When the drawer or an endorser receives notice
of a qualified acceptance, he must within a reasonable
time express his dissent to the holder, or he will be
deemed to have assented thereto.
1–The holder is not bound to sort of currency, which was re
receive a qualified acceptance. fused. Defendant proposed to
Boehm v. Garcias, 1 Camp. 425. show that vals demaros was Suffl
This was an action on a bill
drawn on Lisbon, “payable in
effective and not in ‘vals reals.’”
The drawees offered to accept it
payable in vals denaros, another
cient to answer what was meant
by effective. Lord Ellenborough
said: “Without considering
whether a payment in demar08.
might not have satisfied the term
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“effective, an acceptance to pay
in demaros Was not a sufficient
acceptance of a bill drawn pay
able in effective.”
Wintermute v. Post, 24 N. J.
L. 420; Shackelford V. Hooker,
54 Miss. 716; Gibson v. Smith,
75 Ga. 33.
An agent for collection is not
authorized to receive anything
Short of an explicit and general
acceptance. Walker v. New York
State Bank, 9 N. Y. 582.
Sebag V. Abitbol, 4 M. & S. 462;
Gibson v. Smith, supra.
2-At common law according
to Some authorities the drawer
and indorsers were not dis
charged on a bill accepted in part,
if the holder protested as to the
residue. Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th
ed., sec. 516. The statute makes
no such exception and to that
extent changes the existing law.
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Article III. Presentment for Acceptance.
Sec.
145. When presentment for ac
ceptance must be made.
146. When failure to present re
leases drawer and indor
Ser.
147. Presentment; how made.
148. On what days presentment
may be made.
149. Presentment; where time is
insufficient.
Sec.
150. When presentment is ex
excused.
151. When dishonored by non
acceptance.
152. Duty of holder where bill
not accepted.
153. Rights of holder where bill
not accepted.
Sec. 145. When presentment for acceptance must be
made.—Presentment for acceptance must be made:
First, Where the bill is payable after sight, or in any
other case where presentment for acceptance is necessary
in order to fix the maturity of the instrument; or
Second, Where the bill expressly stipulates that it shall
be presented for acceptance; or
Third, Where the bill is drawn payable elsewhere than
at the residence or place of business of the drawee. In
no other case is presentment for acceptance necessary in
order to render any party to the bill liable.
1—This is an affirmation of the
common-law rule. Mullick V.
Radakissen, 9 Moore P. C. 46.
The words, “or in any other case
where,” are additional to the cor
responding provision of the Bills
of Exchange Act, Sec. 39 (1), and
seem superfluous, because in no
other case than in bills payable
after sight (grace being abol
lished) could the time when the
bill was to be paid depend upon
acceptance. Presentment for ac
ceptance of a bill payable a spec
ified time after date is not nec
essary to charge the drawers and
indorsers. Allen V. Suydam, 20
Wend. 321; Plato v. Reynolds,
27 N. Y. 586.
Although presentment for ac
ceptance is optional the holder
may make presentment for two
purposes, 1st, to secure the li
ability of the drawee as a
party to the bill, in other words
to turn the drawee into an ac
ceptor; 2d, in case of non
acceptance to obtain an imme
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diate right of recourse against
antecedent parties. Thus, a bill
is dated August 1st, 1905, pay
able three months after date;
August 2nd, 1905, the holder pre
sents the bill to the drawee for
acceptance; acceptance is refused;
the drawer is liable on the bill
at once, proper steps having been
taken to fix his liability. The
holder need not wait until the
maturity of the bill as therein
Stated before Suing. Mason V.
Franklin, 3 Johns. 202; Weldon
V. Buck, 4 Johns. 144; See Sec
tion 153, and notes.
But if presentment be made
in cases not required and ac
ceptance refused notice must be
given in the same manner as in
cases where acceptance is re
quired. Sweet V. Swift, 65 Mich.
90; United States v. Barker, 4
Wash. C. C. 464, Fed. Cas. No.
14520. It has been held that if
presentment for acceptance be
made in a case not required the
Same is nugatory. House V. Ad
ams, 48 Pa. 261. But the rule of
this case is peculiar.
It is the duty of banks and other
agents to whom paper is forwarded
for collection to present the same
for acceptance as soon as possible
to the end that the drawee may
become bound on the instrument.
Allen V. Suydam, supra.
Sec. 146. When failure to present releases drawer and
indorser.—Except as herein otherwise provided, the hold
er of a bill which is required by the next preceding sec
tion to be presented for acceptance must either present
it for acceptance or negotiate it within a reasonable time."
If he fail to do so, the drawer and all endorsers are dis
charged.”
1—Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen,
11 Mich. 501. In this case the
court said, “the court cannot say
as a matter of law that any de
lay is reasonable beyond that
which may be fairly required in
the ordinary course of business
without special inconvenience to
the holder; or by the special cir
cumstances of the particular
case.”
Phoenix InSurance
Gray, 13 Mich. 191;
Bank V. Dyer, 19 Conn.
Co. V.
Bridgeport
136;
4 Mason 336,
Walsh V.
Wallace v. Agry,
Fed. Cas. No. 17096;
Dart, 23 Wis. 334.
In Nutting V. Burked, 48 Mich.
241, it was held that a bank
draft issued for negotiable pur
poses was not required to be
forwarded at once for acceptance
and payment; and delay for a
longer time than might be held
reasonable in the case of mere
private drafts would not dis
charge the indorsers. Where a
person presenting a bill agreed
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to present it again for accept
ance, no protest could be made
Without a new demand. Case V.
Burt. 15 Mich. 82.
2-This is so although all par
Sec. 147.
ties are solvent and no damage is
caused by the delay. Allan v. El
dred, 50 Wis. 132; Thornburg v.
Emmons, 23 W. Va. 333.
Presentment; how made.–Presentment for
acceptance must be made by or on behalf of the holder
at a reasonable hour, on a business day, and before the
bill is overdue, to the drawee or some person authorized
to accept or refuse acceptance on his behalf, and
First, Where a bill is addressed to two or more drawees
who are not partners, presentment must be made to them
all, unless one has authority to accept or refuse accept
ance for all, in which case presentment may be made to
him only;”
Second, Where the drawee is dead, presentment may
be made to his personal representative;”
Third, Where the drawee has been adjudged a bank
rupt or an insolvent, or has made an assignment for the
benefit of creditors, presentment may be made to him or
to his trustee or assignee.
write the acceptance; but the
place where it is presented to
1—“Comparing presentment for
acceptance with presentment for
payment, it is clear that the two
cases are governed by somewhat
different considerations. Speak
ing, generally, presentment for
aceptance should be personal,
while presentment for payment
should be local. A bill should be
presented for payment where the
money is. Anyone can then hand
over the money. A bill should be
presented for acceptance to the
drawee himself, for he has to
him is comparatively immaterial,
for all he has to do is to take
the bill. Again (except in the
case of demand drafts), the day
for payment is a fixed day; but
the drawee cannot tell on what
day it may suit the holder to
present the bill for acceptance.
These considerations are mater
ial as bearing on the question
whether the holder has used rea
sonable diligence to effect pre
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Sentation.” Chalmers' Bills of
Exchange Act, 5th Ed. 137-8.
The holder of the bill mak
ing presentment for acceptance
should have it in his possession,
make an actual exhibit of it to
the drawee and request him to
accept it. Fall River Union
Bank V. Willard, 5 Met. (Mass.)
216. It is not neceSSary that the
notary in making presentment
for acceptance should actually
produce the bill; it is sufficient
if he has it with him ready to
produce in case the drawee calls
for it. First Nat. Bank V.
Hatch, 78 Mo. 13. In making de
mand for an acceptance, the
party ought, if possible, to see
the drawee personally or some
agent appointed by him to ac
cept; and diligent inquiry must
be made for him, if he shall not
be found at his house Or place
of business. Wiseman V. Chi
appella, 64 U. S. (23 How.)
368; Sharpe v. Drew, 9 Ind. 281.
Presentment for acceptance of
a foreign bill should be made
by a notary. First Nat. Bank V.
Hatch, Supra.
Presentment to a clerk in the
drawee's counting room is suffi
cient. Stainback v. Bank, 11
Gratt. 269. Acceptance may be
made by the agent but the holder
may require the production by
him of clear and explicit au
thority from his principal to ac
cept in his name and without
its production may treat the bill
as dishonored. Daniel’s Neg. Inst.
(5th ed.) Sec. 487. Refusal to
accept when presentment for ac
ceptance is made on day of ma
turity is equivalent to refusal
to pay. Plato v. Reynolds, 27 N.
Y. 586. As to reasonable time,
See Sec. 74; Bank of Utica V.
Smith, 18 Johns. 230; Cayuga
Bank V. Hunt, 2 Hill 635.
2-Drawers not partners; pre
Sentment must be made to each.
Willis v. Green, 5 Hill 232;
Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Met.
(Mass.) 504. Drawers, partners;
presentment to any one sufficient.
Holtz v. Boppe, 37 N. Y. 634.
3-Presentment in such a case
is excused by section 150. An
executor Or administrator is
Without authority to bind the
estate of decedent by an accept
ance. Schmittler v. Simon, 101
N. Y. 554; Roscoe v. McDonald,
91 Mich. 270, 101 Mich. 313.
Sec. 148. On what days presentment may be made.—A
bill may be presented for acceptance on any day on which
negotiable instruments may be presented for payment
under the provisions of sections seventy-four and eighty
seven of this act. When Saturday is not otherwise a holi
day, presentment for acceptance may be made before
twelve o’clock noon on that day."
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1-See C. L. '97, Sec. 4880, as
amended, Laws 1903, p. 420.
The Colorado Act substitutes
the following for the last Sen
tence: “When any day is in
acceptance may be made during
reasonable hours of the part of
Such day which is not a holi
day.” The Wisconsin Act omits
the last Sentence.
part a holiday, presentment for
Sec. 149. Presentment; where time is insufficient.—
When the holder of a bill drawn payable elsewhere than
at the place of business or the residence of the drawee has
not time, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, to
present the bill for acceptance before presenting it for
payment on the day that it falls due, the delay caused
by presenting the bill for acceptance before presenting
it for payment is excused, and does not discharge the
drawers and indorsers."
1—This follows the Bills Of
Exchange Act, Sec. 30 (4) con
cerning which Judge Chalmers
says: “It settles a moot point
and perhaps alters the law. Sup
drawers in Liverpool.
provides that he shall not be
prejudiced by so doing. Before
the Act the usual practice was
to protest the bill in London
The Act
pose a bill payable one month
after date, is drawn in New York
on a Liverpool firm, but payable
at a London bank. It only
reaches the English holder, or
his agent, on the day that it
matures. He must, nevertheless,
present it for acceptance to the
without any presentment to the
drawees-an obviously inconven
ient mode of proceeding, for the
holder's object is to get the bill
paid, and not to run up expenses
against the drawer and indors
er.” Chalmers' Bills of Exchange,
5th ed., 133.
Sec. 150. When presentment is excused.—Presentment
for acceptance is excused, and a bill may be treated as
dishonored by non-acceptance, in either of the following
CaSeS:
First, Where the drawee is dead" or has absconded,
or is a fictitious person, or a person not having capacity
to contract by bill;
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Second, Where, after the exercise of reasonable dili
gence, presentment cannot be made;
Third, Where although presentment has been irregular,
acceptance has been refused on some other ground.”
1-See Sec. 147.
Mr. Daniel doubts the rule
generally stated that the death
of the drawer will not operate
as an excuse for non-presentment
for acceptance. Daniel’s Neg.
Inst., 5th ed., sec. 1178. Whatever
doubt there may have been on.
the point is now settled by the
Statute.
2-This provision is not a cod
ification of existing law but was
borrowed from the Bills of Ex
change Act, Sec. 41 (2) concern
ing which Judge Chalmers says:
“This is perhaps new law and
is important having regard to
the next Sub-section.” The Sub
Section referred to is as follows:
Sec. 151.
“The fact that the holder has
reason to believe that the bill,
on presentment, will be dishon
Ored, does not excuse present
ment.” Chalmers' Bills of Ex
change, 5th ed. 137. The mean
ing of the provision seems to be
unmistakable (-) notwithstanding
there is not coupled with it
Such a proVision as is coupled
with the corresponding provision
of the Bills of Exchange Act,
and that is that although pre
sentment was made in such a
manner that the drawer Was not
bound to recognize it
,
yet if he
put his refusal to accept On oth
er grounds, presentment will be
excused.
When dishonored by non-acceptance.—The
bill is dishonored by non-acceptance:
First, When it is duly presented for acceptance and
such an acceptance a
s is prescribed by this act is refused
or cannot be obtained; or
Second, When presentment for acceptance is excused
and the bill is not accepted.
Sec. 152. Duty o
f
holder where bill is not accepted.—
Where a bill is duly presented for acceptance and is not
accepted within the prescribed time, the person present
ing it must treat the bill as dishonored by non-acceptance
o
r
he loses the right o
f
recourse against the drawer and
indorsers.
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Sec. 153. Rights of holder where bill is not accepted.—
When a bill is dishonored by non-acceptance, an imme
diate right of recourse against the drawers and indorsers
accrues to the holder, and no presentment for payment is
necessary."
1-Upon dishonor by non-ac
ceptance the holder may at once
bring suit against parties secon
darily liable. He need not wait
until the maturity Of the in
strument. See sec. 145; Win
throp v. Pepoon, 1 Bay (S. C.)
468; Watson v. Loring, 3 Mass.,
557; Lennox V. Cook, 8 Mass.
460,
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Article IV. ProtéSt.
#. In what cases protest neC
eSSary.
155. Protest; how made.
156. Protest; by whom made.
157. Protest; when to be made.
158. Protest; where made.
159. Protest, both for non-ac
Sec. 154.
Sec.
Ceptance and nOn-pay
ment.
160. Protest before maturity
Where acceptor insolvent.
161. When protest dispensed
With.
162. Protest where bill is lost,
etc.
In what cases protest necessary.—Where a
foreign bill appearing on its face to be such, is dishonored
by non-acceptance, it must be duly protested for non
acceptance, and where such a bill which has not pre
viously been dishonored by non-acceptance is dishonored
by non-payment it must be duly protested for non-pay
ment. If it is not so protested, the drawer and indorsers
are discharged. Where a bill does not appear on its face
to be a foreign bill, protest thereof in case of dishonor
is unnecessary.”
1–Protest from the Words
“pro” and “testare” has been
given two meanings in this con
nection. 1st, the bearing of pub
lic witness. 2nd, bearing of wit
ness before the notary, of facts
going to make up the dishonor
of the paper.
The word “protest” is applied
to the formal instrument made
by a notary public, alleging the
due presentment and dishonor of
a bill, and declaring that Said
notary does protest the same for
non-payment or non-acceptance
as the case may be. Platt V.
Drake, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 296.
Failure to protest discharges the
drawer and indorsers. Smith V.
Long, 40 Mich. 555; Gale v.
Walsh, 5 T. R. 329; Citizens'
Sav. Bank v. Hays, 96 Ky. 365,
29 S. W. 20; Smith v. Curlee, 59
Ill. 221; Ocean Nat. Bank v. Wil
liams, 102 Mass. 141; Halliday v.
McDougall, 20 Wend. 81; Amsinck
v. Rogers, 93 N. Y. Supp. 87 (a
case under the statute).
The law conclusively presumes
injury to the indorser from fail
ure to protest and give the requi
site notice and will not permit
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the contrary to be shown. Smith
V. Long, supra. Protest of a for
eign bill is So indispensable that
nothing can take its place and
none of the facts necessary to
the protest can be proved by ex
traneous testimony. Union Bank
V. Hyde, 6 Wheat 572; Joseph V.
Salomon, 19 Fla. 623. Mr. Dan
iel, in discussing the reason why
protest of foreign bills is re
quired, says, “The requisition of
a protest in the case of foreign
bills was in Order to afford au
thentic and satisfactory evidence
of due dishonor to the drawer,
who, from his residence abroad,
would experience a difficulty in
making proper inquiries on the
Subject, and be compelled to rely
On the representations of the
holder. It also furnishes an in
dorser With the best evidence
to charge an antecedent party
abroad; for foreign courts give
credit to the acts of a public
functionary in the same manner
as a protest under the Seal of a
foreign notary is evidence in
our courts of the dishonor of a
bill payable abroad.” Daniel’s
Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec. 927.
2-See sections 120 and 131.
Sec. 155. Protest; how made.—The protest must be
annexed to the bill, or must contain a copy thereof, and
must be under the hand * and seal” of the notary making
it
,
and must specify:
First, The time * and place" of presentment;
Second, The fact that presentment was made, and the
manner thereof;"
Third, The cause or reason for protesting the bill;
Fourth, The demand made and the answer given, if
any, o
r
the fact that the drawee o
r acceptor could not
be found."
1—Fulton V. MacCracken,
Md. 528.
2—Although the notary is re
quired to sign the protest, for
that is the obvious meaning of
“under his hand,” his name may
be signed by his clerk, for that
too is included in the phrase
“under his hand,” (see Phelps V
.
Riley, 3 Conn. 266) or it may
be printed. It is only necessary
18 that it should be authorized by
him. Fulton v. MacCracken,
Supra.
3–Under the law merchant by
Some authorities the seal of the
notary was regarded as an abso
lute essential. Donegan V
. Wood,
49 Ala. 251; by others it was
not. Huffaker V. Nat. Bank, 12
Bush 287. In the case last cited
it was said: “The notary being
14
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an officer of the state, his offi
cial signature is all that is re
quired to the protest.”
The seal of the notary proves
the genuineness of his signature.
Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546.
A protest, required by the laws
of one State to be under seal,
Will not be received as evidence
in another State without such
seal. Bank v. Gray, 2 Hill 227.
The Bills of Exchange Act does
not require the protest to be
made under seal (Sec. 51 (1) ).
4—The date upon Which pre
sentment and demand were made
must be Stated. Union Nat. Bank
V. Williams Milling Co., 117
Mich. 535. But the hour of the
day need not be stated, as the
certificate imports a presentment
during the proper hours of busi
ness. Cayuga County Bank V.
Hunt, 2 Hill 635; Skelton V.
Dustin, 92 Ill. 49.
5—Burbank V. Beach, 15 Barb.
326; Duckert v. Von Lilenthal,
11 Wis. 55. In this case the cer
tificate stated that the note was
presented “at Montello” and pay
ment demanded and refused, but
it did not state to whom or at
what place in the town pre
sentment and demand were made.
Held insufficient.
When it is necessary to make
presentment at a bank, it is not
sufficient to allege presentment
to the cashier. Seneca Co. Bank
V. Neass, 5 Denio 329.
6-It must appear in the cer
tificate of protest that present
ment and demand were made. A
Statement that the notary made
demand does not comply with the
requirement. Musson v. Lake, 4
How. (U. S.) 262. But see Nott's
Ex’r. v. Beard, 16 La. 308.
7-This section requires sub
stantially the same particulars to
be set out in the protest as have
ordinarily been required. See
Brooks Notary, 4th ed. 82.
Sec. 156. Protest; by whom made.—Protest may be
made by:
First, A notary public; or
Second, By any respectable resident of the place where
the bill is dishonored, in the presence of two or more
credible witnesses.”
1—A notary public is a Sort of
international officer and the rule
has been general to intrust the
protest of bills to him. The
general rule is that the protest
must be made by him in per
son. Sacrider v. Brown, 3 MacL.
481, Fed. Cas. No. 12205; Ocean
Nat. Bank v. Williams, 102 Mass.
141; Cribbs v. Adams, 13 Gray
597; Commercial Bank v. Var
num, 49 N. Y. 269; Carter v.
Union Bank, 7 Humph. (Tenn.)
548. Since interest in litigation
no longer disqualifies witnesses,
a notary public who is cashier
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of a bank may legally protest
its paper. Nelson v. First Nat.
Bank, 69 Fed. 798; Moreland's
Assignee et al. v. Citizens' Sav
ings Bank, 97 Ky. 211, 30 S. W.
19. Though such cashier be the
maker of a note, he can protest
it himself, the note being held
by the bank. Dykman V. North
ridge, 36 N. Y. Supp. 962, affirm
ed 153 N. Y. 662.
2-See Todd V. Neals Adm'r,
49 Ala. 266.
Sec. 157. Protest; when to be made.—When a bill is
protested, such protest must be made on the day of its
dishonor, unless delay is excused as herein provided.
When a bill has been duly noted, the protest may be sub
sequently extended as of the date of the noting."
1—The formal protest need
not be made at the time or On
the day of presentment and de
mand, but may be made there
after if proper Steps Were taken at
the time presentment and de
mand were made. It is the duty
of the notary at the time of
making presentment and demand
to note on the bill or On the
paper attached thereto or in his
book the particulars which are
to make up the formal protest,
Viz: the time, the fact of refusal
of acceptance or payment as the
case may be, and the reaSon aS
signed therefor, and his charges
of protest, and verify such mem
oranda by adding his name or
initials. This is called noting.
The notes or memoranda may
afterwards be extended into the
formal protest. Leftley V. Mills,
4 T. R. 170. The noting must
be made on the very day of dis
honor, else it cannot be made
the basis of the extended pro
test. Dennistown V. Stewart, 58
U. S., (17 How.) 606; Cayuga
Bank V. Hunt, 2 Hill 635. The
noting is not protest but may be
used in the place of protest if
the formal certificate be lost or
destroyed without the holder's
consent or if the notary should
die before extending his notes.
Sec. 158. Protest; where made.—A bill must be pro
tested at the place where it is dishonored, except that
when a bill drawn payable at the place of business or resi
dence of some person other than the drawee, has been
dishonored by non-acceptance, it must be protested for
non-payment at the place where it is expressed to be pay
able, and no further presentment for payment to, or
demand on. the drawee is necessary.”
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1—This is an affirmation Of
the general rule. Daniel's Neg.
Inst., 5th ed. 935.
2—The Bills of Exchange Act,
Sec. 51 (6), from which this pro
vision is borrowed, follows in
terms the declaratory statute 3
Williams IV Ch. 98, which over
turned the rule laid down in
Mitchell v. Baring, 4 C. & P.
35, 19 E. C. L. 395.
Sec. 159. Protest both for non-acceptance and non
payment.—A bill which has been protested for non-ac
ceptance may be subsequently protested for non-pay
ment."
1—When a bill has been pro
tested for non-acceptance, im
mediate recourse may be had
against drawer and indorsers.
See Secs. 145 and 153 and notes.
Therefore protest for non-pay
ment would not be necessary ex
cept for the fact that some of
the Secondary parties are resi
dents of a foreign country by
the laws whereof no right Of
action accrueS on non-payment at
maturity. See Introduction, pp. 9
and 10. See Bills of Exchange Act,
sec. 51 (3). Concerning this
provision Judge Chalmers says:
“Protest in such case might be
necessary for the purpose of
*
charging a foreign drawer Or in
dorser in his own country. An
English Act can only lay down
the law for the United Kingdom,
though by the comity of nations
the duties of the holder Would
generally be regarded as regu
lated by the law of the place
where they are to be performed.
* * * Under Some of the Con
tinental codes no right of action
arises on non-acceptance; the
holder can demand security from
antecedent parties, but he is
bound to re-present the bill at
maturity.” Chalmers’ Bills of Ex
change, 5th ed. 172.
Sec. 160. Protest before maturity where acceptor in
solvent.—Where the acceptor has been adjudged a bank
rupt or an insolvent, or has made an assignment for the
benefit of creditors, before the bill matures, the holder
may cause the bill to be protested for better security
against the drawer and endorsers."
fore its maturity, it may be pro
better security Chalmers says: tested for better security,” and
“When the acceptor of a bill of adds that “the only effect of such
exchange becomes bankrupt be- a protest is that there may be
1–In the matter of protest for
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Bn acceptance supra protest.”
Chalmers' Digest Bills, Notes and
Checks (Benjamin) 177; Exparte
Wackerbath, 5 Wes. Jr. 574; Dan
iel’s Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec. 530.
This Section is borrowed from
the Bills of Exchange Act, sec.
Sec. 161. When protest
51 (5). Mr. Bigelow questions
whether this section is the ex
pression of any custom existing
in this country.
Protest for better security is
not necessary. In re English
Bank, 2 Chy. (1893) 438.
dispensed with.—Protest is
dispensed with by any circumstances which would dis
pense with notice of dishonor. Delay in noting or pro
testing is excused when delay is caused by circumstances
beyond the control of the holder and not imputable to
his default, misconduct or negligence. When the cause
of delay ceases to operate, the bill must be noted or pro
tested with reasonable diligence.
1—See sec. 113, 114 and notes. Whatever will excuse notice, Will
excuse protest.
Sec. 162. Protest where bill is lost, et cetera.—Where
a bill is lost or destroyed, or is wrongly detained from the
person entitled to hold it
,
protest may be made on a copy
or written particulars thereof."
1-Loss of the instrument will copy is sufficient and protest
not excuse demand and protest.
Daniel’s Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec.
1464; Kavanaugh v. Bank, 59
Mo. App. 540, Presentment o
f
a
may be made on the basis o
f
the
copy. Hinsdale v. Miles, 5 Conn.
331.
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Article V. Acceptance for Honor.
Sec. Sec.
163. When bill may be accepted 168. Maturity of bill payable af
for honor. ter sight; accepted for
164. Acceptance for honor; how honor.
made. 169. Protest of bill accepted for
165 when deemed to be an as 1, r: etc.ceptance for honor of - resentment for payment to
acceptor for honor, howdrawer.
d- Inacle.
166. '' * * * 171 when delay in making pre
Sentment is excused.
167. Agreement of acceptor for 172. Dishonor of bill by aecept
honor. or for honor.
Sec. 163. When bill may be accepted for honor.
Where a bill of exchange has been protested for dishonor
by non-acceptance or protested for better security and
is not overdue, any person not being a party already
liable thereon may, with the consent of the holder, inter
vene and accept the bill supra protest for the honor of
any party liable thereon, or for the honor of the person
for whose account the bill is drawn. The acceptance for
honor may be for part only of the sum for which the bill
is drawn; and where there has been an acceptance for
honor for one party, there may be a further acceptance
by a different person for the honor of another party."
1—Acceptance for honor is another to intervene for the pro
likewise called acceptance supra tection of his credit and permit
protest. This is an English cus- a ready negotiation of the bill.
tom preserved in the Bills of The holder is not bound to take
Exchange Act, sec. 65 (1) and an acceptance for honor. Before
(2), from which the section is taking such an acceptance, he
borrowed. The object of the pro- should cause the bill to be pro
vision is to enable a party who tested and then to be accepted
is liable on the bill to induce in the manner provided in the
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Act. Acceptance for honor may be
made by any person not already
liable as a party to the bill. The
drawee, though refusing to accept
the bill generally, may accept it
for the honor of the drawer Or
of any one indorser. The drawee
after refusing to accept may in
tervene through an agent, thus
he may request a stranger to
the bill to accept for his honor
and under his guaranty. Konig
v. Bayard, 1 Pet. (26 U. S.), 250.
No One but the drawee can ac
cept a bill, but for the honor of
one of the parties. May v. Kel
ly, 27 Ala. 497.
Sec. 164. Acceptance for honor; how made.—An ac
ceptance for honor Supra protest must be in writing and
indicate that it is an acceptance for honor, and must be
signed by the acceptor for honor."
1—Compare Bills of Exchange
Act, sec. 65 (3), which requires
acceptance for honor to be writ
ten on the bill. Section 164
permits such an acceptance to be
written on a separate paper. The
usual form of acceptance for
honor is: “Accepted supra pro
test for honor of A.” “Accepts
S. P.,” followed by the signa
ture.
Sec. 165. When deemed to be an acceptance for honor
of drawer.—Where an acceptance for honor does not ex
pressly state for whose honor it is made, it is deemed to
be an acceptance for the honor of the drawer."
1-The purpose of this section
is to fix under all circumstances
the person for Whose honor the
acceptance is made, and thus to
define the recourse of the ac
ceptor for honor. The acceptor
for honor must State in his ac
ceptance for whose honor he ac
cepts, as his rights against ante
cedent parties may be materially
affected thereby, for if the ac
ceptor for honor should after
wards pay the bill, he will be en
titled to recourse for repayment
against the person for whose
honor he made the acceptance
and to all other parties who are
liable to that person. Goodall v.
Polhill, 1 C. B. 233. Hence, if
he accepts for the honor of the
drawer only he will, in general,
have no right of recourse against
the indorsers; and if for the
honor of an indorser he will
have no right of recourse against
any subsequent indorser, unless,
indeed, such person for whose
honor he accepts the bill might
have such right of recourse
against either; as for example, if
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he were an accommodation draw
er or indorser. Story on Bills,
Sec. 256.
The acceptor of a bill for the
honor of the drawer cannot main
tain an action thereon against
the drawer without proof of its
presentment to the drawee and
non-acceptance or non-payment by
him, and notice thereof to the
drawer.
220.
An acceptor for the honor of
the first indorser may require,
as a condition of payment, that
the holder shall indorse the bill
to him, or otherwise indemnify
him. Freeman v. Perot, 2 Wash.
C. C. 485, Fed. Cas. No. 5087.
Baring v. Clark, 19 Pick.
Sec. 166. Liability of acceptor for honor.—The ac
ceptor for honor is liable to the holder and to all parties
to the bill subsequent to the party for whose honor he has
accepted.
Sec. 167. Agreement of acceptor for honor.—The ac
ceptor for honor by such acceptance engages that he will
on due presentment pay the bill according to the terms
of his acceptance, provided it shall not have been paid
by the drawee, and provided also that it shall have been
duly presented for payment and protested for non-pay
ment and notice of dishonor given to him."
1—The acceptor for honor does
not assume an absolute liability
but a conditional One. To fix his
liability certain steps are essen
tial. At maturity the bill must
be presented to the drawee, not
withstanding that he has previ
ously refused acceptance. Upon
the original drawee's refusal to
pay, the bill must be again pro
tested for non-payment and due
notice given to the acceptor for
honor. Phillips V. Im Thurn, L.
R. 1 C. P. 463, 14 L. T. (n. s.)
406; Williams v. Germain, 7 B.
& C. 468; Hoare v. Cazenove, 16
East 391; Schofield v. Bayard, 3
Wend. 491.
Whether the acceptor for hon
or admits the genuineness of the
signature of the party for whose
honor he accepts has been a
controverted question—that he
does is maintained by the follow
ing: Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed.,
sec. 528; Story on Bills, sec. 262;
Byles on Bills (Sharswood ed.)
258, 406; Phillips v. Im Thurn,
18 C. B. (n. s.) 694; that he
does not is maintained by Par
Sons on Bills and Notes, 323,
citing Wilkinson v. Johnson, 3 B.
& C. 428.
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Sec. 168. Maturity of bill payable after sight; accepted
for honor.—Where a bill payable after sight is accepted
for honor, its maturity is calculated from the date of the
noting for non-acceptance, and not from the date of the
acceptance for honor."
1-This section is the same as convenient ruling to the effect that
sec. 65 (5) Bills of Exchange maturity was to be calculated
Act, concerning which Judge from the date of acceptance for
Chalmers SayS: “This sub-sec- honor (William V. Germaine, 7
tion brings the law into accord- B & C. 468).” Chalmers' Bills
ance with mercantile under- of Exchange, 5th ed., 228.
standing, and gets rid of an in
Sec. 169. Protest of bill accepted for honor, et cetera.
—Where a dishonored bill has been accepted for honor
supra protest or contains a reference in case of need it
must be protested for non-payment before it is presented
for payment to the acceptor for honor or referee in case
of need."
1-See Bills of Exchange Act, Sec. 67 (1).
Sec. 170. Presentment for payment to acceptor for
honor; how made.—Presentment for payment to the ac
ceptor for honor must be made as follows: -
First, If it is to be presented in the place where the
protest for non-payment was made, it must be presented
not later than the day following its maturity;
'Second, If it is to be presented in some other place than
the place where it was protested, then it must be for
warded within the time specified in section one hundred
•
six."
1-Doubts having arisen as to the acceptor supra protest for
the day on which it was requi- honor, or to the referee in case
site to present for payment to of need, bills which had been
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dishonored, Parliament passed a
statute in 1836, 6 & 7 William
IV, Ch. 58, declaring, “That it
shall not be necessary to present
such bills of exchange to Such
acceptors for honor or to such
referee until the day following
the day on which such bills of
exchange shall become due; and
that if the place of address
On Such bill of exchange Of
such acceptor for honor or
of Such referee Shall be in
any city, town or place other
Sec. 171.
than in the city, town Or place
where such bill Shall be therein
made payable, then it shall not
be necessary to forward such bill
of exchange for presentment for
payment to such acceptor for
honor or referee until the day
following the day on which such
bill of exchange shall become
due.” Sec. 67 (2) of the Bills
of Exchange Act re-enacts this
statute in substance. Sec. 170
follows said Sub-Section.
When delay in making presentment is ex
cused.—The provisions of section eighty-three apply
where there is delay in making presentment to the ac
ceptor for honor or referee in case of need.
Sec. 172. Dishonor of bill by acceptor for honor.—
When a bill is dishonored by the acceptor for honor it
must be protested for non-payment by him."
1-The Bills of Exchange Act,
sec. 67 (4), from which this sec
tion is taken, settled the law in
England on the matter covered
by the provision. Before that
time it was probable but not
certain that when a bill of ex
change was dishonored by the
acceptor supra protest, it must
have been again protested in
order to charge the other parties
liable thereon. Chalmers’ Bills,
Notes and Checks (Benjamin)
178. The Section affirms the ex
isting law in the United States.
Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., 527.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE. 219
Article VI. Payment for Honor.
Sec. Sec.
173. Who may make payment for 177. Effect on subsequent par
honor. ties where bill is paid
174. Payment for honor; how for honor.
made. 178. Where holder refuses to re
175. Declaration before payment ceive payment supra pro
for honor. test.
176. Preference of parties offer- 179. Rights of payer for honor.
ing to pay for honor.
Sec. 173. Who may make payment for honor.—Where
a bill has been protested for non-payment any person
may intervene and pay it supra protest for the honor of
any person liable thereon, or for the honor of the person
for whose account it was drawn."
1—The law merchant limits There can be no payment for
the right to make payment for honor until after dishonor by
honor to bills of exchange and non-payment, and protest. Deacon
does not extend it even to ne- v. Stodhart, 2 Man. & Gr. 317;
gotiable promissory notes, Smith Vandewall v. Tyrrell, 1 M. & M.
V. Sawyer, 55 Me. 141. 87; Wood v. Pugh, 7 Ohio, pt. 2,
A stranger to a bill which has 156, 164.
been refused acceptance can at The protest for non-payment,
the request and under the guar- though necessary, need not be
anty of the drawee who has re- completed at the time of the pay
fused acceptance or payment, pay ment for honor; it may be ex
the bill supra protest for the tended at a later time. Geral
honor of the drawer or an in- opulo v. Wieler, 10 C. B. 690,
dorser. Konig v. Bayard, 1 Pet. 20 L. J. C. P. 105.
(26 U. S.) 250.
Sec. 174. Payment for honor; how made.—The pay
ment for honor supra protest in order to operate as such
and not as a mere voluntary payment must be attested
by a notarial act of honor which may be appended to the
protest or form an extension to it."
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1-A Stranger may take up a
bill for the honor of the parties
or any of them and thus acquire
the rights of an indorsee, pro
Vided he makes the payment af
ter protest, causes a notarial act
to be made showing why and for
whom he made the payment and
parties to whom he intends to re
Sort for indemnity. Gazzam V.
Armstrong's Exr., 3 Dana (Ky.)
554. If he fails to notify such
parties within a reasonable time,
he loses his right of recourse
against them. Wood v. Pugh, 7
Ohio, pt. 2, 156. See note, sec
tion 173.gives immediate notice to all
Sec. 175. Declaration before payment for honor.—The
notarial act of honor must be founded on a declaration
made by the payer for honor, or by his agent in that
behalf, declaring his intention to pay the bill for honor,
and for whose honor he pays.
Sec. 176. Preference of parties offering to pay for
honor.—Where two or more persons offer to pay a bill
for the honor of different parties, the person whose pay
ment will discharge most parties to the bill is to be given
the preference.
Sec. 177. Effect on subsequent parties where bill is
paid for honor.—Where a bill has been paid for honor, all
parties subsequent to the party for whose honor it is paid
are discharged, but the payer for honor is subrogated for,
and succeeds to, both the rights and duties of the holder
as regards the party for whose honor he pays and all
parties liable to the latter."
1—The payer supra protest
stands in the shoes, so far as re
course is concerned, of the party
for whose honor he pays. For
example, a dishonored bill is held
by the fourth indorsee. If A
pays it supra protest for the
honor of the acceptor, he has re
course against the acceptor alone.
If he pays it for the honor of
the first indorser he has recourse
against him and against the
drawer and acceptor, but in
dorsers subsequent to the first
are discharged. A payer supra
protest for the honor of the
drawer has no recourse against
the acceptor if he accepted for
the accommodation of the draw
er, because the drawer would
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not have the right of reimburse
ment against the accommodation
acceptor. McDowell v. Cook, 14
Miss. 420; Gazzam V. Armstrong's
Sec. 178. Where holder
EXr. 3 Dana (Ky.) 554. But see
Ex parte Swan, L. R. 6 Eq. 344;
Daniel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec.
1255.
refuses to receive payment
supra protest.—Where the holder of a bill refuses to re
ceive payment supra protest, he loses his right of recourse
against any party who would have been discharged by
such payment."
1–Before the enactment of the
Bills of Exchange Act the prop
osition covered by this section
was undetermined by any adjud
ication in England. It is one of
those propositions which Chalmers
States With a “perhaps.” Intro
duction p. 7, Chalmers’ Digest
(Benjamin) 243. Subsection 7 of
Section 68 set at rest whatever
doubt had theretofore existed as
to the right of recourse of the
holder who refuses payment su
pra protest. This section is a
copy of Said subsection.
Sec. 179. Rights of payer for honor.—The payer for
honor, on paying to the holder the amount of the bill and
the notarial expenses incidental to its dishonor, is entitled
to receive both the bill itself and the protest."
1—This Section follows Sec. 68
(6) of the Bills of Exchange Act,
which affirmed the practice in
England. There were no adjudi
cated cases On the Subject. Chal
mers' Digest (Benjamin) 243,
A person desiring to make
payment for honor must be ready
and offer to do so at the time
and place of payment. Denston
v. Henderson, 13 Johns. (N. Y.)
322.
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Article VII. Bills in a Set,
Sec.
180. Bills in Set constitute one
bill.
181. Rights of holder where
different parts are nego
tiated.
182. Liability of holder who in
dorses two or more parts
Sec.
of a set to different per
Sons.
183. Acceptance of bills drawn
in SetS.
184. Payment by acceptor of
bills drawn in sets.
185. Effect of discharging cne of
a Set.
Sec. 180. Bills in set constitute one bill.—Where a
bill is drawn in a set, each part of the set being num
bered and containing a reference to the other parts, the
whole of the parts constitutes one bill."
1-Because the means of com
munication were imperfect and
uncertain, the custom arose at
an early day to make a foreign
bill generally in three but some
times in four separate parts, the
better to facilitate the transmis
sion and insure the delivery of
the bill to its destined place. To
secure the end sought, these sep
arate parts were forwarded by
different messengers or by differ
ent modes of transportation.
The practice was maintained af
ter the reason for
all practical purposes ceased.
These several parts constitute but
one bill which is called a bill in
a set. Each part of the set is
numbered and contains a refer
ence to the other parts. Downes v.
Church, 13 Pet. (38 U. S.) 207. A
form of a bill in a set is as fol
lows:
it had for
$500.00
New York, August 1, 1905.
At sight of this first of ex
change, (second and third un
paid) pay to the order of Solon
Clark Five hundred dollars. Val
ue received and charge to the ac
count of Daniel DaViS.
TO
Seth Eaton,
1009 Marquette Bldg.
Chicago, Ill.
The three parts would be trip
licates except the second would
state, “Pay this second of ex
change, (first and third un
paid)”; the third, “Pay this
third of exchange, (first and sec
ond unpaid).” Walsh v. Blatch
ley, 6 Wis. 413; Ralli v. Den
nistoun, 6 Ex. 483, 20 L. J. E.X.
278; Holdsworth v. Hunter, 10
B. & C. 449. The condition in
corporated in bills in a set-Sec
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ond and third unpaid-gives no
tice that all the parts Constitute
but one bill. Payment of any
kin v. Cranston, 7 Johns. 442;
Wells V. Whitehead, 15 Wend.
527.
part extinguishes the whole. Dur
Sec. 181. Rights of holders where different parts are
negotiated.—Where two or more parts of a set are
negotiated to different holders in due course, the holder
whose title first accrues is as between such holders the
true owner of the bill. But nothing in this section affects
the rights of a person who in due course accepts or pays
the part first presented to him.
1—The first indorsement of One of the whole Set. Walsh V.
set vests in the indorsee the ab- Blatchley, 6 Wis. 413.
solute right to the possession
Sec. 182. Liability of holder who indorses two or more
parts of a set to different persons.—Where the holder
of a set indorses two or more parts to different persons
he is liable on every such part, and every indorser sub
sequent to him is liable on the part he has himself in
dorsed, as if such parts were separate bills."
1—Holdsworth v. Hunter, 10 B. & C. 449.
Sec. 183. Acceptance of bills drawn in sets.—The ac
ceptance may be written on any part, and it must be
written on one part only. If the drawee accepts more
than one part, and such accepted parts are negotiated to
different holders in due course, he is liable on every
such part as if it were a separate bill."
1—This section is substantially
identical with Subdivision 4, Sec.
71 of the Bills of Exchange Act.
It is declaratory of existing law.
Holdsworth V. Hunter, 10 B. &
C. 449; Bank v. Neal, 22 How.
(U. S.) 96. Any one of the set
may be presented for acceptance
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and, if not accepted, a right of Blatchley, 6 Wis. 413; Downes &
action arises upon due notice Co. v. Church, 13 Pet. 205.
against the indorser. Walsh v.
Sec. 184. Payment by acceptor of bills drawn in sets.—
When the acceptor of a bill drawn in a set pays it with
out requiring the part bearing his acceptance to be de
livered up to him, and that part at maturity is outstand
ing in the hands of a holder in due course, he is liable
to the holder thereon."
1—Holdsworth v. Hunter, 10 B. & C. 449.
Sec. 185. Effect of discharging one of a set.—Except
as herein otherwise provided, where any one part of a
bill drawn in a set is discharged by payment or other
wise the whole bill is discharged."
1—Holdsworth v. Hunter, 10 B.
& C. 449. See note to section
180.
The Wisconsin Act contains the
following additional provisions:
Sec. 1682. Whenever any bill
of exchange drawn or indorsed
within this state and payable
Without the limits of the United
States shall be duly protested for
non-acceptance or non-payment
the party liable for the contents
of such bill shall, on due notice
and demand thereof, pay the
Same at the current rate of ex
change at the time of the de
mand, and damages at the rate
of five per cent upon the con
tents thereof, together with in
terest On the Said contents, to be
computed from the date of the
protest; and said amount of con
tents, damages and interest shall
be in full of all damages, charges
and expenSeS.
Sec. 1683. If any bill of ex
change drawn upon any person
or corporation out of this state,
but within some state or terri
tory of the United States, for
the payment of money shall be
duly presented for acceptance or
payment and protested for non
acceptance or non-payment the
drawer or indorser thereof, due
notice being given of such non
acceptance or non-payment, shall
pay said bill with legal interest
according to its tenor and five
per cent. damages, together with
costs and charges of protest.
TITLE III.
PROMISSORY NOTES AND CHECKS.
Article I.
Sec.
186. Promissory note defined.
187. Check defined.
188. Within what time a check
must be presented.
189. Certification of check; ef
fect of.
Sec.
190. Effect where the holder of
check procures it to be
certified.
191. When check operates as an
assignment.
192. Inconsistent laws repealed.
Sec. 186. Promissory note defined.—A negotiable
promissory note within the meaning of this act is an un
conditional promise in writing, made by one person to
another, signed by the maker, engaging to pay on de
mand, or at a fixed or determined future time, a sum cer
tain in money, to order or to bearer." Where a note is
drawn to the maker’s own order, it is not complete until
indorsed by him.”
1—See Bills of Exchange Act,
Sec. 83.
The Bills of Exchange Act in
cludes in its definition of a
promissory note a note payable
“to or to the order of a specified
person or to bearer,” thus em
bracing instruments which were
not negotiable according to the
law merchant. In some states
a non-negotiable note was held to
import consideration by virtue of
statutory provision or by inter
pretation of common law rules.
15
Daniel’s Neg. Inst., 5th ed., sec.
163. The statute changes the
rule in those states because the
statute deals only with negoti
able instruments, and so it was
held in Yarwood V. Trusts &
Guarantee Co. (ltd.), 94 App.
Div. 47, 87 N. Y. Supp. 947 (a.
case under the Statute), that a.
note in the following terms: “I
promise to pay Jennie Crawford
$5,000 when I die and George
Crawford $5,000,” imported con
sideration prior to the act, but
225
226 THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.
that this section changed such
prior law.
In Deyo V. Thompson, 53 App.
Div. 9, 65 N. Y. Supp. 459 (a
case under the statute), it was
held that a note payable to “a
specified person” imported no
consideration. See Hickok V.
Bunting, 92 App. Div. 167, 86 N.
Y. Supp. 1059 (a case under the
Statute).
Certificates of deposit in the Or
dinary form payable to order or to
bearer are in legal effect negotia
ble promissory notes. Cate V. Pat
terson, 25 Mich. 191; Tripp v. Cur
tenius, 36 Mich. 494; Birch V.
Fisher, 51 Mich. 36; Beardsley v.
Webber, 104 Mich. 88; Curran v.
Witter, 68 Wis, 16; Trustees etc.
V. Lewis, 34 Fla. 424; Kirkwood
v. First Nat. Bank, 40 Neb. 484.
A certificate of deposit made out
to Z or her assigns was held not a
negotiable instrument under this
statute. Zander v. N. Y. Security
& Trust Co., 81 N. Y. Supp. 1151.
Coupon Or interest notes are
promissory notes. Boyer V.
Chandler, 160 Ill. 394.
2-A note payable to the mak
er's own order satisfies the re
quirement of the rule that it
should be made payable “to an
Other,” but only when the note is
negotiated. See note 2, sec. 10.
This part of the section was re
ferred to, in connection with
others, in Hoffman V. Planters’
Nat. Bank, 99 Va. 480, 39 S. E.
134.
A note drawn payable to the
Order of the maker and not in
dorsed by him is valid against
the indorser, although he did
not know that it was to be is
Sued without the maker's in
dorsement. C. L. '97, 4870. Penin
Sular Savings Bank V. Hosie, 112
Mich. 351.
Sec. 187. Check defined.—A check is a bill of exchange
drawn on a bank, payable on demand.” Except as
herein otherwise provided, the provisions of this act ap
plicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply
to a check.”
1—This section is identical
with Section 73 of the Bills of
Exchange Act, except that the
word “bank” is substituted for
“banker.” The Variation is im
material, as the words are made
synonymous by the terms of the
statute. See sec. 2.
Sec. 73 of the Bills of Ex
change Act was declaratory of
then existing law so far as it de
fined a check as a bill of ex
change. McLean V. Clydesdale
Banking Co., 9 App. Cas. 95. See
note Sec. 128. All checks are
bills of exchange but not all bills
of exchange are checks. A check
is distinguishable from a bill in
that it is always drawn on a
bank. People v. Kemp, 76 Mich.
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410; Merchants Bank v. State
Bank, 10 Wal. 604; Bull v. Bank,
123 U. S. 105; Rogers V. Durant,
140 U. S. 298; Hopkinson v. For
ster, L. R. 19 Eq. 76; Ridgely
Bank v. Patton, 109 Ill. 479;
N. W. Coal Co. V. Bowman, 69 Ia.
152; Harrison v. Nicollett Nat.
Bank, 41 Minn. 488; Amsinck V.
Rogers, 93 N. Y. Supp. 87, (a
case under the statute) Wherein
the instrument was held not a
check because not drawn. On a
bank.
2—A check is further distin
guishable from a bill in that it
is always payable on demand.
The courts have been at Variance
as to whether a draft On a bank
payable at a future day is a
check or bill of exchange. That
such a draft is not a check:
Bowen V. Newell, 13 N. Y. 290;
Georgia Nat. Bank V. HenderSon,
46 Ga. 496; Ivory v. Bank, 36
Mo. 475; Harrison v. Nicollett
Nat. Bank, supra; Morrison v.
Bailey, 5 Ohio St. 13; Minturn
v. Fisher, 4 Cal. 36. That such a
draft is a check: In re Brown,
2 Story 502, Fed. Cas. No. 1985;
Champion V. Gordon, 70 Pa.
St. 474; Westminster Bank v.
Wheaton, 4 R. I. 30.
A check is a bill of exchange
payable on demand and the
drawee will be deemed to have ac
cepted it if he does not return
it within twenty-four hours after
its delivery for acceptance, ac
cording to sec. 129. State Bank
v. Weiss, 91 N. Y. Supp. 276 (a
case under the statute), Unaka
Nat. Bank v. Butler, (Tenn.), 83
S. W. 655 (a case under the
Statute).
3-Presentment and notice of
dishonor are required to charge
the drawer of a check as well as
the drawer of a bill, with this
distinction, if the drawer of a
check draws Without funds in
the hands of his bank he is li
able as a primary party without
notice. Carew v. Duckworth, L.
R. 4 Exch. 313; Andrew V. Black
ly, 11 Ohio St. 89; First Nat. Bank
v. Linn etc., 30 Ore. 296; Indus
trial Bank v. Bowes, 165 Ill. 70.
If the drawee of a bill draws
Without funds in the hands of
the drawee he is liable only pre
Sumptively as a primary party,
the drawing without funds being
only prima facie fraudulent. The
presumption of fraud arising
from a lack of funds in the hands
of the drawee may be rebutted.
Dolph V. Rice, 18 Wis. 418;
Harker V. AnderSon, 21 Wend.
372.
There are other distinctions be
tween bills and checks apart
from those mentioned in the
statute which should be noted. A
check is ordinarily intended for
payment and, as its name im
plies, for stopping or closing a
transaction; a bill is frequently,
perhaps ordinarily, intended as
an instrument of credit; a check
purports to be drawn against a
fund or deposit of the drawer in
the hands of his bank; a bill
does not necessarily import
funds of the drawer in the hands
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of the drawee, but may be drawn
upon reasonable grounds that
the drawee will honor the bill;
all checks are intended for
prompt presentment, not all bills.
Authority to draw checks does
not necessarily include authority
to draw bills. Forster V. Mac
reth, L. R., 2 Exch. 163.
Crossed Checks.—Earlier than
1850 it was the practice of Eng
lish merchants and bankers to
cross checks, that is, to write or
stamp across the face of the
check some direction as to its
payment. See Bills of Exchange
Act, sec. 76-81. In Bellamy v.
Marjoribanks, 7 Ex. (W. H. &
G.) 389, decided in 1852, it was
held that the practice of cross
ing checks did not amount to a
fixed custom. In 1856 a declara
tory statute was enacted defining
the status of crossed checks and
providing that a crossed check
“shall be payable only to or
through some banker,” 19 & 20
Vict. ch. 25. In 1858 this statute
was amended, 21 & 22 Vict. ch. 79.
See Smith V. Bank, 1 Q. B. D.
31, 4 Eng. Rul. CaS. 436. The
Statutes above named were further
amended in 1876, 39 & 40 Vict.
ch. 80. This last statute is sub
stantially re-enacted in the Bills
Of Exchange Act. Bank V. Silke
[1891] 1 Q. B. 435, 4 Eng. Rul.
Cas. 440. The object of crossing
is protection to the drawer or
holder and caution to the bank.
The English usage is not prac
ticed in the United States. Dan
iel's Neg. Inst., 5th ed., Sec. 1585 a.
Sec. 188. Within what time a check must be presented.
—A check must be presented for payment within a
reasonable time after its issue, or the drawer will be dis
charged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss
caused by the delay."
1—See sec. 2, reasonable time.
This Section affirms the rule of
the common law. To meet the
requirements of this rule a check
must, in the absence of special
circumstances, be presented for
payment not later than the day
after it is received if the party re
ceiving the check and the drawee
bank are in the same place; if in
different places, the check must, in
the absence of special circum
stances, be forwarded not later
than the day after it is received.
Freiberg v. Cody, 55 Mich. 108;
Holmes v. Roe, 62 Mich. 199;
Hamilton v. Lumber Co., 95 Mich.
436; Haggerty v. Baldwin, 131
Mich. 187; Aebi v. Bank (Wis.),
102 N. W. 329 (a case under the
Statute). In this case the payee of
a check, drawn on a bank 17 miles
distant, deposited it in his bank
Sept. 21 and was credited with
the amount. The bank forward
ed it to the drawee bank but
failed for ten days to make in
quiry from the drawee bank and
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then found that the check haW
ing been lost had never reached
the drawee bank. Held, that this
delay was not excusable and that
the payee indorser was discharged
from liability.
As to reasonable time for pre
sentment of a check for payment
see Gifford V. Hardell, 88 Wis.
538; Lloyd V. Osborne, 92 Wis.
93; Grange v. Reigh, 93 Wis.
552; Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Drey
fus, 82 MO. App. 399; Hamlin
v. Simpson, 105 Ia. 125; Cox. V.
Boone, 8 W. Va. 500; Kershaw
V. Ladd, 34 Ore. 375; First Nat.
Bank v. Miller, 43 Neb. 791; Wil
lis v. Finley, 173 Pa. St. 28.
The insolvency of the drawee
bank is the only circumstance
under which the drawer Of a
check can be injured by failure
of presentment within a reason
able time. The drawer is injured
only to the extent of the loss
suffered by him. Heywood v.
Pickering, L. R. 9 Q. B. 428; Little
v. Phenix Bank, 2 Hill 425.
If the drawer has no fundS
upon deposit in the drawee bank
or subsequently withdraws them,
any delay in presentment or no
tice to him will be no defense,
as he can suffer no loss or dam
age from such delay. Industrial
Bank v. Bowes, 165 Ill. 70; First
Nat. Bank V. Linn, etc., 30 Ore.
296; Bell v. Alexander, 21 Gratt. 1.
Where the bank fails before
the expiration of the time allot
ted the payee in which to make
presentment, the loss falls on the
drawer. Holmes V. Roe, 62 Mich.
199; Kelty v. Bank, 52 Barb.
328; Bickford v. First Nat. Bank,
42 Ill. 238; Simpson v. Pacific
etc. Ins. Co., 44 Cal. 139; Wear
V. Lee, 87 Mo. 359; Tomlin V.
Thornton, 99 Ga. 585.
Failure of the holder to make
presentment within a reasonable
time discharges the indorser
whether he has suffered loss or
not. Carroll V. Sweet, 128 N. Y.
19, 27 N. E. 763; First Nat.
Bank V. Miller, 43 Neb. 791.
Death of the payee or indorser
of a check after it has been ne
gotiated cannot affect its nego
tiability or prevent the drawee
from safely paying it. Brennan
V. Merchants’ & MfrS. Nat. Bank,
62 Mich. 343.
A banker as such is bound to
honor his customer's check, when
duly presented, to the extent of
the balance which the customer
then has in his hands. Chal
mers' Digest 266 (Benjamin).
Whether the death of the drawer
revokes the authority of the bank
to pay the check is a disputed
question. Mr. Chalmers states
that the authority of a banker to
pay a check drawn on him by
his customer is determined by
notice of the customer's death.
This view is supported by: Nat.
Commercial Bank v. Miller, 77
Ala. 168. But see Raesser v. Nat.
Exchange Bank, 112 Wis. 591.
Mr. Crawford explains: “There
is no decision directly in point
and the Views of text writers
differ. To meet the difficulty the
original draft of the negotiable
instrument law. Submitted to the
commissioners contained a provi
Sion (which was taken from the
statute of Mass.) as follows:
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“The death of the drawer does
not operate as a revocation of
the authority to pay a check if
the check is presented for pay
ment within ten days from the
date thereof, but it was thought
by the commissioners that this
would be objected to in some of
the States because Of the effect
it might have on the estates of
decedents.”
Sec. 189. Certification of check; effect of.—Where a
check is certified by the bank on which it is drawn, the
certification is equivalent to an acceptance."
1—This section, which is de
claratory of the common law,
makes the certifier primarily
liable on the check. The certi
fication of a check is equivalent
to the acceptance of a bill. The
act of certifying, however, re
sembles the making of a note
rather than the accepting of a
bill, for example: 1st. The hold
er of a check presents it to the
drawee bank and demands and
receives $500, the amount of the
check, the transaction leaves the
bank with $500 less of cash and
$500 less of liability and uncon
cerned with the fact that Peter
has paid Paul. 2nd. The holder
demands and receives not cur
rency but a certificate of de
posit, the transaction leaves the
bank with liability to the draw
er decreased but with liability to
the holder of the certificate cor
respondingly increased, the bank
is not affected by the fact that
Paul took its promissory note
instead of its currency. 3rd. The
holder requests that the check be
certified, the bank complies with
the request, the drawer's account
is debited $500, the liability of
the bank is reduced $500, which
is offset by its outstanding obli
gation, and Peter is discharged
of liability as effectually as he
Was When Paul took the certifi
cate of deposit.
By the law merchant of this
country the certificate of a bank
that a check is good is equiva
lent to an acceptance. It implies
that the check is drawn upon
sufficient funds in the hands of
the drawee, that they have been
Set apart for his satisfaction and
that they will be so applied
whenever the check is presented
for payment. It is an undertak
ing that the check is good then
and shall continue good, and
this agreement is as binding
as its notes of circulation, a
certificate of deposit payable to
the Order of the depositor or
any other obligation it can as
Sume. The object of certifying a
check as regards both parties is
to enable the holder to use it as
money. The transferee takes it
with the same readiness and
sense of security that he would
take the notes of the bank. It is
available also to him for all the
purposes of money. Thus it con
tinues to perform its important
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function until in the course of
business it goes back to the bank
for redemption and is extin
guished by payment. Justice
Swayne, Merchants' Bank v. State
Bank, 10 Wallace 648; Drovers'
Nat. Bank V. Provision Co., 117
Ill. 106.
The certifier is liable to a
holder without notice notWith
standing a statute making it un
lawful for any officer, clerk or
employee of a bank to certify a
check unless the amount thereof
stands to the credit of the draw
er upon the books of the bank
and providing for the punish
ment of an offender against the
provisions of the statute. Union
Trust Co. V. Preston Nat. Bank
(Mich.), 99 N. W. 399.
Sec. 190. Effect where the holder of check procures it
to be certified.—Where the holder of a check procures
it to be accepted or certified, the drawer and all in
dorsers are discharged from liability thereon."
1—The holder of a check pro
curing it to be certified loses in
case of the bank’s failure. The
drawer procuring it to be certi
fied loses in case of the bank’s
failure. Where the holder pro
cures it to be certified the draw
er and the indorsers are dis
charged. Minot v. Russ, 156
Mass. 458; First Nat. Bank v.
Leach, 52 N. Y. 350; Metropoli
tan Nat. Bank V. Jones, 137 Ill.
634, 27 N. E. 533. "Herein lies
the difference between the certi
fication of a check procured by
the holder and the acceptance of
a bill; in the latter case when
payment is duly demanded from
the acceptor and refused and
notice of non-payment given, the
drawer and indorser are held;
in the case of certification, the
drawer and indorsers are dis
charged. Minot V. Russ, supra;
Born V. First Nat. Bank, 123
Ind. 78; Brown v. Leckie, 43
Ill. 497; First Nat. Bank v.
Whitman, 94 U. S. 343; Metro
politan Nat. Bank V. Jones, su
pra; Larson v. Breene, 12 Col.
480; Mutual Nat. Bank v. Rot
ge, 28 La. Ann. 933; Nat. Com
mercial Bank v. Miller, 77 Ala.
168. But if an indorser requests
Or consents to a certification he
is not discharged. Mutual Nat.
Bank V. Rotge, supra.
Where the drawer procures cer
tification of his own check before
delivery he is not discharged.
Minot v. Russ, supra; Metropoli
tan Nat. Bank V. Jones, supra;
Oyster & Fish Co. v. Bank, 51
Ohio St. 106, 36 N. E. 833; Born
v. First Nat. Bank, supra. The
same rule applies when the payee
before delivery to him requests
the drawer to procure the check
to be certified. Randolph Nat.
Bank v. Hornblower, 160 Mass.
401, 35 N. E. 850. In Meuer V.
Phenix Nat. Bank, 94 App. Div.
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331, 88 N. Y. Supp. 83 (a case
under the statute), it was held
that where a bank at the re
quest of the holder certified a
check not indorsed by the payee,
the cashier not knowing or in
quiring for whom it was being
certified, the bank was liable on
such certification, as the holder
got title to the check by its de
livery to him without indorse
ment, though such delivery de
stroyed its negotiability. See
Cullinan v. Union Surety & Guar
anty Co., 79 App. Div. 409, 80
N. Y. Supp. 58 (a case under the
Statute).
Sec. 191. When check operates as an assignment.—A
check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any
part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the
bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder unless and
until it accepts or certifies the check."
1—Whether, in the absence of
statute, a check operates as an
assignment of any part of the
funds in the hands of the drawee
is a disputed question. That the
check does not operate as an as
signment: Brennan v. Merchants
& Manufacturers Nat. Bank, 62
Mich. 343; McIntyre V. Farmers
and Merchants Bank, 115 Mich.
255; Sunderlin V. Mecosta Co.
Savings Bank, 116 Mich. 281;
Bank of the Republic v. Millard,
10 Wall. 152; First Nat. Bank
v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343; La
clede Bank V. Schuler, 120 U. S.
511; Florence Mining Co. v.
Brown, 124 U. S. 385; St. Louis
etc. R. R. Co. v. Johnston, 133
U. S. 566; Fourth St. Bank v.
Yardley, 165 U. S. 634; O'Conner
V. Mechanics Bank, 124 N. Y.
324; Maginn v. Dollar Savings
Bank, 131 Pa. St. 362; Creveling
V. Bloomburg Nat. Bank, 46 N.
J. Law, 255; Nat. Commercial
Bank v. Miller, 77 Ala. 172;
Pickle v. Muse, 88 Tenn. 380.
That the check operates as an as
signment: Simmons Hardware Co.
v. Bank, 41 S. C. 177, 19 S. E. 509;
Fonner v. Smith, 31 Neb. 107, 28
Am. St. 510; Gordon v. Muchler,
34 La. Ann. 604; Wyman v. Ft.
Dearborn Nat. Bank, 181 Ill. 279;
Roberts v. Austin Corbin & Co., 26
Ia. 315; Blades v. Grant Co., Dep.
Bank, 101 Ky. 163, 40 S. W. 246;
Coates v. Doran, 83 Mo. 337; Rip
ley Nat. Bank v. Latimer, 64 Mo.
App. 321; Raesser V. Nat. Ex
change Bank, 112 Wis. 591. In
this case the court said that
prior to the enactment of the ne
gotiable instrument law it was
settled in Wisconsin that the giv
ing of a check for value on an
Ordinary bank deposit would be
construed to intend an assign
ment of the funds pro tanto as
between the maker and the payee.
Nat. Bank v. Berrall (N. J.
1904), 58 Atl. 189 (a case under
the statute). The court said, in
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this case, that the statute af
firmed the law as it had been
established in New Jersey, and
that the holder of a check has
no contract with the bank on
which it is drawn and no legal
right to exact payment; Balti
more and Ohio R. CO. V. First
Nat. Bank (Va. 1904), 47 S.E. 837
(a case under the statute).
Even in those jurisdictions
where the giving of a check does
not operate as an assignment of
the fund, it has been held that
the parties may, by agreement,
create such an assignment that
Sec. 192.
the actual intention of the par
ties will prevail, and that such
agreement may be oral or Writ
ten. Fourth St. Bank V. Yardley,
165 U. S. 634; Throop Grain
Cleaner Co. v. Smith, 110 N. Y.
83; First Nat. Bank V. Clark,
134 N. Y. 368. As to the liability
Of the drawee bank to the draw.
er for refusing to honor the
check See Atlanta Nat. Bank V.
Davis, 96 Ga. 334; Schaffner V.
Ehrman, 139 Ill. 109; Patterson
v. Marine Nat. Bank, 130 Pa. St.
419; Bank of Commerce V. Goos,
39 Neb. 437.
Inconsistent laws repealed.—All acts and
parts of acts inconsistent with the foregoing provisions
of this act are hereby repealed.
Approved June 16, 1905.

APPENDIX.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT, 1882.
45 AND 46 VICT., CH. 61.
An act to codify the law relating to bills of exchange, cheques, and
promissory notes.
[18th August, 1882.]
Be it enacted by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with
the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Com
mons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of
the same, as follows:
PART I.
PRELIMINARY.
1. Short title.
This act may be cited as the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882.
2. Interpretation of terms.
In this act, unless the context otherwise requires
“Acceptance” means an acceptance completed by delivery or
notification.
“Action ” includes counter-claim and set-off.
“Banker” includes a body of persons, whether incorporated or
not, who carry on the business of banking.
“Bankrupt” includes any person whose estate is vested in a trus
tee or assignee, under the law for the time being in force relat
ing to bankruptcy.
“Bearer” means the person in possession of a bill or note which
is payable to bearer.
“Bill” means bill of exchange, and “note” means promissory
note.
“Delivery” means transfer of possession, actual or constructive,
from one person to another.
235
236 APPENDIX.
“Holder” means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in
possession of it, or the bearer thereof.
“Indorsement” means an indorsement completed by delivery.
“Issue” means the first delivery of a bill or note, complete in
form, to a person who takes it as a holder.
“Person ” includes a body of persons, whether incorporated or not.
“Value” means valuable consideration.
“Written’’ includes printed, and “writing” includes print.
PART II.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
Form and Interpretation.
3. Bill of exchange defined.
(1) A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing, ad
dressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requir
ing the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed
or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to or to the order
of a specified person, or to bearer.
(2) An instrument which does not comply with these conditions, or
which orders any act to be done in addition to the payment of money,
is not a bill of exchange.
(3) An order to pay out of a particular fund is not unconditional
within the meaning of this section; but an unqualified order to pay,
coupled with (a) an indication of a particular fund out of which the
drawee is to re-imburse himself or a particular account to be debited
with the amount, or (b) a statement of the transaction which gives
rise to the bill, is unconditional.
(4) A bill is not invalid by reason—
(a) That it is not dated;
(b) That it does not specify the value given, or that any value
has been given therefor;
(c) That it does not specify the place where it is drawn or the
place where it is payable.
4. Inland and foreign bills.
(1) An inland bill is a bill which is
,
o
r
on the face o
f it purports
to be—(a) both drawn and payable within the British Islands, or (b)
drawn within the British Islands upon Some person resident therein.
Any other bill is a foreign bill.
For the purposes of this act “British Islands” mean any part of the
United Kingdom o
f
Great Britain and Ireland, the Islands o
f Man,
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Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, and Sark, and the Islands adjacent to any
of them being part of the dominions of Her Majesty.
(2) Unless the contrary appear on the face of the bill the holder
may treat it as an inland bill.
5. Effect where different parties to bill are the same person.
(1) A bill may be drawn payable to, or to the order of, the drawer;
or it may be drawn payable to, or to the order of, the drawee.
(2) Where in a bill drawer and drawee are the same person, or where
the drawee is a fictitious person or a person not having capacity to
contract, the holder may treat the instrument, at his option, either as
a bill of exchange or as a promissory note.
6. Address to drawee.
(1) The drawee must be named or otherwise indicated in a bill
With reasonable certainty.
(2) A bill may be addressed to two or more drawees whether they
are partners or not, but an order addressed to two drawees in the
alternative, or two or more drawees in succession, is not a bill of
exchange.
7. Certainty required as to payee.
(1) Where a bill is not payable to bearer, the payee must be named
or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty.
(2) A bill may be made payable to two or more payees jointly, or
it may be made payable in the alternative to one of two, or one or some
of several payees. A bill may also be made payable to the holder of an
office for the time being.
(3) Where the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person, the bill
may be treated as payable to bearer.
8. What bills are negotiable.
(1) When a bill contains words prohibiting transfer, or indicating
an intention that it should not be transferable, it is valid as between
the parties thereto, but is not negotiable.
(2) A negotiable bill may be payable either to order or to bearer.
(3) A bill is payable to bearer which is expressed to be so payable,
or on which the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank.
(4) A bill is payable to order which is expressed to be so payable,
or which is expressed to be payable to a particular person, and does
not contain words prohibiting transfer or indicating an intention that
it should not be transferable.
(5) Where a bill, either originally or by indorsement, is expressed
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to be payable to the order of a specified person, and not to him or his
order, it is nevertheless payable to him or his order at his option.
9. Sum payable.
(1) The sum payable by a bill is a sum certain within the meaning
of this act, although it is required to be paid
(a) With interest.
(b) By stated instalments.
(c) By stated instalments, with a provision that upon default in
payment of any instalment the whole shall become due.
(d) According to an indicated rate of exchange, or according to
a rate of exchange to be ascertained as directed by the bill.
(2) Where the sum payable is expressed in words and also in figures,
and there is a discrepancy between the two, the sum denoted by the
words is the amount payable.
(3) Where a bill is expressed to be payable with interest, unless the
instrument otherwise provides, interest runs from the date of the bill,
and if the bill is undated from the issue thereof.
10. Bill payable on demand.
(1) A bill is payable on demand
(a) Which is expressed to be payable on demand, or at sight,
or on presentation; or
(b) In which no time for payment is expressed. .
(2) Where a bill is accepted or indorsed when it is overdue, it shall,
as regards the acceptor who so accepts, or any indorser who so indorses
it, be deemed a bill payable on demand.
11. Bill payable at a future time.
A bill is payable at a determinable future time within the meaning
of this act which is expressed to be payable
(1) At a fixed period after date or sight.
(2) On or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a specified event
which is certain to happen, though the time of happening may be
uncertain. -
An instrument expressed to be payable on a contingency is not a bill,
and the happening of the event does not cure the defect.
12. Omission of date in bill payable after date.
Where a bill expressed to be payable at a fixed period after date is
issued undated, or where the acceptance of a bill payable at a fixed
period after sight is undated, any holder may insert therein the true
date of issue or acceptance, and the bill shall be payable accordingly.
Provided that (1) where the holder in good faith and by mistake
inserts a wrong date, and (2) in every case where a Wrong date is
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inserted, if the bill subsequently comes into the hands of a holder in
due course, the bill shall not be avoided thereby, but shall operate
and be payable as if the date so inserted had been the true date.
13. Ante-dating and post-dating.
Where a bill or an acceptance or any indorsement on a bill is dated,
the date shall, unless the contrary be proved, be deemed to be the true
date of the drawing, acceptance or indorsement, as the case may be.
(2) A bill is not invalid by reason only that it is ante-dated or post
dated, or that it bears date on a Sunday.
14. Computation of time of payment.
Where a bill is not payable on demand, the day on which it falls due
is determined as follows:
(1) Three days, called days of grace, are, in every case where the
bill itself does not otherwise provide, added to the time of payment
as fixed by the bill, and the bill is due and payable on the last day
of grace:
Provided that—
(a) When the last day of grace falls on Sunday, Christmas
Day, Good Friday, or a day appointed by Royal proclamation
as a public fast or thanksgiving day, the bill is, except in the
case hereinafter provided for, due and payable on the pre
ceding business day;
(b) When the last day of grace is a bank holiday (other than
Christmas day or Good Friday) under the Bank Holidays
Act, 1871,” and acts amending or extending it, or when the
last day of grace is a Sunday and the second day of grace
is a bank holiday, the bill is due and payable on the suc
ceeding business day.
(2) Where a bill is payable at a fixed period after date, after sight,
or after the happening of a specified event, the time of payment is
determined by excluding the day from which the time is to begin to
run and by including the day of payment.
(3) Where a bill is payable at a fixed period after sight, the time
begins to run from the date of the acceptance if the bill be accepted,
and from the date of noting or protest if the bill be noted or protested
for non-acceptance or for non-delivery.
(4) The term “month” in a bill means calendar month.
15. Case of need.
The drawer of a bill and any indorser may insert therein the name
of a person to whom the holder may resort in case of need, that is to
say, in case the bill is dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment.
*34 and 35 Vict. ch. 17.
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Such person is called the referee in case of need. It is in the option
of the holder to resort to the referee in case of need or not as he may
think fit.
16. Optional stipulations by drawer or indorser.
The drawer of a bill, and any indorser, may insert therein an
express stipulation
(1) Negativing or limiting his own liability to the holder;
(2) Waiving as regards himself some or all of the holder's duties.
17. Definition and requisites of acceptance.
(1) The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of
his assent to the Order of the drawer.
(2) An acceptance is invalid unless it complies with the following"
conditions, namely:
(a) It must be written on the bill and be signed by the drawee.
The mere signature of the drawee without additional words
is sufficient.
(b) It must not express that the drawee will perform his prom
ise by any other means than the payment of money.
18. Time for acceptance.
A bill may be accepted
(1) Before it has been signed by the drawer, or while otherwise
incomplete:
(2) When it is overdue, or after it has been dishonored by a pre
vious refusal to accept, or by non-payment:
(3) When a bill payable after sight is dishonored by non-acceptance,
and the drawee subsequently accepts it, the holder, in the absence of
any different agreement, is entitled to have the bill accepted as of the
date of first presentment to the drawee for acceptance.
19. General and qualified acceptances.
(1) An acceptance is either (a) general or (b) qualified.
(2) A general acceptance assents without qualification to the order
of the drawer. A qualified acceptance in express terms varies the
effect of the bill as drawn.
In particular an acceptance is qualified which is—
(a) Conditional, that is to say, which makes payment by the
acceptor dependent on the fulfillment of a condition therein
stated:
(b) Partial, that is to say, an acceptance to pay part only of
the amount for which the bill is drawn:
(c) Local, that is to say, an acceptance to pay only at a par
ticular specified place:
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An acceptance to pay at a particular place is a general accept
ance unless it expressly states that the bill is to be paid
there only and not elsewhere:
(d) Qualified as to time:
(e) The acceptance of SOme One or more of the drawees, but not
of all.
20. Inchoate instruments.
(1) Where a simple signature On a blank Stamped paper is delivered
by the signer in Order that it may be converted into bill, it operates
as a prima facie authority to fill it up as a complete bill for any
amount the stamp will cover, using the signature for that of the
drawer, or the acceptor, or an indorser; and, in like manner, when a
bill is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession
of it has a prima facie authority to fill up the omission in any way
he thinks fit.
(2) In order that any such instrument when completed may be
enforceable against any person who became a party thereto prior to
its completion, it must be filled up within a reasonable time, and
strictly in accordance with the authority given.
Reasonable time for this purpose is a question of fact.
Provided that if any such instrument after completion is negotiated
to a holder in due course, it shall be valid and effectual for all pur
poses in his hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up
Within a reasonable time and strictly in accordance with the author
ity given.
21. Delivery.
(1) Every contract on a bill, whether it be the drawer's, the
acceptor's, or an indorser's, is incomplete and revocable, until delivery
of the instrument in order to give effect thereto.
Provided that where an acceptance is written on a bill, and the
drawee gives notice to or according to the directions of the person
entitled to the bill that he has accepted it, the acceptance then becomes
complete and irrevocable.
(2) As between immediate parties, and as regards a remote party
Other than a holder in due course, the delivery—
(a) In order to be effectual must be made either by or under
the authority of the party drawing, accepting, or indorsing,
as the case may be:
(b) May be shown to have been conditional or for a special
purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the
property in the bill.
But if the bill be in the hands of a holder in due course a valid
16
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delivery of the bill by all parties prior to him so as to make them
liable to him is conclusively presumed.
(3) Where a bill is no longer in the possession of a party who has
signed it as drawer, acceptor, or indorser, a valid and unconditional
delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved.
Capacity and Authority of Parties.
22. Capacity of parties.
(1) Capacity to incur liability as a party to a bill is co-extensive with
capacity to contract.
Provided that nothing in this section shall enable a corporation to
make itself liable as drawer, acceptor, or indorser of a bill unless it is
competent to it so to do under the law for the time being in force
relating to corporations.
(2) Where a bill is drawn or indorsed by an infant, minor, or
corporation having no capacity or power to incur liability on a bill,
the drawing or indorsement entitles the holder to receive payment of
the bill, and to enforce it against any other party thereto.
23. Signature essential to liability.
No person is liable as drawer, indorser, or acceptor of a bill who has
not signed it as such:
Provided that—
(1) Where a person signs a bill in a trade or assumed name, he is
liable thereon as if he had signed it in his own name:
(2) The signature of the name of a firm is equivalent to the signa
ture by the person so signing of the names of all persons liable as
partners in that firm.
24. Forged or unauthorized signature.
Subject to the provisions of this Act, where a signature on a bill
is forged or placed thereon without the authority of the person whose
signature it purports to be, the forged or unauthorized signature is
wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the bill, or to give a dis
charge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party
thereto, can be acquired through or under that signature, unless the
party against whom it is sought to retain or enforce payment of the
bill is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the ratification of
an unauthorized signature not amounting to a forgery.
25. Procuration signatures.
A signature by procuration operates as notice that the agent has
but a limited authority to sign, and the principal is only bound by
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such signature if the agent in so signing was acting within the actual
limits of his authority.
26. Person signing as agent or in representative capacity.
(1) Where a person signs a bill as drawer, indorser, or acceptor,
and adds words to his signature indicating that he signs for or on
behalf of a principal, or in a representative character, he is not per
sonally liable thereon; but the mere addition to his signature of Words
describing him as an agent, or as filling a representative character,
does not exempt him from personal liability.
(2) In determining whether a signature on a bill is that of the
principal or that of the agent by whose hand it is written, the con
struction most favorable to the Validity of the instrument shall be
adopted.
The Consideration for a Bill.
27. Value and holder for Value.
(1) Valuable consideration for a bill may be constituted by
(a) Any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract;
(b) An antecedent debt or liability. Such a debt or liability is
deemed valuable consideration whether the bill is payable
on demand or at a future time.
(2) Where value has at any time been given for a bill the holder is
deemed to be a holder for value as regards the acceptor and all parties
to the bill who became parties prior to such time.
(3) Where the holder of a bill has a lien on it, arising either from
contract or by implication of law, he is deemed to be a holder for
value to the extent of the sum for which he has a lien.
28. Accommodation bill or party.
(1) An accommodation party to a bill is a person who has signed
a bill as drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor,
and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person.
(2) An accommodation party is liable on the bill to a holder for
value; and it is immaterial whether, when such holder took the bill,
he knew such party to be an accommodation party or not.
29. Holder in due course.
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who has taken a bill, com
plete and regular on the face of it, under the following conditions;
namely,
(a) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and
without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if
such was the fact:
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(b) That he took the bill in good faith and for value, and that
at the time the bill was negotiated to him he had no notice
of any defect in the title of the person who negotiated it.
(2) In particular the title of a person who negotiates a bill is de
fective within the meaning of this Act when he obtained the bill, or
the acceptance thereof, by fraud, duress, or force and fear, or other
unlawful means, or for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates
it in breach of faith, or under Such circumstances as amount to a
fraud.
(3) A holder (whether for value or not), who derives his title to a
bill through a holder in due course, and who is not himself a party
to any fraud or illegality affecting it, has all the rights of that holder
in due course as regards the acceptor and all parties to the bill prior
to that holder.
30. Presumption of value and good faith.
(1) Every party whose signature appears on a bill is prima facie
deemed to have become a party thereto for value.
(2) Every holder of a bill is prima facie deemed to be a holder in
due course; but if in an action on a bill it is admitted or proved that
the acceptance, issue, or subsequent negotiation of the bill, is affected
with fraud, duress, or force and fear, or illegality, the burden of proof
is shifted, unless and until the holder proves that, subsequent to the
alleged fraud or illegality, value has in good faith been given for the
bill.
Negotiation of Bills.
31. Negotiation of bill.
(1) A bill is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to
another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder
of the bill.
(2) A bill payable to bearer is negotiated by delivery.
(3) A bill payable to order is negotiated by the indorsement of the
holder completed by delivery.
(4) Where the holder of a bill payable to his order transfers it for
Value Without indorsing it, the transfer gives the transferee such title
as the transferor had in the bill, and the transferee in addition ac
quires the right to have the indorsement of the transferor.
(5) Where any person is under obligation to indorse a bill in a
representative capacity, he may indorse the bill in such terms as to
negative personal liability.
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32. Requisites of a valid indorsement.
An indorsement in order to operate as a negotiation must comply
with the following conditions, namely:
(1) It must be written on the bill itself and be signed by the in
dorser. The simple signature of the indorser on the bill, without addi
tional words, is sufficient.
An indorsement written on an allonge, or on a “copy” of a bill
issued or negotiated in a country where “copies” are recognized, is
deemed to be written on the bill itself.
(2) It must be an indorsement of the entire bill. A partial in
dorsement, that is to say, an indorsement which purports to transfer
to the indorsee a part only of the amount payable, or which purports
to transfer the bill to two or more indorsees severally, does not operate
as a negotiation of the bill.
(3) Where a bill is payable to the order of two or more payees or
indorsees who are not partners all must indorse, unless the one in
dorsing has authority to indorse for the others.
(4) Where, in a bill payable to order, the payee or indorsee is
wrongly designated, or his name is misspelt, he may indorse the bill as
therein described adding, if he thinks fit, his proper signature.
(5) Where there are two or more indorsements on a bill, each in
dorsement is deemed to have been made in the order in which it ap
pears on the bill, until the contrary is proved.
(6) An indorsement may be made in blank or special. It may also
contain terms making it restrictive.
33. Conditional indorsement.
Where a bill purports to be indorsed conditionally, the condition
may be disregarded by the payer, and payment to the indorsee is valid
whether the condition has been fulfilled or not.
34. Indorsement in blank and special indorsement.
(1) An indorsement in blank specifies no indorsee, and a bill so
indorsed becomes payable to bearer.
(2) A special indorsement Specifies the person to whom, or to whose
order, the bill is to be payable.
(3) The provisions of this Act relating to a payee apply with the
necessary modifications to an indorsee under a special indorsement.
(4) When a bill has been indorsed in blank, any holder may convert
the blank indorsement into a special indorsement by writing above
the indorser's signature a direction to pay the bill to or to the order
of himself or some other person.
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35. Restrictive indorsement.
(1) An indorsement is restrictive which prohibits the further nego
tiation of the bill, or which expresses that it is a mere authority to
deal with the bill as thereby directed, and not a transfer of the owner
ship thereof, as, for example, if a bill be indorsed “Pay D. only,” or
“Pay D. for the account of X.” or “Pay D. or order for collection.”
(2) A restrictive indorsement gives the indorsee the right to re
ceive payment of the bill and to sue any party thereto that his indorser
could have sued, but gives him no power to transfer his rights as in
dorsee unless it expressly authorize him to do so.
(3) Where a restrictive indorsement authorizes further transfer, all
subsequent indorsees take the bill with the same rights and Subject
to the same liabilities as the first indorsee under the restrictive in
dorsement.
36. Negotiation of overdue or dishonoured bill.
(1) Where a bill is negotiable in its origin it continues to be nego
tiable until it has been (a) restrictively indorsed or (b) discharged
by payment or otherwise.
(2) Where an overdue bill is negotiated, it can only be negotiated
subject to any defect of title affecting it at its maturity, and thence
forward no person who takes it can acquire or give a better title than
that which the person from whom he took it had.
(3) A bill payable on demand is deemed to be overdue within the
meaning and for the purposes of this section, when it appears on the
face of it to have been in circulation for an unreasonable length of
time. What is an unreasonable length of time for this purpose is a
question of fact.
(4) Except where an indorsement bears date after the maturity of
the bill, every negotiation is prima facie deemed to have been effected
before the bill Was Overdue.
(5) Where a bill which is not overdue has been dishonoured any
person who takes it with notice of the dishonour takes it subject to
any defect of title attaching thereto at the time of dishonour, but
nothing in this sub-section shall affect the rights of a holder in due
course.
37. Negotiation of bill to party already liable thereon.
Where a bill is negotiated back to the drawer, or to a prior in
dorser, or to the acceptor, such party may, subject to the provisions of
this Act, re-issue and further negotiate the bill, but he is not entitled
to enforce payment of the bill against any intervening party to whom
he was previously liable.
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38. Rights of the holder.
The rights and powers of the holder of a bill are as follows:
(1) He may sue on the bill in his own name:
(2) Where he is a holder in due course, he holds the bill free from
any defect of title of prior parties, as well as from mere personal
defences available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce
payment against all parties liable on the bill:
(3) Where his title is defective (a) if he negotiates the bill to a
holder in due course, that holder obtains a good and complete title to
the bill, and (b) if he obtains payment of the bill the person who
pays him in due course gets a valid discharge for the bill.
General Duties of the Holder.
39. When presentment for acceptance is necessary.
(1) Where a bill is payable after sight, presentment for acceptance
is necessary in order to fix the maturity of the instrument.
(2) Where a bill expressly stipulates that it shall be presented for
acceptance, or where a bill is drawn payable elsewhere than at the
residence or place of business of the drawee, it must be presented for
acceptance before it can be presented for payment.
(3) In no other case is presentment for acceptance necessary in
order to render liable any party to the bill.
(4) Where the holder of a bill, drawn payable elsewhere than at
the place of business or residence of the drawee, has not time, with
the exercise of reasonable diligence, to present the bill for acceptance
before presenting it for payment on the day that it falls due, the de
lay caused by presenting the bill for acceptance before presenting it
for payment is excused, and does not discharge the drawer and in
dorserS.
40. Time for presenting bill payable after sight.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, when a bill payable after
sight is negotiated, the holder must either present it for acceptance
or negotiate it within a reasonable time.
(2) If he do not do so, the drawer and all indorsers prior to that
holder are discharged.
(3) In determining what is a reasonable time within the meaning
of this section, regard shall be had to the nature of the bill, the usage
of trade with respect to similar bills, and the facts of the particular
CRS e.
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41. Rules as to presentment for acceptance, and excuses for non-pre
Sentment.
(1) A bill is duly presented for acceptance which is presented in
accordance with the following rules:
(a) The presentment must be made by or on behalf of the
holder to the drawee, or to some person authorized to accept
Or refuse acceptance on his behalf, at a reasonable hour on
a business day and before the bill is overdue:
(b) Where a bill is addressed to two or more drawees, who are
not partners, presentment must be made to them all, unless
One has authority to accept for all, then presentment may
be made to him only:
(c) Where the drawee is dead, presentment may be made to his
personal representative:
(d) Where the drawee is bankrupt, presentment may be made
to him or his trustee:
(e) Where authorized by agreement or usage, a presentment
through the post office is sufficient.
(2) Presentment in accordance with these rules is excused, and a
bill may be treated as dishonoured by non-acceptance—
(a) Where the drawee is dead, or is a fictitious person or a
person not having capacity to contract by bill:
(b) Where, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, such pre
Sentment cannot be effected:
(c) Where, although the presentment has been irregular, ac
ceptance has been refused on some other ground.
(3) The fact that the holder has reason to believe that the bill, on
presentment, will be dishonoured does not excuse presentment.
42. Non-acceptance.
(1) When a bill is duly presented for acceptance and is not accepted
within the customary time, the person presenting it must treat it as
dishonoured by non-acceptance. If he do not, the holder shall lose
his right of recourse against the drawer and indorsers.
43. Dishonour by non-acceptance and its consequences.
(1) A bill is dishonoured by non-acceptance
(a) When it is duly presented for acceptance, and such an ac
ceptance as is prescribed by this act is refused or cannot be
obtained; or
(b) When presentment for acceptance is excused and the bill
is not accepted.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, when a bill is dishonoured
by non-acceptance, an immediate right of recourse against the drawer
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and indorsers accrues to the holder, and no presentment for payment
is neceSSary.
44. Duties as to qualified acceptances.
(1) The holder of a bill may refuse to take a qualified acceptance,
and if he does not obtain an unqualified acceptance may treat the bill
as dishonoured by non-acceptance.
(2) Where a qualified acceptance is taken, and the drawer or an in
dorser has not expressly or impliedly authorized the holder to take
a qualified acceptance, or does not subsequently assent thereto, such
drawer or indorser is discharged from his liability on the bill.
The provisions of this sub-section do not apply to a partial accept
ance, whereof due notice has been given. Where a foreign bill has
been accepted as to part, it must be protested as to the balance.
(3) When the drawer or indorser of a bill receives notice of a
qualified acceptance, and does not within a reasonable time express his
dissent to the holder, he shall be deemed to have assented thereto.
45. Rules as to presentment for payment.
Subject to the provisions of this Act, a bill must be duly presented
for payment. If it be not so presented the drawer and indorsers
shall be discharged.
A bill is duly presented for payment which is presented in accord
ance with the following rules:
(1) Where the bill is not payable on demand, presentment must be
made on the day it falls due.
(2) Where the bill is payable on demand, then, subject to the pro
visions of this Act, presentment must be made within a reasonable
time after its issue in order to render the drawer liable, and within
a reasonable time after its indorsement, in order to render the in
dorser liable.
In determining what is a reasonable time, regard shall be had to
the nature of the bill, the usage of trade with regard to similar bills,
and the facts of the particular case.
(3) Presentment must be made by the holder or by some person
authorized to receive payment on his behalf at a reasonable hour on a
business day, at the proper place as hereinafter defined, either to the
person designated by the bill as payer, or to some person authorized
to pay or refuse payment on his behalf if with the exercise of reason
able diligence such person can there be found.
(4) A bill is presented at the proper place:
(a) Where a place of payment is specified in the bill and the
bill is there presented.
(b) Where no place of payment is specified, but the address
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of the drawee or acceptor is given in the bill, and the bill
is there presented.
(c) Where no place of payment is specified and no address
given, and the bill is presented at the drawee's or acceptor's
place of business if known, and if not, at his ordinary resi
dence if knoWIm.
(d) In any other case if presented to the drawee or acceptor
wherever he can be found, or if presented at his last known
place of business or residence.
(5) Where a bill is presented at the proper place, and after the ex
ercise of reasonable diligence no person authorized to pay or refuse
payment can be found there, no further presentment to the drawee or
acceptor is required.
(6) Where a bill is drawn upon, or accepted by two or more per
sons who are not partners, and no place of payment is specified, pre
sentment must be made to them all.
(7) Where the drawee or acceptor of a bill is dead, and no place
of payment is specified, presentment must be made to a personal repre
sentative, if such there be, and with the exercise of reasonable dili
gence he can be found.
(8) Where authorized by agreement or usage a presentment through
the post-office is sufficient.
46. Excuses for delay or non-presentment for payment.
(1) Delay in making presentment for payment is excused when the
delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the holder,
and not imputable to his default, misconduct, or negligence. When
the cause of delay ceases to operate presentment must be made with
reasonable diligence.
(2) Presentment for payment is dispensed with,
(a) Where, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, present
ments as required by this Act, cannot be effected.
The fact that the holder has reason to believe that the bill will, on
presentment, be dishonoured, does not dispense with the necessity
for presentment. -
(b) Where the drawee is a fictitious person.
(c) As regards the drawer where the drawee or acceptoi is not
bound, as between himself and the drawer, to accept or pay
the bill, and the drawer has no reason to believe that the bill
Would be paid if presented.
(d) As regards an indorser, where the bill was accepted or
made for the accommodation of that indorser, and he has no
reason to expect that the bill would be paid if presented.
(e) By waiver of presentment, express or implied.
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47. Dishonour by non-payment.
(1) A bill is dishonoured by non-payment (a) when it is duly pre
Sented for payment and payment is refused or cannot be obtained, or
(b) when presentment is excused and the bill is overdue and unpaid.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, when a bill is dishonoured
by non-payment, an immediate right of recourse against the drawer
and indorsers accrues to the holder.
48. Notice of dishonour and effect of non-notice.
Subject to the provisions of this Act, when a bill has been dishon
oured by non-acceptance or by non-payment, notice of dishonour must
be given to the drawer and each indorser, and any drawer or indorser
to whom such notice is not given is discharged;
Provided that—
(1) Where a bill is dishonoured by non-acceptance, and notice of
dishonour is not given, the rights of a holder in due course Subsequent
to the omission, shall not be prejudiced by the Omission.
(2) Where a bill is dishonoured by non-acceptance, and due notice
of dishonor is given, it shall not be necessary to give notice of a sub
sequent dishonour by non-payment unless the bill shall in the mean
time have been accepted.
49. Rules as to notice of dishonour.
Notice of dishonour in order to be valid and effectual must be given
in accordance with the following rules:
(1) The notice must be given by or on behalf of the holder, or by or
on behalf of an indorser who, at the time of giving it, is himself liable
on the bill.
(2) Notice of dishonour may be given by an agent either in his own
name, or in the name of any party entitled to give notice whether
that party be his principal or not.
(3) Where the notice is given by or on behalf of the holder, it
enures for the benefit of all subsequent holders and all prior indorsers
who have a right of recourse against the party to whom it is given.
(4) Where notice is given by or on behalf of an indorser entitled
to give notice as hereinbefore provided, it enures for the benefit of
the holder and all indorsers subsequent to the party to whom notice is
given.
(5) The notice may be given in writing or by personal communica
tion, and may be given in any terms which sufficiently identify the
bill, and intimate that the bill has been dishonoured by non-acceptance
Or non-payment.
(6) The return of a dishonoured bill to the drawer or an indorser
is, in point of form, deemed a sufficient notice of dishonour.
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(7) A written notice need not be signed, and an insufficient written
notice may be supplemented and Validated by verbal communication.
A misdescription of the bill shall not vitiate the notice unless the
party to whom the notice is given is in fact misled thereby.
(8) Where notice of dishonour is required to be given to any per
son, it may be given either to the party himself, or to his agent in
that behalf.
(9) Where the drawer or indorser is dead, and the party giving
notice knows it, the notice must be given to a personal representative,
if such there be, and with the exercise of reasonable diligence he can
be found.
(10) Where the drawer or indorser is bankrupt, notice may be given
either to the party himself or to the trustee.
(11) Where there are two or more drawers or indorsers who are
not partners notice must be given to each of them, unless one of them
has authority to receive such notice for the others.
(12) The notice may be given as soon as the bill is dishonoured,
and must be given within a reasonable time thereafter.
In the absence of special circumstances notice is not deemed to
have been given within a reasonable time, unless
(a) Where the person giving and the person to receive notice
reside in the same place, the notice is given or Sent Off in
time to reach the latter on the day after the dishonour of
the bill.
(b) Where the person giving and the person to receive notice
reside in different places, the notice is sent off on the day
after the dishonour of the bill, if there be a post at a con
venient hour on that day, and if there be no such post on
that day then by the next post thereafter.
(13) Where a bill when dishonoured is in the hands of an agent, he
may either himself give notice to the parties liable on the bill, or he
may give notice to his principal. If he give notice to his principal,
he must do so within the same time as if he were the holder, and the
principal upon receipt of such notice has himself the same time for
giving notice as if the agent had been an independent holder.
(14) Where a party to a bill receives due notice of dishonour, he
has after the receipt of such notice the same period of time for giving
notice to antecedent parties that the holder has after the dishonour.
(15) Where a notice of dishonour is duly addressed and posted,
the sender is deemed to have given due notice of dishonour, notwith
standing any miscarriage by the post-office.
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50. Excuses for non-notice and delay.
(1) Delay in giving notice of dishonour is excused where the delay
is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the party giving
notice, and not imputable to his default, misconduct, or negligence.
When the cause of delay ceases to operate the notice must be given
with reasonable diligence.
(2) Notice of dishonour is dispensed with—
(a) When, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, notice as
required by this act cannot be given to or does not reach
the drawer or indorser sought to be charged:
(b) By waiver, express or implied. Notice of dishonour may be
waived before the time of giving notice has arrived, or after
the omission to give due notice:
(c) As regards the drawer in the following cases, namely, (1)
where drawer and drawee are the same person, (2) where
the drawee is a fictitious person or a person not having
capacity to contract, (3) where the drawer is the person to
whom the bill is presented for payment, (4) where the
drawee or acceptor is as between himself and the drawer
under no obligation to accept or pay the bill, (5) where the
drawer has countermanded payment:
(d) As regards the indorser in the following cases, namely (1)
where the drawee is a fictitious person or a person not
having capacity to contract and the indorser was aware of
the fact at the time he indorsed the bill, (2) where the in
dorser is the person to whom the bill is presented for pay
ment, (3) where the bill was accepted or made for his ac
commodation.
51. Noting or protest of bill.
(1) Where an inland bill has been dishonoured it may, if the
holder think fit, be noted for non-acceptance or non-payment, as the
case may be; but it shall not be necessary to note or protest any such
bill in order to preserve the recourse against the drawer or indorser.
(2) Where a foreign bill, appearing on the face of it to be such,
has been dishonoured by non-acceptance it must be duly protested for
non-acceptance, and where such a bill, which has not been previously
dishonoured by non-acceptance, is dishonoured by non-payment it
must be duly protested for non-payment. If it be not so protested the
drawer and indorsers are discharged. Where a bill does not appear
on the face of it to be a foreign bill, protest thereof in case of dis
honour is unnecessary.
(3) A bill which has been protested for non-acceptance may be sub
Bequently protested for non-payment.
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(4) Subject to the provisions of this Act, when a bill is noted or
protested, it must be noted on the day of its dishonour. When a bill
has been duly noted, the protest may be subsequently extended as of
the date of the noting.
(5) Where the acceptor of a bill becomes bankrupt or insolvent or
suspends payment before it matures, the holder may cause the bill
to be protested for better security against the drawer and indorsers.
(6) A bill must be protested at the place where it is dishonoured:
Provided that—
(a) When a bill is presented through the post-office, and re
turned by post dishonoured, it may be protested at the
place to which it is returned and on the day of its return
if received during business hours, and if not received during
business hours, then not later than the next business day:
(b) When a bill drawn payable at the place of business or resi
dence of some person other than the drawee, has been dis
honoured by non-acceptance, it must be protested for non
payment at the place where it is expressed to be payable,
and no further presentment for payment to, or demand on,
the drawee is necessary.
(7) A protest must contain a copy of the bill, and must be signed
by the notary making it, and must specify
(a) The person at whose request the bill is protested:
(b) The place and date of protest, the cause or reason for pro
testing the bill, the demand made, and the answer given, if
any, or the fact that the drawee or acceptor could not be
found.
(8) Where a bill is lost or destroyed, or is wrongly detained from
the person entitled to hold it, protest may be made on a copy or writ
ten particulars thereof.
(9) Protest is dispensed with by any circumstance which would
dispense with notice of dishonour. Delay in noting or protesting is
excused when the delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control
of the holder, and not imputable to his default, misconduct, or negli.
gence. When the cause of delay ceases to operate the bill must be
noted or protested with reasonable diligence.
52. Duties of holder as regards drawee or acceptor.
(1) When a bill is accepted generally presentment for payment is
not necessary in order to render the acceptor liable.
(2) When by the terms of a qualified acceptance presentment for
payment is required, the acceptor, in the absence of an express stipu
lation to that effect, is not discharged by the omission to present the
bill for payment on the day that it matures.
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(3) In order to render the acceptor of a bill liable it is not neces
sary to protest it, or that notice of dishonour should be given to him.
(4) Where the holder of a bill presents it for payment, he shall ex
hibit the bill to the person from whom he demands payment, and
when a bill is paid the holder shall forthwith deliver it up to the
party paying it.
Liabilities of Parties.
b3. Funds in hands of drawee.
(1) A bill, of itself, does not operate as an assignment of funds in
the hands of the drawee available for the payment thereof, and the
drawee of a bill who does not accept as required by this Act is not
liable on the instrument. This sub-Section shall not extend to Scot
land.
(2) In Scotland, where the drawee of a bill has in his hands funds
available for the payment thereof, the bill operates as an assignment
of the sum for which it is drawn in favor of the holder, from the
time when the bill is presented to the drawee.
54. Liability of acceptor.
The acceptor of a bill, by accepting it
(1) Engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his ac
ceptance:
(2) Is precluded from denying to a holder in due course:
(a) The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signa
ture, and his capacity and authority to draw the bill;
(b) In the case of a bill payable to drawer's order, the then
capacity of the drawer to indorse, but not the genuineness
or validity of his indorsement;
(c) In the case of a bill payable to the order of a third person,
the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse,
but not the genuineness or validity of his indorsement.
55. Liability of drawer or indorser.
(1) The drawer of a bill by drawing it—
(a) Engages that on due presentment it shall be accepted and
paid according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonoured
he will compensate the holder or any indorser who is com
pelled to pay it, provided that the requisite proceedings on
dishonour be duly taken;
(b) Is precluded from denying to a holder in due course the
existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.
(2) The indorser of a bill by indorsing it—
(a) Engages that on due presentment it shall be accepted and
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paid according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonoured
he will compensate the holder or a subsequent indorser who
is compelled to pay it, provided that the requisite proceed
ings on dishonour be duly taken;
(b) Is precluded from denying to a holder in due course the
genuineness and regularity in all respects of the drawer's
signature and all previous indorsements;
(c) Is precluded from denying to his immediate or a subsequent
indorsee that the bill was at the time of his indorsement
a valid and subsisting bill, and that he had then a good
title thereto.
56. Stranger signing bill liable as indorser.
Where a person signs a bill otherwise than as drawer or acceptor,
he thereby incurs the liabilities of an indorser to a holder in due
course.
57. Measure of damages against parties to dishonoured bill.
Where a bill is dishonoured, the measure of damages, which shall
be deemed to be liquidated damages, shall be as follows:
(1) The holder may recover from any party liable on the bill, and
the drawer who has been compelled to pay the bill may recover from
the acceptor, and an indorser who has been compelled to pay the bill
may recover from the acceptor or from the drawer, or from a prior
indorser
(a) The amount of the bill:
(b) Interest thereon from the time of presentment for pay
ment if the bill is payable on demand, and from the matur
ity of the bill in any other case:
(c) The expenses of noting, or, when protest is necessary, and
the protest has been extended, the expenses of protest.
(2) In the case of a bill which has been dishonoured abroad, in
lieu of the above damages, the holder may recover from the drawer
or an indorser, and the drawer or an indorser who has been compelled
to pay the bill may recover from any party liable to him, the amount
of the re-exchange with interest thereon until the time of payment.
(3) Where by this Act interest may be recovered as damages, such
interest may, if justice require it, be withheld wholly or in part, and
where a bill is expressed to be payable with interest at a given rate,
interest as damages may or may not be given at the same rate as
interest proper.
58. Transferor by delivery and transferee.
(1) Where the holder of a bill payable to bearer negotiates it by
delivery without indorsing it, he is called a “transferor by delivery.”
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(2) A transferor by delivery is not liable on the instrument.
(3) A transferor by delivery who negotiates a bill thereby war
Tants to his immediate transferee being a holder for value that the
bill is what it purports to be, that he has a right to transfer it,
and that at the time of transfer he is not aware of any fact which
renderS it ValueleSS.
Discharge of Bill.
59. Payment in due course.
(1) A bill is discharged by payment in due course by or on be
half of the drawee or acceptor.
“Payment in due course” means payment made at or after the
maturity of the bill to the holder thereof in good faith and without
notice that his title to the bill is defective.
(2) Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, when a bill
is paid by the drawer or an indorser it is not discharged; but
(a) Where a bill payable to, or to the order of, a third party
is paid by drawer, the drawer may enforce payment
thereof against the acceptor, but may not re-issue the
bill:
(b) Where a bill is paid by an indorser, or where "a bill pay
able to drawer's order is paid by the drawer, the party
paying it is remitted to his former rights as regards the
acceptor or antecedent parties, and he may, if he thinks
fit, strike out his own and subsequent indorsements, and
again negotiate the bill.
(3) Where an accommodation bill is paid in due course by the
party accommodated the bill is discharged.
60. Banker paying demand draft whereon indorsement is forged.
When a bill payable to Order on demand is drawn. On a banker,
and the banker on whom it is drawn pays the bill in good faith
and in the ordinary course of business, it is not incumbent on the
banker to show that the indorsement of the payee or any subsequent
indorsement was made by or under the authority of the person whose
indorsement it purports to be, and the banker is deemed to have paid
the bill in due course, although such indorsement has been forged
Or made Without authority.
61. Acceptor the holder at maturity.
When the acceptor of a bill is or becomes the holder of it at or
after its maturity, in his own right, the bill is discharged.
17
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62. Express waiver.
(1) When the holder of a bill at or after its maturity absolutely
and unconditionally renounces his rights against the acceptor the bill
is discharged.
The renunciation must be in writing, unless the bill is delivered
up to the acceptor.
(2) The liabilities of any party to a bill may in like manner
be renounced by the holder before, at, or after its maturity; but
nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a holder in due
course without notice of the renunciation.
63. Cancellation.
(1) Where a bill is intentionally cancelled by the holder or his
agent, and the cancellation is apparent thereon, the bill is dis
charged.
(2) In like manner any party liable on a bill may be discharged
by the intentional cancellation of his signature by the holder or
his agent. In such case any indorser who would have had a right of
recourse against the party whose signature is cancelled, is also dis
charged.
(3) A- cancellation made unintentionally, or under a mistake, or
without the authority of the holder, is inoperative; but where a bill
or any signature thereon appears to have been cancelled the burden
of proof lies on the party who alleges that the cancellation was made
unintentionally, or under a mistake, or without authority.
64. Alteration of bill.
(1) Where a bill or acceptance is materially altered without the
assent of all parties liable on the bill, the bill is avoided except as
against a party who has himself made, authorised, or assented to
the alteration, and subsequent indorsers.
Provided that,
Where a bill has been materially altered, but the alteration is not
apparent, and the bill is in the hands of a holder in due course,
such holder may avail himself of the bill as if it had not been
altered, and may enforce payment of it according to its original
tenour.
(2) In particular the following alterations are material, namely,
any alteration of the date, the sum payable, the time of payment,
the place of payment, and, where a bill has been accepted generally,
the addition of a place of payment without the acceptor's assent.
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Acceptance and Payment for Honour.
65. Acceptance for honour supra protest.
(1) Where a bill of exchange has been protested for dishonour
by non-acceptance, or protested for better security, and is not over
due, any person, not being a party already liable thereon, may, with
the consent of the holder, intervene and accept the bill supra protest,
for the honour of any party liable thereon, or for the honour of the
person for whose account the bill is drawn.
(2) A bill may be accepted for honour for part only of the sum
for which it is drawn.
(3) An acceptance for honour Supra protest in order to be valid
must
(a) Be written on the bill, and indicate that it is an accept
ance for honour:
(b) Be Signed by the acceptor for honour.
(4) Where an acceptance for honour does not expressly state for
whose honour it is made, it is deemed to be an acceptance for the
honour of the drawer.
(5) Where a bill payable after sight is accepted for honour, its
maturity is calculated from the date of the noting for non-accept
ance, and not from the date of the acceptance for honour.
G6. Liability of acceptor for honour.
(1) The acceptor for honour of a bill by accepting it engages
that he will, on due presentment, pay the bill according to the tenor
of his acceptance, if it is not paid by the drawee, provided it has
been duly presented for payment, and protested for non-payment,
and that he receives notice of these facts.
(2) The acceptor for honour is liable to the holder and to all
parties to the bill subsequent to the party for whose honour he has
accepted.
67. Presentment to acceptor for honour.
(1) Where a dishonoured bill has been accepted for honour supra
protest, or contains a reference in case of need, it must be protested
for non-payment before it is presented for payment to the acceptor
for honour, or referee in case of need.
(2) Where the address of the acceptor for honour is in the same
place where the bill is protested for non-payment, the bill must be
presented to him not later than the day following its maturity;
and where the address of the acceptor for honour is in some place
other than the place where it was protested for non-payment, the
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bill must be forwarded not later than the day following its maturity
for presentment to him.
(3) Delay in presentment or non-presentment is excused by any
circumstance which would excuse delay in presentment for payment
or non-presentment for payment.
(4) When a bill of exchange is dishonoured by the acceptor for
honour it must be protested for non-payment by him.
68. Payment for honour supra protest.
(1) Where a bill has been protested for non-payment, any person
may intervene and pay it supra protest for the honour of any party
liable thereon, or for the honour of the person for whose account
the bill is drawn.
(2) Where two or more persons offer to pay a bill for the honour
of different parties, the person whose payment will discharge most
parties to the bill shall have the preference.
(3) Payment for honour supra protest, in order to operate as
such and not as a mere voluntary payment, must be attested by a
notarial act of honour which may be appended to the protest or
form an extension of it.
(4) The notarial act of honour must be founded on a declaration
made by the payer for honour, or his agent in that behalf, declaring
his intention to pay the bill for honour, and for whose honour he
payS.
(5) Where a bill has been paid for honour, all parties subsequent
to the party for whose honour it is paid are discharged, but the
payer for honour is subrogated for, and succeeds to both the rights
and duties of, the holder as regards the party for whose honour he
pays, and all parties liable to that party.
(6) The payer for honour, on paying to the holder the amount
of the bill and the notarial expenses incidental to its dishonour, is
entitled to receive both the bill itself and the protest. If the holder
do not on demand deliver them up, he shall be liable to the payer
for honour in damages.
(7) Where the holder of a bill refuses to receive payment supra
protest he shall lose his right of recourse against any party who
would have been discharged by such payment.
Lost Instruments.
69. Holder's right to duplicate of lost bill.
Where a bill has been lost before it is overdue, the person who
was the holder of it may apply to the drawer to give him another
bill of the same tenor, giving security to the drawer if required to
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indemnify him against all persons whatever in case the bill alleged
to have been lost shall be found again.
If the drawer on request as aforesaid refuses to give such dupli
cate bill, he may be compelled to do so.
70. Action on lost bill.
In any action or proceeding upon a bill, the court or a judge may
order that the loss of the instrument shall not be set up, provided
an indemnity be given to the satisfaction of the court or judge
against the claims of any other person upon the instrument in
question.
Bill in a Set.
71. Rules as to sets.
(1) Where a bill is drawn in a set, each part of the set being
numbered, and containing a reference to the other parts, the whole
of the parts constitute one bill.
(2) Where the holder of a set indorses two or more parts to
different persons, he is liable on every such part, and every indorser
Subsequent to him is liable on the part he has himself indorsed as
if the said parts were separate bills.
(3) Where two or more parts of a set are negotiated to different
holders in due course, the holder whose title first accrues is as
between such holders deemed the true owner of the bill; but nothing
in this sub-section shall affect the rights of a person who in due
course accepts or pays the part first presented to him.
(4) The acceptance may be Written on any part, and it must
be Written on One part only.
If the drawee accepts more than one part, and such accepted parts
get into the hands of different holders in due course, he is liable
on every Such part as if it were a separate bill.
(5) When the acceptor of a bill drawn in a set pays it without
requiring the part bearing his acceptance to be delivered up to him,
and that part at maturity is outstanding in the hands of a holder
in due course, he is liable to the holder thereof.
(6) Subject to the preceding rules, where any one part of a bill
drawn in a set is discharged by payment or otherwise, the whole
bill is discharged.
Conflict of Laws.
72. Rules where laws conflict.
Where a bill drawn in one country is negotiated, accepted, or pay
able in another, the rights, duties, and liabilities of the parties
thereto are determined as followS:
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(1) The validity of a bill as regards requisites in form is de
termined by the law of the place of issue, and the validity as regards
requisites in form of the Supervening contracts, such as acceptance,
or indorsement, or acceptance supra protest, is determined by the
law of the place where such contract was made.
Provided that—
(a) Where a bill is issued out of the United Kingdom it is
not invalid by reason only that it is not stamped in
accordance with the law of the place of issue:
(b) Where a bill, issued out of the United Kingdom, conforms,
as regards requisites in form, to the law of the United
Kingdom, it may, for the purpose of enforcing payment
thereof, be treated as valid as between all persons who
negotiate, hold, or become parties to it in the United
Kingdom.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the interpretation of
the drawing, indorsement, acceptance, or acceptance supra protest of
a bill, is determined by the law of the place where such contract is
made.
Provided that where an inland bill is indorsed in a foreign country
the indorsement shall as regards the payer be interpreted according
to the law of the United Kingdom.
(3) The duties of the holder with respect to presentment for
acceptance or payment and the necessity for or sufficiency of a
protest or notice of dishonour, or otherwise, are determined by the
law of the place where the act is done or the bill is dishonoured.
(4) Where a bill is drawn out of but payable in the United King
dom and the sum payable is not expressed in the currency of the
United Kingdom, the amount shall, in the absence of some express
stipulation, be calculated according to the rate of exchange for
sight drafts at the place of payment on the day the bill is payable.
(5) Where a bill is drawn in one country and is payable in
another, the due date thereof is determined according to the law
of the place where it is payable.
PART III.
CHEQUES ON A BANKER.
73. Cheque defined.
A cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on
demand.
Except as otherwise provided in this Part, the provisions of this
Act applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a
cheque.
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74. Presentment of cheque for payment.
Subject to the provisions of this Act
(1) Where a cheque is not presented for payment within a
reasonable time of its issue, and the drawer or the person on whose
account it is drawn had the right at the time of Such presentment
as between him and the banker to have the cheque paid and Suffers
actual damage through the delay, he is discharged to the extent of
such damage, that is to say, to the extent to which such drawer or
person is a creditor of such banker to a larger amount than he
would have been had such cheque been paid.
(2) In determining what is a reasonable time regard shall be
had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade and of
bankers, and the facts of the particular case.
(3) The holder of such cheque as to which such drawer or person
is discharged shall be a creditor, in lieu of such drawer or person,
of such banker to the extent of such discharge, and entitled to re
cover the amount from him.
75. Revocation of banker's authority.
The duty and authority of a banker to pay a cheque drawn on
him by his customer are determined by
(1) Countermand of payment:
(2) Notice of the customer's death.
Crossed Cheques.
76. General and special crossings defined.
(1) Where a cheque bears across its face an addition of -(a)
the words “and company” or any abbreviation thereof between two
parallel transverse lines, either with or without the words “not
negotiable;” or (b) two parallel transverse lines simply, either with
or Without the words “not negotiable;” that addition constitutes
a crossing, and the cheque is crossed generally.
(2) Where a cheque bears across its face an addition of the name
of a banker, either with or without the words “not negotiable,” that
addition constitutes a crossing, and the cheque is crossed specially
and to that banker.
77. Crossing by drawer or after issue.
(1) A cheque may be crossed generally or specially by the drawer.
(2) Where a cheque is uncrossed, the holder may cross it gen
erally or specially.
(3) Where a cheque is crossed generally the holder may cross
it specially.
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(4) Where a cheque is crossed generally or specially, the holder
may add the words “not negotiable.”
(5) Where a cheque is crossed specially, the banker to whom it
is crossed may again cross it specially to another banker for col
lection.
(6) Where an uncrossed cheque, or a cheque crossed generally,
is sent to a banker for collection, he may cross it specially to himself.
78. Crossing a material part of checque.
A crossing authorized by this Act is a material part of the
cheque; it shall not be lawful for any person to obliterate or, ex.
cept as authorized by this Act, to add to or alter the crossing.
79. Duties of banker as to crossed cheques.
(1) Where a cheque is crossed specially to more than one bank
er except when crossed to an agent for collection being a banker,
the banker on whom it is drawn shall refuse payment thereof.
(2) Where the banker on whom a cheque is drawn which is so
crossed nevertheless pays the same, or pays a cheque crossed gen
erally otherwise than to a banker, or if crossed specially otherwise
than to the banker to whom it is crossed, or his agent for collection
being a banker, he is liable to the true owner of the cheque for
any loss he may sustain owing to the cheque having been so paid.
Provided that where a cheque is presented for payment which
does not at the time of presentment appear to be crossed, or to
have had a crossing which has been obliterated, or to have been
added to or altered otherwise than as authorised by this Act, the
banker paying the cheque in good faith and without negligence shall
not be responsible or incur any liability, nor shall the payment be
questioned by reason of the cheque having been crossed, or of the
crossing having been obliterated or having been added to or altered
otherwise than as authorised by this Act, and of payment having
been made otherwise than to a banker or to the banker to whom
the cheque is or was crossed, or to his agent for collection being a
banker, as the case may be.
80. Protection to banker and drawer where cheque is crossed.
Where the banker, on whom a crossed cheque is drawn, in good
faith and without negligence pays it, if crossed generally, to a
banker, and if crossed specially, to the banker to whom it is crossed,
or his agent for collection being a banker, the banker paying the
cheque, and, if the cheque has come into the hands of the payee,
the drawer, shall respectively be entitled to the same rights and be
placed in the same position as if payment of the cheque had been
made to the true owner thereof.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT. 265
81. Effect of crossing on holder.
Where a person takes a crossed cheque which bears on it the
words “not negotiable,” he shall not have and shall not be capable
of giving a better title to the cheque than that which the person
from whom he took it had.
82. Protection to collecting banker.
Where a banker in good faith and without negligence receives
payment for a customer of a cheque crossed generally or specially
to himself, and the customer has no title or a defective title thereto,
the banker Shall not incur any liability to the true owner of the
cheque by reason only of having received such payment.
PART IV.
PROMISSORY NOTES.
83. Promissory note defined.
(1) A promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing
made by one person to another signed by the maker, engaging to
pay, on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum
certain in money, to, or to the order of, a specified person or to
bearer.
(2) An instrument in the form of a note payable to maker's
order is not a note within the meaning of this section unless and
until it is indorsed by the maker.
(3) A note is not invalid by reason only that it contains also
a pledge of collateral security with authority to sell or dispose
thereof.
(4) A note which is, or on the face of it purports to be, both
made and payable within the British Islands is an inland note. Any
other note is a foreign note.
84. Delivery necessary.
A promissory note is inchoate and incomplete until delivery there
of to the payee or bearer.
85. Joint and several notes.
(1) A promissory note may be made by two or more makers,
and they may be liable thereon jointly, or jointly and severally
according to its tenour.
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(2) Where a note runs “I promise to pay” and is signed by two
Or more persons it is deemed to be their joint and several note.
86. Note payable on demand.
(1) Where a note payable on demand has been indorsed, it must
be presented for payment within a reasonable time of the indorse
ment. If it be not so presented the indorser is discharged.
(2) In determining what is a reasonable time, regard shall be
had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade and the
facts of the particular case.
(3) Where a note payable on demand is negotiated, it is not
deemed to be overdue for the purpose of affecting the holder with
defects of title of which he had no notice, by reason that it appears
that a reasonable time for presenting it for payment has elapsed
Since its issue.
87. Presentment of note for payment.
(1) Where a promissory note is in the body of it made payable
at a particular place, it must be presented for payment at that place
in order to render the maker liable. In any other case, presentment
for payment is not necessary in order to render the maker liable.
(2) Presentment for payment is necessary in order to render
the indorser of a note liable.
(3) Where a note is in the body of it made payable at a par
ticular place, presentment at that place is necessary in order to
render an indorser liable; but when a place of payment is indi
cated by way of memorandum only, presentment at that place is
sufficient to render the indorser liable, but a presentment to the
maker elsewhere, if sufficient in other respects, shall also suffice.
88. Liability of maker.
The maker of a promissory note by making it
(1) Engages that he will pay it according to its tenour;
(2) Is precluded from denying to a holder in due course the
existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.
89. Application of Part II to notes.
(1) Subject to the provisions in this Part, and, except as by this
section provided, the provisions of this Act relating to bills of ex
change apply, with the necessary modifications, to promissory notes.
(2) In applying those provisions the maker of a note shall be
deemed to correspond with the acceptor of a bill, and the first indors
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er of a note shall be deemed to correspond with the drawer of an
accepted bill payable to drawer's order.
(3) The following provisions as to bills do not apply to notes;
namely, provisions relating to—
(a) Presentment for acceptance;
(b) Acceptance;
(c) Acceptance Supra protest;
(d) Bills in a set.
(4) Where a foreign note is dishonoured, protest thereof is un
necessary.
PART V.
SUPPLEMENTARY.
90. Good faith.
A thing is deemed to be done in good faith, within the meaning
of this Act, where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done
negligently or not.
91. Signature.
(1) Where, by this Act, any instrument or writing is required
to be signed by any person, it is not necessary that he should sign
it with his own hand, but it is sufficient if his signature is written
thereon by some other person by or under his authority.
(2) In the case of a corporation, where by this Act any instru
ment or writing is required to be signed, it is sufficient if the instru
ment or writing be sealed with the corporate Seal.
But nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the
bill or note of a corporation to be under seal.
92. Computation of time.
Where, by this Act, the time limited for doing any act or thing
is less than three days, in reckoning time, non-business days are
excluded.
“Non-business days” for the purposes of this Act mean
(a) Sunday, Good Friday, Christmas Day:
(b) A bank holiday under the Bank Holidays Act, 1871, or
acts amending it:
(c) A day appointed by Royal proclamation as a public fast
or thanksgiving day.
Any other day is a business day.
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93. When noting equivalent to protest.
For the purposes of this Act, where a bill or note is required to
be protested within a specified time or before some further pro
ceeding is taken, it is sufficient that the bill has been noted for
protest before the expiration of the specified time or the taking of
the proceeding; and the formal protest may be extended at any time
thereafter as of the date of the noting.
94. Protest when notary not accessible.
Where a dishonoured bill or note is authorized or required to be
protested, and the Services of a notary cannot be obtained at the
place where the bill is dishonoured, any householder or substantial
resident of the place may, in the presence of two witnesses, give a
certificate, signed by them, attesting the dishonour of the bill, and
the certificate shall in all respects operate as if it were a formal
protest of the bill.
The form given in Schedule 1 to this Act may be used with neces
Sary modifications, and if used shall be sufficient.
95. Dividend warrants may be crossed.
The provisions of this Act as to crossed cheques shall apply to
a warrant for payment of dividend.
96. Repeal.
The enactments mentioned in the second Schedule to this Act are
hereby repealed as from the commencement of this Act to the extent
in that schedule mentioned.
Provided that such repeal shall not affect anything done or suf
fered, or any right, title, or interest acquired or accrued before the
commencement of this Act, or any legal proceeding or remedy in
respect of any such thing, right, title, or interest.
97. Savings.
(1) The rules in bankruptcy relating to bills of exchange, prom
issory notes, and cheques, shall continue to apply thereto notwith
standing anything in this Act contained.
(2) The rules of common law including the law merchant, save
in so far as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of
this Act, shall continue to apply to bills of exchange, promissory
notes, and cheques.
(3) Nothing in this Act or in any repeal effected thereby shall
affect
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(a) The provisions of the Stamp Act, 1870," or acts amending
it
,
or any law o
r
enactment for the time being in force
relating to the revenue:
(b) The provisions of the Companies Act, 1862,f or acts
amending it, or any act relating to joint stock banks
or companies:
(c) The provisions of any act relating to or confirming the
privileges of the Bank of England or the Bank of Ire
land respectively:
(d) The validity of any usage relating to dividend warrants,
or the indorsements thereof.
98. Saving o
f Summary diligence in Scotland.
Nothing in this Act or in any repeal effected thereby shall extend
or restrict, or in any Way alter or affect the law and practice in
Scotland in regard to summary diligence.
99. Construction with other acts, etc.
Where any act or document refers to any enactment repealed by
this Act, the act or document shall be construed, and shall operate,
as if it referred to the corresponding provisions of this Act.
100. Parol evidence in judicial proceedings in Scotland.
In any judicial proceeding in Scotland, any fact relating to a bill
of exchange, bank cheque, or promissory note, which is relevant to
any question of liability thereon, may be proved by parol evidence:
Provided that this enactment shall not in any way affect the exist
ing law and practice whereby the party who is, according to the
tenour of any bill o
f exchange, bank cheque, or promissory note,
debtor to the holder in the amount thereof, may be required, as a
condition o
f obtaining a sist o
f diligence, or suspension o
f
a charge,
or threatened charge, to make such consignation, or to find such
caution as the court or judge before whom the cause is depending
may require.
This section shall not apply to any case where the bill of exchange,
bank cheque, or promissory note has undergone the sesennial pre
scription.
FIRST SCHEDULE.
Form of protest which may be used when the services o
f
a notary
cannot be obtained.
*33 and 34 Vict. c. 97.
t25 and 26 Vict. c. 89.
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Know all men that I, A. B. (householder), of in the
county of , in the United Kingdom, at the request of C.
D., there being no notary public available, did on the day
of 188 at demand payment (or acceptance)
of the bill of exchange hereunder written, from E. F., to which de
mand he made answer (state answer, if any). Wherefore, I now
in the presence of G. H. and J. K. do protest the said bill of ex
change.
(Signed) A. B.
G. H.
J. K.
N. B.—The bill itself should be annexed, or a copy of the bill and
all that is written thereon should be underwritten.
}
Witnesses.
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ABSOLUTE OR REAL DEFENSES, 111.
ACCEPTANCE
meaning of, 24.
definition of, 192.
kinds of, 196.
general, what constitutes, 196.
qualified, 196.
conditional, 198.
local, 198.
partial, 198.
form of, 192.
must be in writing, 192.
must be signed, 192.
may be required on face of bill, 193.
signature of drawee sufficient, 192.
must be for payment in money, 192.
is new contract, 112-118.
by separate instrument, 193.
when binds acceptor, 193.
promise deemed an, 194.
by telegraph, 193.
oral promise a sufficient, at common law, 194.
by agent, 194, 204.
cannot take qualified acceptance, 200.
by executor, not authorized, 204.
time allowed drawee for, 195.
retention of bill amounts to, when, 195.
holder need not take qualified, 199.
effect of taking qualified, 199.
of incomplete bill, 195-6.
Where bill Over due, 195-6.
after bill dishonored, 195-6.
date of, 195-6.
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ACCEPTANCE–Continued.
when bill dishonored by non-acceptance, 206.
when bill dishonored by non-acceptance, duty of holder, 206.
what bills must be protested for non-acceptance, 208.
of bills in sets, 223.
ACCEPTANCE FOR HONOR
when bill may be accepted for honor, 214.
how made, 215.
for part of sum, 214.
for different parties, 214.
when deemed to be for honor of drawer, 215.
admits, what, 216.
contract of, 216.
maturity of bill payable, payable after sight accepted for honor,
217.
when delay in making presentment for excused, 218.
protest of bills accepted for honor, 217.
ACCEPTANCE SUPRA PROTEST
See Acceptance for Honor.
ACCEPTOR
admissions Of
existence of drawer, 117.
authority to draw, 117.
genuiness of drawer's signature, 117.
capacity to draw, 117.
of infant, 117-119.
of married woman, 117-119.
of lunatic, 119.
of corporation, 117-119.
does not admit signature of indorser, 118.
not presumed to know handwriting in body of bill, 118.
liability of, 117.
demand of payment not necessary to charge, 129.
when insolvent, bill may be protested for better security, 212.
ACCEPTOR FOR HONOR
contract of, 216.
dishonor of bill accepted by, 218.
presentment for payment to, 217.
ACCOMMODATION PAPER—
notes mutually exchanged are not, 78, 80.
loan of credit necessary to constitute, 80.
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ACCOMMODATION PAPER—Continued.
payment of by party accommodated, 172.
no implied warranty that bill is not, 124.
ACCOMMODATION PARTIES
liability of, 79.
bound according to their relation to the paper, 79.
right to withdraw signature, 80.
corporations cannot make, 80.
partnership as, 80.
rights of on payment of instrument, 178.
ACTION
meaning of, 24.
right to bring under restrictive indorsement, 89.
AGENT
authority of, 64.
how shown, 64.
signature by, 64.
person signing as, liability of, 65, 128.
duty of to present for acceptance, 202.
cannot take qualified acceptance, 200.
right to give notice of dishonor, 151-2.
notice of dishonor may be given to, 156.
holder may require production of authority of, to accept, 204.
ALLONGE, 84.
ALTERATION
material, what is, 184.
as to date, 184.
as to sum payable, 184.
as to time of payment, 184.
as to place of payment, 184.
as to number of parties, 185.
as to relation of parties, 185.
as to medium of payment, 185.
as to addition of place of payment, 185.
as to other changes, 185.
material, what is not, 185-6.
burden of explaining, 183.
effect of, 182.
instrument may be enforced according to original tenor, notwith
standing, 182.
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AMBIGUOUS INSTRUMENTS–
how construed, 60-1.
ANTECEDENT DEBT
constitutes value, 72.
ANTE DATING
effect of, 54.
APPLICATION OF ACT, 24-26.
ASSIGNMENT
bill is not, 188.
check is not, 232.
when bill may amount to, 189.
When check may amount to, 233.
ASSUMED NAME
liability of person signing in, 63-4.
ATTORNEY'S FEE
effect of provision for, 35.
BANK–
meaning of, 24.
iability of on certified check, 230.
iability of as indorsee for collection, 88.
not liable on check without acceptance or certification, 232.
paper payable at, how presentment made, 137
paper payable at, when suit may be brought on, 139.
duty of to present bill for acceptance, 202.
branch, notice of dishonor by, 153
instrument payable at, equivalent to order to pay, 147.
BANK NOTES
origin of, 20-1.
instrument payable in, 32.
negotiability of declared, 20.
BEARER
meaning of, 24.
instrument must be payable to, or to order, 27.
instrument payable to, when, 50.
instrument payable to fictitious person is payable to, 50.
when payee not name of any person, 50.
when instrument payable to CASH, is payable to, 52.
when instrument payable to SUNDRIES is payable to, 52.
instrument indorsed in blank payable to, 50.
-
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BEARER-Continued.
instrument payable to, continues payable to notwithstanding spec
ial indorsement, 86, 92.
notwithstanding special indorsement, 86, 92.
BILL
meaning of, 24.
BILL OF EXCHANGE
definition of, 187.
kinds of, 189.
foreign bill what constitutes, 189.
negotiability of declared, 17.
inland bill what constitutes, 189.
negotiability declared, 17.
not an assignment, 188.
when bill may amount to assignment, 189.
ambiguous instrument may be considered either bill or note, 60
when bill may be treated as promissory note, 190.
where drawer and drawee are identical, 190.
where drawer and drawee are fictitious persons, 191.
may be addressed to two or more drawees, 189.
but not in the alternative, 189.
may name referee in case of need, 191.
BILLS IN A SET
constitute one bill, 222.
origin of, 222.
form of, 222.
acceptance of, 223.
payment of, 224.
discharge of, 224.
rights of holder where different parts are negotiated, 223.
liability of indorser where different parts are negotiated, 223.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT
origin of, 6-8.
text of, 235-270.
BLANKS
when may be filled, 55.
when improperly filled, 55.
improperly filled where instrument has not been declared, 56-7.
BOHEMIAN OATS NOTES, 44.
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BONDS
payable to bearer, 50.
public or corporate, liability of person negotiating, 122, 124.
BROKER
liability of in negotiating instrument, 128.
BURDEN OF PROOF
as to cancellation, 182.
as to title of prior party being defective, 113.
CANCELLATION.—
effect of, 182.
discharges instrument when, 172.
burden of proof as to, 182.
CAPACITY
of drawer admitted by acceptance, 117.
of prior parties, warranted where negotiation by delivery, 122.
of prior parties, Warranted where negotiation by indorsement, 125.
CARRIER, LETTER—
delivery of notice of dishonor to, 163.
CASH
instruments payable to, 52.
CASHIER
instrument payable to, 92.
not disqualified to act as notary, 210, 211.
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT
are promissory notes, 226.
are deemed continuing securities, 133.
bringing suit upon, sufficient demand, 130.
CERTIFICATION
effect of, 230.
where holder procures, effect of, 231.
where drawer procures, effect of, 231.
CHECK–
defined, 226.
negotiability of declared, 21.
difference between check and bill, 226-228.
authority to draw, does not include authority to draw bill. 228.
When must be presented, 228.
effect of delay, 228.
presentment and notice necessary, 227.
certification of 230.
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CHECK–Continued.
not assignment, 232.
but may be by agreement, 233.
COLLATERAL SECURITIES
effect of provision for sale of, 42.
must be tendered with instrument, 137.
holder of instrument secured not required to proceed upon col
lateral before suing indorser, 145.
COLLECTION
indorsement for, 88.
effect of, 88.
liability of indorser for, 88.
CONDITIONAL INDORSEMENT
condition may be disregarded by party paying, 91.
indorsee holds subject to right of indorser, 91.
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT—
provision for does not affect negotiability, 42.
must be at Or after maturity, 44.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
what law governs liability of maker, 116.
CONSIDERATION
presumption as to, 71.
distinguishes contracts of law merchant from contracts of com
mon law. 71.
in case of non-negotiable notes, 71, 225.
in case of non-negotiable bills, 71.
What constitutes, 72.
antecedent debt is, 72.
absence or failure of a defense, 77, 78.
partial failure of, defense pro tanto, 78.
partial failure though unliquidated, 78, 79.
sufficient, 72.
lack of, 72.
illegality of, 72.
CONTINENTAL CODES, 8.
provision as to allonge, 84.
CONTINGENCY
instrument payable on, not negotiable, 40.
happening of contingent event does not cure defect, 40.
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CONTINUING SECURITY
note as, 132.
certificate of deposit as, 133.
CORPURA'11UN
included in word “person,” 24.
indorsement by, 68.
capacity of to indorse admitted by maker, 116.
capacity of to draw admitted by acceptor, 119.
capacity of to make note admitted by indorser, 124.
delivery of paper of, by officer for personal debt, 108.
CROSSED CHECKS, 228.
CURRENCY, 32.
CURRENT FUNDS, 32.
CURRENT MONEY—
designation of particular kind of, 45.
DATE–
absence of does not impair Validity of instrument, 45.
presumption as to, 53.
mistake as to, may be shown, 53.
alteration of, 184.
insertion of, permissible when, 54.
insertion of, wrong, 54.
instrument may be ante-dated, 54.
instrument may be post-dated, 54.
from what, law takes effect, 25, 26.
DAYS OF GRACE
abolished, 145, 146.
retained by Bills of Exchange Act, 239.
Wisconsin Act as to, 145.
North Carolina Act, as to, 146.
Massachusetts Act, as to, 146.
effect of non-secular days upon, 25.
DEFECT
what constitutes notice of, 107, 108.
DEFENSES
nature of, 111, 112.
classification of, 111.
inherent, 112.
collateral, 112.
who liable to, 110.
when instrument subject to, 110.
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DELAY
excused in presenting for payment, 142.
excused in giving notice of dishonor, 168.
excused in presenting check, 228.
DELIVERY
meaning of term, 24.
kinds of, 59.
presumption as to, 58.
necessity to convey title, 58.
of incomplete instrument, 58.
evidence to show terms of, 59.
conditional delivery, 58-59.
contract revocable until, 58.
is negotiation of instrument payable to bearer.
Warranty Where negotiation by, 122.
DEMAND, INSTRUMENT PAYABLE ON
instrument must be payable on or at determinable future time, 27.
instrument expressed to the payable on. 46.
when payable at sight, 46.
When payable on presentation, 46.
when no time expressed, 46.
instrument issued when overdue is payable on demand, 46.
distinction between instruments payable on demand and at sight,
46.
instrument payable on demand negotiated an unreasonable time
after its issue, 103.
overdue bill is payable on, 46.
when must be presented, 131.
when interest begins to run on, 47.
when statute of limitations begins to run on, 47.
expressions equivelant to demand, 47.
DETERMINABLE FUTURE TIME–
What is, 40.
What is not, 40.
instrument payable at, 27.
fixed period after date or sight is, 40.
on or before fixed time is, 40.
on or after event certain to happen is, 40.
DISCHARGE OF INSTRUMENT
by payment on behalf of principal debtor, 172.
by cancellation, 172.
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DISCHARGE OF INSTRUMENT—Continued.
by alteration, 182.
by renunciation, 180.
by other act, 172.
by payment by party accomodated, 172.
where principal debtor becomes holder after maturity, 172.
of one part of a bill drawn in a set, 224.
DISCHARGE OF PARTY SECONDARILY LIABLE -.
by discharge of instrument, 174.
* by cancellation of signature, 174.
by discharge of prior party, 174.
by tender by prior party, 174.
by release of principal debtor, 175.
by extension of time, 175-176.
mere indulgence will not discharge, 176.
where holder permits statute of limitations to run against princi
pal debtor, 175.
DISHONOR OF INSTRUMENT
by non-payment, 144.
by non-acceptance, 200.
liability of secondary party upon, 144.
DRAWEE–
must be named or indicated, 28.
not liable until acceptance, 188.
time allowed in Which to accept, 195.
retaining or destroying bill, effect of, 195.
bill addressed to two or more drawers, 189.
bill addressed to two or more drawees in alternative, 189.
IDRAWER–
liability of, 116.
may negative, 117.
where bill dishonored by non-acceptance, 207.
admission of, 116.
engagement of by drawing bill, 116.
when party of primary liability, 116.
instrument payable to order of, 48.
when presentment not necessary to charge, 141.
right of recourse to, 144.
notice of dishonor must be given to, 149.
notice of dishonor need not be given to, when, 168.
when released by failure to present bill for acceptance, 202.
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DRAWER–Continued.
when protest necessary in order to charge, 208.
of check and bill contrasted, 227.
of check discharged if holder has check certified, 231.
existence of admitted by acceptor, 117.
DUE DILIGENCE
what will constitute, 143, 168.
when question of law, 143.
When question of fact, 143.
DURESS
instrument or signature obtained by, 105.
DUSTY FOOT COURTS, 14.
EQUITIES, 111.
EVIDENCE–
admissiblity of to show agreement among indorsers, 127.
inadmissible to vary express liability of maker, 115.
EXCHANGE
paper payable in, 31.
paper payable with, 31, 35.
of accomodation paper, 78, 80.
EXHIBITION OF INSTRUMENT—
when necessary, 137.
when excused, 137.
FACULTATIVE INDORSEMENT, 167.
FICTITIOUS PERSON.—
instrument payable to Order of, payable to bearer, 50.
when drawee is, drawer primarily liable, 143.
notice need not be given to drawer where drawee is, 169.
notice need not be given to indorser Where drawee is, 170.
FIGURES
discrepancy between, and words, 60.
marginal figures, effect of, 61.
FISCAL OFFICER
effect of instrument drawn or indorsed to, 92.
FORCE AND FEAR
instrument obtained by, 105, 107.
FOREIGN BILL
defined, 189.
protest of, 208.
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FORGED SIGNATURE
wholly inoperative, 68.
When party estopped to allege forgery, 68.
FORGERY
what constitutes, 69.
ratification of, 70.
FRAUD
kinds of, 105.
fraud in esse contractus, 105.
illustration of, 105.
fraud in the indictment, 105.
instrument or signature obtained by, 105.
GENERAL ACCEPTANCE
what constitutes, 196-197.
GENUINENESS
warranty of, where negotiation by delivery, 122.
warranty of, where negotiation by qualified indorsement, 122.
warranty of, by general indorser, 125.
warranty of when not implied, 123.
of signature of drawer, acceptor admits, 117.
of signature of indorser, acceptor does not admit, 118.
of handwriting in body of instrument, not admitted by acceptor,
118.
GOLD DOLLARS
note payable in, 33.
GRACE
see Days of Grace.
what instruments entitled to, 46.
when last day of, is non-secular day, 25.
GUARANTOR
person may become such, 119.
proceedings against principal are necessary to charge, 145.
not entitled to notice of dishonor, 150.
GUARANTY
conditional guaranty, 145.
HOLDER—
meaning of term, 24.
may sue in his own name, 98.
may receive payment, 98.
rights of when bill dishonored by non-acceptance, 207.
duty of, where bill not accepted, 206.
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HOLDER-Continued.
refusal to receive payment for honor, 221.
discharges drawer and indorsers of check he procures to be certi
fied, 231.
cannot recover of bank on check until it accepts or certifies the
Same, 232.
HOLDER FOR VALUE
what constitutes, 76.
person having lien is, 77.
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
What constitutes, 100-102.
who is not, 103.
payee as, 103.
presumption as to being, 113.
in case of instrument payable On demand, 103.
Where full amount has not been paid before notice, 104.
what constitutes notice of defeat, 107.
holds instrument free from equities, 109.
may recover full face value, 109-110.
rights of persons claiming under, 111.
when burden on holder to prove that he took the instrument in
due course, 113.
HOLDER OF OFFICE
instrument payable to Order of, 48.
HOLIDAY
instrument falling due On, 145.
when day for doing act falls on, 24.
when last day of grace is, 25.
HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION LAWS
waiver of, 42, 44.
ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION
instrument given for, 72, 105.
INCOMPLETE INSTRUMENT
acceptance of, 195.
non-delivery of, 57.
filling blanks in, 55.
INCONSISTENT LAWS REPEALED, 233.
INDORSER–
when person deemed, 119.
signer presumed to be where character not otherwise clear, 61.
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INDORSER—Continued.
irregular, 119.
contract of, 125.
liability of joint indorsers, 127.
liability of where paper negotiable by delivery, 126.
liability of where he indorses different parts of a set, 223.
where collaterals have been received, 145.
where bill dishonored by non-acceptance, 207.
presentment necessary to charge, 129, 227.
when presentment not necessary to charge, 142.
not mere surety after dishonor, 144.
admits capacity of corporation to make note, 124.
right of recourse to, 144.
notice of dishonor must be given to, 149.
notice of dishonor need not be given to, when, 170.
notice must be given to, though he has received security, 131.
Order in Which indorsers liable, 127.
holder not required to proceed on collaterals in order to charge,
145.
parol evidence to vary liability of, 121, 126, 127.
what will discharge, 174-178.
payment by does not discharge maker, 178.
released by failure to present for acceptance when, 207.
When protest necessary to charge, 208.
of check, discharged by delay to present, 229.
of check, discharged where holder procures check to be certified,
231.
Warranties of, 125.
INDORSEMENT
meaning Of term, 24.
contract of, 84.
elements of contract, 84.
kinds of, 86.
illustrations of, 86.
special, 86.
in blank, 86.
blank changed to special, how, 87.
qualified, 90.
effect of, 90.
does not impair negotiable character of instrument, 90.
does not throw suspicion on paper, 91.
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INDORSEMENT—Continued.
warranty where negotiation by, 122.
warranty of title in case of, 122.
conditional, 91.
rights of party making, 91.
restrictive, 87.
prohibits further negotiation, 87.
constitutes indorse mere agent, 88.
vests title in trust, 88.
authorizes indorsee to receive payment, 89.
authorizes indorsee to bring action, 89.
authorizes indorsee to transfer his rights as indorsee, 89.
for collection, effect of, 88, 125, 126.
by infant, 68.
by cashier, 92.
by corporation, 68.
by fiscal officer, 92.
how made, 84.
departure from regular form of, 84, 85.
must be on instrument, 84.
or on allonge, 84.
must be of entire instrument, 85.
must be completed by delivery, 82.
signature alone sufficient, 84.
instrument indorsed in blank, payable to bearer, 50.
of instrument payable to bearer, 91.
of instrument payable to two or more, 92.
where name misspelled, 93.
where payee or indorsee Wrongly designated in representative
capacity, 93.
presumption as to place of, 94.
presumption as to time of, 93.
striking out, 95.
effect of, 95.
when may be done, 95.
transfer without, 96.
rights of transferee, 96.
prior equities, 96.
INFANT–
indorsement by, 68, 124.
IN HIS OWN RIGHT—
meaning of, 174.
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INLAND BILL
what is, 189.
INSOLVENCY
of principal debtor, no implied Warranty against, 123, 124.
does not excuse presentment, 131.
INSTALMENTS
instruments payable in, 35.
demand of each, necessary to charge indorser, 132.
INSTRUMENT
meaning of term, 24.
INTEREST
where instrument does not Specify date from which interest to
run, 60.
does not make sum uncertain, 34.
begins to run on demand paper when, 47.
INUREMENT
notice by, 152.
IRREGULAR INDORSER
who is, 119.
liability of, 119.
ISSUE
meaning of term, 24.
JOINT DEBTORS
presentment to, 140.
notice to, 158.
JOINT INDORSERS
liability of, 127.
JOINT PARTIES
two or more persons signing “I promise to pay,” 61.
JUDGMENT NOTES, 42, 43.
LAW MERCHANT
meaning of, 10.
origin of, 11.
embraced what, 11.
incorporated into common law, 12.
stages of development of, 14-16.
when governs, 25.
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LIABILITY
of maker, 115.
of acceptor, 117.
of certifier, 230.
of drawer, 116.
of general indorser, 125.
of irregular indorser, 119.
of indorser where paper negotiable by delivery, 126.
of person signing as agent, 65, 128.
of agent or broker, 128.
no one liable whose signature not on instrument, 63.
of indorsers, order of, 127.
LIEN
person having, holder for value, 77.
LOST INSTRUMENT—
Suit on, 148.
protest of, 213.
presentment as to, 137.
LUNATIC
acceptor cannot show that drawer or payee is, 119.
MAIL
notice sent by, 155.
miscarriage in, does not invalidate notice, 162.
MAKER—
liability of, 115.
-
what law governs, 116.
liability to holder where part payment made by indorser, 173.
admissions of, 115.
proper method of signing by, 115.
effect of signing otherwise, 115.
note payable after death of, 41.
instrument payable to order of 48, 225.
demand of payment not necessary to charge, 129.
MARRIED WOMAN
capacity of to indorse, maker admits, 116.
capacity of to draw bill acceptor admits, 118.
MATURITY
time of, 145, 146.
option to pay before, 41.
payment before, when a defense, 100.
payment before, not in usual course, 148.
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MONEY
what is, 30.
equivalents of, 30, 32.
not equivelants of, 31.
effect of particular kind specified in instrument, 45.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
statute confined to, 23.
“instrument” means negotiable instrument, 24.
must contain unconditional promise, 27.
must be for payment of sum certain, 27.
must be for payment of money only, 27.
must be in Writing, 27.
must be signed by maker or drawer, 27.
must be payable on demand or at determinable future time, 27.
must be payable to order or to bearer, 27.
drawee must in indicated with reasonable certainty, 28.
statement of transaction, negotiable character not affected by, 38.
order to pay out of particular fund, not negotiable, 38.
instrument payable on contingency, not negotiable, 40.
provision for sale of collateral, 42.
provision for confession of judgment, 42.
indication of particular fund from which re-imbursement is to be
made does not render instrument non-negotiable, 38.
nor does direction to charge to particular fund, 38.
waiver of benefits of law, 42.
option to require something in lieu of payment in money, 42.
payable on contingency of one's coming of age, 41.
happening of contingent event does not cure defect, 40.
Omissions not affecting, 45.
not dated, 45.
not specifying value given, 45.
not specifying place where drawn, 45.
not specifying place where payable, 45.
bearing seal, 45.
designation of particular kind of current money, 45.
instrument continues negotiable until discharged or restrictively
indorsed, 94.
contrast between English and French theory of, 9, 10.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
what is, 1.
states adopted in, 1.
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW-Continued.
purpose of, 3.
Origin of, 2-3.
to what instrument applies, 23-24-26.
Controlling effect of, 23.
NEGOTIATION
what constitutes, 82.
does not include “issue”, 57.
rules governing, 82-97.
of instrument payable to bearer, 82.
of instrument payable to order, 82.
of post-dated instruments, 54.
of bills in asset, 223.
by prior party, 97.
in breach of faith, 105-107.
party secondarily liable, paying instrument may again negotiate
it, 178.
drawer and indorsers released by failure of holder to negotiate
bill, when, 202.
bill must be negotiated within reasonable time, 131-202.
NOTARY PUBLIC–
may make protest, 210.
not disqualified because officer of bank holding paper, 210-211.
must make presentment in person, 210.
NOTE
meaning of term, 24.
NOTICE
when transferee receives before payment in full, 104.
NOTICE OF DISHONOR—
rules governing, 149-172.
must be given to indorser, 149.
must be given to drawer, 149.
need not be given to guarantor, 150.
must be given to indorser though he holds collateral, 131.
may be given to agent, 156.
who deemed agent to receive, 156-7.
to partners, 158.
to joint parties not partners, 158.
to bankrupt, 158-9.
to assignor for creditors, 159.
".
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NOTICE OF DISHONOR—Continued.
when party dead, 157.
holder required to give notice only to his immediate indorser, 150.
by whom given, 150.
by agent, 151-153.
by bank as agent, 151-2.
by branch bank, 153.
by stranger not suffiicient, 151.
by drawee who refuses acceptance, not sufficient, 151.
when notice should be given, 159.
may be given as soon as instrument dishonored, 159.
where parties reside in same place, 160.
where parties reside in different places, 161.
may be sent by mail, 155.
when notice deemed deposited in post office, 163.
miscarriage in mails, does not invalidate, 163.
time in which indorser may give notice to prior parties, 163.
may be sent by telegram, 165.
may be sent by first regular mail steamer, 162.
may be delivered personally, 155.
where notice to be sent, 164.
when party adds address to signature, 164.
when party has not given address, 164.
when party lives in one place and has office in another, 164.
when party is sojourning in another place, 164.
when notice actually received is sufficient, 164.
form of, 154.
when defective, 155.
when sufficient, 154.
when misdescription does not vitiate, 154.
need not be signed, 154.
signature of notary, 209.
waiver of, 165.
to be strictly construed, 167.
before dishonor, 165-6.
after dishonor, 165-6.
what will constitute waiver of 166.
waiver embodied in instrument, 166.
waiver written over signature, 166.
when dispensed with, 167.
when cannot be given after reasonable diligence, 167.
when delay excused, 168.
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NOTICE OF DISHONOR-Continued.
reliance upon directory, 168.
when need not be given to drawer, 168-9.
when need not be given to indorser, 170.
where instrument issued or negotiated when overdue, 48.
when instrument has been previously dishonored by non-accept
ance, 170.
omission to give notice of dishonor by non-acceptance, 171.
to whose benefit notice inures, 152.
NOTICE OF EQUITIES
what constitutes, 107.
NOTING, 211.
OMISSIONS–
not affecting validity or negotiable character of instrument, 45.
OPTION
to pay before maturity, 41.
of holder to require something in lieu of payment in money, 42.
ORDER
instrument must be payable to, or bearer, 28.
instrument payable to, 48.
instrument payable to Order of drawer, 48.
instrument payable to order of maker, 48.
instrument payable to order of drawee, 48.
instrument payable to order of two or more payees, 48.
instrument payable to order of one of several payees, 48.
instrument payable to order of holder of office, 48.
OVERDUE INSTRUMENT
payable on demand as regards parties issuing or negotiating, 46.
PARTNERS
maker admits existence of firm to which he makes note pay
able, 116.
presumption that note is given for partnership purpose, 108.
note of, given for individual partner's debt, 108.
presentment to, 140.
indorsement by one of, sufficient, 92.
PASSAGE OF ACT
meaning of, 25.
PAYEES
must be named or indicated, 48-9.
may be holder in due course, 103.
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PAYEES.–Continued.
instrument payable to two or more, 48.
instrument payable to one of several, 48.
when name of, not name of any person, 50.
trade or assumed name, 64.
fictitious, 50-52.
maker admits existence of, 115.
acceptance admits existence of, 117.
drawer admits existence of, 116.
maker admits capacity of to indorse, 115.
acceptance admits capacity of to indorse, 117.
drawer admits capacity of to indorse, 116.
acceptance does not admit signature of, 118.
PAYMENT
before maturity, when a defense, 100.
before maturity, not in usual course, 148.
in due course, what constitutes, 148.
by principal debtor, 172.
by party accommodated, 172.
by party secondarily liable, 173-178.
of bills in set, 224.
in money, instrument must be for, 27.
in merchandise, 31.
option to require something in lieu of payment in money, 42.
holder in due course can recover face value, 109.
what bills must be protested for non-payment, 208.
bill protested for non-acceptance may be protested for non-pay
ment, 212.
PAYMENT FOR HONOR
who may make, 219.
how made, 219.
preference of parties offering, 220.
effect on subsequent parties, 220.
where holder refuses to receive payment, effect of, 221.
declaration before payment, 220.
rights of payer for honor, 221.
PENCIL
writing may be in, 28.
PERSON
meaning of term, 24.
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PERSON PRIMARILY LIABLE
who is, 24.
demand of payment not necessary to charge, 129.
PERSON SECONDARILY LIABLE
who is, 24.
right of recourse to, 144.
PLACE
failure to specify place where drawn does not affect negotiable
character, 45.
presumption as to place of indorsement, 94.
of presentment, what is proper, 135.
alteration as to, 184-5.
POST-DATED INSTRUMENT—
negotiation Of, 54.
not invalid, 54.
post-dating sight draft, effect of, 54.
POST OFFICE
deposit in, what constitutes, 163.
deposit in post office box, 163.
deposit with carrier, 163.
PRE-EXISTING DEBT
constitutes value, 72.
PRESENTATION
instrument payable on, payable on demand, 47.
PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE–
when necessary, 201.
when bill payable after sight, 201.
when required to fix maturity, 201.
when bill expressly stipulates for, 201.
when bill not payable at drawee's place of business or resi
dence, 201.
not necessary when payable at day certain or at fixed time after
date, 201.
how made, 203.
must be by or on behalf of holder, 203.
must be on business day, 203.
must be at reasonable hour, 203.
must be before bill is overdue, 203.
must be to drawee or some person authorized to act for him, 203.
failure of, release drawer and indorsers when, 202.
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PRESENTMENT FOR ACCEPTANCE–Continued.
duty of agent to make, 202.
in case there are two or more payees not partners, 203.
in case drawee is dead, 203.
in case drawee is bankrupt or insolvent, 203.
on what days may be made, 204.
in case time is insufficient, 205.
When excused, 205-6.
drawee dead, 205.
drawee absconded, 205.
drawee fictitious person, 205.
drawee, no capacity to contract, 205.
When cannot be made after reasonable diligence, 206.
PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT—
necessary in order to charge drawer and indorsers, 129.
not necessary to charge party primarily liable, 129.
what constitutes sufficient, 133.
must be made on day of maturity, 131.
when instrument payable on demand, 131.
holder has entire day in which to make, 134.
place of, 135.
when payable at particular place, 129-130.
when instrument payable at bank, 137.
When instrument payable in instalments, 132.
to persons primarily liable as partners, 140.
to joint parties not partners, 140.
where principal debtor dead, 139.
where principal debtor has abandoned place of business, 136.
where principal debtor has changed his residence, 136.
how made to acceptor for honor, 217.
within what time check must be presented, 228.
effect of delay, 228.
when not required to charge indorser, 142.
when not required to charge drawer, 141.
instrument must be exhibited, 137.
when need not be exhibited, 137.
collaterals must be tendered with instrument, 137.
when delay of, excused, 142.
waiver of, 143.
- what will amount to, 143-144.
where drawee is fictitious person, 143.
When dispensed with, 142-143.
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PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT—Continued.
of instrument falling due on Sunday, 145.
of instrument falling due on holiday, 145.
of instrument falling due on Saturday, 145.
not necessary when bill has been dishonored by non-accept
ance, 207.
of instrument issued or negotiated when overdue, 48.
what sufficient evidence of authority to receive payment, 133.
PRIMARILY LIABLE
who is, 24.
PRINCIPAL
not liable unless his signature appears on instrument, 63.
PRINTED PROVISIONS–
yield to written provisions, 60.
PROCURATION
signature by, 67.
What is, 67.
PROMISSORY NOTE
defined, 225.
negotiability of, declared, 17.
“Bohemian Oats” notes, 44.
given for purchase price of goods, 39-40.
payable on or after death of maker, 44.
ambiguous instrument considered as bill on note, 60-61.
bill treated as, when, 190.
drawn to maker's own order, 225.
non-negotiable, 71-225.
whether import consideration, 71-225.
BROTEST
origin and meaning of term, 208.
construction of term, 167.
may be made in case of dishonor of any instrument, 171.
must be made only in case of foreign bills, 171-208.
how made, 209.
when to be made, 211.
must be annexed to bill, 209.
must be under hand of notary, 209.
must be under seal of notary, 209.
must specify time and place of presentment, 209.
must specify fact that presentment was made, 209.
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PROTEST-Continued.
must specify cause for protesting the bill, 209.
must Specify demand made and answer given, 209.
must specify manner of presentment, 209.
may be made by notary public, 210.
may be made by respectable resident, 210.
presentment must be made by notary himself, 210.
where made, 211.
when dispensed with, 213.
when delay in making excused, 213.
for better security, 212.
both for non-acceptance and non-payment, 212.
extending noting of, 211.
before maturity, where acceptor insolvent, 212.
of lost, destroyed or wrongly detained bill, 213.
of bill accepted for honor, 217.
QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE
effect of, 199.
holder need not take, 199.
agent cannot take, 200.
REASONABLE DILIGENCE
what constitutes, 168.
See Due Diligence.
REASONABLE HOUR
What is, 134.
REASONABLE TIME
what constitutes, 24.
in case of instrument payable on demand, 103.
instrument payable on demand must be presented within, 131.
when question of law, 133.
when question of fact, 133.
REFEREE IN CASE OF NEED, 191.
RENEWAL NOTES
as payment of old, 172-173.
RENUNCIATION
effect of, 180.
how made, 180.
REPEAL
laws repealed, 233.
INDEX. 297
The references are to pages.
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY
person indorsing in may negative personal liability, 93.
RESERVATION
of rights against Surety, 175.
SATURDAY
instrument falling due on, 145.
SEAL
does not affect negotiable character, 45.
Of corporation, 46.
necessity of in protest, 209.
SHORT TITLE
of negotiable instruments law, 23.
SIGHT
instrument payable at, payable on demand, 46-47.
SIGNATURE
form Of, 28.
no person liable whose signature does not appear on instrument, 63.
by agent, 64.
by procuration, 67.
forged, 68.
drawee’s admitted by acceptance, 117.
SOJOURNING
meaning of, 165.
SPOLIATION
effect of, 183.
STATUTE OF ANNE
text of, 18-20.
negotiability of promissory notes declared by, 19.
STRIKING OUT INDORSEMENT—
effect of, 95.
when may be done, 95.
SUM CERTAIN
what is, 34-5.
what is not, 35.
SUNDAY
instrument falling due on, 145.
when day for doing act falls on, 24.
SUNDRIES
instrument payable to, 52.
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TAXES
agreement for payment of in note, 42.
TENDER- -
ability and willingness at place of payment, equivalent to, 129,
when discharges party secondarily liable, 174.
TERMS
when sufficient, 53.
TIME
how computed, 24, 146.
when statute in effect, 25-26.
of indorsement, 93.
TITLE–
of act, 23.
when defective, 105.
burden of proof where title of prior party defective, 113.
warranty of where negotiation by delivery, 122.
warranty of where negotiation by qualified indorsement, 122.
where negotiation by general indorser, 125.
TRADE NAME
person signing in, 63.
UNCONDITIONAL PROMISE OR ORDER
what is, 28, 29, 38.
test of, 38.
order to pay out of particular fund is not, 38.
UNDER HIS HAND–
meaning of, 209.
USAGE
regard may be had to, to determine reasonable time, 24.
USURY
implied warranty that note is not void for, 123.
VALUE
meaning of term, 24.
what constitutes, 72.
pre-existing debt is, 72.
lien on instrument is, 77.
failure to specify does not affect negotiability, 45.
what constitutes holder for, 76.
VALUE RECEIVED–
words not necessary, 45.
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WAIVER
of presentment for payment, 143.
what Will amount to, 143-4.
of notice of dishonor, 165.
when embodied in instrument, 166.
When written above signature, 166.
of protest, what includes, 167.
of benefits of law by obligor, 42.
WARRANTY
where negotiation by delivery or qualified indorsement, 122.
of genuineness, 122.
not implied when, 123.
of capacity of prior parties, 122.
that instrument is not void for usury, 123.
not implied that paper is not accommodation paper, 124.
not implied that principal debtor, not insolvent, 123-124.
of general indorser,
of genuineness, 125.
that instrument is what it purports to be, 125.
that he has good title, 125.
capacity of prior parties, 125.
that instrument is valid and subsisting, 125.
in case instrument indorsed for collection, 125-126.
on sale of municipal bonds, 122-124.
WITHOUT RECOURSE
effect of term, 90.
equivalents of term, 90.
WRITING
includes print, 24.
may be in pencil, 28.
WRITTEN
includes printed, 24.
WRITTEN PROVISIONS
prevail over printed, 60.
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